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MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS BETWEEN TAIWANESE ENTERPRISES 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years merger and acquisition (M &A) activities have increasingly claimed 
the attention of government officials, company management and the public in 
Taiwan. The primary purpose of this study is to examine merger motives and 
methods of payment and to compare the pre- and post- transaction performance of 
Taiwanese enterprises. The samples of mergers and acquisitions in Taiwan analysed 
in this study are relatively comprehensive and are the largest which have ever been 
collected for academic reséarch. So the conclusions of this study have much greater 
validity than those found in previous work carried out on Taiwanese mergers. 
In brief, securing operational synergies is a very important merger motive for firms of 
all sizes. Large enterprises are motivated to take -over other firms by the desire to 
acquire market share while increasing corporate debt capacity or financing was more 
important for small acquiring enterprises than for large ones. Payment is made either 
by means of a cash offer or by an exchange of shares depending on tax and 
government regulations, the future prospects of the acquiring enterprise as perceived 
by the acquired enterprise's shareholders and the level of activity of the stock market. 
The results indicate that large and medium -sized acquiring enterprises achieve greater 
increases in their post- transaction operational and financial performance than do small 
and small- medium sized acquiring enterprises. The results of logit analysis indicate 
that profitability and changes in profitability are important variables for discriminating 
between acquired and non -acquired firms. The findings mean that firms with lower 
profitability have a significantly increased probability of being taken -over, but that 
smaller firms do not see a significant increase in the likelihood of being acquired. This 
implies that take -over discipline is strong for low profitability firms but is not strong 
for small firms. The take -over threat forces firms to improve their profitability rather 
than to increase their size. The empirical evidence as to the nature of the take -over 
mechanism of acquired firms supports the traditional theory of the firm. 
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1.1 BACKGROUND TO, AND MOTIVATION FOR, THE STUDY 
With 20 million people living in 36,000 square kilometres, Taiwan is one of the most 
densely populated areas of the world.1 The average economic growth rate between 
1953 and 1990 was 8.7 %.2 In 1990, the per capita gross national product was US $ 
8,111 and the gross national savings rate was 29.33 %.3 In combination, these features 
of the Taiwanese economic landscape offer enterprises opportunities to expand. The 
nature of the tax system means that enterprises are likely to consist of many small 
companies so as to minimise income tax liability. For example, the operational net 
income tax rate on enterprises was up to 50% for the largest companies in 1953. 
When these tax advantages do not apply (e.g. operating income before income tax 
above NT$ 100,000 pay 25% corporate income tax in 1990)4, different fiinis in the 
same business group typically apply for the merger. In 1990, there were 818,061 
enterprises and 97.16% of them could be classified as small or medium sized.5 
Following the Uruguay Round Trade Talks agreement of 1994, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) was set up in January 1995 to replace the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) so as to further the liberalisation of international trade. 
After many years of Taiwanese economic development and capital formation, the 
scale of Taiwanese enterprises has gradually enlarged. The stock market has 
developed significantly. As enterprises face stronger domestic and international 
competition, the operational environment has become very challenging. To 
encourage small and medium size companies to merge or consolidate so as to 
promote more efficient managerial and operational practices, the government 
currently offers many tax benefits to profit -seeking enterprises (Article 13 of the 
Statute for Upgrading Industries). 
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Between 1990 and 1995, the Taiwanese economy experienced a period of fluctuating 
development following many years of economic growth. In recent years merger and 
acquisition (M &A) activities have increasingly claimed the attention of government 
officials, company management and the public. The government favours larger 
business units in the belief that this will help the economy in the face of growing 
international competition. Business managers look to acquiring firms to increase their 
firm's size as the least costly method of securing external growth. Shareholders of 
acquired and acquiring firms hope to profit from these transactions. Mergers and 
take -overs are flourishing and have considerable significance and importance. 
Despite this few studies have been conducted to research and explain this kind of 
activity. 
Almost all previous empirical research has focused on descriptive characterisations 
of merger motives and the post- transaction performance of Taiwanese enterprises 
using univariate tests on limited samples. Wu, C. M. (1984)6 and Chen, C. R. (1990)' 
used a case study (one or two cases) to analyse merger motives. The results of course, 
are specific and can not be applied to the population as a whole. Huang (1977)8, 
Chang (1980)9, Wu, Y. C. (1982)1° and Lin (1990)11 used questionnaires to collect 
data but the questions were not based on theories of motives for mergers and 
acquisitions so that it is difficult to use the results to validate the theory. Most of the 
studies have not used inferential statistical tests to examine the generality of their 
results. The findings of the studies are sometimes unclear and sometimes 
contradictory. 
The motives for mergers and acquisitions are a very important issue. Many merger 
motives are presented, and some of them have perplexed economists and the general 
public for many years. Can we identify the structures underpinning the motives for 
mergers and acquisitions so as to elucidate some of their fundamental factors? The 
preferred method of payment is one of the important considerations shaping how 
mergers and acquisitions are negotiated. However, very few Taiwanese studies 
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address this issue. In addition, the previous literature relating to performance 
comparisons between acquired and/or acquiring firms has not considered the 
implications for the theory of the firm. As a result there are difficulties in gauging the 
efficiency of the merger and take -over mechanism. Thus there is a need for a more 
rigorous and complete investigation into merger and take -over activities amongst 
Taiwanese enterprises. This study attempts to advance previous empirical research by 
means of a comprehensive questionnaire survey and the analysis of financial data 
relating to a very large sample of companies involved in acquisitions. It examines 
merger motives, methods of payment, and the pre- and post- transaction performance 
comparisons of Taiwanese enterprises. Unlike most previous studies it uses both 
univariate and multivariate analyses. As far as is known, the samples analysed in this 
study are the first comprehensive samples of mergers and acquisitions in Taiwan that 
have ever been collected for academic study. The databases are thus the largest ever 
assembled by a considerable margin and so allow particular insights into the motives 
and effects of mergers and acquisitions in Taiwan. The result is that the conclusions 
of this study have much greater validity than any previous work carried out on 
Taiwanese mergers by any other researcher. 
1.2 THE SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
Why should one team of managers wish to take -over the resources of another firm? A 
number of hypotheses have been proposed to explain why mergers and acquisitions 
occur. The principal ones relate to efficiency, information and signalling, free cash 
flow, market power, tax considerations, and to agency problems. Do all of these 
hypotheses apply to Taiwan? Does Taiwan possess some special and unique 
characteristics which contribute to shaping the mergers and acquisitions process? For 
example, previous empirical studies indicate that tax considerations are not a 
statistically significant merger motive for Taiwanese enterprises (Chang, 198012; Wu, 
Y. C. 198213; Lin, K. C., 199014; Li, L. C., 199115; Wu, A. N., 199216; Yang, 199617). 
This is a puzzling finding. If firms are not motivated by tax considerations, why then 
do they apply for special governmental approval for merger and consolidation? If 
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they are not overly concerned with obtaining tax exemptions or deductions, they can 
always merge without governmental say -so and so save themselves the time and 
resources needed to get approval. There are many motives or factors which may 
influence the decision to merge. Fang (1990)18 and Lin (1990)19 separately find four 
main dimensions which relate to the motives or reasons for mergers and acquisitions 
of Taiwanese enterprises over the periods 1979 -1988 and 1985 -1989. Can we 
identify the same or different fundamental constructs to explain merger motives in 
association with other variables? To what extent does each variable affect the 
acquisition decision? These are questions that are ripe for research. 
In the negotiation of a proposed merger or take -over, one of the most important 
considerations is the main method of payment. The final choice influences the returns 
to the stockholders of both the acquiring and acquired firms. Previous empirical 
research focuses mainly on a comparison of stockholders' returns between acquiring 
and acquired firms (Jensen and Ruback, 198320; Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter, 198821; 
and Trifts, 199122) or on the method of payment (e.g. cash offer or stock exchange) 
which generally results in larger excess returns (Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 198323; 
Huang and Walkling, 198724; Travlos, 198725; Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 198726; and 
Franks, Harris, and Mayer, 198827; Peterson and Peterson, 199128; Trifts, 199129; Lo, 
19913°; Sung, 199331). Based on the main methods of payment, this study aims to 
extend the analysis to consider the films' pre- transaction sizes, changes in assets, and 
the association between the main methods of payment and the estimated values of the 
acquired enterprises. The aim is to further our understanding of the characteristics of 
Taiwanese enterprises' mergers and acquisitions. 
Theoretically speaking, mergers and take -overs are an important mechanism in 
capitalist economies. It is alleged that the threat of a merger or take -over forces 
managers to improve their performance and hence to achieve better profitability 
(Manne, 196532; Marris, 196333). A merger or take -over offers a company an 
excellent opportunity to restructure its organisation and to reallocate its resources. 
This may improve the efficiency and profitability of the combined company. Thus, we 
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need to understand the characteristics of mergers and take -overs in Taiwanese 
enterprises prior to their completion. This study focuses on two main issues. Firstly, 
the nature of the merger and take -over selection process is analysed. Do the target 
firms differ from the bidding or non -transaction ones in tenus of size, profitability and 
liquidity? Secondly, does the merger and take -over mechanism conform to the theory 
of profit maximisation? If the theory cannot explain the occurrence, can we draw on 
other theories or assumptions to properly account for the empirical results? 
The combination of two companies poses many questions about the post- transaction 
performance of the company. When a bidding firm merges with another company, is 
its post- transaction performance better than its previous performance? On average, 
large enterprises have greater capital, higher production scales and greater market 
share. Thus, they have better opportunities than small firms to improve their operating 
performances. Does the size of a company's assets influence its post- transaction 
performance? If bidding and target films are in the same business group, the terms of 
a transaction are easier to achieve than if they are not (Fang, 1990).34 Does the ease of 
forging a contract within a business group result in better or worse post- perfolluance 
than for a firm which does not belong to the same group? 
Shelton (1988)35 finds that related -supplementary or identical business mergers 
provide significant chances for value creation whereas unrelated mergers offer the 
least opportunities to generate value. Fang (1990)36 and Yang (1996)37 show that 
horizontal transaction enterprises have much better post- transaction performance than 
other types of transactions in Taiwan. However, Singh and Montgomery (1987)38 
indicate that acquiring firms which engage in related acquisitions do not have 
significantly or abnormally higher returns than firms in unrelated acquisitions. 
Agrawal et al. (1992)39 consider that non -conglomerate mergers result in significantly 
inferior performance than conglomerate mergers over the post- merger period. 
However, Jensen (1986)40 argues that conglomerate mergers are less likely to succeed 
because the acquiring firm's managers are not familiar with their acquired firm. Is 
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there any relationship between the type of a merger or take -over and the post - 
transaction performance in Taiwanese enterprise? 
Even though managers can invoke any number of reasons as to why they need to 
acquire another company, do these arguments justify all transactions? Some merger 
motives make economic sense but a few seem more dubious. This study aims to relate 
the importance of different motives for mergers and acquisitions to resulting post - 
transaction performance to tease out the empirical reality. The differential efficiency 
theory assumes that if the bidding film enjoys superior operating achievements 
relative to the target firm, and if the target firm's operating achievements are 
improved up to the level of the bidding firm following the transaction, then efficiency 
will be increased by the merger. Can we indicate a significantly positive correlation 
between the pre- transaction performance of acquiring firms relative to acquired furls 
and the post- transaction performance of Taiwanese enterprises? 
Mitchell (1988)41 finds that a clash of corporate cultures is the first and most 
important reason why mergers fail. The other reasons are because the target firm's top 
management quits and the company has been bought at the wrong time in its 
corporate life cycle, etc.. Lin (1990)42 shows assets and goodwill valuation and 
corporate integration are the most difficult problems during the transaction process 
period. We try to answer questions such as how many transaction process problems 
are encountered over the course of the acquisition? Which of these teething problems 
are most significant? How do they have a measurable impact on the post- transaction 
performance? These issues are interesting to explore, and are described separately in 
the chapters that follow. 
1.3 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
In this study the terms "merger ", "acquisition" and "take- over" are used 
interchangeably. However, for some purposes, it is necessary to distinguish among 
these forms of business combination. 
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Merger: The combination of two or more firms to form a single firm, such that only 
one of the firms continues to exist after the combination (Articles 317 and 398 of 
Company Law). 
Consolidation: The combination of two or more firms to form a single firm, such that 
all the firms are dissolved with the combination and a new company is incorporated 
instead (Articles 317 and 398 of Company Law). 
Acquisition of Stock: A corporate acquisition of stock is the purchase by one 
company (the bidder or acquiring fiüu) of all, or a substantial part of, the securities of 
the target firm. 
Acquisition of Assets: A corporate acquisition of assets is the purchase by one 
company (the bidder or acquiring firm) of all, or a substantial part of, the assets of the 
target firm (Article 185 of Company Law). 
Takeover: The acquisition, including stock and assets, of one company by another. 
Horizontal transaction: A combination of two or more firms that produce the same 
type of good or service. 
Congeneric transaction: A combination of firms within the same general industry, but 
for which no customer or supplier relationship exists. 
Vertical transaction: A combination between a fine and one of its suppliers or 
customers. 
Conglomerate transaction: A combination of companies coming from totally 
different industries. 
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Business group: A group of interrelated companies which noinially consists of one 
parent company and a number of subsidiary and/or associated companies which are 
partially owned by the parent company. 
1.4 ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY 
The framework of this study is arranged as follows. This first chapter is the 
introduction which includes the background, motivation, scope and objectives of 
the study, definition of terms, and the organisation and contribution of the study. 
Chapter 2 explains the research sample and design which include research sample, 
data collection, questionnaire and experimental design, pilot work, and 
questionnaire survey. The third chapter describes the characteristics of Taiwanese 
acquiring and acquired enterprises. In this and the following five chapters data 
collected by means of questionnaires are analysed. The third chapter outlines the 
data collected including the industrial classification of merging firms, transaction 
years, business group, form of merger and acquisition, type of transaction, 
proportion of transactions which are friendly, and total assets before or after each 
transaction. 
Chapter four focuses on the theoretical and empirical literature relating to the 
motives for mergers and acquisitions. It considers alternative theoretical rationales 
for mergers and acquisitions in terms of efficiency theories, infoimation and 
signalling, market power, tax considerations, stock market consideration, agency 
problems and free market flow. In the fifth chapter the empirical study of the 
motives for mergers in Taiwanese enterprises is outlined. The primary aim of the 
chapter is to explain the relative importance of the different motives held by 
acquiring firms for their transactions (classified both as four subgroups and as a 
totality), the motives classified by business group and type of transaction, the 
correlation between the importance of the motives and the size of the acquiring 
enterprises before each transaction and the change in assets after the merger. 
Finally, a factor analysis of all variables relating to the motives for mergers is 
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analysed. In chapter 6, details of the main methods of payment for mergers and 
acquisitions are given. This covers, firstly theoretical and empirical studies of 
methods of payment for mergers and acquisitions, secondly the differences 
between the pre- transaction sizes of acquiring firms and different methods of 
payment, and thirdly the differences between the increase in assets after transaction 
and the method of valuation of the acquired enterprise, for different methods of 
payment. 
Chapters 7 and 8 explore the post- transaction performance of acquiring enterprises 
using univariate and multivariate analysis, respectively. They contain the post - 
transaction performance of acquiring enterprises classified by size, business group 
and type of transaction. They deal with the correlation between the motives for 
merging and post- transaction performance; the correlation between the pre - 
transaction performance of the acquiring enterprise relative to that of the acquired 
enterprise and the post- transaction performance of the acquiring enterprise; and the 
relationship between transaction process problems and post- transaction 
performance. 
Chapters 9 and 10 use the financial statement data set to discuss and compare pre - 
transaction size and performance. Chapter 9 includes a review of the relevant 
theoretical and empirical literature; variables, hypotheses and samples; independent 
and paired sample t -tests for average size and operating and financial performance 
over the year prior to the transaction year. In chapter 10, five logit models are used 
to examine firm size, profitability, liquidity and growth between acquired and non - 
acquired firms, between acquired and acquiring firms, between acquired and non - 
transaction finds, and between acquiring and non -transaction films. Finally, 
conclusions are presented in chapter 11 including a consideration of the limitations 
of the research and suggestions for future research. 
1.5 THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIS STUDY 
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This study, drawing on theoretical rationales for mergers and acquisitions, engages in 
empirical research into Taiwanese enterprises over the period 1990 -1995. It attempts 
to further our understanding of mergers and take -overs using questionnaire data 
which has been collected from a relatively large sample of companies and using 
financial data relating to a large proportion of Taiwanese companies. Thus, this thesis 
makes the following contributions to the theoretical debate and also offers some 
suggestions to both enterprises and government departments. 
1. The relatively large sample and the in -depth analysis resolve some of the puzzling 
features of tax and stock market considerations as they relate to Taiwanese 
enterprises, which other studies have not resolved despite many years of research. 
The results indicate that the merger motives of either securing a listing on the stock 
market or tax considerations were very important for only a few companies in 
Taiwan in the 1990s. 
2. The relative importance of different motives for mergers varies with the size of the 
acquiring firms. The four subgroups identified by this study, classified by the size of 
their total assets before the transaction, provide further inforniation about the merger 
motives of differently sized acquiring firms. In brief, securing operational synergy was 
a very important merger motive for firms of all sizes. Large enterprises were 
motivated to take -over other films by the desire to acquire market share indicating that 
the Fair Trade Commission still needs to note or investigate whether the merger 
process has involved films in any improper business activity as a consequence of their 
market standing. 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or financing was more important for small 
acquiring enterprises than for large ones. These results are similar to those found in 
previous studies (Teng and Chen, 197943; Liao, 198544; Liu, 199345; Li, Chen, and 
Chang, 199346) i.e. that small acquiring enterprises encounter relatively greater 
financing problems than do large companies. Although the Statute for Development of 
Medium and Small Business is intended to help provide financial facilities, loans and 
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guarantees to medium and small businesses, smaller businesses still face significant 
financial hurdles. This indicates that the Statute for Development of Medium and 
Small Business is not completely successful in meeting its aims. 
3. The results show that the cases and amounts of tax exemption (Business Income 
Tax, Stamp Tax, Deed Tax) due to implementation of the Statute for Encouragement 
of Investment or the Statute for Upgrading Industries were few between 1990 to 1995. 
The cases and amounts of Land Value Increment Tax were large but this tax can be 
deferred and is paid by the acquiring enterprise at the time the land is subsequently 
transferred. If the firm does not merge with another it cannot enjoy these tax benefits 
since the government only exempt the taxes payable when a merger has taken place. 
This policy is not a subsidy or tax reduction as such. The government takes a neutral 
role, overseeing a policy which is to ensure that resources are not wastefully 
distributed. 
4. Where both the acquiring and acquired film belong to the same business group, the 
acquiring firm is motivated by the wish to achieve operating synergy, tax advantages, 
free cash flow and improve management efficiencies. The results indicate that if firms 
belong to the same business group, they may have more and better information by 
which to accurately assess the merger's advantages. If they find the transaction is 
beneficial for the acquiring and/or acquired firms, the merger gets the go- ahead. If the 
acquiring and acquired firm do not belong to the same business group, the acquiring 
firm is more significantly motivated to increase its market power than are acquiring 
firms which belong to the same business group. This finding indicates that if firms do 
not belong to the same business group, their merger motive is chiefly concerned with 
the market power of Taiwanese enterprises. So the Fair Trade Commission still needs 
to observe the combination to judge whether it affects the interests of consumers and 
ensures fair competition. 
5. A factor analysis of merger motives identifies that improving management 
efficiency, market control and new product introduction, finance and stock market 
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considerations are important constructs which affect acquisition decisions. These 
factors were not consistent with Fang's (1990), Lin's (1990) and Yang's (1996) 
results and this research helps us to understand the motives for mergers in Taiwanese 
enterprises over the period 1990 -1995. 
7. For Taiwanese enterprises' mergers and acquisitions the most common payment 
method was by `common stock'. Payment is made either by means of a cash offer or by 
an exchange of shares depending on three considerations. The first consideration is tax 
and government regulations. The second consideration is the future prospects of the 
acquiring enterprise as perceived by the acquired enterprise's shareholders. The third 
consideration is the level of activity of the stock market. If a transaction involves 
equity securities, capital gains taxes may be deferred until the new securities are sold, 
while for cash transactions, all income should be paid in the year of the transaction 
(Article 14 of Income Tax Law). Thus, tax regulations will significantly affect the 
preferred payment method. 
8. The average pre- transaction assets of the acquiring fi is which used common stock 
as the main method of payment were significantly greater than those of the acquiring 
films which used cash from reserves as the main method of payment. This indicates 
that (1) if acquiring firms have a greater value of assets, they prefer to use common 
stock as the main payment method or the shareholders of the acquired firms prefer to 
ask for a common stock exchange rather than a cash offer. (2) the acquired enterprise's 
shareholders perceive or predict that large acquiring enterprise may have better future 
prospects. (3) if the acquiring firm uses a cash from reserves as the main payment 
method, then as cash availability is limited so the bidding firm tends to be relatively 
small. This result implies that the pre- transaction assets of the acquiring firms will 
influence the method of payment. 
9. The average change in assets of acquiring firms in each transaction using common 
stock as the main method of payment was significantly greater than that of acquiring 
firms using cash from reserves or cash from borrowings as the main method of 
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payment. This implies that the exchange of common stock offers greater funds to the 
acquiring firm in the acquisition of a new firm than does a cash offer. 
10. On the issue of payment methods, there was a significant negative association 
between acquiring enterprises paying with cash from reserves and their using book 
value to estimate the value of their acquired enterprises. However, there was a 
significant positive association between payment with cash from reserves and the use 
of replacement cost and/or cash flow value as the valuation method. There was a 
significant positive association between the use of cash from borrowings to pay for the 
acquisition and the use of replacement cost and cash flow value to estimate the worth 
of the acquired enterprise. These findings imply that banks are highly likely to offer 
funds to acquiring films if they use replacement cost value or cash flow value 
estimation method to gauge the value of the target. 
Book value is not a good measure of the true value of a firm's assets because it is 
based on their historical cost. This value may drop far below actual asset values when 
there is rapid inflation and book value often overlooks the value of intangible assets. A 
book value estimation suggests an apparent underestimation of the value of the 
acquired fiiiu so a target firm's shareholders is not likely to accept the cash offer. This 
result is similar to that found by Hansen (1987).47 Hansen concluded that when a 
target firm knows its value better than a bidding fiiiii does, the acquiring firm will 
prefer to use a share.-for-share exchange rather than a cash offer. In contrast, the 
replacement cost value estimation is a more accurate indication of present market 
prices. In these circumstances, the target firm's shareholders are more likely to accept 
the cash offer. 
11. The results indicate that large and medium -sized acquiring enterprises achieve 
greater increases in their post- transaction operational and financial performance than 
do small and small- medium sized acquiring enterprises. That is, the greater the size of 
the acquiring firm the better its post- transaction performance improvement will be. 
Why do large acquiring firms in Taiwan achieve better operational and financial 
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performances after the transaction? In general, large enterprises have greater capital, 
higher production scales and greater market share. Thus, they may have greater 
opportunities to achieve operational and financial synergies than small enterprises 
have. Considering operational synergy, most of the mergers and acquisitions in 
Taiwan are horizontal (see Table 3 -6 -1) so they are more likely than other types of 
merger to yield operational synergy. Large enterprises have greater capital so they find 
it comparatively easy to enlarge their production scale, obtain economies of scale and 
ensure more earnings per dollar of investment. In the case of financial synergy, large 
enterprises have better goodwill and credit so they find it comparatively easy to raise 
funds and increase their debt capacity, and even to gain lower interest rates from 
banks or the money market. Turning to marketing synergy, on the whole, one would 
expect that large enterprises have greater market share and market power, and so have 
greater opportunities for collaborative activity. The anticompetitive activities of 
mutual dealing or tie -in sales result in market power -related gains (Lone and Halpern, 
1970).48 These results are similar to those found in a previous empirical study of 
Taiwan (Lin, 1990).49 
12. The results indicate that if firms do not belong to the same business group, 
acquiring firms achieve better perceived performance improvement after the 
transaction than those which belong to the same business group. Lin (1990)50 found a 
similar result but it was not statistically significant. 
One possible explanation for these results is that if acquiring and acquired firms do 
not belong to the same business group, the acquiring firm is better able to replace 
inefficient managers, lay off unnecessary employees, and increase the market power 
after the transaction than those firms which belong to the same business group. Many 
members of a business group's management in Taiwan are made up of family or 
relatives. If one person is the chairperson or general manager of the large company, 
his /her family (spouse and children) or his /her relatives (brother or sister) will be 
amongst the management of the other small companies. These business group 
companies can help each other, especially with financial guarantees and assistance. 
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But if the family or relatives do not have the same or superior management ability, the 
small companies will display a performance consistent with poorer management. 
When firms merge, an acquiring firm can usually replace the incompetent managers 
but this is seldom the case when family or relatives are involved. 
The other possible explanation for these results is that if acquiring and acquired firms 
do not belong to the same business group, the acquiring firm needs to raise the 
transaction money either from the firm's shareholders or from a bank or the money 
market so it has to present good reasons as to why the transaction is reasonable and 
profitable to the public, shareholders or the bank. If the transaction is approved by the 
shareholders or bank, it indicates that not only do the acquiring firm's managers 
believe in the reliability and profitability of this transaction but that this faith is shared 
by the shareholders, bankers and investors. These careful preparations and 
considerations increase the probability that the acquiring firm will achieve its goal and 
achieve a better post- transaction performance. 
13. The results indicate that amongst Taiwanese enterprises horizontal post - 
transaction performance is much better than for transactions of other types. The 
results were similar to those found in previous empirical studies in Taiwan (Fang, 
199051; Yang, 199652). A number of reasons are apparent for this behaviour. Firstly, it 
is easier for such firms to increase their sales or enlarge their services, to take 
advantage of economies of scale and to grab greater market share or market power 
than would be the case with conglomerate and vertical transactions. Secondly, the 
horizontal transaction firm's management are familiar with the products, distribution 
channels, production techniques and organisational characteristics. These managers 
are more likely to be able to exploit these advantages to improve their firms' levels of 
profit and profit rates than are the management of other transactions' firms. 
14. About 11 -14% and 14 -16% of the acquiring firms indicated that their pre - 
transaction levels of profit and profit rate performances were inferior or very inferior 
to those of the acquired enterprises. Article 75 of Company Law states "A continuing 
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company or a new company created by merger or consolidation shall succeed to all 
the rights, powers and privileges of the merged or consolidated company ". The Inland 
Revenue Service recognises that after the transaction the continuing company can 
cover its net losses for the preceding five years but it cannot absorb the net losses of 
the merged or consolidated company for the preceding five years.53 Some companies 
utilising this net losses regulation, nominate the net losses company as the continuing 
firm and the net incomes company as the merged firm, so as to take advantage of the 
tax deduction. Soon after the transaction is completed, the acquiring firm (originally 
the net losses company) applies to change the company name to the acquired firm's 
name (originally the net incomes company) so as to trade with the better and/or more 
famous company name. The Inland Revenue Service knows of this manoeuvre but 
does not want to change its regulations. It is afraid of losing revenue if the net 
incomes company should always try to acquire a net losses company to exploit the tax 
deduction advantage. This explains why 11 -14% and 14 -16% of acquiring firms' pre - 
transaction levels of profit and profit rate perfoimances are inferior or very inferior to 
those of acquired enterprises. 
15. The more important the motive of increased market 
the acquiring firm will enjoy superior net sales, gross profits, and price /earning ratio 
performance after the transaction. A film can increase its market share after a 
horizontal merger. Increasing market share means increasing the size of the firm 
relative to other firms in an industry. This result indicates that the combined film can 
exercise its influence over the price and output in a particular market. Samuels et al. 
(1994)54 mention that the higher the level of concentration in an industry, the greater 
are the levels of profit. If a fiiiu can dictate the conditions of the sale of its product or 
it has the ability to act as a price leader, or it can deter other firms' entry, or is able to 
make persistent super -normal profits, then it is highly likely to increase its net sales, 
gross profits and its price /earning ratio perfoimance after the transaction. The results 
are consistent with the conclusions of Singh and Montgomery (1987)55 and Seth 
(1990)56 who found that increased market power can earn super normal profits. 
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16. The results of this study show that having merger motives of acquiring brand 
marks, patents or copyright technologies and of combining complementary resources 
negatively affect the chance that the acquiring firm will achieve superior post - 
transaction operating income performance and vice versa, i.e. as those particular 
motives become less relevant, the likelihood of improved post- transaction 
performance increases. The results indicate that when the acquiring firm wishes to 
exploit the brand marks, patents or copyright technologies of the acquired firm, it 
does not achieve its expected gains. Sales and administrative expenses and/or research 
and development costs may increase rather than decrease and so result in poorer 
operating incomes. The same outcome may be experienced by the acquiring firm 
when its motive is to combine complementary resources but it cannot achieve its 
expected goal. This may result from an over -optimism in evaluating the merger's 
advantages and/or an overestimation of the value of the brand marks, patents or 
copyright technologies and of combining complementary resources. Roll (1986)57 
points out that if there are no gains in acquisition, hubris provides an explanation as to 
why managers do not abandon these acquisitions or reflect on why their bids' 
valuation are wrong. 
17. The analysis of the financial data indicates that acquiring firms are bigger and 
more profitable than their targets. The results match those found by Singh (1975) and 
Cosh et al. (1980 and 1989). This indicates that acquiring firms are normally large 
and profitable; they have sufficient funds or access to credit (e.g. borrowing from 
banks or financial institutions) to afford to merge with or take -over smaller and less 
profitable firms. The take -over mechanism can thus act as an efficient means by those 
firms who can effectively reallocate and make better use of resources. This situation is 
consistent with the theory of the firm with films aiming to maximise profits. 
The extraordinarily high average current ratio of the acquired firms indicates that 
they have relatively high current assets (or relatively low current liabilities) 
compared to those of non -transaction firms. The result indicates that managers would 
like to hold more net current assets within the film. Greater levels of current assets in 
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the firm mean that managers have more resources under their control, and have little 
difficulty in paying their short term liabilities. At the same time, high current assets 
attracts raiders and may act as an important pre- condition for take -over. The 
relatively high liquidity (current ratio) may explain why acquired firms are easy 
targets for acquiring firms. 
18. The results of logistic regression analysis indicate that profitability, and change in 
profitability are important variables for discriminating between acquired and non - 
acquired finis. The results mean that fines with lower profitability have a 
significantly increased probability of being taken -over, but that smaller firms do not 
see a significant increase in the probability of being acquired. This implies that take- 
over discipline is strong for low profitability films but is not strong for small films. 
The take -over threat forces firms to improve their profitability rather than to increase 
their size. Empirical evidence as to the nature of the take -over mechanism of acquired 
fines supports the traditional theory of the 
19. The result of logistic regression analysis also suggests that size is a significant 
variable in identifying the differences between acquired and acquiring firms, and is an 
important consideration in take -overs. Smaller size increases a firm's probability of 
becoming a target rather than an acquiring firm. This result is not consistent with 
Singh's (1975) finding. He found that size, followed by change in profitability and 
level of profitability were the most important discriminators between acquired and 
acquiring firms. The result is consistent, however, with the findings of Cosh et al. 
(1989). They found that size was the most important discriminator but that 
profitability was not significant in discriminating between acquired and acquiring 
firms. The traditional approach of the theory of the firm assumes that producers aim to 
maximise profits. The low profitability firm will be replaced by the high profitability 
firm. The empirical evidence about the nature of the take -over mechanism of acquired 
firms does not support the traditional theory of the firm. 
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20. Size and growth are important variables in distinguishing between acquiring and 
non -transaction firms in logistic regression analysis. The acquiring firms have 
significantly greater size and growth than non -transaction firms but profitability is not 
different. This indicates that the acquiring firm's managers would like to pursue 
growth rather than profitability. It may imply that the managers of the acquiring firm 
prefer to have greater power and influence in the company, earn prestige in the society 
and achieve self -actualisation, and satisfy shareholders need rather than increase 
profits. The phenomenon of the acquiring firm's managers just attempting to achieve a 
normal level of profitability but with a priority for increases in size and growth is more 
like satisficing behaviour and is consistent with the implications of managerial 
theories of firm e.g. Marris (1964)58, Baumol (1959)59, etc. 
21. The results of logistic regression analysis indicate that curvilinear (non -linear) 
characteristics exist between acquired and non -acquired firms and between acquired 
and non -transaction firms, especially with regard to liquidity. This indicates that as a 
firm's liquidity increases, the likelihood of it being an acquired firm increases. 
However when a firm's liquidity reaches a large value, the likelihood of becoming an 
acquired firm will decrease. The possible explanations for the result are that: (1) The 
same business or family group. The high current ratio firms are controlled by the 
same business or family group so these firms have relatively high exemption to being 
taken -over. (2) No stock market listing or active market in the shares exists. The 
comparative high current ratio firms are not listed company or do not have an active 
market so bidding firm do not have opportunity to acquire their shares. (3) 
Government regulation or industrial requirement. The government regulates banks or 
other financial institutions which need to hold a high reserve ratio to ensure solvency. 
' Monthly Statistics of The Republic of China, Directorate -General of the Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics, Executive Yuan, The Republic of China, No. 377, June 1997, p. 7. 
2 Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1994, Council for Economic Planning and Development, Republic of 
China, June 1994, p. 27. Monthly Statistics of The Republic of China, Directorate -General of the 
Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, The Republic of China, No. 377, June 1997, p. 7. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The ordering of the research design processes was as follows. First, the specific aim 
was decided: the study of Taiwanese enterprises' mergers and acquisitions. The 
relevant theory and literature were then reviewed. From this, a set of hypotheses 
were formulated and the in' foimation needed to test the hypotheses decided upon. 
Two methods of capturing this information were chosen: questionnaires and 
financial statements. This chapter discusses only the questionnaires; the details of 
the financial statements are discussed in chapter 9. The questions to be contained in 
the questionnaires were constructed and the method of administration, by post 
decided on. The research time period was decided and the lists of companies which 
have been involved in the merger and acquisition activities compiled. A pilot survey 
was then conducted to make sure that the questionnaire worked and yielded the data 
required. The field work was then carried out. 
The statement of hypotheses is considered in a later chapter when different aspects 
of merger and acquisition activity are separately considered. This chapter describes 
in Section 2, the research samples relating to the lists of companies which have been 
involved in merger and acquisition activities between 1990 and 1995. In Section 3, 
the reasons for using postal questionnaires as a primary research instrument are 
explored. Section 4 describes the questionnaire and experimental design. Section 5 
reviews the pilot work and Section 6 the questionnaire survey. Finally Section 7 
draws a brief conclusion. 
2.2 RESEARCH SAMPLE 
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The sample for the study consists of two parts, mergers (including consolidations) 
and take -overs. The mergers data originates mainly from the Department of 
Commerce and the Bureau of Industrial Affairs of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs (MEA), and from the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Ministry 
of Finance of The Republic of China (ROC). The take -over cases originated 
primarily from the Data Base Centre of the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) Co., 
Ltd. The identity of a few take -over cases within the sample emerged from 
telephone interviews, business enterprises' prospectuses /annual reports, and 
completed questionnaires. Owing to the practical difficulties of collecting non- 
public offering companies' financial statements, the Data Base Centre of TEJ only 
collects the consolidated financial statements of listing companies and some public 
offerings. According to government regulations, if a company holds over 50% of 
the shares in another company and the subsidiary company's total assets and net 
sales amount to over 10% of those of the parent company, the parent company 
must present a consolidated financial statement to indicate its financial situation 
and its operational outcome. Between 1989 and 1995, 243 listing companies and 
147 public offering companies presented a consolidated financial statement to the 
Inland Revenue Service. A check of the parent and subsidiary companies from 
these consolidated financial statements indicated that the parent company typically 
sets up and holds 51% to 99% of shares in the new subsidiary company. Foreign 
business merger or take -over events are excluded. The data sources are shown in 
Table 2 -2 -1. The total sample includes 331 merger and take -over cases. 
Almost all films involved in a merger or an acquisition during the period 1990 -95 
have been identified and included.' The period 1990 -1995 is studied for four 
reasons. Firstly, it is very difficult to collect merger cases from any source apart 
from government records and government records only identify 3 merger cases 
which were transacted prior to 1990. The private data banks only collect limited 
data and except for large and important cases, newspapers do not report merger 
events. Secondly, it is difficult to discover the motives for mergers which occurred 
before the data collection period because the respondent may not remember or 
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know the reasons. Thirdly, it takes time for the influence of a merger to become 
apparent. If the acquiring film has one to five years to observe the merger's effect, 
the results may be more fully assessed. Fourthly, Taiwan's economic development 
and industrial structure have significantly changed during the 1980s. For example, 
gross national product increased from US $ 41,369 million in 1980 to US $ 
164,076 million in 1990 and to US $ 275,144 million in 1995.2 Agriculture was an 
important industry in the 1950s and 1960s in Taiwan. But Services have become 
the largest industry and produce 54.6% of GDP in 1990 and 60.2% in 1995. The 
share of GDP produced by Agriculture and Industry was 4.2% and 41.2% 
respectively in 1990, and 3.6% and 36.2% respectively in 1995.3 The changed 
economic development and industrial structure may have various effects. Since the 
total population of merger and take -over cases is so small, it was necessary to 
collect as many cases as possible to conduct a statistical analysis. 
2.3 DATA COLLECTION 
The sample contained 17 listing and 17 public offering merger cases (acquiring 
company). The other cases were non -public offering companies and are not required 
to publish their financial statements. In Taiwan, a financial statement typically 
contains confidential information about that company and, hence, is difficult for a 
researcher to collect. However, balance sheets may be obtained from some private 
companies. The difficulty of obtaining financial statements means that some merger 
information may not be clearly indicated by the financial data. As a result it was 
decided to use a Postal questionnaire as the primary research instrument with the 
collection of financial data to gain further information. 
2.4 THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The questions within the questionnaire were suggested, in part, by reference to 
earlier and similar research, by consulting with experts (including chartered 
accountants, lawyers, management consultants, and government officials), and 
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experienced academic researchers, and by my own knowledge of Taiwan's 
economic environment. Rating scales are used in some questions (questions 7, 10, 
12, 13, 14, and 15) to collect as much infouuation as possible on respondents 
attitudes at the highest order level of measurement possible. Each scale ranges 
from "very important" to "fairly important ", "important ", "slightly important ", and 
"not at all important" or from "very superior" to "superior ", "fair ", inferior ", and 
"very inferior" or from "very serious" to "fairly serious ", "serious ", "slightly 
serious ", and "not at all serious" in five divisions. These five divisions are ascribed 
values of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively. 
2.5 PILOT WORK 
The pilot survey was conducted to make sure that the questionnaire worked and 
yielded the data required. A random number table was used to select 10 merger 
companies as the first pilot survey sample. After ten days, the 10 firms were 
telephoned but only four of the questionnaires had been received by the right 
department and person. Two companies stated that they receive many 
questionnaires every week and only choose the few which are necessary and have 
simple and relevant questionnaires to answer. This questionnaire was too long to 
be worth their while. One firm said that it did not noimally answer questionnaires. 
Only one company completed the questionnaire as requested. The other six firms 
said that if the address and addressee are not correct, the questionnaire may simply 
be destroyed. In those cases, the correct department and person responsible for the 
merger event was established and they were asked to complete the questionnaire. 
As the original 25- question version of the question had proved too long, 8 
questions were deleted and the revised questionnaire was sent out to the first pilot 
survey companies again. The questionnaire can be found in Appendix 1. The 
random number table was used again to select a further 10 companies and the 
survey procedure adjusted. Firstly, the second pilot survey companies were phoned 
to find the pertinent department and person. Secondly, the purpose was explained 
to the relevant managers or directors. A number of company officials volunteered 
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the real reason(s) or motive(s) for their merger, together with other issues. Thirdly, 
the address and addressee were confirmed. In the second pilot survey of the 
original 10 firms 9 responses were eventually received and 9 out of 9 responses 
(one firm had folded) were received from the second pilot survey sample. 
2.6 MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
The questionnaire survey consisted of a telephone interview to confirm the 
appropriate respondent and accurate address, sending out of the postal 
questionnaires, telephone follow -up, and the collection and checking of the returns. 
The two pilot surveys provided valuable experience on gaining access to 
respondents and increasing the response rate. All of the 331 merger companies in 
the sample were contacted. On average, it took 5 -10 telephone calls to establish the 
relevant respondent and speak with them. About 2,000 telephone calls were made 
in the course of this study. The results were as follows: 
(1) 21 firms did not finally merge or take -over. 
(2) 14 acquiring firms ceased trading. 
(3) 10 firms could not be contacted. 
(4) 286 cases were identified and the questionnaires mailed or faxed to them 
(including the first and second pilot survey companies). 
(5) 248 questionnaires were returned but 3 of them were not completed. 
(6) Completed questionnaires for 245 merger and take -over cases were received. 
(7) The effective response rate was 85.7% (245/286). 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
The sample for the study consists of two parts, mergers and take -overs. The mergers 
data originate mainly from three governments Departments. The take -over cases are 
drawn primarily from the Data Base Centre of the Taiwan Economic Journal Co., 
Ltd. All firms involved in a significant merger or acquisition during the period 1990- 
95 were identified. 
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There were 34 listing or public offering merger cases (acquiring company) in the 
sample. The others were non -public offering companies. It is difficult to collect the 
financial statements of non -public offering companies and some merger information 
may not be acquired from financial data. Postal questionnaires were the primary 
research instrument with the collection of financial data to gain further information. 
The questions within the questionnaire were suggested by reference to earlier and 
similar research, by consulting with experts and experienced academic researchers, 
and by knowledge of Taiwan's economic environment. 
Two pilot surveys were conducted to make sure that the questionnaire worked and 
yielded the data required. Many telephone calls were made to confirm the appropriate 
respondent and accurate address and to increase the response rate. The sample finally 
included 245 merger and take -over cases. The effective response rate was 85.7% 
(245/286). 
1 (1) Article 398 of Company Law states that "A company merged or consolidated with another 
company shall apply for any of the following registrations within fifteen days after the merger or 
consolidation has been effected: 1. Amendment registration in case the company continues its 
corporate existence after merger or consolidation; 2. Dissolution registration in case the company is 
dissolved after merger or consolidation; or 3. Incorporation registration in case the company is a new 
company after merger or consolidation ". An application for any of the above registrations (at the 
Department of Commerce of Ministry of Economic Affairs) shall be accompanied by a balance sheet 
prepared by the company as the situation requires. (2) If a company wants to enjoy tax benefits to go 
into merger or consolidation for the purpose of promoting reasonable operations and management, it 
needs to register and gets specifically approved by the Bureau of Industrial Affairs of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (Article 13 of Statute for Upgrading Industries). (3) When a company wants to issue 
new shares as a result of a merger or consolidation with another company, it requires to register and 
get the approval by the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Ministry of Finance (Article 267 
of Company Law and Article 22 of Securities and Exchange Law). 
2 Monthly Statistics of The Republic of China, Directorate -General of the Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics, Executive Yuan, The Republic of China, No. 377, June 1997, p. 27. Taiwan Statistical Data 
Book 1994, Council for Economic Planning and Development, Republic of China, June 1994, p. 1. 
3 Monthly Statistics of The Republic of China, Directorate - General of the Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics, Executive Yuan, The Republic of China, No. 377, June 1997, p. 29. Taiwan Statistical Data 
Book 1994, Council for Economic Planning and Development, Republic of China, June 1994, p. 2. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CHARACTERISTICS OF TAIWANESE ACQUIRING AND ACQUIRED 
ENTERPRISES 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we begin the analysis of the completed questionnaires derived from a 
fairly complete postal survey of Taiwanese mergers and take -overs and describe the 
general characteristics of the respondent firms. The industrial classification of 
enterprises involved in mergers and acquisitions in Taiwan is discussed in the next 
section. Transaction years and cases are presented in the third section. The fourth 
section describes the prior relationship of acquiring and acquired firms. The fifth 
section discusses four forms of merger and acquisition. The type of transaction 
between bidders and their targets is then presented in the sixth section. The issue of 
friendly and hostile mergers and acquisitions is the subject of the seventh section. 
The eighth section analyses the total assets of the acquiring and acquired enterprises 
before and after each transaction. The final section outlines some conclusions. 
3.2 THE INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION OF MERGING FIRMS 
The standard industrial classification of the identified firms is shown in Table 3 -2 -1. 
There were 286 identified cases of merger and acquisition from 1990 to 1995. The 
Electrical and Electronic Machinery, Manufacturing and Repair industry had the 
greatest number of acquiring firms with 53 cases which is 18.6% of the sample. 
Second was the Securities and Futures industry with 30 cases, 10.5% of the sample. 
The third was Food Products Manufacturing with 18 cases and the fourth was 
Foreign Trade with 14 cases. The other acquiring industries with over 10 cases were 
Textiles, Chemical Products Manufacturing, Plastic Products Manufacturing, Basic 
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Metal Manufacturing, Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing and Repair and 
Building Construction. 
Details of the standard industrial classification of the respondent sample are also 
shown in Table 3 -2 -1. There were 245 effective cases which occurred from 1990 to 
1995. It can be seen that the industry with the largest number of acquiring firms was 
still Electrical and Electronic Machinery, Manufacturing and Repair. It had 41 cases, 
which is 17.6% of the sample. The next is the Securities and Futures industry which 
had 26 cases, 10.6% of the sample. Food Products Manufacturing was third with 16 
cases. The other industries with over 10 cases were Textiles, Chemical Products 
Manufacturing, Basic Metal Manufacturing, Machinery and Equipment 
Manufacturing and Repair and International Trade. 
To see whether the sample was representative of firms known to be involved in 
mergers and acquisitions, a number of tests were performed. Some tests (Siegel, 
19561; Dixon and Massey, 19692) recommend that all expected cell counts should be 
five or more before performing the Chi -Square goodness -of -fit test. Cochran (1954)' 
indicates that the approximation should be very good if no expected number is less 
than one and no more than 20% of the expected numbers are less than five. We 
combine categories if some of the expected numbers are too small and if the 
combination of categories does not change the nature of the hypothesis to be tested. 
As seen in Table 3 -2 -2, we divide the identified and respondent samples into seven 
industries. The industrial distribution of the acquiring enterprises in both groups was 
then compared. A goodness -of -fit test was used. The null hypothesis (Ho) and 
alternative hypotheses (H1) are as follows: 
Ho : Yi = Yio for categories i = Agriculture, Manufacturing, ..., Business Services and 
Others, Yio are specified probabilities. 
Yio = Ni / , Ni , where Ni is the identified number in category i. 
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and 
H1 : At least one of the cell probabilities differ from the hypothesised value. 
x2 =E [ (n; - E1)2 / E, ] , where n, is the responding number in category i and 
E; = nYio is the identified number under Ho 
The computed value of x2= 1.0433 is smaller than the critical value of 12.5916, so 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and it can be concluded that there is no 
significant difference in the industrial distribution of the acquiring firms between the 
identified sample and the respondent sample. 
Using the same statistical test, the industrial distribution of acquired enterprises was 
tested in Table 3 -2 -3. The computed value of x2= 1.3828 is smaller than 12.5916, so 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and it can be concluded that there is no 
significant difference between the industrial distribution of the identified acquired 
firms and those contained in the respondent sample. 
The result of the Chi -Square goodness -of -fit tests indicates that the observed relative 
frequencies of responses from this survey are the same as those that would be 
expected on the basis of government registered data. The sample is a very good 
representation of the firms known to be involved in mergers and acquisitions in 
Taiwan in the period 1990 -1995. 
As shown in Table 3 -2 -4, the total number of business units (in Taiwan at the end of 
1995) was 994,305. There were 11,617 business units in the Electrical and Electronic 
Machinery, Manufacturing and Repair sector, 1.17% of the total number of business 
units. Comparing the 17.6% merging rate in Electrical and Electronic Machinery, 
Manufacturing and Repair (see Table 3 -2 -1), this industry shows a very high merger 
rate. 
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Why was the incidence of merger and acquisition activity in the Electrical and 
Electronic Machinery, Manufacturing and Repair industry so high between 1990 and 
1995? It is possible to explain the high incidence in temms of international 
competition in these industries. The total amount of business sales in all industries in 
1995 in Taiwan in aggregate was NT$ 19,021,003 million4. Electrical and Electronic 
Machinery, Manufacturing and Repair achieved NT$ 1,457,576 million in sales5 
which was 7.7% of total business sales. If we compare total business sales, 7.7 %, 
with total business units, 1.17 %, we find that the former is about six times greater 
than the latter. Electrical and Electronic Machinery, Manufacturing and Repair, 
especially in the information, semi -conductor, and communications products sectors, 
has faced very strong competition from global markets in the 1990s. It is also the 
most successful industry in Taiwan.6 The total value of business sales in the 
information industry was NT$ 360 thousand million in 1995. Taiwanese information 
industry's sales ranked third in the world in 1995. The semi -conductor industry's 
sales were NT$ 148 billions in 1995. Its output of integrated circuits was the fourth 
largest in the world.? The technologies involved in the information and semi- 
conductor industries have advanced very quickly in recent years. These sectors now 
need to develop new technologies, improve production processes, enhance their 
financial structures, increase market power, and improve their managerial efficiency 
in order to meet the demands of international market competition.8 The requirements 
of rapid technological development and strenuous market competitiveness may have 
caused this industry to display the greatest number of merger and acquisition cases in 
Taiwan from 1990 to 1995. 
Prior to 1988, the Taiwanese government forbade the setting up of new securities 
firms. Table 3 -2 -5 shows that there were only 28 securities broker firms 
(headquarters) in 1987. This number increased to 373 in 1990. The prosperity of the 
domestic economy and the expectation of an appreciation of the New Taiwan Dollar 
led to a substantial amount of money being invested in the stock market in 1988. The 
large trading value and high turnover rate in stocks and shares made huge profits for 
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securities firms. The bull market environment lasted for two years. Table 3 -2 -6 
shows that the index of stock prices was 1,039.11 in 1986 and reached the highest 
level of 8,616.14 in 1989. The trading value in stocks was NT$ 675,656 million in 
1986, rose to NT$ 25,407,963 million in 1989, and fell to NT$ 5,917,078 million in 
1992. This huge reduction in trading value meant that the peak number of securities 
broker firms could not be sustained. Mergers and acquisitions of securities firms 
began to occur from 1990; a total of 29 securities firms were acquired between 1990 
and 1995. 
With increasing labour costs, the labour intensive textile industry lost its cheap 
labour cost advantage. Meanwhile, the public had also grown concerned about 
environmental pollution and the textiles and Chemical Products Manufacturing 
industries were compelled to invest heavily in expensive anti -pollution equipment. 
The textiles and Chemical Products Manufacturing industries' operating costs thus 
increased and profits fell. In addition, when companies closed or moved off -shore to 
ensure cheaper labour costs, a number of firms merged with, or were acquired by, 
other enterprises. There were 13 acquired enterprises in these industries. 
3.3 TRANSACTION YEAR 
As shown in Table 3 -3 -1, there were 285 identified mergers and acquisitions in 
Taiwan between 1990 and 1995. More (80 cases) occurred in 1995 than in any other 
year. The lowest number of cases in a year was 12 in 1990. Data relating to 237 
mergers and acquisitions for all years were returned to me. The largest and smallest 
number were 65 and 12 in 1995 and 1990 respectively. We can see the upward trend 
in the number of mergers and acquisitions in Taiwan since 1990. 
A further test was carried out to see if the survey sample (respondent merging and 
acquiring firms) was similar to the population (identified merging and acquiring 
firms). This time it concerned the distribution of transactions in each year. Again we 
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used the Chi -Square goodness -of -fit test. The null hypothesis (Ho) and alternative 
hypotheses (H1) were as follows: 
Ho : Yi = Yio for categories i = 1990, ... , 1995, Y10 are specified probabilities. 
Y io = Ni / / Ni , where Ni is the identified number in category i. 
and 
H1 : At least one of the cell probabilities differs from the hypothesised value. 
x2 =y [ (ni -Ei)2 / Ei ] , where ni is the observed number in category i and 
Ei = nY10 is the identified number under Ho 
The computed value of x2= 1.9964 is smaller than the critical value of 11.0705, so 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and it can be concluded that there are no 
significant differences in the distribution of numbers of transaction over the years 
1990 -1995 between the population and the observed sample. 
3.4 BUSINESS GROUP 
Table 3 -4 -1 shows that there were 210 cases where both the acquiring and the 
acquired firm belonged to the same business group, i.e. 85.7% of the sample. There 
were only 35 cases, 14.3% of the sample, where this did not hold. These results 
indicate that most merger and acquisition events in Taiwan were transacted from 
within the same business group in this period. 
This result is similar to that found by Fang (1990)9 and Lin (1990)10. Fang outlined 
three reasons for the high proportion of mergers and acquisitions occurring within the 
same business group in Taiwan. (1) It is easier to agree the terms and conditions of a 
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transaction when the acquiring and acquired firms are in the same business group 
than when they are not. (2) The organisational culture of firms is similar between 
members of the same business group and there is likely to be less resistance from 
employees towards a transaction when it occurs within that bloc. (3) The 
management or main shareholders can still retain control of the firm. Li (1991)11 
reasoned as follows: (1) Existing productive enterprises, if they conform to the 
production scales and criteria prescribed by the Government following a merger or 
consideration, are entitled to a fifteen per cent (15%) reduction in the profit -seeking 
enterprise income tax for two years after the transaction is enacted (Article 40 of the 
Statute for Encouragement of Investment). (2) In a cumulative income tax rate 
system, companies are likely to sub -divide themselves into many smaller enterprises 
to decrease their firms' total liability for income tax. That is, setting up many small 
companies reduces the cumulative income tax rate to the lowest possible income tax 
rate. The highest operational net income tax rate was 30% in 1951 and rose to 50% in 
1953. By 1995, profit -seeking enterprises whose operational net income exceeds NT$ 
100,000 (the foreign exchange rate of New Taiwan Dollar to Pound Sterling is about 
42 : 1 in 1995) were liable to pay 25% income tax.12 When the amount of taxable 
is so low that the incentive for saving tax is no longer so 
companies may change their tactics. For example, when they find that processing 
many small business units increases their administrative and communication costs 
while the savings on enterprise income tax is limited or is no longer relevant, they 
merge. (3) The rise in the stock market beginning in 1988 (its bull market period) 
encouraged many companies to merge so as to meet the criteria of the minimum 
corporation capital NT$ 200 millions' regulation and to apply to be listed on the 
security market. 
According to information I gleaned from telephone interviews with acquiring firms' 
Finance or Accounting Directors (or with Chief Executive Officers), the major 
reasons for a high proportion of transactions occurring between members of the same 
business group were as follows. (1) Ease of negotiation: where the acquiring and 
acquired firms belong to the same business group, the agreement to transact is easier 
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to negotiate than if the companies belong to different groups. (2) Managerial 
arrangements: in Taiwanese business, "the management" is the Chief Executive 
Officer or the major shareholder. In the same business group, the acquiring and 
acquired firm's manager may be the same person or be a member of his /her family. 
Hence, there will be less managerial resistance and it is easier to decide on the 
allocation of managerial duties than if this family relationship did not exist. (3) 
Organisational culture and structure: in the same business group, these are similar. 
The staff are more compatible than would be the case with utterly different 
companies. The acquired find's employees probably find it easier to accept the 
transaction than if they were not part of the same group. (4) More and better 
information: management can access more and better information to assess and 
analyse a find's operations if it is in the same business group. If they find that the 
transaction is likely to be beneficial for both the acquiring and acquired companies, 
the deal is likely to be concluded. 
3.5 FORMS OF MERGER AND ACQUISITION 
As seen in Table 3 -5 -1, the most common form of transaction was the `Merger'. 
There were 217 cases of this form, that is 88.6% of the sample. The least common 
form in the sample was `Consolidation' of which there were just four cases, i.e. 1.6% 
of the sample. The `Acquisition of Stock' and `Acquisition of Assets' had 14 and 10 
cases, that is 5.7% and 4.1% of the sample respectively. 
The government encourages the merging and consolidation of small companies for 
the purpose of promoting efficient operations and management.13 If an acquiring 
company merges with another enterprise, the acquired firm does not need to liquidate 
its assets and close up shop. If the acquiring company chooses `consolidation' as its 
means of transacting with another company, the acquiring and acquired films need to 
liquidate their assets, repay their debts, and close prior to setting up a new company. 
The consolidation procedures are more complicated than is the case for mergers and 
administrative costs are higher. This is why few companies opt for a `consolidation'. 
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If a company is specifically approved by the Ministry of Economic Affairs to go into 
a merger or consolidation for the purpose of promoting reasonable operations and 
management, it can qualify for tax benefits (Article 13 of the Statute for Upgrading 
Industries). The company is also exempt from all income tax, stamp tax and deed tax 
(Paragraph 1 of Article 13 of the Statute for Upgrading Industries). The land -value 
increment tax payable may be charged to the account of, and paid by, the enterprise 
surviving after the merger or consolidation at such time as the land is further 
transferred (Paragraph 2 of Article 13 of the Statute for Upgrading Industries). 
Article 40 of the Statute for Encouragement of Investment states that "Existing 
productive enterprises, if conforming to the production scale and criteria prescribed 
by the Government after a merger or consolidation, shall be entitled to a fifteen 
percent (15 %) reduction in the profit -seeking enterprise income tax for two years 
after a merger or consolidation ". Firms transacting by `Acquisition of Stock' and 
`Acquisition of Assets' cannot receive the tax benefits mentioned above. 
If the acquiring company selects a `merger' as its form of transacting with another 
company, it can lessen the administrative load, reduce transaction costs, and enjoy 
tax benefits. In the light of such governmental tax regulations, we can understand 
why the `merger' accounted for 88.6% of all transacted cases in Taiwan. 
3.6 TYPE OF TRANSACTION 
As seen in Table 3 -6 -1, horizontal transactions accounted for the greatest proportion 
of cases, (142), 58.0% of the sample. The smallest proportion of cases was of the 
congeneric type with just 24 cases, i.e. 9.8% of the sample. There were 43 and 36 
cases of conglomerate and vertical transactions respectively, this is 17.6% and 14.7% 
of the sample. 
This high incidence of horizontal transaction is consistent with other studies: Sung 
(1989)14, Fang (1990)15, Lin, K. C., (1990)16, Li (1991)17, Lin, Tsung -tse (1990)18, 
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and Yang (1996)19. Fang concluded that there are two reasons for this phenomenon. 
Firstly, technology and market distribution are easier to exploit in horizontal 
transactions than in other transactions. Secondly, government approval (i.e. 
conforming to the criteria of Article 38 of the Statute for Encouragement of 
Investment) may be more easily gained for horizontal transactions than for other 
transactions. 
The earliest merger record we can find is that of the Eastern Asia Electronic 
Enterprise which consolidated four small electronic companies --Asia, Kuokuang, 
Taiwan, Hsinhsing --and founded the China Electronic Limited Company in 1955.20 
The first listed firm merger case was Taiwan Plastic Industry Limited which merged 
with Kungsan Electronic Stone Limited in 1965.21 Thus there is a 40 -year history of 
mergers and acquisitions in Taiwan. This resembles merger and acquisition activity 
in the US, whose first merger wave, 1895 -1904, consisted mainly of horizontal 
transactions.22 
As shown in Table 3 -2 -6, there were only 199 listed companies with capital of over 
NT$ 200 million in Taiwan in 1990, but this rose to 347 listed companies in 1995. 
The capital and sales of a company are very small in the early stages of its 
development. A small or medium -sized business does not typically have enough 
surplus funds to merge with or acquire another business. This is probably the reason 
why there have been so few mergers or acquisitions in Taiwan. Where firms do have 
surplus funds to acquire another firm, they generally try to do a deal with a firm from 
the same industry. Management are more familiar with the production, market 
distribution, and technological issues of their own industry than they are of other 
industries. Hence, horizontal transactions reduce their risk. Another reason may be 
that an acquiring firm may gain the economies of a larger production scale and 
decreasing administration costs if they opt for a horizontal transaction. It is probably 
easier to increase market share or market power and so enhance market 
competitiveness through a horizontal transaction. The government's declared 
purpose is to encourage small firms producing the same product to merge or 
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consolidate in order to promote efficient operations and management (Article 38 of 
the Statute for Encouragement of Investment). That is why it is easier for horizontal 
transactions to gain government approval and its commensurate tax benefits. More 
light will be shed on the significance of different motives for different types of 
merger and acquisition activity when we present evidence from the questionnaire 
study in the next chapter. 
3.7 FRIENDLY TRANSACTIONS 
As seen in Table 3 -7 -1, almost all the acquiring and acquired firms in our survey 
were engaged in a friendly rather than a hostile transaction. There were 244 cases, 
i.e. 99.6% of the sample. There was only one hostile transaction. 
A friendly merger or acquisition is a bid agreed by the acquired firm's management 
and shareholders, whereas a hostile merger or acquisition is agreed only by the 
acquired firm's shareholders.23 Firstly, in Taiwan, industrial development has not 
reached a stage where the separation of ownership and management is common. The 
management is usually the owning group or the main shareholders.24 If the owner or 
main shareholders accept the transaction, it can be assumed that the management 
also agree. Secondly, capital markets25 (including the stock and bond markets) and 
money markets26 are in the earliest stages of development in Taiwan. They cannot 
offer a necessary variety of financial instruments for a high degree of operating 
leverage.27 Leveraged buy- outs28 and management buy- outs29 are not popular, and 
junk bonds have never been issued because the Taiwan (ROC) government forbids 
this practice. Thirdly, Section 3.4 mentioned that in 85.7% of the sample, acquiring 
and acquired firms belong to the same business group. Where this is the case, a 
friendly transaction can be reasonably expected. Fourth, only 17 transacted 
companies in our sample are listed companies. The bidding company does not have a 
market in which to `tender offer'30 the target firm's shareholders. Finally, a hostile 
transaction is anathema to Chinese culture. Even in business, Chinese culture nudges 
its participants towards co- ordination, co- operation and friendly negotiation, rather 
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than hostile competition. That is why all but one case in the sample have been 
friendly transactions. 
3.8 TOTAL ASSETS BEFORE OR AFTER EACH TRANSACTION 
3.8.1 SKEWNESS AND KURTOSIS 
Table 3 -8 -1 shows the coefficients of skewness31 of the size distributions of 
acquiring and acquired firms, where size is measured by total assets. The coefficient 
of the distribution of acquiring firms before the transaction was 14.095, after the 
transaction, 14.146, and for acquired firms, 11.590. A positive value indicates that 
the distribution is skewed to the right and the mean value is affected by the extreme 
values (i.e. of extremely large assets). The coefficients of skewness of the 
distributions of acquiring firms' total assets pre- and post -transaction are almost 
equal, and both of them are larger than the distribution for acquired firms. This result 
implies that the acquired firms' total assets display a smaller proportion towards the 
left side of the distribution than does the proportion for acquiring firms. 
The coefficients of kurtosis32 for the distribution of the acquiring firms' total assets 
pre- and post -transaction are 203.737 and 206.521 respectively. For the distribution 
of acquired firms, it is 147.326. The huge values indicate that the distribution is very 
peaked. A leptokuric distribution tends to have more cases in the extreme tails than 
does a normal distribution. Just like the coefficients of skewness, the coefficients of 
kurtosis of the distribution of the acquiring firms' total assets before and after 
transaction are similar, and both of them are larger than the distribution for the 
acquired firms. This result shows that the distribution of the acquired firms' assets is 
flatter than that of the acquiring firms' assets. The distribution of the acquiring firms' 
total assets before and after transaction and that of the acquired are shown separately 
in Figures 3 -8 -1, 3 -8 -2, and 3 -8 -3. 
3.8.2 MEAN SIZES 
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Table 3 -8 -1 also shows that the minimum and maximum value of the pre- transaction 
assets of acquiring enterprises were NT$ 5,000,000 and NT$ 345,362,400,000 
respectively. The mean and variance of assets were NT$ 2,916,260,000 and NT$ 
5,627,000,000,000. The minimum and maximum value of the post- transaction assets 
of acquiring enterprises were NT$ 5,000,000 and NT$ 368,716,970,000 respectively. 
The mean and variance of assets were NT$ 3,449,670,000 and NT$ 
6,271,000,000,000. 
Table 3 -8 -1 indicates that the minimum and maximum value of assets of the pre - 
transaction the acquired enterprises were NT$ 500,000 and NT$ 41,187,020,000 
respectively. The mean and variance of assets were NT$ 606,160,000 and NT$ 
94,410,000,000. When the size of each acquiring firm was compared with its 
acquisition partner, the size of the assets of the acquiring firms was larger than that 
of the acquired firms. This result is similar to the findings of Singh (1975)33, Cosh et 
al. (1980)34, and Cosh et al. (1989)35. They all conclude that acquiring films are, on 
average, bigger than those they acquire. The large firm has greater financial resources 
(in terms of its own funds or its term borrowing from banks) to merge with or take- 
over another small firm, and the smaller target firm may decrease the acquiring 
firm's transaction costs. 
3.8.3 DIFFERENCES BY BUSINESS GROUP 
Table 3 -8 -2 shows that the acquiring films that did not belong to the same business 
group before and after the transaction had larger mean assets than those which did. 
By contrast, where the acquired firm had a prior relationship with the acquiring fiiiu, 
it had larger average assets than those which did not. All of the standard deviations 
of the transaction's enterprises were larger than their mean. The result indicates that 
the asset distribution of the firms was very scattered. No matter whether they 
belonged to the same business group or not, the mean size of the acquiring firms' 
assets before the transaction was also greater than that of the corresponding acquired 
firm. 
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The result indicates that where the acquiring firm did not have a prior relationship 
with the target film, the former required considerable assets (cash or stocks) to 
acquire the latter. In contrast, where the acquiring and acquired firms belong to the 
same business group, the main shareholders of both companies are the same so it is 
easier to agree to the transaction and the acquiring firm does not need to have large 
assets to pursue the merger. As for the assets of the acquired firm, the bidding firm is 
only bound by its own available transaction funds so it can go ahead and acquire a 
small target even where no prior relationship exists. This means that the average 
assets of acquired firms which did not have a prior relationship with their acquiring 
firms were smaller than those that had this association. 
3.8.4 DIFFERENCES BY FORM OF TRANSACTION 
The size of acquiring and acquired fi ins differed between the different forms of 
transaction. The results are presented in Table 3 -8 -3. The largest average assets pre - 
and post- transaction were for deals involving the `acquisition of stock'. These were 
NT$ 4,219,380,000 and NT$ 4,967,800,000 respectively. Considering the sizes of 
acquired firms in relation to the form of transaction, the acquired firms with the 
largest average assets (NT$ 633,860,000) were those transacted as a `merger'. The 
minimum average assets occurred in `consolidation' for both acquiring and acquired 
firms. These values were NT$ 30,000,000, NT$ 75,000,000, and NT$ 25,000,000 
respectively. For most forms of transaction, the standard deviation of the 
distributions of assets for acquiring and acquired firms was larger than its mean. This 
result indicates that the asset distribution of the firms was very dispersed. 
The findings suggest that an `acquisition of stock' normally requires the bidding 
company to have considerable funds if it is to purchase the target's total or 
substantial -part shares (over 50% of total shares) so it is reasonable to expect that the 
acquiring firm will have the largest average assets. If the acquiring company chooses 
`consolidation' to transact with another company, the bidding and target companies 
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separately need to liquidate their assets, repay their debts and close their companies 
before setting up a new company. After the liquidation, the total assets of the 
consolidated firm are apparently reduced. The average size of acquiring firms before 
the transaction was larger than the average size of the acquired firms for all forms of 
acquisition. 
3.8.5 TYPE OF TRANSACTION 
Table 3 -8 -4 separately indicates the mean assets pre- and post- transaction by type of 
transaction. For acquiring films the largest average assets were NT$ 20,232,880,000 
and NT$ 21,307,610,000 before and after transaction respectively. For acquired 
enterprises, the largest size was NT$ 2,611,720,000. In all cases the largest size was 
found for enterprises involved in a congeneric transaction. The smallest average 
assets were NT$ 780,490,000, NT$ 1,076,620,000, and NT$ 277,420,000 
respectively, and all were found for vertical transactions. 
It was also found that the standard deviation of the distributions of fiims' sizes for 
companies involved in congeneric transactions was very large. The standard 
deviation of the distributions was NT$ 81,163,350,000, NT$ 84,176,220,000 and 
NT$ 9,380,610,000 for acquiring firms before transaction, acquiring firms after 
transaction and for acquired firms, respectively. The standard deviation of enterprises 
involved in congeneric transactions was approximately four times its mean. These 
results indicate that the distributions of films' assets were widely scattered. 
Article 13 of Fair Trade Law states that "to ensure fair competition and to promote 
the stability and prosperity of the economy, where an enterprise enters into a 
combination without filing an application for approval as required or after the 
disapproval of its application, the Fair Trade Commission may prohibit such 
combination ". If the surviving enterprise captures one -third of market share, or if an 
enterprise participating in the combination holds a quarter of the market, it needs to 
file with the Fair Trade Commission for approval (Article 11 of Fair Trade Law). 
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Horizontal transactions are subject to the Fair Trade Law so their scale cannot, in 
general, be very large. In contrast, congeneric combination firms are in the same 
general industry but do not produce the same type of goods or service. So the Fair 
Trade Commission does not forbid a `congeneric' transaction. The results indicate 
that the mean assets of enterprises involved in `congeneric' transactions are larger 
than the mean assets of enterprises involved in `horizontal', `vertical', or 
`conglomerate' transactions in Taiwan. Considering that Taiwan is in the early stage 
of its economic development, the scale of business is not very large so enterprises do 
not usually have enough surplus funds to invest in acquiring upward or downward 
suppliers. Even when this type of transaction is accomplished, the acquisition scale 
remains very small. As a result, the average size of vertical transactions is small for 
acquiring and acquired firms. The pre- transaction mean assets size of acquiring firms 
is larger than that of acquired firms in all types of transaction. This indicates that the 
assets of acquiring firms are nouually greater than those of their targets. 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
The industry with the largest number of acquiring firms was Electrical and Electronic 
Machinery, Manufacturing and Repair. The requirements of high technological 
development and keen market competitiveness may account for why it has the most 
merger and acquisition activity in Taiwan from 1990 to 1995. The largest and 
smallest number of merger and acquisition cases occurred in 1995 and in 1990 
respectively. There has been an upward trend in the number of mergers and 
acquisitions in Taiwan since 1990. Most of the merger and acquisition events 
happening in Taiwan are within the same business group. The major reasons for a 
high proportion of transactions occurring between members of the same business 
group are ease of negotiation, less management resistance, similar organisational 
culture and structure, and management have access to more and better information to 
assess and analyse the transaction. The most common foim of transaction was the 
`merger'. The least con mon faun was `consolidation'. Government encouragement 
(tax benefits) and simple and cheap administrative procedures were the primary 
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incentives for acquiring companies choosing the merger as the form of transaction. 
Where the acquiring company chooses `consolidation' as the form of taking -over 
another company, both the acquiring and acquired companies need to liquidate their 
assets, repay their debts and close their companies before setting up a new company. 
The consolidation procedures are complicated and administrative costs are very high. 
This is why few companies adopt a `consolidation' approach. 
The most common transaction type for acquiring and acquired firms was horizontal. 
We hypothesise that this is due to management's familiarity with the production, 
market distribution and technology of the partner firm making it easier to gain the 
economies of a larger production scale, to increase market share or market power, 
and to avail of the special tax benefits that are aimed at encouraging small enterprises 
to merge. Most transactions were considered friendly because the management is 
usually the owning group or the main shareholders and the Chinese culture supports 
`friendly negotiation' over `hostile competition'. The leveraged buy -out or 
management buy -out is not popular in Taiwan as capital markets and money markets 
are in an early stage of development so they cannot offer the variety of financial 
instruments that allow a high degree of operating leverage. Acquiring firms that did 
not belong to the same business group before or after the transaction had larger mean 
assets than those which did belong to the same group. Where the acquired firm had a 
prior relationship with its acquirer, it had larger average assets than those which did 
not. 
The largest average assets before and after transaction occurred when the `acquisition 
of stock' by the acquiring firm demanded substantial funds if the target's shares 
(over 50% of the total shares) were to be purchased. The average size of acquiring 
and acquired firms was lowest when the transaction was a `consolidation'. When the 
acquiring company chooses `consolidation' as the form of taking -over another 
company, the bidding and target companies separately need to liquidate their assets, 
repay their debts and close their companies, before setting up a new company. After 
the liquidation, the total assets of the consolidated firm are apparently reduced. The 
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largest and smallest average value of assets occurred in congeneric and vertical 
transactions. Horizontal transactions are subject to the Fair Trade Law so their scale 
cannot be very large. The firms in a congeneric combination are in the same general 
industry but they do not produce the same type of goods or service so the Fair Trade 
Commission does not forbid their combination. The mean asset size of acquiring 
firms before transaction is larger than that for acquired firms in all directions of 
transaction. This indicates that the assets of the acquiring firm are normally greater 
than those of its target. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE RELATING 
TO THE MOTIVES FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The motives for mergers and acquisitions (M & A) are a very important issue in the 
study of M &A. Why does one team of managers try to take -over the resources of 
another firm? A number of hypotheses have been proposed to explain why mergers 
and acquisitions happen. These hypotheses can be simplified as of two types: value - 
maximising and non -value -maximising theories (Seth, 1990).1 The value -maximising 
theories consider that the main motive for mergers and acquisitions is the 
maximisation of the value of the company to shareholders. The non- value- 
maximising theories postulate that managers of bidding firms engage in mergers and 
acquisitions to maximise their personal gains at the expense of shareholders. 
The primary motivation for most mergers and take -overs is to increase the value of 
the combined enterprise. Ascribing a single motive to any specific merger is 
dangerous. The principal hypotheses about the motives or reasons for mergers and 
acquisitions relate to efficiency (operating synergy, financial synergy, pure 
diversification, etc.), infoimation and signalling, free cash flow, market power, tax, 
stock market considerations, and to agency problems. All of these US -based theories 
apply to Taiwan, although stock market considerations are of particular interest in 
Taiwan. Alternative motives, consisting of seven hypotheses, are summarised in 
Table 4 -1. However, it is very easy to create even more categories; as economic and 
financial circumstances develop and change new motivations may emerge. So it is 
difficult to generalise about the motives for mergers and acquisitions. 
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In this chapter a number of alternative theories of the motives for mergers and 
acquisitions are described first, and then the relevant empirical studies relating to the 
motives for mergers and acquisitions in the US and Taiwan are reviewed separately. 
Finally we summarise the empirical studies and provide a brief conclusion. 
4.2 ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL RATIONALES FOR MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS 
4.2.1 EFFICIENCY THEORIES 
Efficiency theories suggest that mergers and acquisitions, by rearranging assets, carry 
potential social benefits. They generally predict that performance will be improved, 
either by the incumbent managers or by a kind of synergial achievement. Some 
mergers and acquisitions are motivated by the belief that the acquiring company's 
managers can better handle the target's resources. Synergy refers to the ability of a 
combined company to be more profitable than would be the companies as individual 
units. This implies that the combined resources of the two companies increase total 
value. 
4.2.1.1 DIFFERENTIAL EFFICIENCY 
If company A merges with company B to form company AB, and if the value of the 
combined company AB exceeds that of the sum of firm A and firm B, then we 
consider that synergy has occurred. Such a combination should offer advantages to 
the shareholders of both company A and company B. 
Vab > Va + Vb 
The most common theory of motives for mergers and acquisitions draws on the idea 
of differential efficiency. If the manager of company A is more efficient than the 
manager of company B, and if company A merges with or takes -over company B, 
49 
then the efficiency of company B is improved up to the level of company A following 
the transaction. We consider that efficiency is increased by merger or take -over; not 
only do a company's profits increase, but social advantages also accrue. The 
efficiency of the whole economy can be improved by such combinations. 
The differential efficiency theory of mergers and acquisitions is that there are 
companies whose operating efficiency is not optimal. Therefore, for companies 
operating in the same or similar kind of enterprise activity, the potential bidders are 
more likely to be those whose operating efficiency is above average. They have both 
the industrial information and understanding to judge whether a target's operating 
performance is below average or is not realising its potential, and they also have the 
managerial know -how to improve the performance of the target firm. 
4.2.1.2 INEFFICIENT MANAGEMENT 
Inefficient management refers to those situations where managers are not performing 
well, especially because of their wastefulness or their lack of ability or their 
disorganisation. Inefficient management covers not only the waste of cash but also 
flows in how staff are deployed or failures to exploit opportunities to increase sales 
and earnings or to decrease costs. If the capital market is efficient, incompetent 
management is only tenable for a limited time, it cannot last over the long term 
because the market mechanism assures that they will be replaced by more capable 
management. For example, where production companies expand into distribution 
activities, the managers may not possess enough knowledge of those new activities to 
operate the company effectively. When a merger or take -over occurs, it works to 
replace inefficient managers and so achieves an increase in profit rate. 
Of course, merger or take -over is not the only means to improve management. But 
sometimes it is the most simple and effective method. Typically, it is difficult to 
expect the stockholders of a large public firm to effectively supervise an incumbent 
management. Managers are naturally reluctant to lay off or demote staff , but if a film 
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with inefficient management can be acquired, then it may be possible to replace the 
current managers with a more efficient management team, and thereby create wealth. 
The differential efficiency theory is more likely to involve the superior ability or 
efficiency of an acquiring firiu's management because they possess knowledge of a 
specific industrial operation. The theory is also more likely to apply to horizontal or 
congeneric mergers. The inefficient management theory may explain unrelated 
combinations. 
4.2.1.3 OPERATING SYNERGY 
Operational synergy theories emphasise that the motive underpinning mergers and 
acquisitions is to improve operational performance or to achieve some forms of 
synergy between the acquiring and acquired films. These can occur in different types 
of merger including horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate ones. The results can take 
the form of economic gains for the acquiring and acquired films and also produce 
benefits serving the public interest. They may increase the operational efficiency of 
social resources. 
It becomes feasible to exploit economies of scale, to control distribution channels, to 
combine complementary resources, or to eliminate duplicate personnel and 
equipment (including administration and research and development), and implies that 
combining the resources of the two companies increases their total value. The 
combined company can leverage each separate firm's comparative advantages to 
increase overall profit rate and growth. 
Economies of scale address the problems of indivisibility and of the division of 
labour. For instance the average cost (measured in terms of people, equipment or 
overhead) of producing goods or services decreases as output of the goods or services 
increases. One or both films may own a special resource that cannot be used to the 
full, yet which, because of indivisibility, cannot be reduced in size. Merger may 
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enable resources to be more fully used, allowing fixed costs to be spread over a larger 
production output. A typical example is management. A good manager may be 
under -used in a small company. A combination will enable him to exercise his ability 
within a larger business. The division of labour means that it is possible to restrict the 
range of jobs performed by each individual labourer, and to employ specialised staffs 
within the larger company. 
Economies of scale may apply in production, marketing, distribution, or research and 
development, etc. Expensive investments in plant and equipment need larger output 
to diminish the per unit cost. The expenses of television or newspaper advertising to 
promote products may be deployed to maximum effect by a national chain store. Any 
duplication in sales or administrative staff can be eliminated following an 
acquisition. If a firm finds a good investment opportunity, it may not have time to set 
up a new plant. Mergers or acquisitions can provide speedy access to new markets or 
industries and avoid dependence on inadequate distribution channels. When firms 
merge, the acquiring firm can share the acquired film's original distributors and 
customers and increase its sales to these new customers after the transaction. A larger 
company is more likely to be able to afford R & D and research efforts can be shared. 
Combined firms can enjoy mutual brand marks, patents and copyright technology, 
thus saving time and costs. Operating economies may arise in vertical integration. A 
large company may expect to gain greater control over the production process, 
through backward integration and forward integration towards the final consumer. 
Combined companies may achieve more efficient co- ordination and may avoid 
unnecessary bargaining processes and administrative expenses (accounting, ordering, 
data processing, etc.) between companies (Williamson, 19712; Arrow, 19753; Klein, 
Crawford, and Alchian, 19784). 
4.2.1.4 FINANCIAL SYNERGY 
The rapid growth of conglomerate mergers in the 1960s and 1970s in the USA casts 
doubt on the earlier managerial synergy hypothesis. Most conglomerate finis are the 
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outcome of mergers into quite different lines of business, whereas managerial 
synergy usually refers to acquisitions between companies operating in similar areas. 
Financial synergy refers to the impact of a merger or take -over on the costs of capital 
to the acquiring or acquired firm. If financial synergy exists in a corporate 
combination, capital costs should be lowered. The combination of two firms can 
reduce risk if the firms' cash flow streams are not perfectly correlated. Higgins and 
Schall (1975)5 consider this effect for debt -coinsurance. If the correlation of the 
income streams of two firms is less than perfectly positively correlated, the 
bankruptcy risk associated with the combination of the two films may be diminished. 
If one of the firms is forced into bankruptcy, loan providers may suffer a loss. If these 
two firms suffering financial difficulties merge in advance, the cash flows of the 
combined fiuii abate the impact of the decline in the single firm's cash flows. Mutual 
compensation earnings may be adequate to prevent the merged firm from falling into 
bankruptcy and causing creditors to suffer losses. If a firm can reduce its risk of 
default or bankruptcy, it may increase its debt capacity and benefit from lower 
interest rates from banks or the money market and so decrease its operating costs. 
Because interest payments are tax deductible, the increased tax savings on the interest 
payments of that extra debt capacity also benefit shareholders (Higgins and Schall, 
1975; Galai and Masulis 19766). 
Lewellen (1971)' considers that if the total debt is permitted to increase, a 
conglomerate merger may expand the debt capacity of the combined firm and he 
concludes that stockholders gain from these types of combination. Higgins and Schall 
(1975) show that shareholders do not benefit from a conglomerate merger. The 
coinsurance effect of debt just benefits creditors at the expense of shareholders. 
Rubinstein (1973)8 and Galai and Masulis (1976) point out that the bondholders 
receive more protection than the stockholders because the latter have to support the 
debt claims of the former for both companies. Even though the merged firm may 
improve financial difficulties and further reduce the risks and costs of default or 
bankruptcy, the gains from low interest rates will be compensated for by the loss 
attached to guaranteeing each other's debt. 
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Financial economies of scale occur in the form of lower security transaction and 
flotation costs (Levy and Sarnat, 1970).9 A large company enjoys certain advantages 
in financial markets that may lower the cost of capital to the firm. It enjoys better 
access to financial markets and gets notable cost savings when further financing is 
needed (Turner, 1965).10 The costs of borrowing by issuing bonds are lower since a 
larger acquiring final can probably issue bonds offering lower interest rates than a 
small acquiring firm's bonds. There are many fixed costs in the issuance of 
securities, such as stock exchange committee registration costs, legal fees, accounting 
and printing expenses, etc. Flotation costs are lower for larger than for smaller issues. 
4.2.1.5 UNDERVALUATION 
Some firms have found that it is cheaper to purchase assets through an acquisition 
than to replace its assets or to set up a new company, especially when the target 
firm's assets (i.e. real estate, machinery and equipment, or stock value) are 
undervalued.1' A less expensive purchase can decrease the acquiring firm's expenses 
and increase its profits or value. 
When the stock market is underestimating the actual worth of a film, a merger or 
take -over may arise. If a company's stock market price is lower than its real value, it 
is an ideal target for a take -over bid. However, if the stock market is efficient, it 
should fully reflect all available information, whether publicly available or not. How 
can a company's share price be undervalued? To some extent the stock market is 
efficient and the share price reflects all publicly available infouuation.12 But there are 
still a lot of undervalued companies. 
(1) Especially in a recessionary period, the stock market is depressed and share prices 
may be undervalued. The market price of a firm's shares may be significantly below 
the replacement costs of the assets represented by these shares. 
(2) Even in prosperous times the value of a firm can be undervalued, if the firm's 
management is not operating the company efficiently. 
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(3) Private or inside information may be relevant. The staff or management of a 
company can have inside information which outsiders do not know. If the acquiring 
firm is able to access private information before it is generally available, it can 
purchase the shares of a company at less than their true value. Dimson and Marsh 
(1984)13 indicate that security analysts may have superior information on companies. 
If they use this information skilfully, they may get higher profits. 
(4) The influence of inflation makes the current replacement costs of assets higher 
than their historical book values. 
4.2.1.6 PURE DIVERSIFICATION 
Diversification played a major role in the mergers and acquisitions in the 1960s and 
1970s in the US. Why should a company want to merge with another to diversify its 
risk? The reasons may include the following. First, financial synergy theory mentions 
that when the earnings from two companies are less than perfectly positively 
correlated, diversification can lead to a more stable cash flow and hence reduce the 
chance of bankruptcy because the losses of one firm can be compensated for by the 
income of the other (Lewellen, 1971). Diversification can offer managers and 
employees job security and opportunities for promotion. In addition, films may find it 
easy to promote their products, because customers do not need to worry about after - 
sales service and suppliers believe they can receive their accounts receivable. 
Second, some argue that shareholders can diversify their shares through the stock 
market more easily than could the company through acquisition. Why should one 
company merge with another to stabilise its earnings? Levy and Sarnat (1970)14 argue 
that, in practice, investors find it impossible to diversify all of their securities through 
portfolio because of indivisibility, different transaction costs, the costs of acquiring 
information, and the difficulties of keeping track of numerous investments. 
In addition, the major shareholders or the owner -managers of a company may not 
want to sell their stock to diversify, because this would dilute their ownership and 
generate a tax liability. 
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Third, diversification can uphold the company's reputation which would otherwise 
collapse if the company failed. Reputation is an intangible asset of a company which 
needs nurturing in the form of investments in advertisement, personnel training, 
research and development, and customer loyalty. If a company is failing, its assets 
cannot sell for their value `in use' and the shareholders can only receive a low pay- 
out after liquidation. 
Finally, diversification can provide an opportunity for the company's growth. 
Although the company can expand its scope through internal growth, a merger or 
take -over may enable it to achieve this goal more quickly. Companies in declining 
industries like to pursue new products or technologies to strengthen their enterprises' 
growth prospects. If a firm seeks to enter a new industry or new market and lacks the 
relevant production knowledge and distribution channels, this action can be very 
risky and/or costly. Mergers often provide a rapid and safe way of entering into new 
markets or industries. 
4.2.2 INFORMATION AND SIGNALLING 
The information, or signalling, hypothesis refers to the revaluation of the shares of 
firms owing to new information that is generated during the merger negotiations, the 
tender offer process, or the joint venture planning. Ross (1977)15 discusses the 
signalling idea in financial structure decisions. He assumes that if manager- insiders 
have inside information about their firms which is not possessed by ordinary 
investors, then the choice of a financial structure signals information to the market. 
There are two types of information hypothesis. The first assumes that the 
announcement of merger negotiations or of a tender offer may reveal information 
and/or signal to the market that the target share is undervalued. This may be called 
the "sitting on a gold mine" hypothesis (Bradely, Desai, and Kim, 198316). The 
second argues that the new infollnation encourages the present target management to 
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achieve a more efficient operating strategy on its own. We might say that this is the 
"kick in the pants" explanation. 
Myers and Majluf (1984)17 present asymmetric information actuality and speculate 
that the managers of a company often have better information than do outsiders and 
that both managers and outsiders understand this. When the acquiring firm's 
managers use common stock to pay for another fine, it may be viewed as a signal by 
the acquired firm and others that the acquiring firm's common stock is overvalued 
(Travlos, 1987).18 Hence, the issuing of common stock yields contrary information to 
the bidder's return. The signalling hypothesis also indicates that cash financing is a 
positive signal that the bidder's cash flows and future values are likely to increase. 
Dodd and Ruback (1977)19 and Bradley (1980)20 found that the shareholders of both 
acquiring and acquired firms in cash tender offer realise a significant and positive 
abnormal return. The management of the acquired firm would accept the cash offer if 
they believed that the stock of their firm was undervalued relative to its received 
value (Hansen, 198721; and Brown and Ryngaert, 198922). When companies 
repurchase their shares, the stock market may consider this action as a signal that the 
managers of this company have information that its shares are undervalued and thus 
that it has good growth opportunities in the future. 
4.2.3 MARKET POWER 
Market power means that a single firm or group of firms can control or influence a 
product's price, quantity and characteristics. Enlarging market share means 
increasing the total amount or the proportion of the film relative to other firms in an 
industry. The question is why increasing the firm's relative size should generate 
benefits. If the two firms are operating in the same market, a merger will increase 
market concentration and give the combined firm greater market power. This could 
also be obtained by the internal growth of the film. Why is the outside merger or 
take -over of another business essential to yield benefits? Many possible explanations 
may be offered, but a merger is a much faster way to get market dominance than is a 
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competitive war between the firms, and it has the advantage of not increasing total 
capacity in a market that may not expand very much. Also market power gain means 
an acquiring firm bought an acquired firm for a price which is less than the expected 
post- merger value because after merger the acquired film can increase its product 
prices and this may increase profits. 
Horizontal combinations was be investigated by a competition authority (e.g. a Fair 
Trade Commission).23 In addition, backward vertical integration captures the source 
of raw materials and forward vertical integration secures new markets for the 
company's product. This increases the firm's control over the whole production cycle 
and reduces the compétition it faces. Some economists consider that intense 
concentration may cause some degree of monopoly, while others argue that increased 
concentration is usually the outcome of practical and intense competition. Edwards 
(1955)24 states that the gains from market power are related to the mutual forbearance 
or spheres of influence hypothesis. Stigler (1963)25 considers that in horizontal 
mergers, large firms have greater market share and market power, so they may have 
greater opportunities for collaboration. The anticompetitive activities of mutual 
dealing or tie -in sales will result in market power -related gains (Lone and Halpern, 
1970).26 Singh and Montgomery (1987)27 and Seth (1990)28 indicate that market 
power can earn super normal profits. Pike and Neale (1993)29 consider that it is easier 
to obtain higher earnings if there are fewer competitors. But intense competition 
among large companies in a concentrated industry yields a great variety in prices, 
types of product, quality of product, etc.. So collusion is neither easy and nor always 
feasible (Weston, et al., 1990).3° 
4.2.4 TAX CONSIDERATIONS 
Tax considerations can be an important motive for certain mergers and acquisitions. 
This is particularly important in Taiwan because if the acquiring firm can comply 
with the government's regulatory requirements, it can enjoy some tax advantages. 
These tax advantages include the following: 
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(1) Tax exemption or deferment. Article 13 of the Statute for Upgrading Industries 
states that where a company is specifically approved by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs to go into a merger or consolidation for the purpose of promoting reasonable 
operation and management, the company is exempt from all income tax, stamp tax 
and deed tax payable as a result of such a merger or consolidation (according to 
transaction price) and it may defer its land -value increment tax after the merger or 
consolidation until the time the land is further transferred. 
(2) Carry -over of net operating loss and tax credits. Article 75 of Company Law 
regulates that a continuing company or a new company created by merger or 
consolidation shall succeed to all the rights, powers and privileges of the merged or 
consolidated company. A firm that is highly profitable and in the highest corporate 
tax bracket can acquire a company with large accumulated tax losses, and then use 
those losses to shelter its gain. Similarly, a company with large losses can acquire a 
profitable firm. In Taiwan, the losses of one company can only be offset against 
future profits of the same company (Article 39 of Income Tax Law). The combining 
firm can accommodate the acquiring firm's net operating loss backwards for five 
years. 
(3) Accelerated depreciation. "The service life of instruments and equipment for 
exclusive use in research and development purposes and/or inspection of pilot 
products, or machinery and equipment used for energy saving purposes or as alternate 
energy sources may accelerate their depreciation by two years ". "Based on the 
requirements for adjustment of the industrial structure and the improving the scale of 
operations and methods of production, depreciation of the machinery and equipment 
of specially designated industries may be accelerated by one half of the number of 
years of the service life of the fixed assets" (Article 5 of Statute for Upgrading 
Industries). The tax benefits of the acquired firm may be transferred to the acquiring 
firm after the transaction. 
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(4) Stepped -up asset basis. The acquiring firm can increase or step -up the tax basis of 
the acquired firm's assets to their fair market value rather than the book value and 
take the asset's depreciation charges on this new basis. "The appreciated value of the 
assets of a profit -seeking enterprise resulting from revaluation of assets made in 
accordance with the Income Tax Law shall not be considered taxable income" 
(Article 5 of the Statute for Upgrading Industries). Tax benefits can be created in a 
merger through the revaluation of previously depreciated assets; the advantage 
emerges after the increased depreciation related to this revaluation of assets is gained. 
(5) The variety of future cash flow. Majd and Myers (1984)31 observe that the 
government imposes taxes when the company enjoys earnings but does not share 
its losses when it is in a poor operating situation. So they consider that even though 
the acquiring and acquired firms are in profit at the time of the merger, their 
combination can decrease future tax expenditures when the variety of cash flows is 
lowered after the acquisition. At some future time, one company's earnings can be 
compensated for or decreased by the other's losses which results in tax savings. 
4.2.5 STOCK MARKET CONSIDERATIONS 
It is a special situation in Taiwan that a firm gains benefit by applying for its stock to 
be listed. How can a company apply for listing on the stock market? Basically, it 
needs to demonstrate a good profitability, it must have at least NT$ 200 millions of 
capital stock, a dispersion of shareholdings together with some additional 
requirements.32 If it can meet these requirements and be approved by the government 
(that is the Securities and Exchange Commission), then the public will normally 
believe that this company's operating situation is very good and its future holds 
potential. When the company issues its shares on the stock market, the par value (NT 
$10) of one share may quickly increase. The shareholders of the newly listed 
company can make abnolinal gains from the stock market. At the same time, the 
listed company can also enhance its public image and reputation. That is why many 
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companies actively apply for a listing on the stock market and this motive is one of 
the special merger motives in Taiwanese enterprises. 
According to this argument the purpose of mergers is to generate sufficient capital 
stock such that firms can publicly issue under the Securities and Exchange Law and 
file an application with a stock exchange for listing. The economic development of 
Taiwan is affected by the fact that its stock market entered a bull market in 1988. If a 
firm wants to apply for its stock to be listed, the fiiiu's capital has to be at least NT$ 
200 million. A merger or acquisition is one way for small firms to increase their 
capital stock up to the required level. If they can get approval from the government 
for a listing on the stock market, they gain thereby. 
4.2.6 AGENCY PROBLEMS 
Jensen and Meckling (1976)33 in their famous paper presented "the theory of 
agency ". They considered that an agency problem arises when the principal 
(shareholders) of a company delegate to the agent (managers), who own only a very 
small part of the shares of the firm, power to execute actions on their behalf. The 
former cannot be certain that the latter will perform its tasks in exactly the manner 
the principal would like. The partial ownership may cause the agent to work in 
his /her own interest rather than in the interests of the principal. The self- interest 
motive of agents may weaken the agency relationship. The agency problem does not 
occur if an elaborate contract can be drawn up specifying all the duties of the 
managers and if the monitoring mechanism works well. In fact, it is difficult to 
specify all the conditions which managers ought to meet in their entirely. Jensen and 
Meckling considered that the costs involved in writing such provisions and the costs 
of enforcing them may not be insignificant. The limitations of the manager taking 
optimal actions may also decrease the profitability of the film. 
Myers and Majluf (1984)34 mentioned that the managers of the firm often have better 
information that outsiders do not have. The efforts of the agent are impossible or very 
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expensive to supervise. Strong and Waterson (1987)35 and Besanko, Dranove, and 
Shanley (1996)36 present the problems of informational asymmetries underlying 
agency theory, i.e. the moral hazard problem. A moral hazard problem arises when 
the agent does not always take the action that the principal would wish because (s)he 
knows the principal lacks information to assess his /her effort. After all, the principal 
and the agent usually have divergent aims. Shareholders may want to maximise 
profits, while managers may be more pre- occupied with their own job security. 
Managers may take fewer risks than the shareholders would consider desirable and 
they may work less hard than the shareholders would wish. This self- interest problem 
implied by the moral hazard cannot be prevented by contract. The gains of the 
managers from moral hazard phenomena are usually at the expense of the 
shareholders. 
Lambert and Larcker (1985)37 point out that there are three conflicts between the 
shareholders and the managers. First, if managers are given some discretion, they 
may want to get non -pecuniary benefits from their actions (e.g. acquisitions of new 
companies or access to executive limousines, etc.). The second potential conflict 
relates to risk attitude. The shareholders are open to diversifying their portfolio of 
assets to reduce their risk. The manager's income is closely associated with the 
performance or earnings of his /her own company and his /her human capital is more 
concentrated in the company he /she works for than are shareholders' capital. So in 
any company's decision which involves some risk, the managers may have a more 
risk -averse attitude than do other shareholders. Third, in highly competitive business, 
the manager is focused on short -run income or earnings to indicate his /her ability, 
while the shareholders are more concerned with the company's longer -time interests. 
Most large companies' shareholders are broadly dispersed. How can they act together 
to control any agency problems? In reality, agency problems may be efficiently 
controlled through some management and market mechanisms. Strong and Waterson 
(1987) consider two approaches to solving agency problems. First, shareholders can 
replace managers with others who are prepared to co- operate more closely with them. 
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Second, they can design a remuneration package to encourage managers to act in 
shareholders' interests. 
Fama (1980)38 states that managers face both the discipline and the opportunities 
provided by the markets (within and outside the company) when their perforniance is 
being appraised. The managers invest a substantial amount of their human capital in 
the firm. The rewards for their human capital, signalled by the managerial labour 
market, depend on the success or failure of the film. The company's shareholders 
provide important but indirect signals to the managerial labour market when they 
evaluate the company's management. Although an individual security holder may not 
have a strong interest in seriously monitoring the company's managers, they have a 
strong interest in the values of the company's securities. When they buy a company's 
securities, it reflects their confidence that their risk- taking will bear fruit. The 
remuneration package can be tied to the manager's performance through bonuses, 
promotion and stock options (Besanko, Dranove and Shanley, 1996). 
Fama and Jensen (1983)39 discuss how the stock market offers an external 
monitoring device on managers' performance because stock prices are visible signals 
which reflect the overall ability of, and decisions made by, managers. Low stock 
prices bring pressure on managers to work hard and to act in the company's interests. 
Strong and Waterson (1987) argue that shareholders are not the only parties in the 
principal -agent relationship. The lenders, especially banks, also demand that some 
conditions must be met before granting and maintaining loans. The banks or other 
lenders may have different objectives from the shareholders. The fornier are 
concerned with the company's prospects and the probability of default, whilst the 
latter are interested in the average return on their assets. As a result, banks as 
principals are concerned to deflect managers from taking on high risk projects. These 
constraints may sometimes conflict with the interests of shareholders. From the 
managers' viewpoint, bankruptcy may be a much more important constraint than the 
shareholders and banks consider it to be, because company liquidation or insolvency 
is likely to be viewed as a signal by future principals or shareholders of incompetent 
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management. If the above mentioned mechanisms are not enough to effectively 
control agency problems, the take -over mechanism acts as a last resort to the 
management control problem (Manne, 1965).40 If managers are not using assets to 
maximise the shareholders' value because of inefficiency or agency problems, a 
merger or take -over is an effective method for effectively reallocating assets and 
making better use of resources. 
4.2.7 FREE CASH FLOW 
Jensen (1986)41 first identified the "free cash flow" hypothesis when he discussed the 
problem of agency costs. Free cash flow refers to the operating cash flow which 
exceeds that required to pay for all the profitable investments available to the firm; 
that is, for financing all projects that have positive net present values. 
Jensen considers that when a fiiili generates free cash flow, a conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders over the fate of the surplus cash emerges. This free 
cash flow should be paid out to shareholders if the firm is to maximise its 
shareholders' wealth. Unfortunately, managers may not want to pay free cash flow to 
the shareholders, because (1) any decrease of the resources under their control means 
that their power is reduced, (2) and, if they return surplus funds, they may need to 
recall it at some point to finance another project if some beneficial investment 
opportunity is identified. Another motive relating to the use of surplus funds for 
merger purposes may be based on the interest of shareholders. King (1989)42 indicates 
that the tax system can affect the level of acquisitions. If capital gains' taxes are lower 
than income tax on dividend income, then the shareholder may favour using cash to 
acquire another firm or to repurchase his /her own shares. According to Article 167 of 
Company Law "a company shall neither redeem nor purchase its own shares nor accept 
any of them as collateral under any pledge agreement ". If a company is not able to buy 
its own shares, it can buy someone else's instead. At present, securities transaction 
gains are ceased to levy commencing from January 1, 1990.43 So the acquiring firm can 
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exploit its surplus cash to transact another target firm to substitute capital gains' taxes 
for ordinary income taxes. 
Jensen also states that fines have large excess cash when they enjoy good 
performance and do not payout to shareholders or redeploy the cash by acquisition. 
Such films are often the target for take -over by other firms. If managers cannot use 
excess cash to maximise the firm's value, then resources are not being efficiently 
allocated. A merger or take -over may be brought by those who can effectively use the 
surplus funds and make better use of resources. 
4.3 THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE RELATING TO THE MOTIVES FOR 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE US AND TAIWAN 
4.3.1 EFFICIENCY THEORIES 
4.3.1.1 US EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
The empirical findings of the US studies basically support the theory of synergy. 
Chatterjee (1986)44 devised an event study to analyse cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) and dollar gains for acquiring firms, targets and rivals of targets. He compared 
three classes of resources that contribute to the creation of value. These resources are 
cost of capital related (resulting in financial synergy), cost of production related 
(resulting in operational synergy), and price related (resulting in collusive synergy). 
He concludes that relative size appears to be an indicator of financial synergy. If 
financial synergy can be fully exploited (e.g. if the relative size of the acquiring firm 
is large), then the merger- related gains will be greater than those obtained from 
operational synergy. Shelton (1988)45 built on the concepts of related -complementary 
and related -supplementary developed by Salter and Weinhold (1979).46 He divided 
four strategic fits -- unrelated, related supplementary, related complementary and 
identical -- between a target and a bidder to explain the variance in value created in 
mergers. He found that acquisitions which permit the bidder access to new markets 
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management. If the above mentioned mechanisms are not enough to effectively 
control agency problems, the take -over mechanism acts as a last resort to the 
management control problem (Manne, 1965).40 If managers are not using assets to 
maximise the shareholders' value because of inefficiency or agency problems, a 
merger or take -over is an effective method for effectively reallocating assets and 
making better use of resources. 
4.2.7 FREE CASH FLOW 
Jensen (1986)41 first identified the "free cash flow" hypothesis when he discussed the 
problem of agency costs. Free cash flow refers to the operating cash flow which 
exceeds that required to pay for all the profitable investments available to the firm; 
that is, for financing all projects that have positive net present values. 
Jensen considers that when a firm generates free cash flow, a conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders over the fate of the surplus cash emerges. This free 
cash flow should be paid out to shareholders if the firm is to maximise its 
shareholders' wealth. Unfortunately, managers may not want to pay free cash flow to 
the shareholders, because (1) any decrease of the resources under their control means 
that their power is reduced, (2) and, if they return surplus funds, they may need to 
recall it at some point to finance another project if some beneficial investment 
opportunity is identified. Another motive relating to the use of surplus funds for 
merger purposes may be based on the interest of shareholders. King (1989)42 indicates 
that the tax system can affect the level of acquisitions. If capital gains' taxes are lower 
than income tax on dividend income, then the shareholder may favour using cash to 
acquire another firm or to repurchase his /her own shares. According to Article 167 of 
Company Law "a company shall neither redeem nor purchase its own shares nor accept 
any of them as collateral under any pledge agreement ". If a company is not able to buy 
its own shares, it can buy someone else's instead. At present, securities transaction 
gains are ceased to levy commencing from January 1, 1990.43 So the acquiring firm can 
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between 1974 and 1979. He used postal questionnaires, interviews, companies' 
prospectuses, etc. to collect his data. He found that the most important merger 
motives were to reap the benefits of economies of scale, to improve operating 
management and to increase growth. This indicates that operating synergy is a major 
consideration for these listed companies. 
Wu Y. C. (1982) 
Wu analysed data from the Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
covering firms which applied for merger approval between 1975 and 1980. Fifteen 
firms answered the questionnaire and 17 films were interviewed. The dominant 
merger motives were to improve economies of scale, to increase corporate financing, 
to diversify and to increase market share - -- indicating that operating and financial 
synergy are the most important factors at play. 
Wu, C. M. (1984) 
Wu analysed two relatively significant mergers where the acquiring firms were both 
listed companies in his study. These two transactions occurred in 1977 and 1981 
respectively. The principal merger motives of the first case were to enhance market 
competitiveness, to overcome corporate financial difficulties, to improve operating 
efficiency and also as a response to government encouragement. The situation of the 
second case was that the acquired fiiiii was experiencing operational and financial 
difficulties but had new and good machinery and equipment. Meanwhile, the 
acquiring firm wanted to exploit the target firm's machinery and equipment to 
expand its production scale and improve the acquired firm's operating efficiency. 
The study indicates that operating and financial synergy were the most important 
motives behind the mergers. 
Sung (1989) 
Sung selected 500 manufacturing companies for his postal sample and achieved 67 
effective respondents. Only 20 of these companies had been merged with or had 
acquired another company. He used T -tests to examine the importance of the motive 
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for mergers and acquisitions. He found that management cost reductions, combining 
personnel and technology to improve R &D, controlling marketing channels and 
acquiring raw materials were significant motives. Achieving economies of scale was 
an important merger motive but was not statistically significant. He also found that 
tax considerations were the least important merger motive in his sample. 
Lin (1990) 
Lin's study was based on lists from the Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs together with reports from newspapers and magazines about 
merger and take -over activities in the period 1985 -89. The effective postal 
questionnaire response eases were 42. He found that the most important merger 
motives were enlarging the enterprise's profitability, increasing the firm's growth, 
enjoying economies of scale, promoting reasonable operations and management and 
enhancing the firm's competitiveness. His findings indicate that operating synergy is 
a major consideration in merger activities. 
Chen, C. R. (1990) 
Chen's study focused on one acquisition event which happened in January 1990. He 
reviewed this case and found that operating and financial synergy, together with a 
desire to apply for listing on the stock market, were the most apparent merger 
motives. 
Wu, A. N. (1992) 
Wu analysed 13 acquiring companies which had been involved in a merger or take- 
over event between 1985 and 1988 - -- all of them listed firms and applying for 
approval by the Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. To improve 
the reliability of her findings, she used financial statements and companies' 
prospectuses as her data. She found that the primary motivations were to pursue 
monopoly power, to increase market share and to achieve economies of scale. Thus, 




As his research sample Yang chose the top 1,000 Taiwanese manufactures, with the 
exception of 10 government -controlled enterprises. There were 94 valid 
questionnaires, i.e. 9.50% of those initially dispatched. These companies included 
ones which had merged with or acquired another company between 1979 and 1995. 
The findings show that strengthening the enterprise's growth, promoting operational 
and management modernisation, diversifying, increasing market share and achieving 
economies of scale are the most important motives for mergers and acquisitions. This 
means that efficiency theories concerning market power and diversification can 
explain merger and acquisition motivations. 
These studies indicate that almost all previous empirical research into the merger 
motives of Taiwanese enterprises use just simple weighted average or univariate tests 
on limited samples. Wu, C. M. (1984) and Chen, C. R. (1990) took a case study 
approach (with just one or two samples) to analyse their research questions. Their 
results cannot be applied to the general population. Huang (1977), Chang (1980), 
Wu, Y. C. (1982) and Lin (1990) used questionnaires to analyse their data, but their 
questions were not based on theories of motives for mergers and acquisitions. 
Consequently, their results cannot for the most part prove or critique the theory. 
Yang's (1996) study covers 17 years - -- a period when Taiwan's macroeconomic 
environment changed significantly and where Yang's respondents might not have 
been personally involved in the acquisition event. Thus, it is not easy to discover the 
real and detailed motives for mergers which occurred over 10 years prior to the data 
collection period. Most of these studies did not use statistical tests to prove their 
results. The findings of these studies are sometimes unclear and sometimes 
downright contradictory. 
Empirical research indicates that the financial synergy motive is weaker than the 
operational synergy motive, and is not the primary impetus for mergers and 
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acquisitions in Taiwan. While financial synergy emerges as a theme from these 
studies it is not as significant as operational synergy. 
The empirical studies used questionnaires or case studies, except for Wu, A. N. who 
used financial statement data to analyse take -overs. In questionnaires or face -to -face 
interviews, questions were pitched to senior manager. As we have seen, operational 
synergy emerged as a significant motive. The reasons may be as follows: 
1. There are about 1,000,000 companies in Taiwan, but only about 1,400 with assets 
over NT$ 200,000,000 in 1995 (the exchange rate of Pound Sterling to New Taiwan 
Dollar is about 1:42).57 'This means that most firms are small or medium -sized. If 
they can merge with other companies, this tactic may help them achieve economies 
of scale. 
2. In Taiwan most mergers and acquisitions are horizontal. Horizontal mergers are 
more likely to yield operational synergy than other types of merger. Empirical studies 
give support to the importance of operational synergy, but they do not show the same 
synergetic results in production, marketing, research and development, etc. 
4.3.2 MARKET POWER 
4.3.2.1 US EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Jensen (1984)58 combined evidence from four studies of mergers and his analysis 
indicates that merger gains do not come from the merger's creation of monopoly 
market power but from its productive economies and synergy. If companies gain 
from market power, their industrial competitors can benefit from higher prices, and 
enjoy a significant increase in their stock prices and profits. Where the Federal Trade 
Commission (FI'C) or the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department cancel or 
challenge the merger, the rivals' stock prices then fall. However, the evidence 
indicates that competitors' stock prices do not fall on the mere announcement of 
70 
antitrust prosecution or of cancellation of the acquisition. Feinberg (1985)59 tested 
the mutual forbearance theory of conglomerate behaviour at both organisational and 
industrial levels. He found that organisations have a significant effect in increasing 
price -cost margins. Firms may collude after a merger but this is not easy to achieve 
without mutual forbearance. Eckbo (1983)60 examined abnormal returns to major 
horizontal competitors of target firms around merger proposal and antitrust complaint 
announcements in order to test the hypothesis that horizontal mergers gains come 
from collusion. The collusion hypothesis holds that rivals of the combining firms can 
expect to benefit from the news of a horizontal merger which significantly decreases 
output and increases product prices and/or lowers factor prices. When the subsequent 
news comes out that the merger is to be challenged by the antitrust enforcement 
agencies, mergers then reverse the expectations of monopoly benefits and cause 
rivals to display negative abnormal performance. Eckbo found that the observed 
sequence of abnormal returns does not conform to the pattern predicted by the 
collusion hypothesis. There is little evidence indicating that the mergers have 
collusive, anticompetitive effects. Stillman (1983)61 uses stock returns from a sample 
of rivals to 11 horizontal mergers attempted between 1964 and 1972 which were 
challenged by the government (the Justice Department and the FTC). His study tests 
the hypothesis that horizontal mergers must result in higher product prices and hence 
increases profits for rivals to the merging films. His results indicate that there is no 
clear support for the existence of large gains. 
In conclusion, the result of US empirical studies indicate that the market power 
hypothesis is relevant in some situations but is not of great concern. 
4.3.2.2 TAIWANESE EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Empirical studies of market power in Taiwan have mainly concentrated on the 
relationship of mergers to market share (Huang, 197762; Chang ,198063; Wu, Y. C., 
198264; Wu, C. M., 19846'; Sung, 198966; Chen, C. R., 199067; Lin, 199068; Wu, A. 
N., 199269; Yang, 19967°). Findings indicate that the motive of market power is 
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sometimes unimportant (Huang, 1977; Chang ,1980; Wu, Y. C., 1982; Wu, C. M., 
1984; Chen, C. R., 1990; Lin, 1990) yet at other times it is important or statistically 
significant (Sung, 1989; Wu, A. N., 1992; Yang, 1996). 
Huang (1977) used a simple weighted average method to analyse merger motives and 
found that increasing market share is a fairly unimportant impetus. Chang (1980) also 
used this method to understand the reasons underpinning mergers. He discovered that 
fostering business growth is one factor behind acquisitions but it is not the most 
significant goal. Wu, Y. C. (1982) applied the same statistical method and produced 
findings consistent with Huang's and Chang's. Although increasing market share is 
one merger motive, it is not the decisive reason. Wu, C. M. (1984) examined two 
cases to study merger motivation and noted that that market share is not significant. 
Sung (1989) found this motive significant at 10% significance level. Chen, C. R. 
(1990), taking a case study approach, found that the market share motivation did not 
feature in that particular case. Lin (1990) listed 18 motives for merger and 
acquisitions and found that increasing market share scored 8th. The average value of 
market share motivation can be classified as being of "minor importance ". Lin also 
used factor analysis to identify the structure of the motives for mergers and 
acquisitions. He found that acquiring market share, distribution channels and know - 
how was one of the main drivers underpinning mergers and acquisitions in 
Taiwanese enterprises. Wu, A. N. (1992) analysed listed companies' financial 
statements to test the motivation of market share. Her results show that the market 
share of acquiring firms increases significantly post- transaction. This indicates that 
the pursuit of market share is an important merger motive for Taiwanese listed 
companies. Yang (1996) analysed the top 1000 manufacturing companies and found 
that increasing market share is an important motivation for mergers and acquisitions. 
Yang also used factor analysis to extract the main constructions of the motives for 
mergers and acquisitions. His results indicate that enterprises hold an "optimistic 
growth strategy" as a result of their business combinations. 
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Most of these empirical studies aimed to investigate the issue of increasing market 
share and used simple weighted average or /and factor analysis to analyse their data. 
Huang (1977), Chang (1980), Wu, Y. C. (1982), Wu, C. M. (1984), Sung (1989), 
Chen, C. R. (1990), Lin (1990) and Wu, A. N. (1992) extrapolated from very few 
samples (1 to 42 cases) to analyse their research questions. Their sample sizes are not 
big enough to enable further or in -depth research, and their results may not be 
generalisable to the whole population of companies. Yang's (1996) is the only study 
working on more than 42 but his research period is so long (17 years) that his 
respondents may not really remember or be able to reconstruct the true motives for 
mergers. Overall the findings of the above studies are sometimes equivocal and 
sometimes completely contradictory. 
Normally, it is not easy to draw conclusions as to the relative importance of different 
motives for mergers and acquisitions when questionnaires or face to face questions 
and answers are used. Although the government encourages small and medium 
enterprises to merge to increase their economies of scale, improve their research and 
development, etc. so as to face the more stringent competition of domestic or 
international markets, firms do not always like to own up to the motive of market 
share as their primary consideration. If a firm admits that its motive is to make 
monopolistic or oligopolistic gains, its activities may become a topic of unwelcome 
public attention or may lead to an investigation by antitrust authorities (The Fair 
Trade Commission). Therefore the importance of this motive may be underestimated. 
Because Wu, A. N. (1992) used financial statements to examine companies' merger 
motives, her results may be more objective. But her sample (13 films) is too small for 
our purposes here. The low proportion of films involved in mergers and take -overs in 
her study may not be representative of Taiwanese enterprises' mergers and take- 
overs, taken as a whole. 
4.3.3 TAX CONSIDERATIONS 
4.3.3.1 US EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
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Tax considerations have been considered an important factor behind mergers and 
acquisitions in the US. Smirlock, Beatty, and Majd (1986)71 analyse and review the 
results of many previous empirical studies relating to tax -related incentives and their 
affect on merger activity and suggest that tax code provisions are a significant 
influence. These tax incentives include accelerated depreciation, carryover of net 
operating losses, carryover of R &D credits, and interest deductions. Smirlock et al. 
also find that the variability of the merged company's cash flow will be diminished if 
one firm is less risky than the other, even if they are entirely correlated. A decrease in 
the variability of cash flows implies that the probability of default on debt payments 
is reduced and this may lead to an increase in debt capacity in a merger (Lewellen, 
1971).72 The deductibility of interest payments on debt indicates that increases in 
debt capacity will enlarge the firm's value because the combined firm can borrow 
more than the two firms taken separately, or the combined firm can borrow the same 
amount at a lower interest rate. Auerbach and Reishus (1986)73 estimated the use of 
tax losses and credits and found that tax benefits were not a significant factor in the 
majority (80 per cent) of large mergers. Majd and Myers (1984)74 found that even if 
both companies concurrently enjoy profits they can reduce their future tax liability 
following the merger. One company's profits can be reduced or offset by the other's 
losses. This results in tax savings. 
4.3.3.2 TAIWANESE EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
The results of empirical studies indicate that tax considerations are not important or 
have not proved statistically significant (Huang, 197775; Chang, 198076; Wu, Y. C., 
198277; Sung, 198978; Lin, 199079; Wu, A. N., 1992ß0; Yang, 199681). 
Huang (1977) lists 16 possible merger motives and posed them to bidding firms. He 
found that "tax benefits" is not an important motive. Chang (1980) found that "tax 
deduction and government encouragement" was only of minor importance. Wu, Y. C. 
(1982) indicates that "tax deduction, exemption or deferment" is a "less important" 
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acquisition factor. Sung (1989) shows that the motive of tax deductions or 
deferments is of the least importance and is not significant. Lin (1990) offered 18 
potential combination reasons to his acquiring firms for their comment and found 
that "tax deduction, exemption, deferment and government encouragement" emerged 
in a lowly 16th place. Wu, A. N.'s (1992) results indicate that "tax deduction or 
exemption benefits" is not significant between listed acquiring and non -transaction 
firms. Yang (1996) finds that "enjoying tax benefits from the regulation of the Statute 
for Encouragement of Investment" comes 15th out of 18 possible merger motives. 
On balance, tax considerations are not an important merger motive for Taiwanese 
enterprises. Sung's study even found that tax considerations were of least relevance 
to mergers and acquisitions in Taiwanese companies. These results are puzzling. If 
firms do not have a tax motive, why do they apply for merger approval to the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs? If they do not especially want tax exemptions or 
deductions, they may simply merge on their own initiative and bypass the need to 
prepare documents and spend money to gain approval. Two alternative 
interpretations may be placed on the empirical findings. 
1. Tax considerations may not be the primary reason for merging. When a firm 
decides a merging strategy, it naturally chooses the method that most reduces tax. It 
is not the purpose of the merger, but just one of its consequences, that the tax 
liabilities of the firm are reduced. 
2. Most of the empirical studies collected their data by questionnaires or face -to -face 
interviews. These methods carry the weakness that respondents' answers may not 
reveal the real reason for mergers and acquisitions. The company may claim other 
reasons (e.g. economies of scale or diversification) to answer the question. In 
particular, respondents may not like to admit that tax exemptions or deductions are 
the primary reason for their formal applications. The government does not encourage 
small and medium enterprises to merge for the purpose of offering them tax 
incentives (Article 38, Statute for Encouragement of Investment). 
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4.3.4 STOCK MARKET CONSIDERATION 
4.3.4.1 US EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
In Taiwan a firm gains from applying for its stock to be listed. US empirical research 
does not reveal any stock market motive for US mergers and acquisitions. 
4.3.4.2 TAIWANESE EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Lin (1990) first analysed acquiring firms' questionnaires and found that stock market 
considerations emerged as an unimportant merger motive (17th of the 18 motives). 
Second, he compared the high and low post- transaction operating performance firms' 
merger motives and found that the difference between these two groups concerning 
the issue of stock market considerations was not significant. Wu, A. N. (1992) 
examined the dates of acquiring companies' listing (i.e. whether before or after 1 
August 1985) and used a Point Biserial Correlation Test to estimate stock market 
considerations. The results were not statistically significant. Yang (1996) found that 
the average value of stock market considerations was the least (placed last out of the 
18 merger motives) important merger factor. In the single case study of Chen, C. R. 
(1990), the result was significant. Two newly- founded films applied for listing on the 
stock market in 1989. This was a bull market period in Taiwan's stock market. 
Approval by the Securities and Exchange Committee meant that the firms earned 
giant gains from the stock market. 
The Taiwanese stock market entered a bull phase in 1988. If a firm could have its 
stock listed, shareholders could gain from the stock market price rises. The empirical 
studies indicated different results on this issue. As Chen's (1990) work is confined to 
one case, his findings cannot be generalised to other companies. Lin (1990), Wu 
(1992), and Yang's (1996) studies have larger samples (13 cases to 94 cases) and all 
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of these indicate that the motive of stock market considerations is of the least 
importance or is not statistically significant. 
If an enterprise's application for listing on the stock market is approved by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, it can usually earn extra benefits from the stock 
market. However, such probable stock market gains would not be made explicit in the 
fine's application to the government for permission to merge. The government has set 
certain criteria for companies wishing to apply for a listing on the stock market.82 
First, the company has to have been in existence for over five full years. Second, the 
amount of capital stock for the most recent two years must exceed NT$ 200,000,000. 
Third, the operating profits and before -tax net profits for the most recent three years 
must be more than 5% of the amount of paid -in capital in its final accounts. Fourth, 
the before -profit- distribution net worth for the most recent year must represent one - 
third (1/3) or more of the total assets. Fifth, the number of holders of name -bearing 
stock certificates must not be less than two thousand (2,000). These requirements are 
not easy to meet and this may be another reason why previous empirical studies 
indicate that stock market considerations are unimportant merger motives. 
The limitation on the amount of capital stock (at least NT$ 200,000,000) indicates 
that if the combining firm's capital does not exceed NT$ 200,000,000, then there is 
no stock market consideration. Lin (1990) did not further classify the firms' capital in 
his study so his result may be vague. Wu (1992) used only listed companies as the 
research sample, so the comparison of stock market considerations may not be 
correct. As Yang (1996) examined the top 1,000 manufacturing companies, the 
enterprises' capital in his sample is inclined to be very large. Thus, his conclusion 
may well be unrepresentative of all mergers. 
4.3.5 AGENCY PROBLEMS 
Agency problems often occur when managers own just a small proportion of the 
shares of a company. While shareholders can use a portfolio to diversify their risk, 
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the manager has human capital which is uniquely or largely related to the company 
for which s/he works and so can not diversify his /her employment risk. The manager 
might pursue sales- maximisation, growth- maximisation or any of a large number of 
personal goals at the expense of the interest of shareholders. S /he can make personal 
gains from mergers. Marris (1964)ß3, Mueller (1969)84 and others have presented 
evidence which show that the rewards to managers are more closely and positively 
related to the size as opposed to the profits of their firm. Lewellen and Huntsman 
(1970)85 found that company profits have a strong and persistent influence on 
managers' rewards, whereas sales seem to have little impact. 
4.3.5.1 US EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
The US empirical studies support the theory of agency. Amihud and Lev (1981)86 
selected 309 of Fortune's 500 largest industrial US firms which had the required data 
on sales, income, and equity for the entire period and checked the FTC Statistical 
Report on Mergers and Acquisitions to determine the number and type of 
acquisitions carried out during the period 1961 -1970. Amihud and Lev consider that 
managers' income mainly comes from their employment institute. Hence, the risk to 
managers' income is discrete from the firm's risk. Risk- averse managers may 
promote conglomerate mergers to steady the firm's income stream, to diversify their 
employment risk, and even to avoid the occurrence of bankruptcy. The empirical 
findings show that manager -controlled firms engage in more conglomerate 
acquisitions than do owner -controlled firms. The operations of manager -controlled 
companies are also more diversified than owner -controlled companies. The results 
are consistent with the argument that managers engage in conglomerate mergers so as 
to decrease their undiversifiable employment risk. These findings are consistent with 
the managerial motive. Walsh's (1988)87 research comprised an experimental group 
of 55 acquired companies and a control group of 30 matched companies not involved 
in any merger and acquisition activity over the years 1975 to 1979. The control group 
of companies were of comparable asset size and the average ages of the managers in 
each sample were not significantly different. Walsh analysed the turnover of top 
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management to gauge how a merger or acquisition affects the management of a target 
company. He followed the employment situation of acquired firms' top managers for 
5 years from the date of the merger and found a significantly higher rate of turnover 
of acquired company's top managers than of non -merged firms' top managers. 
4.3.5.2 TAIWANESE EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
There are some studies which mention and explain the theory of agency (Chen, C. R. 
199088; Lin, 199089; Wu, A. N. 19929°; Yang 199691). Chen, C. R. studied a single 
firm where the owner was also the manager. On this basis, he assumed that agency 
problems did not exist in this company. Lin considered that managers thought more 
about their own interests than the company's interests when merging, and that 
managers would sacrifice stockholders' interests to achieve their aims (of risk 
diversification or of more power in a larger company). His questionnaire -based study 
indicated that these results are statistically significant. Wu, A. N. took the 
shareholding of managers (including managers, board directors, and shareholding of 
over 10% of major shareholders) as a measured variable. This study hypothesised 
that the more managers have a shareholding stake, the more motivation there will be 
for mergers. She tested the empire -building theory and found that the result was not 
statistically significant. Wu, A. N. further tested for differences between acquiring 
and non -acquiring finis. This empirical study indicated that differences between 
acquiring and non -acquiring fiiius are not statistically significant. But Wu's 
hypothesis is apparently in conflict with the theory of agency problems. Agency 
problems arise when managers own just a small part of the shares of a company. The 
fewer managers sharehold, the more agency problems will arise. Yang found that the 
motive of improving managers' social position is an important merger consideration 
and inferred that agency problems exist. 
Chen, C. R. took one case study to examine agency problems, but his conclusion 
cannot be generalised to other firms. Lin's agency problem variables include 
increasing the enterprise's growth, promoting operational and managerial 
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rationalisation, diversifying risk, increasing market share, acquiring brand marks and 
patents, etc. These variables are also potentially associated with "shareholders' 
profit -maximisation ", so it is not reasonable to infer that managers of acquiring firms 
engage in mergers and acquisitions so as to maximise their personal gains at the 
expense of shareholders. These studies do not permit a decisive conclusion to be 
drawn because Lin's and Yang's studies support the idea of agency problems whilst 
Chen's, C. J. and Wu's, A. N. do not. 
Theories and empirical studies of the motives for mergers and acquisitions in the US 
and Taiwan are presented in Tables 4 -2 and 4 -3 respectively. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
As the economic environments, governmental regulations, and character of business 
differ between in the US and Taiwan, so the relative importance of each motive for 
mergers and acquisitions varies between the two countries. Here we summarise the 
empirical findings and provide a brief conclusion. 
1. According to the studies, both Taiwan and the US support the hypothesis of 
operational synergy. Operational synergy may be the most significant motive for 
mergers and acquisitions in Taiwan. The average size of Taiwanese enterprises is 
smaller than those in the US and most Taiwanese mergers and acquisitions are 
horizontal. If Taiwanese firms do merge, it is easy for them to increase the number of 
products they offer and to achieve economies of scales. Most of the empirical studies 
concerning this motive and relating to Taiwan deploy case studies and/or 
questionnaire surveys. The conclusions of case studies cannot be applied to the 
general population. The questions posed in some of the postal surveys were not based 
on theories of motives for mergers and acquisitions. Consequently, the results cannot 
usually prove or refute the theory. 
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2. The empirical studies relating to the US give stronger support to financial synergy 
arguments than to operational or managerial synergy ones. The empirical studies of 
Taiwan point the opposite picture. In Taiwan, issues of financial synergy are not 
significant. The difference in results may be accounted for by differences in the 
banking or financing systems of each country. 
3. The results of US and Taiwanese empirical studies indicate that the market power 
hypothesis is relevant in some situations but is not of great concern. Typically, 
enterprises do not care to admit that market share is their major merger motive, 
especially when their views are elicited through interviews or postal surveys. If a firm 
admits that its merger motive is to make monopolistic or oligopolistic gains, the firm 
it may invite censorious comment from the public or may lead to an investigation by 
antitrust authorities. Therefore, the importance of this motive may be underestimated. 
Though merging firms may try to achieve market power through collusion, it is, in 
fact, difficult to do so. The reasons are as follows. 
(1) Legal limitations and government supervision. In the US, the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (1982), the Hart -Scott -Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act (1976), 
the Celler- Kefauver Act (1950), the Wheeler -Lea Act (1938), the Clayton Act (1914) 
and the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890) work to supervise business activity so as to 
prevent monopolistic or oligopolistic behaviour. In Taiwan the Fair Trade Law 
(1991) restricts certain types of business behaviour. If firms intend to collude so as to 
monopolise a market or product, the regulatory authorities may investigate and they 
have the power to prohibit any such actions. 
(2) International free trade. In a closed economy, a monopolistic or oligopolistic 
market may easily emerge. In an open economy, international competition will make 
this more difficult because monopolistic profits may be reduced by competition from 
imports. 
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4. Though tax regulations differ between the US and Taiwan, the empirical findings 
in both countries suggest that this is not a significant concern. The evidence indicates 
that tax considerations are not a major motive for mergers and acquisitions. This is a 
puzzling result for Taiwan. If firms do not have the motive of securing tax 
advantages, why do they apply for merger approval to the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs? If they do not want to get tax exemptions and deductions, they can merge 
independently and do not need to prepare documents and expend resources to gain 
approval. Two alternative interpretations may be placed on the empirical studies. (1) 
Tax considerations may not be the primary reason for mergers. That is, when a firm 
decides to merge for other reasons, it will also naturally choose the method that most 
reduces tax. (2) Firms may not be willing to acknowledge their tax motive. 
5. In Taiwan studies on the benefits of a stock market listing yield differing 
conclusions. Chen's study indicates it is significant, but the findings of a single case 
study cannot be generalised to all mergers and acquisitions. Wu, A. N. used listed 
companies and Yang examined the top 1,000 manufacturing companies; both found 
that stock market considerations are not an important merger motive. These firms' 
assets are apparently larger than most so their results are likely to contain a bias. In 
addition, even if stock market considerations were a genuine concern, it is unlikely 
that films would make this explicit in their bids to government for permission to 
merge. The government sets certain criteria which firms must comply with if they are 
to gain a listing on the stock market. These requirements are not easy to meet. This 
may provide another reason why previous empirical studies indicate that stock 
market considerations are the least important merger motive in Taiwan. 
6. US empirical studies support the idea of agency problems in that country. 
Taiwanese findings are different. The premise of agency problems is that the owner 
and the manager are not the same person. The family business is still very popular in 
Taiwan such that the interests of the owner are synonymous the interests of the 
manager. Thus, the agency problem theory is not especially relevant in Taiwan. 
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CHAPTER 5 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE MOTIVES FOR MERGERS 
AND ACQUISITIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we analyse the motives for mergers and acquisitions in Taiwanese 
enterprises between 1990 and 1995. The relative frequency of different reasons is 
discussed in the following section. The relative importance of different acquisition 
motives may vary with the size of the acquiring firms. So in the third section the 
relative importance of different motives as held by four subgroups of acquiring films 
is discussed. The acquiring enterprises' merger motives classified by business group 
is described in the fourth section. These are then tabulated against the type of 
transaction -- horizontal, vertical, congeneric and conglomerate --and the results are 
presented in the fifth section. The sixth section describes the correlation between the 
reasons for mergers and acquisitions and the total pre- transaction assets of the 
acquiring enterprises. The correlation between merger motives and changes in the 
assets of acquiring enterprises following the transaction are discussed in the seventh 
section. Factor analysis of the many reasons for mergers and acquisitions is presented 
in the eighth section. The final section offers some conclusions. 
5.2 THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT MERGER MOTIVES 
TO ACQUIRING FIRMS 
This section seeks to elucidate which merger and acquisition motives assumed greatest 
importance for acquiring enterprises in Taiwan between 1990 and 1995. It is also 
necessary to establish whether certain merger incentives such as tax considerations or 
applying for a listing on the stock market play a part in shaping the decision. 
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Questionnaire responses are used as the basis for identifying the motives for mergers 
and acquisitions of acquiring firms. 
Table 5 -2 -1 indicates that the four most important reasons were reducing 
administrative expense, combining complementary resources, achieving economies of 
scale and improving finance management efficiency. The average values were 2.322, 
2.596, 2.629 and 2.800 respectively. These motives ranged between `fairly important' 
and `important'. This indicates that operational synergy is a fairly important merger 
motive for Taiwanese enterprises. The results echo those found in previous empirical 
studies in Taiwan (Huang, 19771; Chang, 19802; Wu, Y. C., 19823; Lin, 19904; Wu, A. 
N., 19925; Yang, 19966). 
The least important incentives were acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright 
technologies, controlling material resources, buying below replacement cost, and 
diversifying risk. Their average scores were 3.934, 3.748, 3.722 and 3.679 respectively 
which can be classified as `slightly important'. The results indicate that the economies 
of vertical integration, buying below replacement cost and diversification are not 
important merger motives for Taiwanese enterprises between 1990 and 1995. 
The average values of increased market power and enhanced market competitiveness 
were 2.869 and 2.864 respectively. This indicates that market factors are important 
motives for Taiwanese enterprises' acquisitions. Previous empirical studies of market 
power in Taiwan have mainly concentrated on the relationship of mergers to 
monopolies or oligopolies. According to these previous results obtained by case 
studies, questionnaires or financial data analyses, the motive of market power is not 
statistically significant (Huang, 1977; Wu, Y. C., 19828; Sung, 19899; Lin, 19901°; Li, 
199111; Wu, A. N., 199212; Yang, 199613). In the western world empirical evidence is 
more equivocal on this point. In horizontal mergers, firms have greater opportunities 
for collusion (Stigler, 1968).14 The anticompetitive activities of mutual dealing or tie - 
in sales result in market power -related gains (Lone and Halpern, 1970).15 There is no 
significant evidence showing that horizontal mergers necessarily produce collusive, 
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anticompetitive effects (Eckbo, 1983).16 They have a significant effect in increasing 
price -cost margins where collusion is feasible but difficult to achieve without mutual 
forbearance (Feinberg, 1985).17 Market power can result in firms earning super noimal 
profits (Singh and Montgomery, 1987).18 
The average values of applying for a listing on the stock market and tax considerations 
were 3.620 and 3.347 respectively. These motives thus range between `important' and 
`slightly important' . As shown in Table 5 -2 -2, even though there are 25 and 44 
enterprises respectively which considered that applying for a listing on the stock 
market was a `very important' or `fairly important' merger motive, there are 96 
enterprises which chose `not at all important' as their score on this issue. Similarly, 
there were 38 and 40 films respectively which considered that tax considerations were 
a `very important' or `fairly important' merger motive but 78 filais claimed that this 
reason was `not at all important'. The results indicate that a listing on the stock market 
or tax considerations were very important merger motives for a few companies in 
Taiwan in the 1990s but not for a majority. 
Table 5 -2 -3 shows that the cases and amounts of tax exemption (Business Income 
Tax, Stamp Tax, Deed Tax) due to implementation of the Statute for Encouragement 
of Investment (abolished on 29 December 1990) or the Statute for Upgrading 
Industries (initiated on 29 December 1990) were few between 1990 to 1995. The cases 
and amounts of Land Value Increment Tax were large but this tax can be deferred and 
is paid by the acquiring enterprise at the time the land is subsequently transferred. The 
data verify that this tax consideration is important for a few companies but does not 
apply to the majority. 
According to Article 5 of the Statute for Upgrading Industries, if the acquired firm 
buys "instruments and equipment for exclusive use for research and development 
purposes and/or inspection of pilot products, or machinery and equipment used for 
energy saving purposes or as alternate energy sources" then the depreciation on these 
items may be accelerated by two years. "Based on the requirements for adjustment of 
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the industrial structure and improvement of the scale of operations and methods of 
production, depreciation of the machinery and equipment of specifically designated 
industries may be accelerated by one half of the number of years of the service life of 
fixed assets as prescribed in the Income Tax Law ". If the acquired firm has enjoyed 
the above tax break, the acquiring flan can inherit this benefit and continue the assets' 
depreciation over one year or several years within the service life of such assets until 
the peimissible depreciation has completely run its course. If the acquiring firm 
showed losses in the preceding five years, the combined firm can swallow the 
acquiring firm's net operating loss and deduct it from its net income.19 In addition, tax 
benefits can be created in a merger through the revaluation of previously depreciated 
assets. A merger permits previously depreciated assets to be revalued; thus the 
advantage becomes tangible after the increased depreciation related to this revaluation 
of assets. 
Previous empirical studies indicate that tax considerations (Chang, 198020; Wu, Y. C., 
198221; Sung, 198922; Lin, 199023; Li, 199124; Wu, A. N., 199225; Yang, 199626) and 
applying for a listing on the stock market (Lin, 199027; Li, 199128; Wu, A. N., 199229; 
Yang, 199630) are not statistically significant merger motives in Taiwanese enterprises. 
Sung's study even found that tax considerations were the least important motive. 
These results are puzzling. If funs are not concerned about tax considerations, why do 
they apply to the Ministry of Economic Affairs for special approval to merge and 
consolidate? If this issue is of such negligible significance, they could simply merge in 
a private arrangement and bypass the time and expense involved in getting approval. 
This study shows that tax consideration is an important factor for a few companies but 
is not verified for the majority. The relatively large sample and in -depth analysis of 
this research resolves the puzzling features of tax and stock market considerations in 
Taiwanese enterprises. 
5.3 THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT MOTIVES AS HELD 
BY FOUR SUBGROUPS OF ACQUIRING FIRMS 
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The relative importance of different acquisition motives may vary with the size of the 
acquiring firms. The government recognition standards for medium & small 
businesses are that the firms' actual capital amount does not exceed NT$ 40 million; 
that their total assets do not exceed NT$ 120 million (Manufacturing and 
Construction); or that their business revenues from the previous year do not exceed 
NT$ 40 million (Transportation, Warehouse & Storage, Telecommunications and 
other services).31 If a company wants to apply for a listing on the stock market, its 
paid -up capital must be NT$ 200 million or more (Article 5 of the Taiwanese Stock 
Exchange Corporation Rules Governing Examination of the Listing of Securities). In 
the light of government regulations and the distribution of our sample, we divided the 
acquiring firms into four subgroups based on the size of their total pre- transaction 
assets. The size groups are shown in Table 5 -3 -1. 
Table 5 -3 -2 indicates that the four most important merger motives for the smallest 
acquiring firms (X1) were reducing administrative expense, improving management 
efficiency, combining complementary resources and improving finance management 
efficiency respectively. This indicates that small acquiring enterprises see the primary 
benefits of a proposed merger as being ensuring operational synergy and improving 
finance management efficiency. 
The second subgroup of acquiring firms (i.e. small- medium sized enterprises, X2) 
claim that their incentives are reducing administrative expense, combining 
complementary resources and improving general and financial management efficiency 
respectively. This result is similar to that of the small enterprises. 
The most important merger motives for the third subgroup of acquiring firms (i.e. 
medium -sized enterprises, X3) were reducing administrative expense, establishing 
economies of scale, combining complementary resources and improving finance 
management efficiency respectively. This indicates that operational synergy and 
improving finance efficiency were most important to Taiwanese medium -sized 
enterprises. 
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The fourth subgroup of acquiring firms (i.e. large enterprises, X4) cited the importance 
of reducing administrative expense, combining complementary resources, establishing 
economies of scale, enhancing market competitiveness and increasing market power. 
This result suggests that large Taiwanese enterprises aim to achieve more than 
operational synergy; they also wish to enhance their market competitiveness and 
market power. This finding suggests that the Fair Trade Commission still needs to 
note or investigate whether the combined firm has engaged in any unfair or tactics or 
has abused its market standing. 
In short, gain operational synergy emerged as a very important merger motive for 
enterprises of all sizes. Improving management efficiency (especially in finance) was 
important for small and medium -sized enterprises. Large enterprises were also 
motivated by a market power factor. 
The acquisition of brand marks, patents or copyright technologies and the buying of 
assets below replacement cost were the least important merger motives for firms of all 
sizes. This result may be related to the high percentage of mergers occurring within the 
same business group (85.7 %). Where the acquiring and acquired firms belong to the 
same group, the acquiring film does not need to get brand marks, patents or copyright 
technologies from the acquired firm. 
The motive of government encouragement or support was relatively less important for 
small and medium -sized enterprises but the differences were not statistically 
significant. This indicates that such companies do not consider that they can avail of 
sizeable government encouragement or support as a result of a merger and acquisition. 
Article 38 of the Statute for Encouragement of Investment and Article 13 of the 
Statute for Upgrading Industries encourage small and medium -sized enterprises to go 
into merger or consolidation for the purpose of promoting reasonable operations and 
management. They state that the company shall be exempt from all income tax, stamp 
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tax and deed tax and can defer land -value increment tax payable as a result of such 
actions, and these benefits only accrue if a merger takes place. As such, the 
government incentive is neither a subsidy nor a tax reduction. The government take a 
neutral role, overseeing a policy which is appropriately geared to ensure that resources 
are not wastefully distributed. 
Table 5 -3 -2 measures our predictions for each motive, with a T -test of the difference 
between the mean scores for each of the four subgroups. The motive of resolving 
financial difficulties were of greater relative importance to small and small- medium 
sized enterprises than to medium and large enterprises. The small acquiring 
enterprises, x1, attached significantly more importance (at a = 0.05) to the merger 
motive of resolving financial difficulties than did the medium and large acquiring 
enterprises (x3 and x4). The small- medium sized acquiring enterprises, x2, also gave 
more importance (at a = 0.10) to the merger motive of improving financial difficulties 
than that did the medium and large acquiring enterprises. 
The small acquiring enterprises were significantly more importance (at a = 0.05) to 
the merger motive of increasing corporate debt capacity or financing than did the large 
acquiring enterprises. It indicates that the motive of increasing corporate debt capacity 
or financing was more important for small enterprises than it was for large ones. This 
is consistent with the argument that small acquiring enterprises grapple with relatively 
more difficult financing problems than do large acquiring enterprises. 
The Statute for Development of Medium and Small Business was enacted for the 
furtherance of a sound development basis for medium and small businesses, by 
helping them improve their operating environments, promote mutual co- operation, and 
strive for growth through their own efforts (Article 1 of the Statute for Development 
of Medium and Small Business). "For satisfying the capital requirements of medium 
and small business the government shall co- ordinate with financial institutions and 
credit bonding enterprises concerned to enhance their respective functions of 
providing financial facilities and guaranty32 to medium and small businesses" (Article 
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13 of the Statute for Development of Medium and Small Business). "All banks 
throughout the Republic of China shall, within the scope of their respective business, 
increase the proportion of financing facilities to be provided to medium and small 
businesses" (Article 14 of the Statute for Development of Medium and Small 
Business). "The competent authority shall co- ordinate with various agencies 
concerned to make ample funds available for providing special loans to medium and 
small businesses, and cause, by instruction, sponsoring banks to provide special or 
emergency financing facilities or to extend loans to meet with the requirements of 
enterprises implementing business converting projects or for adaptation to the 
changing economic situation; and to elevate, when necessary, the ceiling of such 
financing facilities, loans and guaranty" (Article 15 of the Statute for Development of 
Medium and Small Business). 
Although the Articles of the Statute for Development of Medium and Small Business 
are intended to help provide financial facilities, loans and guarantees to medium and 
small businesses, such businesses still encounter significant financial difficulties. This 
indicates that the regulations of the Statute are not completely successful in meeting 
their aims. Our findings relating to on -going financial difficulties and increasing 
corporate debt capacity are similar to those found in previous studies. Teng and Chen 
(1979)33 found that medium and small businesses experience difficulty, in accessing 
finance. The weakness of the medium and small firm is due to the fragility of capital 
structure, the shortage of internally generated funds and the misuse of short -tern 
and/or long- teiiii loans (Liao, 1985).34 With regard to the cost of capital, the medium 
and small enterprise finds it more difficult than its larger counterpart to obtain funding 
so the costs and risks are relatively higher (Liu, 1993).35 The weakness of financial 
management in medium and small businesses stems from the highly leveraged capital 
structure and the difficulty of ensuring adequate financing (Li, Chen, and Chang, 
1993).36 
The motive of applying for a listing on the stock market is the least important merger 
motive for small acquiring enterprises. This incentive was relatively important for 
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medium and large acquiring enterprises. The medium and large acquiring enterprises 
attached significantly greater importance to the merger motive of applying for a listing 
on the stock market than did the small acquiring enterprises according to the T -test. 
This verifies the economists and managers' claim that many firms merge with others 
for the purpose of applying for a listing on the stock market. 
Owing to the prosperity of the economy and increases in individual incomes, the stock 
market entered a bull phase in 1988. The government set up requirements for 
companies applying for a listing on the stock market.37 
1. Number of years of corporate existence: The company must be in existence for over 
five full fiscal years after its incorporation. 
2. Amount of capital stock: The number of paid -in capital in its final accounts for the 
two most recent fiscal years must exceed NT$ 200,000,000. 
3. Profitability: The operating profits and before -tax net profits for the three most 
recent fiscal years must be positive; the company must not show a cumulative loss in 
the three most recent fiscal years; and the operating profits and pre -tax net profits for 
the five most recent years must represent 5% or more of the amount of paid -in capital 
in its final accounts. 
4. Capital structure: The before -profit- distribution net worth for the most recent year 
must represent one -third or more of the total assets. 
5. Dispersion of shareholdings: The number of holders of name -bearing stock 
certificates must exceed 2,000. 
If a firm's capital stock does not reach the requirement of at least NT$ 200,000,000 to 
600,000,000 (category one to three) the merger motive of applying for a listing on the 
stock market should not be important. Medium sized acquiring enterprises whose total 
assets range between NT$ 200 million and NT$ 1,000 million, just fit this requirement 
and this subgroup did indeed give a relatively high score to the importance of applying 
for a listing on the stock market. This result is consistent with our prediction. 
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Typically, the business public are confident that if a company achieves these approval 
requirements (as set by the Securities and Exchange Commission, Ministry of 
Finance), then the company's operating perfoiniance must also be very good. In these 
cases, when a company issues its shares on the stock market, the NT$ 10 (par value) 
per share quickly increases to NT$ 20 or 30 per share. The newly listed company 
typically earns abnormally high gains from the stock market. This is why many 
companies actively applied for a listing on the stock market during the period of 
fieldwork, and this motive is one that is particular to Taiwan's unique stock market 
environment. 
Small acquiring enterprises attach more importance to the motive of improving 
management efficiency (especially in marketing) than do large acquiring enterprises 
according to the T -test. This result indicates that small acquiring enterprises desire to 
use a merger to improve their marketing management efficiency. The motive of 
improving production management efficiency is more important for medium sized 
acquiring enterprises than for large ones. The motive of improving R &D management 
efficiency is more important for small sized acquiring enterprises rather than for small - 
medium sized acquiring enterprises. 
The detailed results of the T -test and Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test 
(U -test) of the difference between the mean and median scores for each motive of the 
four subgroups are showed in Appendix 2. The results of the U -test were similar to the 
results of the T -test. 
5.4 MOTIVES CLASSIFIED BY BUSINESS GROUP 
We now discuss acquirers' merger and acquisition motives classified by business 
group. As shown in Table 5 -4 -1, if the acquiring and acquired films belonged to the 
same business group, the most important motives for the acquiring firm were reducing 
administrative expense, combining complementary resources, establishing economies 
of scale and improving finance management efficiency. This indicates that operating 
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synergy emerges as a fairly important merger motive for Taiwanese enterprises. For 
the acquiring and acquired firms which are located in different business groups, the 
most important motives for the acquiring firm are increasing market power, achieving 
economies of scale, enhancing market competitiveness and controlling distribution 
channels. The results indicate that market factors, including market power, market 
competitiveness and marketing channels, are the main merger motives for the 
acquiring firm only when the acquiring and acquired firm do not belong to the same 
business group. 
Where the acquiring and acquired firms belonged to the same business group, the least 
important motives for' the acquiring film were acquiring brand marks, patents or 
copyright technologies, controlling material resources, diversifying risk, gaining rapid 
entry into new markets or industries and buying below replacement cost. The results 
indicate that establishing economies of vertical integration, buying below replacement 
cost and diversifying risk are not important merger motives for Taiwanese enterprises 
between 1990 and 1995. This is reasonable, since the acquiring film does not need to 
acquire the brand marks, patents or copyrights, and are unlikely to be trying to enter 
new markets or industries or to diversify risk if the acquired firm also belongs to the 
same business group. Where the acquiring and acquired firms come from separate 
business groups, the least important motives for the acquiring film are soaking up 
surplus funds, applying for a listing on the stock market, being mindful of tax 
considerations and buying below replacement cost. This indicates that free cash flow 
and stock market and tax considerations are not important merger motives. 
Table 5 -4 -2 shows a T -test of the difference between the mean scores for each motive 
within or outwith the same business groups. Where both the acquirer and the target 
belong to the same business group, then the acquiring firm is more significantly 
motivated by the issues of reducing administrative expense, combining 
complementary resources, capitalising on tax considerations, exploiting surplus funds 
and improving management efficiencies (especially in marketing, production, finance, 
personnel and purchasing). The results indicate that when firms belong to the same 
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business group, they may have access to more and better information to accurately 
assess the merger's advantages. If they find the transaction is beneficial for themselves 
and/or their target, they go ahead with the deal. When the acquiring and acquired firms 
do not belong to the same business group, the acquiring firm is more significantly 
concerned with using the acquisition opportunity to increase its market power. The 
result indicates that firms that do not belong to the same business group, are chiefly 
concerned with addressing the issue of their market power. So the Fair Trade 
Commission still needs to observe the combination to judge whether it affects the 
interests of consumers and ensures fair competition. 
The U -test of the difference between the median scores for each motive within or 
outwith the same business groups is displayed in Appendix 3. The results of the U -test 
were similar to the results of the T -test. 
5.5 MOTIVES CLASSIFIED BY THE TYPE OF TRANSACTION 
Different types of transaction between acquiring and acquired firms reveal different 
merger motives. As seen in Table 5 -5 -1, on average, acquiring firms choosing a 
horizontal transaction were more concerned with economies of scale, control of 
distribution channels, reducing administrative expense, increased market power and 
improved personnel management efficiency than were acquirers pursuing other types 
of transaction. The results indicate that operating synergy, market power and personnel 
management improvement are major motives in horizontal transactions. Acquiring 
firms which opted for vertical integration were more concerned with acquiring know - 
how or research and development, enhancing market competitiveness, gaining rapid 
entry into new markets or industries, controlling material resources, combining 
complementary resources, increasing corporate debt capacity or financing, applying 
for a listing on the stock market, addressing tax considerations, availing of 
government encouragement or support, buying below replacement cost and improving 
management efficiency (especially in marketing, production, purchasing and R &D). 
This indicates that combining complementary resources (including technologies, 
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markets, materials, finance, tax, equipment, and managerial skills) and applying for a 
listing on the stock market are important merger motives for firms engaging in a 
vertical transaction. Acquiring firms which pursued a congeneric transaction were 
more motivated by acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright technologies and 
improving financial management efficiency. Acquiring firms opting for a 
conglomerate transaction were more preoccupied with resolving financial difficulties, 
diversifying risk, deploying surplus funds and gaining potential real estate than were 
acquirers pursuing other types of transaction. 
Differences in merger motives between acquiring firms involved in different types of 
transaction are tested in Table 5 -5 -2. The results indicate that the following motives 
are more important in vertical than in horizontal transactions: applying for a listing on 
the stock market, addressing tax considerations, availing of government 
encouragement or support. This indicates that, through a vertical transaction, 
companies can increase their capital size and apply for a listing on the stock market, 
and can enjoy tax exemptions38, deductions39 or deferments40. As we saw in Section 
5.4, where the acquiring and acquired firms belong to the same business group, then 
the acquiring firm is more strongly motivated by tax considerations (at a = 0.001) and 
a stock market listing (at a = 0.057) (see Table 5 -4 -2). With regard to tax 
considerations (different corporate income tax rates and progressive tax rates), the 
business group typically sets up discrete firms (e.g. a manufacturing unit, a marketing 
unit, etc.) to reduce the group's tax burden. When these tax advantages do not apply 
(e.g. operating income before income tax above NT$ 100,000 pay 25% corporate 
income tax) but the advantage of applying for a listing on the stock market remains in 
play, different firms in the same business group typically apply for special 
governmental approval for the merger. 
The merger motives of increasing corporate debt capacity or financing and 
diversifying risk were more important in horizontal than in congeneric transactions. 
The following motives were more important in horizontal than in conglomerate 
transactions: economies of scale, control of distribution channels, reducing 
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administrative expense, enhancement of market competitiveness, increased market 
power and improved management efficiency (especially in marketing, personnel, 
purchasing and R &D). These results indicate that the merger motives behind 
horizontal transactions in Taiwanese enterprises are to achieve operating and finance 
synergy, increased market power and improved management efficiency. These results 
are similar to those presented in previous empirical studies in Taiwan. 
The merger motives of achieving economies of scale and increasing corporate debt 
capacity or financing were more important in vertical than in congeneric transactions. 
Comparing vertical and conglomerate transactions, firms pursuing a vertical 
transaction were more concerned to control distribution channels, enhance market 
competitiveness, control material resources, increase corporate debt capacity or 
financing, increase market power, apply for a listing on the stock market, capitalise on 
tax considerations and improve marketing, purchasing and R &D management 
efficiency. This indicates that finds opting for a vertical transaction try to use the 
merger to control distribution channels and material resources so as to enhance their 
market competitiveness, and also to apply for a listing on the stock market, to take 
advantage of tax benefits and to improve management efficiency. 
The following motives were more important in congeneric than in conglomerate 
transactions: administrative expense reduction, brand mark, patent or copyright 
technology acquisition, enhancement of market competitiveness, increased market 
power and improved purchasing management efficiency. This indicates that, through a 
congeneric transaction, firms chiefly aim to reduce administrative expense and acquire 
brand marks, patents or copyright technologies to enhance market competitiveness and 
increase market power. 
The merger motive of risk diversification was more important in conglomerate rather 
in congeneric transactions. This indicates that risk diversification is of overriding 
importance to firms engaged in a conglomerate transaction. 
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The U -test of the differences in merger motives between acquiring firms involved in 
different types of transaction is showed in Appendix 4. The results of the U -test were 
similar to the results of the T -test. 
5.6 THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE IMPORTANCE OF MERGER 
MOTIVES AND PRE- TRANSACTION SIZE OF ACQUIRING ENTERPRISES 
The Pearson product- moment correlation between the importance of different reasons 
for mergers and acquisitions and the total pre -transaction assets of acquiring enterprises 
is presented in Table 5 -6 -1. All the correlation coefficients indicated that there was a 
low positive or negative linear relationship in the sample between the merger motives 
and the total assets of acquiring enterprises before each transaction. 
Table 5 -6 -1 also shows that we can reject the null hypothesis p = 0, at the a = .05 level, 
for certain motives. These are: resolving financial difficulties, increasing corporate debt 
capacity or financing, applying for a listing on the stock market, and improving 
management efficiency (especially in marketing). These results indicate that when the 
total pre- transaction assets of acquiring enterprises are larger, the merger motive of 
applying for a listing on the stock market assumes greater importance for acquiring 
enterprises. It supports the generally held economic argument that large firms merge 
with others so as to garner sufficient capital stock (i.e. at least NT$ 200,000,000) to 
enable the combined firm to apply for a listing on the stock market. 
When the total pre- transaction assets of acquiring enterprises are small, the motives of 
resolving financial difficulties, increasing corporate debt capacity or financing and 
improving management efficiency (especially in marketing) assumes greater 
importance for acquiring enterprises. This indicates that establishing operating and 
financial synergy is more important for small acquiring enterprises than it is for large 
acquirers. 
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The results of the two -tailed test of Spearman's rank correlation between the 
importance of different reasons for mergers and acquisitions and the total assets of 
acquiring enterprises, at the a = .05 level, are similar to the results of the Pearson 
linear correlation (as shown in Appendix 5). 
5.7 THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE IMP®"TANCE OF THE 
MOTIVES FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS AND THE CHANGE IN 
ASSETS FOLLOWING THE TRANSACTION 
The Pearson product- moment correlation between the importance of the reasons for 
mergers and acquisitions and the change in assets thereafter is shown in Table 5 -7 -1. 
The correlation coefficients ranged from -.2362 to .1059, which indicates that there 
was a low positive or negative linear relationship between the importance of merger 
motives and the change in assets following the transaction in the sample. 
However, Table 5 -7 -1 shows that we can reject the null hypothesis p = 0, at the a = .05 
level, only in the case of achieving economies of scale, reducing administrative expense 
and applying for a listing on the stock market. This means that the greater the increase in 
assets after the merger or acquisition, the more important are these particular merger 
motives. This result indicates that a large increase in the acquirer's assets after a merger 
or acquisition verifies the hypothesis that many small companies merge so as to generate 
sufficient capital stock (i.e. at least NT$ 200,000,000) to entitle them to apply for a 
listing on the stock market. It also indicates that there is an important correlation 
between the merger motives of economies of scale and administrative expense reduction 
and the increase in assets after the merger or acquisition. This shows that a large 
increase in the acquirer's assets is heavily implicated in how the company has used the 
merger to achieve operating synergy. 
The Spearman's rank correlation between the ranking of the importance of different 
reasons for mergers and acquisitions and the change in the pre- transaction assets of 
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acquiring enterprises is presented in Appendix 6. The results indicate a similarity with 
the Pearson linear correlation. 
5.8 FACTOR ANALYSIS OF ALL VARIABLES IN THE MOTIVES FOR 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
In this study, we conduct factor analysis to identify the structure underpinning the 
motives for mergers and acquisitions. This analysis reduces the data so that 
fundamental motivational constructs can be teased out. With factor analysis, we can 
identify any separate motivational factor and then determine the degree to which each 
variable is explained by that factor. If any factors can be so extracted, it is possible to 
reduce the data to a hard core, from which a summary can be drawn. 
The unrotated principal components analysis factor loadings matrix of the motives for 
mergers and acquisitions is shown in Table 5 -8 -1. Various statistics need to be noted. 
First, we observe that there are four factors with an eigenvalue of 1.000 or greater --the 
conventional criterion for accepting a factor for extraction. The lowest proportion of 
total variance which is explained by these four factors is 4.3 %, which by conventional 
standards is quite low (Hair et al., 1995).41 Second, the communalities are all more 
than 0.486. A communality represents the amount of variance of each variable that is 
accounted for by the factors which have been extracted. Third, the total percentage of 
variance is 63.4 %. This result indicates that the four extracted factors accounted for 
63.4 per cent of the total variance for all the groups. 
In order to achieve a clearer factor structure, we choose an orthogonal rotation method 
to rotate the initial factor solution. Our principal goal is to simplify the columns of the 
factor matrix (i.e., to reduce the number of high factor loadings to as few as possible) 
for ease of interpretation, and for this we use the VARIMAX rotation method. 
The VARIMAX rotated principal components analysis factor loadings matrix for the 
motives for mergers and acquisitions is presented in Table 5 -8 -2. Factor 1 had eight 
significant loadings and the first six variables related to improving management 
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efficiency. These management efficiency improvements included marketing, 
personnel, finance, purchasing, production and research and development. For Factor 
1, all the significant variables had positive signs. This indicates that improving 
management efficiency, is a generic factor for enterprises proposing to enter into 
merger. Factor 2 had 10 significant loadings and the variables mainly related to market 
control and new product introduction components. These chiefly embrace enhancing 
market competitiveness, control of distribution channels, acquiring know -how or 
research and development, increased market power, economies of scale, acquiring 
brand marks, patents or copyright technologies, gaining rapid entry into new markets 
or industries, improving purchasing and R & D management efficiency and control of 
material resources. All the variables had positive signs. Factor 3 had 10 significant 
loadings but the largest eight variables mainly related to finance components which 
included resolving financial difficulties, increasing corporate debt capacity or 
financing, risk diversification, exploiting surplus funds, tax considerations and 
government encouragement or support, etc. All the variables had positive signs 
indicating they are all positively correlated with each other. Factor 4 had five 
significant loadings but the largest two variables related to applying for a listing on the 
stock market and gaining potential real estate or other related value. Both variables 
were of the same sign, suggesting that the respondents held similar perceptions. 
According to the above factor analysis, the 25 variables can be summarised into four 
main dimensions which relate to the motives for mergers and acquisitions in 
Taiwanese enterprises between 1990 and 1995. These were improving management 
efficiency, market control and new product introduction, finance and stock market 
considerations. These factors were not consistent with Fang's (1990), Lin's (1990) and 
Yang's (1996) results. 
5.9 CONCLUSION 
The most important motives for mergers and acquisitions were reducing 
administrative expense, combining complementary resources, achieving economies of 
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scale and improving finance management efficiency. The least important reasons were 
acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright technologies, controlling material 
resources, buying below replacement cost and diversifying risk. The hypotheses that a 
stock market listing or tax considerations are very important merger motives in 
Taiwan in the 1990s were true for a few companies but could not be verified for the 
majority of companies. 
If we divide the acquiring firms into four subgroups based on their total assets size, 
operating synergy emerged as a very important merger motive for finns of all sizes. 
Large enterprises were also motivated by the market factor. The motive of increasing 
corporate debt capacity or financing was more important for small acquiring 
enterprises than for large ones. This indicates that small companies find it more 
difficult to increase their debt capacity or to raise fund from financial institutions than 
do large firms. The business credibility of companies that can meet the government's 
approval criteria is high; the general assumption is that such firms are good 
perfouuancers. When these firms issue their shares on the stock market, their share 
value increases quickly. 
Where the acquiring and acquired firms belong to the same business group, the 
acquirer is most significantly driven by the need to reduce administrative expense, 
combine complementary resources, avail of tax breaks, deploy surplus funds and 
improve management efficiencies (especially in marketing, production, finance, 
personnel and purchasing), compared to those located in different business groups. 
Where the acquiring and acquired firms come from separate business groups, the 
acquiring firm is significantly more concerned with increasing its market power than is 
the case for those belonging to the same group. 
The merger motives behind horizontal transactions are mainly to establish operating 
and finance synergy, increase market power and improve management efficiency. 
Firms transacting in a vertical direction are concerned with establishing operating and 
finance synergy, applying for a listing on the stock market, availing of tax advantages 
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and improving management efficiency. Companies choosing congeneric transactions 
aim to augment their operating synergy and market power and to improve their 
purchasing management efficiency. Risk diversification is a motive of overriding 
importance in conglomerate transactions between 1990 and 1995. 
When the total pre- transaction assets of acquiring enterprises are large, the merger 
motives of addressing finance issues, applying for a listing on the stock market and 
improving management efficiency are more important for acquiring enterprises. This 
result verifies the hypothesis of many Taiwanese economists and managers and 
resolves the puzzle of whether the merger motive of applying for a listing on the stock 
market exists for large acquiring firms. When the total pre- transaction assets of 
acquiring enterprises are small, the merger motives of resolving financial difficulties, 
increasing corporate debt capacity or financing and improving management efficiency 
become more important for acquiring enterprises. This indicates that small acquirers 
are more driven to focus on improving their finance and operating practices. The 
greater the increase in assets after a merger or acquisition the more important are the 
merger motives of achieving economies of scale, reducing administrative expense and 
applying for a listing on the stock market. A large increase in acquirers' assets after a 
merger or acquisition verifies the hypothesis that applying for a listing on the stock 
market is important for certain Taiwanese enterprises between 1990 to 1995. 
The factor analysis indicated that the four extracted factors accounted for 63.4 per cent 
of the total variance for all merger motives. These were improvements in management 
efficiency, market control and new product introduction, finance and stock market 
considerations. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE MAIN METHOD OF PAYMENT FOR MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the negotiation of mergers and acquisitions, one of the most important 
considerations is the main method of payment. Previous empirical research focuses 
mainly on a comparison of stockholders' returns between acquiring and acquired firms 
or on the method of payment (e.g. cash offer or stock exchange) which generally 
results in larger excess returns. Based on the main methods of payment, this study aims 
to extend the previous analysis to some new aspects. Is there any relationship between 
the pre- transaction sizes of acquiring enterprises and the different methods of 
payment? Differences in the change in assets of the acquiring enterprises after 
completion of the transaction for the various payment methods are also of interest. Is 
there an association between the main method of payment and the estimated value of 
the acquired firm? 
This chapter is arranged as follows. A number of alternative studies of methods of 
payment for mergers and acquisitions are described in the upcoming section. The 
chapter then reviews empirical studies of the effects of payment methods on 
shareholders' returns in corporate take -overs. In the fourth section, the hypotheses and 
the independent variables relating to acquiring firms are presented. An analysis of the 
findings of the main method of payment in Taiwanese mergers and acquisitions is 
offered in the fifth section. Differences in the average pre- transaction assets of the 
independent acquiring enterprises and different payment methods are presented in the 
sixth section. The seventh section describes the change in assets in terms of the main 
method of payment of acquiring enterprises. The relationship between the main method 
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of payment of the acquiring firm and the method used to estimate the value of the 
acquired enterprise is considered in the eighth section. The final section offers a 
conclusion. 
6.2 THEORIES OF METHODS OF PAYMENT FOR MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS 
The following section describes some of the theoretical literature used to explain why 
the various methods of payment employed to finance mergers and acquisitions might 
have different valuation effects on the bidding firms' returns. 
6.2.1 TAX EFFECTS 
Taxation is one of the most important factors affecting the price offered by a bidder 
(Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1983).1 The tax liabilities of the acquired firm's 
shareholders also influence the choice of exchange method (Franks, Harris, and 
Mayer, 1988).2 The main tax effects are tax deferral, stepped -up assets, substitution 
of gains for ordinary income and gains from leverage. 
1. TAX DEFERRAL 
Whether shareholders of the acquired film should pay taxes on the transaction or not 
depends on whether cash or stock is received in exchange for their stock. When the 
payment method is a cash offer, the transaction is taxable and the acquired firm's 
shareholders are liable for income tax in the year of the transaction.3 This decreases 
their returns. If, on the other hand, share -for -share exchange is used, an individual's 
income tax can be deferred until the new securities are sold.4 Some researchers 
(Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1983; Huang and Walkling, 19875; Franks, Harris, and 
Mayer, 1988 and Peterson and Peterson, 19916) claim that the premiums or any 
abnormal returns on cash offers must be higher than the share -for -share exchange if 
this tax disadvantage is to be offset. 
110 
2. STEPPED -UP ASSETS 
Under Taiwan's tax code, if the acquiring firm pays by means of a cash offer, it can 
increase the tax basis of the acquired firm's assets to its fair market value and levy 
depreciation charges on this new basis. This step -up generates higher tax -deductible 
depreciation allowances which are not available for all -stock bids. The depreciation of 
these stepped -up assets can reduce tax and generate greater cash flows. 
3. SUBSTITUTION OF CAPITAL GAINS FOR ORDINARY INCOME 
If a firm has surplus cash, it can distribute that surplus to its shareholders by increasing 
its dividend payment or by repurchasing stock. When the firm distributes the surplus 
cash to its shareholders, this increases the shareholder's individual income tax 
liability.? 
Company Law does not permit a company to repurchase its own shares in Taiwan. 
According to Article 167 of Company Law8 "except in the manner as provided in 
Articles 1589, 18610 and 31711 hereof, a company shall neither redeem nor purchase its 
own shares nor accept any of them as collateral under any pledge agreement; provided, 
however, that where any of its shareholders liquidates or is adjudicated bankrupt, the 
company may redeem the shares held by such a shareholder at the current market price 
to satisfy any and all of his obligations due and payable to the company before his 
liquidation or adjudication of bankruptcy. Any shares redeemed or purchased by the 
company in the manner provided in the proviso of the preceding paragraph or in 
Article 186 hereof shall be sold at the then current market price within six months of 
the redemption or purchase. Such shares shall be deemed un- issued if not sold within 
the prescribed time limit, in which event the company shall apply for amendment 
registration reflecting the cancellation of the issue of such shares ". At present securities 
transaction tax is no longer levied (since January 1, 1990) in Taiwan12 so firms can use 
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their surplus cash to take -over another firm and substitute capital gains tax for ordinary 
income tax. 
4. THE GAINS FROM LEVERAGE 
If a firm does not have enough of its own cash to acquire another company, it may need 
to borrow from a bank. The interest payments on this debt can be deducted from the 
enterprise's income tax.13 If the interest rate is relatively low, the acquiring firm may 
increase its gearing level to complete the transaction. At the same time the higher 
gearing level brings greater risk. The Taiwanese government allowed a private bank to 
open in 1992. Before 'then, government -controlled banks were very conservative and 
did not offer many financial incentives to firms. Films cannot issue `junk bonds' to 
raise the funds to merge with another firm. This means that management buy -outs and 
leveraged buy -outs are not popular in Taiwan. Vermaelen (1981)14 argues that the 
leverage hypothesis may play a role, but it is not the main explanation for the observed 
abnoilual returns. He argues that the more plausible explanation is the signalling or 
information effect. If leverage is regarded as a signal, then it is impossible to separate 
the leverage signalling effect from the leverage tax effect. 
6.2.2 INFORMATION EFFECTS AND THE SIGNALLING HYPOTHESIS 
If all parties to a merger or take -over are not well informed about the prospects, the 
choice of payment method may be shaped by considerations other than taxation. 
Myers and Majluf (1984)15 present an asymmetric information model and 
hypothesise that managers often have better infolniation than do outsiders, and that 
both parties understand this. Where there is unequal access to the relevant 
infoinlation about future prospects, the choice of payment method itself conveys 
some information about the value of the acquiring firni's stock. When stock is used 
to pay for an acquisition, it implies that the acquiring film's managers consider the 
stock to be overvalued (Travlos, 1987).16 Hence, the issuance of stock conveys 
negative information about the bidder's returns. 
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The signalling hypothesis suggests that the use of cash financing is a positive signal 
and that the bidder's cash flow is substantial. A cash offer may also signal that the 
acquiring film has information about the future profitable opportunities of the 
acquisition. Acquiring fiiius' management use cash when they believe that the stock 
of their firm is undervalued relative to its perceived value (Hansen, 198717; and 
Brown and Ryngaert, 198918). 
6.2.3 REGULATION EFFECTS 
The method of payment influences the bidding strategy if it affects the anticipated net 
present value of an acquisition. Payment methods can affect net present values 
through interrelations with either acquisition costs (i.e., size of premium) or the 
probability of success. Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) note that in stock offers an 
acquiring firm must register with, and obtain approval from, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission before acquired shareholders begin to defend their shares. 
This process may take several months. In contrast, an acquiring firm paying cash may 
buy the (potential) acquired firm's shares within several weeks. Thus, cash offers 
facilitate speedier acquisition transactions. In Taiwan, the Securities and Exchange 
Law regulates that "Approval from or effective registration with the Competent 
Authority (Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC) is required for a company to 
publicly offer or issue securities ".19 The teal). "security" or "securities" as used 
includes any corporate stocks and/or corporate bonds publicly offered or issued 
(Article 6 of Securities and Exchange Law). If the combined enterprise captures a one 
third (1/3) of market share, or if an enterprise participating in the combination holds a 
market share of one fourth (1/4), it must apply for approval from the Fair Trade 
Commission (FTC) and the commission must make its approval or disapproval 
decision within two months of receipt of an application.20 
A speedy transaction can be crucial to the success of a take -over, especially in the 
case of a hostile bid. The lengthier processing time for a stock offer potentially gives 
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the acquired firm's management more opportunity to mount a defence. The acquired 
firm's favoured bidders (their white knight) could be induced to join the competition, 
and the management could selectively reveal inside information about the firm's 
value to the white knight. This inforniation could result in an upward revision of cash 
flow estimates or a reduction in the uncertainty such bidders might feel. As a result 
the favoured bidders could offer a higher premium. Consequently, a hostile stock 
offer would have a lower probability of succeeding than if the hostile offer was made 
in cash. 
6.2.4 ACCOUNTING TREATMENT 
The major accounting treatments for acquisitions are the pooling and purchase 
methods. In the pooling method, the book value of the combined firms' assets, 
liabilities and equities are simply added together. Under the purchase method, certain 
excesses of purchase price over book value must be reported as goodwill and then 
amortised. The amortisation reduces reported earnings but is not deductible for 
corporate tax purposes. As a result, a merger consummated by cash would necessarily 
be accounted for using the purchase method. Typically, an exchange of voting 
common stock would be accounted for through a pooling of interest. 
The effect of these accounting differences on the valuation of the postmerger fiiin is 
a subject of controversy (Hong, Kaplan, and Mandelker, 1978).21 While purchase 
accounting may depress earnings per share, it can actually lead to higher cash flow as 
a result of the larger tax -deductible depreciation shields which can often be created in 
a purchase when it is a taxable merger. The effect of the accounting choice might be 
particularly important for managers whose compensation is based on some 
calculation of an earnings figure. 
6.3 EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF EFFECTS OF METHODS OF PAYMENT 
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Whether the method of payment used in mergers or acquisitions affects the returns to 
the stockholders of both acquiring and acquired firms has been subject to a number of 
empirical studies. 
Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1983) 
Wansley, Lane, and Yang found higher abnormal returns to acquired firms for cash 
offers than for stock offers. Their study examined 203 acquired firms over the period 
1970 -1978 in the US. They found that acquired firms' cumulative average residuals 
(CAR) for the 41 days through to the announcement date when the method of 
payment was cash, was 33.54 per cent, as compared with 17.47 per cent when 
securities were used. When the method of payment represented a combination of cash 
and securities, the CAR was 11.77 per cent. Cash offers yield greater tax effects' 
premiums than do securities exchanges. The authors also observed that when stock is 
used, the bidding firm must go through the Securities and Exchange Commission 
registration process which may take several months. Cash offers can be completed 
much more quickly. The longer it takes to finish a merger, the more quickly the 
acquired firm's management can launch a defence against the merger. They can, for 
example, stimulate additional bids and they may encourage such bids by selectively 
disclosing important information to selected potential bidders. These findings are 
consistent with those found for regulation effects. 
Travlos (1987) 
Travlos studied whether the difference between acquiring firms' returns is significant 
depending on their differing choice of payment methods for take -over transactions. 
His sample contains 167 successful bidding firms during the period 1972 to 1981 in 
the US. If the bidding firms use common stock as a means of financing, the 
acquisition proposals at the announcement have a negative effect on common stock 
prices. The cumulative abnormal return on the two -day (t = -1 to t =0) announcement 
period is -1.47 %, which is significant (at a = 0.01). On the contrary, when they pay 
cash for the shares of common stock of the target firms, the bidders experience 
normal rates of return. The cumulative abnormal return is 0.24 %, which is not 
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significant. The results are consistent with the signalling hypothesis which implies 
that take -over financing using common stock exchange conveys negative infoimation 
which implies that the bidding firm is overvalued. 
Huang and Walkling (1987) 
To reduce selection and classification bias, Huang and Walkling use acquisition 
announcements rather than lists of completed acquisitions as their sample. Their 
sample includes 204 target firms over the period 1977 to 1982 in the US. For the 
two -day ( t = -1 to t = 0 ) announcement period, the target film shareholders earn an 
average cumulative abnormal return of 29.3% for cash offers, whereas those for stock 
offers gain 14.4 %. The average cumulative abnormal return for a mixture of payment 
offers (i.e. cash, debt and stock) is 23.3 %, which positions this cluster between the 
values for stock and cash offers. The results, however, are consistent with a tax 
explanation; shareholders request higher premiums because they need to pay taxes 
immediately on their gains. 
Franks, Harris, and Mayer (1988) 
Franks, Harris, and Mayer compare the effects of means of payment in take -overs in 
the United Kingdom and in the United States. Spanning the period 1955 -1985, the 
data include 1,900 acquisitions in the United Kingdom and 1,555 acquired firms and 
850 bidders in the United States. This research shows that the bid premium around 
the announcement date (month 0 and months -4 to +1) for acquired firms were 
significantly higher in all -cash offers than in all- equity offers in both countries. The 
results for the United Kingdom indicate that acquired firms in all -cash offers 
obtained a 30.2 per cent bid premium (month 0) which was significantly higher than 
the all- equity offers with a 15.1 per cent premium. The differences in the United 
States are more impressive, the 11.1 per cent premium in all- equity offers (month 0) 
being less than half the all -cash value of 25.4 per cent. This conclusion is consistent 
with the tax effects or signalling hypothesis. A higher bid premium is essential in 
cash offers to offset the capital gains tax liability and there are negative signals 
associated with equity offers. Over the six -month period (months -4 to +1), the 
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results are about the same in both countries. For acquiring firms during month 0, all 
cash offers earned small positive abnormal returns that were statistically significant 
in the United States, but not significant in the United Kingdom. All equity offers 
brought negative returns that were significant in the United States, but not in the 
United Kingdom. Over the six -month period, cash offers yielded small positive 
abnormal returns both in the United Kingdom and the United States and had some 
statistical significance. All equity offers had no statistical significance. 
Peterson and Peterson (1991) 
This research explores the characteristics of the means of exchange in explaining the 
returns for parties in mergers and acquisitions in the US. The sample includes 272 
merger completed companies between 1980 and 1986. The empirical results indicate 
that cash provides the greatest returns for acquired firm shareholders and stock 
provides the lowest returns. These results are consistent with the tax effects 
argument. Acquiring firms using stock as the medium of exchange during the 
announcement period earn negative abnormal returns. This negative return is 
consistent with the signalling hypothesis. A test of differences in abnormal returns 
across the medium groups, using an F- statistic, indicates that it is significant (at a = 
0.05) for both acquiring and acquired finds. It shows that there is an association 
between the methods of payment and abnormal returns. 
Trifts (1991)22 
Trifts tests the leverage effect while controlling for the method of payment and finds 
a strong leverage impact on the abnormal returns to acquiring firms' shareholders in 
addition to a method of payment effect. His sample consists of 122 completed 
mergers and tender offers over the period 1970 to 1985 in the US. His study shows 
cumulative abnollnal returns (CARs) over the announcement period (days -1 and 0, - 
5 to +5, and -10 to +10), and finds that cash offers are statistically superior to stock 
offers. Over this period, cash transactions reveal a positive but insignificant CAR, 
while stock transactions render a statistically significant negative return. The findings 
indicate that cash payments outperfo nu stock exchanges around the transaction 
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announcement period and thus, Trifts comes to similar conclusions to Travlos (1987) 
and Wansley et al. (1987)23. Over the two and 11 day announcement period (days -1 
and 0 and days -5 to +5), acquiring firms using increased leverage earn significantly 
higher abnormal returns than those with decreased leverage. There is also evidence 
here of a leverage effect. Trifts, using regression analysis, finds that while the method 
of payment remains important, changes in leverage have significant additional 
explanatory power. This result indicates that both the method of payment and 
changes in leverage are important determinants of abnormal returns to acquiring 
films' shareholders. 
Sung (1993)24 
This study consists of 222 successful mergers and take -overs from 1974 to 1987 in 
the US. Over the two -day (days -1 to 0) announcement period, cash offers yield 
nollüal returns and stock exchange offers yield significantly negative abnormal 
returns to bidders. Between 1981 -87, a positive announcement effect occurred when 
the financing method was cash. For stock exchange offers, the negative effect of 
issuing equity dominated any positive net present value. However, between 1974 -80, 
the form of financing did not produce any significant information effect. The 
evidence indicates that there was an information effect on bidder returns in mergers 
and tender offers in the 1980s. 
Lo (1991)25 
We now turn to an empirical study for Taiwan. Lo examines the role of the method 
of payment in the explanation of returns to acquiring firms in mergers and 
acquisitions. Her sample contains 22 successful mergers or take -overs in Taiwan over 
the period 1989 to 1990. For the 11 day ( t = -5 to t = 5 ) announcement period, 
acquiring firm stockholders earn a cumulative abnormal return of -2.0 per cent for 
cash offers, which is statistically insignificant, whereas for stock offers shareholders 
earn 20.2 percent, which is statistically significant different from zero. Her research 
indicates that acquiring firm stockholders earn larger excess returns following stock 
offers than they do for cash offers. Her findings contradict those of the United 
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Kingdom and United States' studies and are also inconsistent with the tax effects 
argument. 
In brief, empirical research for the UK and US indicates that acquired firm 
stockholders earn positive abnormal returns following corporate take -overs, and 
acquiring firm stockholders earn normal or negative abnormal returns (Jensen and 
Ruback, 198326; Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter, 198827; and Trifts, 1991;). The method 
of payment, however, is an important deteiminant of shareholder wealth; acquired 
and/or acquiring firm stockholders generally gain larger excess returns following 
cash rather than stock offers (Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1983; Huang and Walkling, 
1987; Travlos, 1987; Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1987; and Franks, Harris, and 
Mayer, 1988; Trifts, 1991; and Sung, 1993). The only known study for Taiwan 
comes to the reverse conclusion. 
6.4 HYPOTHESES 
In this study we are interested in why firms use a particular main method of payment 
when taking over another. However there were only 17 transactions involving listed 
companies in Taiwan over the period 1990 -1995. This is too small a sample to adopt 
the conventional methodology of analysing their share prices and generalising about 
the effects of the main method of payment on mergers and acquisitions. Therefore to 
further understand why acquiring enterprises opt for their preferred method of 
payment, we compared pre- transaction size and post- transaction growth (increase in 
total assets) between the main methods of payment of acquiring films. We also 
looked at the relationship between the main method of payment and the method of 
valuation of the acquired enterprises. The hypotheses are described as follows. 
6.4.1 SIZE 
When the acquiring firm's size (total assets) is small, for a given expenditure (i.e. size 
of acquired film), the management and shareholders may not care to use shares 
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exchange as the main payment method because a large increase in the number of shares 
might dilute the value of the original shares either in terms of their monetary value or 
the level of control they offer the shareholder. In contrast, the dispersal of shares in 
large films may already be substantial such that the acquiring firm's managers are not 
afraid to issue a given volume of new shares to the acquired firm; the dilution of shares 
is already given. From the acquired firm's shareholders' point of view, if the bidding 
firm's assets are small, this suggests that it is not listed on the stock market. Were the 
combined company's operations to be poor, it would then be very difficult to sell the 
shares. Therefore, the acquired firm's shareholders may prefer a cash offer to a stock 
exchange as a payment method. In the mean time, the absence of any credit -rating 
institutions in Taiwan' means that small acquiring companies find it difficult to issue 
corporate bonds, convertible bonds or subscription warrants as a main method of 
payment and so this payment route is only rarely taken. So it is safe to assume that the 
greater the assets size of the acquiring firm, the more likely it is that acquiring 
shareholders will opt to pay by common stock. 
6.4.2 GROWTH 
The average growth (increase in total assets) of acquiring firms using common stock as 
the main method of payment is greater than that of acquiring films using alternative 
main methods of payment. This hypothesis is based on the premise that transacting a 
merger or take -over costs a great deal. If a company desires to merge with or take -over 
another company, it may use its retained earnings or it may borrow the funds from the 
bank(s) to pay for the transaction. But the amount of retained earnings is limited. 
Borrowing full and sufficient sums from the bank is also difficult, especially as the big 
banks are government- controlled (national, provincial or city banks) and bankers are 
habitually very conservative. These limits on the available cash will affect whether an 
acquiring firm can afford to procure another large company. Under these constraints, 
its growth may only be slight after the transaction. On the other hand, if an acquiring 
firm uses common stock as the main method of payment, it may more easily get large 
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amounts of funds and enter into a merger with another relatively large company, and 
emerge with a significant increase in assets after the transaction. 
6.4.3 VALUATION METHODS 
It is very apparent that different valuation methods result in different values being 
placed on a firm. The book value estimation method using historical cost data may 
underestimate the target company's value so the shareholders of the acquired firms are 
not likely to accept the cash offer. The replacement cost estimation method uses the 
cost of replacing an asset, either in its present faun or as the cost of obtaining 
equivalent services and the cash flow approach estimates the amount of cash being 
received and expended by a business. When the asset can be replaced and/or the money 
can be ensured exactly, a cash offer is more likely to be accepted by the shareholders of 
the target. The stock market price indicates the collective opinion of investors as to a 
firm's cash flow potential and to its corresponding risk but the share price can change 
very quickly and it is only suitable for listed companies. The choice of valuation 
method will influence the shareholders of the acquired firms to accept the cash offer or 
share- for -share exchange. We hypothesise that the estimation method used to value the 
transacted firm and the method of payment of the acquiring enterprise are associated. 
6.5 THE ACQUIRING ENTERPRISE'S MAIN METHOD OF PAYMENT FOR 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
The acquiring enterprise's main method of payment for mergers and acquisitions is 
shown in Table 6 -5 -1. The most common method was `common stock'. There were 
147 cases, i.e. 57.2% of the sample. `Cash (reserves)' and `cash (bank borrowing)' 
had 50 and 34 cases respectively (19.45% and 13.23% of the sample respectively). 
There were 13 cases (5.06% of the sample) where the main form of payment was by 
`subscription warrants'. Very few enterprises used `corporate bonds' and `convertible 
bonds' as payment for their acquired enterprises; only two and four of these cases 
respectively (0.78% and 1.56% of the sample respectively). 
121 
When a company decides to transact with another, the main method of payment is one 
of the key issues upon which both parties must reach agreement. If a company desires 
to merge with or take -over another company, it may use its retained earnings or it may 
borrow the funds from the bank(s). The use of retained earnings to merge with a target 
must be adopted by a majority vote of shareholders present at a meeting attended by 
shareholders holding and representing at least three -quarters of the total number of 
issued and outstanding shares (Article 316 of Company Law). It is not easy to get 
approval from a three -quarters majority of shareholders because they may not want to 
sacrifice present dividends for earnings in the future. Borrowing from the bank is also 
difficult, especially as the big banks are government -controlled (national, provincial or 
city banks) and bankers are habitually very conservative. 
The acquired finds shareholders may prefer a cash offer because the amount is 
precisely known, and with that information they can decide how to adjust their 
portfolios. When the acquired firm's shareholders suspect that the acquiring firm will 
not improve the performance of the acquired company, they prefer a cash offer to a 
share exchange. From the viewpoint of the acquiring firm's management many 
individual shareholders are loyal to the Board of Directors. If the acquiring firm 
considers that the issuing of stock might dilute its shares or earnings and affect its 
control or benefits, it may choose cash as the method of payment. 
Ross (1977)28 postulated that managers, as insiders, have extra information about their 
own companies which outsiders are not privy to. Myers and Majluf (1984) consider 
that the managers of a film often have better information than do outsiders. Sometimes 
acquiring fiinis are afraid that the acquired films may have a contingent liability or that 
litigation problems may surface after the transaction. The exchange of common stock 
may decrease the risk of overestimation or underestimation of the value of the 
acquiring and acquired firms. If a transaction involves equity securities, capital gains 
taxes may be deferred until the new securities are sold, while for cash transactions, all 
relevant income tax must be paid in the year of the transaction (Article 14 of Income 
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Tax Law). Thus, we expect that tax regulations will significantly affect the preferred 
payment method. The stock market entered a bull phase in 1988 in Taiwan, the 
acquired enterprise's shareholders may prefer to accept stock and the acquiring film 
can afford to haggle over the amount of stock it offers. These may explain the reason 
why common stock exchange is the most common payment method. 
Subscription warrants offer the target's shareholders the right to subscribe to the 
ordinary shares of the acquiring firm at a given price and from a certain date. They 
carry no income or other rights to equity. However when the date falls due, and the 
market price of the associated share is higher than the subscription price the shares 
become valuable. Subscription prices usually exceed market prices so the issue of a 
warrant is a risk for the acquiring film. A high (or low) subscription price will affect 
the acquiring firm's profits after the transaction. 
Corporate bonds, convertible bonds and preferred stock are comparatively rarely used 
as financing methods for mergers or acquisitions. The main problems are : (1) It is 
very difficult to estimate what interest rate or dividend will attract the shareholders of 
the target firm. (2) The acquiring firm needs to pay interest or dividends to the 
acquired fiini's shareholders. If the acquiring find offers high fixed interest rates or 
dividends to entice the target company's shareholders at a time of high interest rates, 
this will reduce its profits in the future. Interest payments are tax deductible but 
dividend payments are not. Fixed interest rates or dividends and the future prospects 
of the acquiring enterprise will affect the offering price and further influence its post - 
transaction profit performance. 
For Taiwanese enterprises, whether the payment is a cash offer, an exchange of shares, 
or an alternative method depends on three considerations. The first is tax and 
government regulations. The second is the future prospects of the acquiring enterprise 
as perceived by the acquired firm's shareholders. The third is the level of activity of the 
stock market. 
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6.6 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRE -TRANSACTION SIZES OF 
ACQUIRING FIRMS AND DIFFERENT METHODS OF PAYMENT 
The t -test for an independent acquiring enterprise's average pre- transaction assets and 
its main method of payment is displayed in Table 6 -6 -1. The results indicate that there 
were significant (at a = 0.05) differences in acquiring firms' average assets before each 
transaction depending on whether the transaction was paid for by a cash -from -reserves 
offer or by an exchange of common stock. 
The mean of the pre- transaction assets of acquiring films using cash from reserves as 
the main method of payment was significantly smaller than that for those not doing so. 
This indicates that the size of the pre- transaction assets of acquiring firms using cash 
from reserves as the main method of payment was relatively small in Taiwan between 
1990 and 1995. It may imply that (1) if the assets size of acquiring finis is small, 
acquired firms' shareholders prefer cash offers as the main payment method. and/or (2) 
the directors of relatively small acquiring firms may consider that a cash offer will not 
dilute the firm's shares nor affect their control. 
The mean of the pre- transaction assets of acquiring finis using common stock as the 
main method of payment was significantly greater than that for those not using it. That 
is, the greater the size of the assets of the acquiring firm, the more preferable was 
common stock for the shareholders of the acquiring and acquired finis. This result 
may indicate that (1) the acquired firm's shareholders prefer the large acquiring fiini's 
common stock, predicting that the combined enterprise's prospects are good. (2) the 
dispersal of shareholding in large fines is already very large so acquiring firms' 
managers are not afraid of the consequences of issuing new shares to their targets. 
If we further study detailed differences in acquiring firms' average pre- transaction 
assets by main methods of payment, the results are shown in Table 6 -6 -2. Only one 
difference between firm sizes for different mediums of payment is significant. The 
average pre- transaction assets of acquiring firms which used common stock as the 
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main method of payment were significantly (at a = 0.05) greater than those of 
acquiring firms which used cash from reserves. This indicates that (1) if acquiring 
firms have a greater value of assets, the dispersal of shares in large firms may already 
be substantial such that the acquiring fiiiu's managers are not afraid to issue new 
shares to the acquired firm or the shareholders of the acquired firms prefer to ask for a 
common stock exchange rather than a cash offer. (2) the acquired enterprise's 
shareholders perceive or predict that the large acquiring enterprise promises better 
future prospects. (3) if the acquiring firm uses cash from reserves as the main payment 
method, then, as cash availability is limited, so the bidding film tends to be relatively 
small. This result implies that the pre- transaction assets of acquiring firms will 
influence the method of payment. 
6.7 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE INCREASE IN TOTAL ASSETS POST- 
TRANSACTION FOR DIFFERENT PAYMENT METHODS 
T -tests for differences between the size of independent acquiring enterprises' changes 
in total assets by the main methods of payment are shown in Table 6 -7 -1. The results 
indicate that there were significant (at a = 0.05) differences in acquiring firms' average 
change in total assets depending on whether they were using cash from borrowings or 
not, and whether they were using an exchange of common stock or not. 
The average change in assets of the acquiring firms using cash from borrowings as the 
main method of payment was significantly smaller than the average change in assets of 
acquiring firms not doing so. This suggests cash from borrowings is used to finance the 
purchase of small rather than large acquired firms. One explanation might be that the 
government -controlled banks in Taiwan do not like to offer substantial funding to 
acquiring firms to buy relatively large firms in order to avoid assuming too much risk. 
Consequently, acquiring firms can only use a limited amount of cash from borrowings 
in order to merge with a smaller target. 
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The average change in assets of acquiring firms using common stock as the main 
method of payment was significantly greater than that of acquiring firms not doing so. 
This indicates that those acquirers offering common stock as the main method of 
payment to their acquired firms' shareholders, enjoyed the greatest increase in the size 
of their total assets. This also suggests that issuing common stock through the original 
shareholders or inviting the public to subscribe to shares is an important means of 
financing large acquisitions. 
Table 6 -7 -2 shows the variation of acquiring enterprises' average change in total assets 
by different main methods of payment. The average change in total assets of acquiring 
finds using common stock as the main method of payment was significantly (at a = 
0.05) greater than that of acquiring firms using cash from reserves or cash from 
borrowings. This implies that the exchange of common stock offers greater funds to 
the acquiring firm in the acquisition of a new firm than does a cash offer. 
6.8 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MAIN METHOD OF PAYMENT 
AND THE METHOD OF VALUATION OF THE ACQUIRED ENTERPRISE 
A test of independence between the main method of payment of the acquiring 
enterprise and the method of estimating the value of the acquired enterprise is 
displayed in Table 6 -8 -1. The result indicates that the computed value of x2 = 30.1256 
is greater than the critical value of x2, so the null hypothesis of independence can be 
rejected and it can be concluded that the main method of payment of the acquiring 
enterprise and the method used to estimate the value of the acquired enterprise are 
associated. 
The association between the main method of payment of the acquiring firm and the 
method used to estimate the value of the acquired film is shown in Table 6 -8 -2. The 
phi coefficients ranged from -.266 to .257, which indicates that there is either a low 
positive or a negative association between the main method of payment of the 
acquiring firm and the method used to estimate the value of the acquired firm. 
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There was a significant (at a = 0.05) negative association between acquiring 
enterprises using cash from reserves and whether book value was used to estimate the 
value of their acquired enterprises. This result indicates that if acquiring enterprises 
use the book value estimation method, there is a lower chance that the shareholders 
of the acquired firms will accept the cash offer. However, there was a significant 
positive association between the use of cash from reserves and the use of replacement 
cost or cash flow value as the valuation methods. This result indicates that if 
acquiring enterprises adopt replacement cost value or cash flow value as their 
estimation methods, there is a higher probability that the targets' shareholders will 
accept the cash offer. 
There was a significant positive association between the use of cash from borrowings 
to pay for the acquisition and the use of replacement cost or cash flow value to 
estimate the worth of the acquired enterprise. This result indicates that where 
acquiring enterprises use these estimation methods, there is a greater chance that the 
transaction will be paid for by cash from borrowings. This implies that banks are 
highly likely to offer funds to bidders using replacement cost or cash flow value 
estimation methods to estimate the value of their targets. 
Book value is not a good measure of the true value of a firm's assets because it is 
based on their historical cost. This value may drop far below actual asset values when 
there is rapid inflation and book value often overlooks the value of intangible 
assets.29 A book value estimation suggests an apparent underestimation of the value 
of the acquired firm so a target firm's shareholders are not likely to accept the cash 
offer. This result is similar to that found by Hansen (1987). Hansen concluded that 
when a target firm knows its value better than a bidding firm does, the acquiring firm 
will prefer to use a share- for -share exchange rather than a cash offer. In contrast, 
replacement cost or cash flow value estimation are more accurate indication of 
present market prices. In these circumstances, the target firm's shareholders are more 
likely to accept the cash offer. 
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There was a significant positive association between the use of common stock and the 
choice of book value to estimate the value of the acquired enterprise. This result 
indicates that if the acquiring enterprise uses book value, there is a greater chance that 
common stock will be the main method of payment. There was a significant negative 
association between payment by common stock and the use of cash flow value to value 
the acquired enterprise. This result indicates that where acquirers use cash flow value 
to estimate the value of their targets, there is less chance that common stock will be the 
main method of payment. 
Although book value apparently underestimates the value of proposed targets, an 
acquired firm's shareholders may still agreed to a common stock exchange. In this kind 
of case, the bidder may deliberately underestimate their shares' value or they may 
increase the exchange ratio to a level acceptable to the acquired firm's shareholders. 
6.9 CONCLUSION 
For Taiwanese mergers and acquisitions, the most common payment method is by 
`common stock'. Payment is made either by means of a cash offer or by an exchange of 
shares depending on three considerations. The first is tax and government regulations. 
The second is the future prospects of the acquiring enterprise as perceived by the 
acquired enterprise's shareholders. The third is the level of activity of the stock market. 
The size of the mean pre- transaction assets of acquiring firms using cash from reserves 
as the main method of payment was significantly smaller than those not doing so. This 
may imply that if the assets size of acquiring firms is small, the acquired firms' 
shareholders may prefer cash offers as the main payment method and the directors of 
small acquiring firms may consider that the offer of cash will not dilute the firms' 
shares nor affect their control. The size of the mean pre- transaction assets of acquiring 
firms using common stock as the main method of payment was significantly greater 
than those not doing so. This result indicates that acquired firms' shareholders prefer 
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the large acquiring firm and predict that the combined enterprise has good prospects. 
The dispersal of shareholding in large films, being already very large, will ensure that 
acquiring firms' managers are not afraid to issue new shares to the target, as the 
dilution of power is not an issue. 
The average pre- transaction assets of acquiring firms which used common stock as the 
main method of payment were significantly greater than those of acquiring firms which 
used cash from reserves. This indicates that (1) the dispersal of shares in large fiinis 
may already be substantial such that the acquiring firm's managers are not afraid to 
issue new shares to the acquired firm or that the greater preference shareholders of the 
acquired firms have to ask for a common stock exchange rather than a cash offer. (2) 
the acquired enterprise's shareholders perceive or predict that the large acquiring 
enterprise may offer their own company better future prospects. (3) If the acquiring 
film uses cash from reserves as the main payment method, and as cash availability is 
limited, it is likely that the bidding firm is relatively small. This result implies that the 
pre -transaction assets of acquiring firms will influence the method of payment. 
The average change in total post- transaction assets of acquiring firms using common 
stock as the main method of payment was significantly greater than the average change 
in total post- transaction assets of acquiring firms using cash from reserves or cash from 
borrowings. This implies that the exchange of common stock enables the acquiring 
firm to raise more funds for an acquisition than does a cash offer. 
If an acquiring firm's managers find a good acquisition opportunity, using cash from 
reserves may be the fastest and keeping business secret method for acquiring 
distribution channels, know -how, or rapid entry into new markets or new industries. 
The findings indicate that it is the public or the shareholders (as opposed to bankers) 
who are most likely to believe that the acquiring enterprise's managers can use the 
merger to reduce administrative expense, combine complementary resources or 
improve personnel management efficiency. However, the public or the shareholders do 
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not apparently believe that the goal of rapid entry into new markets or new industries 
can be achieved through the route of embarking on a merger. 
There was a significant negative association between acquiring enterprises using cash 
from reserves to pay for the transaction and the use of book value to estimate the value 
of their acquired enterprises. However, there was significant positive association 
between the use of cash (reserves or borrowings) to pay for the acquisition and the use 
of replacement cost or of cash flow value to estimate the value of the acquired 
enterprise. This result indicates that book value is not a good measure because it is 
apparent underestimation of the value of the acquired firm so a target firm's 
shareholders are not likely to accept the cash offer. In contrast, replacement cost or 
cash flow value estimation method are more accurate indication of acquired firm's 
value. In these circumstances, the target firm's shareholders are more likely to accept 
the cash offer. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE POST -TRANSACTION PERFORMANCE OF MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS-- UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The acquisition of a firm opens up many questions on the post- transaction 
performance of the firm. Amongst the questions that may be asked are the following. 
When an acquiring firm transacts with another company, how does its post - 
transaction performance compare with its previous performance? Does the firm's 
asset size affect the post- transaction performance? Do transactions within the same 
business group fare better or worse? Is there any association between the type of a 
merger or acquisition and post- transaction performance? What is the correlation 
between the motives for merging and post- transaction performance? Is there any 
correlation between the pre- transaction performances of the acquiring and acquired 
firms and the post- transaction performance of the acquiring firm? If the acquiring 
firm has transaction process problems, do they influence its post- transaction 
performance? 
To understand the post- transaction performance during the period 1990 -1995 of 
Taiwanese enterprises, this chapter applies univariate analyses to test a number of 
hypotheses relating to the above questions. The next chapter in contrast, applies 
multivariate analyses to identify which variables are significant predictors of superior 
post- transaction perfoimances. This chapter is arranged as follows. In the next 
section, we present the hypotheses and the independent variables relating to the 
acquiring firm. The questionnaire responses relating to the post- transaction 
performance of Taiwanese enterprises which had merged with, or acquired, others are 
described in the third section. The relationship between a firm's size and its post- 
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transaction performance is discussed in the fourth section. The fifth section analyses 
business group transactions and post- transaction perfouuance. Associations between 
the different types of mergers and acquisitions and post- transaction performance are 
presented in the sixth section. The seventh section classifies the acquiring 
enterprise's motives and rationales for merger and acquisition by its post- transaction 
performance whilst the comparison of previous and post- transaction performance of 
the acquiring enterprises is reviewed in the eighth section. Problems with the 
transaction process are measured against post- transaction perfonnance in the ninth 
section. The final section presents the conclusions. 
7.2 HYPOTHESES AND VARIABLES RELATING TO POST- 
TRANSACTION PERFORMANCE 
This chapter examines eight groups of variables. The hypotheses and the independent 
variables are discussed below. 
1. Size hypothesis: The greater the increase in size (total assets) as a result of the 
merger or take -over, the greater the improvement in post- transaction performance. 
The first test's variable is the acquiring firm's size (total assets). Teng and Chen 
(1979)' find that small and medium sized enterprises encounter difficulties in 
securing finance. Liao (1985)2 mentions that the weakness of the small and medium 
sized firm is due to the frailty of its capital structure and the shortage of its own 
funds. Liu (1993)3 considers that small and medium enterprises find it more difficult 
to obtain funding than do large enterprises, so the cost and capital risk are relatively 
high. Li, Chen, and Chang (1993)4 indicate that the relatively weak financial 
management of small and medium businesses makes it difficult for them to secure 
funds. 
On the whole, large enterprises have greater capital, higher production scales and 
greater market share. Thus, they are better placed than small firms to achieve better 
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operating and financial performance. As regards operations, large enterprises have 
better access to finance so they are more likely to enlarge the scope of their 
production activities and achieve economies of scale. In the case of financial synergy, 
large enterprises have better goodwill and credit so they find it relatively easy to raise 
funds and to increase their debt capacity, even to the extent of being able to avail 
themselves of lower rates from banks or money markets. As regards marketing, large 
enterprises have greater market share and market power, and so they may have 
greater opportunities for co- operative pricing (Stigler, 1968).5 Hall and Weiss (1967)6 
conclude that size matters: larger firms tend to achieve high profit rates. So we 
hypothesise that the greater the increase in size (total assets) as a result of the merger 
or take -over, the greater the improvement in post- transaction performance. 
2. Business group hypothesis: If acquiring and acquired funs do not belong to the 
same business group, such acquiring filins achieve better post- transaction 
performances than those which belong to the same business group. 
Fang (1990)' mentions that if acquiring and acquired firms are in the same business 
group, the terms and conditions of a transaction are easier to achieve than if they are 
not. The management or main shareholders can still control the fiiiii and there is likely 
to be less resistance from employees involved in the business group's transaction. The 
ease of achieving agreement between business group companies may imply however, 
that the transaction has not been thoroughly and carefully considered. The group may 
face a serious disadvantage. Normally the business group's small companies are run 
by the family (spouse or children) or by relatives (brother or sister) of the chairperson 
or general manager who operates a large and superior company. If the family or 
relatives of the chairperson or general manager do not have the same or better 
management ability, the small companies will have inferior operating performance. An 
acquiring firm can usually replace an incompetent manager but it is difficult, in a 
normal situation, to dismiss family members or relatives. So we hypothesise that if 
acquiring and acquired films do not belong to the same business group, such acquiring 
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firms achieve better post- transaction performances than those which belong within the 
same business group. 
3. The types of transaction hypothesis: There are no differences in the post 
transaction performances of acquiring firms as a direct consequence of the differing 
types of transaction. 
It is often considered that horizontal and congeneric transactions are more likely to 
exploit their operating synergistic advantages, e.g. economies of scale, marketing 
channels, research and development, etc., as the managers are familiar with the same 
or similar products, production techniques and with the organisational structure of 
the corporation. Shelton (1988)8 found that strategic fits are of considerable 
importance in determining the total gains generated through acquisition. The related - 
supplementary fits (i.e. similar products and new customers) and identical business 
fits (i.e. similar products and similar customers) provide significant opportunities for 
value creation. Unrelated fits (i.e. new products and new customers) offer the least 
chance to generate value. However, Singh and Montgomery (1987)9 have 
investigated whether firm acquisitions involving related technological resources or 
similar product markets create superior economic returns in comparison with 
unrelated acquisitions. Their findings indicate that acquiring firms engaged in related 
acquisitions do not have significantly or abnormally higher returns than firms in 
unrelated acquisitions. 
Lewellen (1971)10 and Higgins and Schall (1975)11 present the coinsurance 
hypothesis and argue that if the combined firms do not have perfectly correlated 
earnings, such mergers decrease the chances of bankruptcy. That is, the more 
conglomerate the features of the acquisition the lower the risk of bankruptcy to the 
combined finis. Diversification helps to stabilise the firm's earnings stream. When 
the firm's cash flow stabilises, the risk of bankruptcy declines and the firm may 
increase its debt capacity. The interest on the debt is tax deductible thus reducing the 
cost of the debt. Benefits from financial diversification are likely to be higher for 
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conglomerate acquisitions than for other acquisition types. Agrawal et al. (1992)12 
found that non -conglomerate mergers display significantly inferior performance 
(cumulated average abnormal returns) than do conglomerate mergers over the five - 
year post- merger period. But Jensen (1986)13 found that conglomerate mergers are 
less likely to succeed because the acquiring firm's managers are not familiar with 
their acquired firm. 
Large companies normally like to control their raw material as much as possible to 
avoid shortages and to decrease costs. The other advantages of vertical integration are 
that by- products may be exploited, administration costs (e.g. ordering, inspection, 
and accounting, etc.) 'are reduced, and co- ordination and communication difficulties 
are easier to resolve. Lubatkin (1987) found that there are no significant post- merger 
performance differences amongst different types of bidders and targets (that is 
horizontal and market concentric, product concentric, vertical, and conglomerate 
transactions). Seth (1990)14 also found that different sources of value creation are 
likely to emerge from different types of acquisition, i.e. value is created in both 
related and unrelated acquisitions. Related acquisitions do not create more value than 
unrelated acquisitions. These empirical studies indicate mixed results. However, 
there are reasons why profit rates may be expected to increase in all cases, but it is 
almost impossible to say, as a general tendency, which type is most likely to lead to 
the greatest increase in profit rates. So we hypothesise that there are no differences in 
the post transaction performance of firms as a consequence of the different types of 
transaction. 
4. Merger motive hypothesis: The more important the motive to increase profits or 
the profit rate through merging or acquiring, the greater will be the post- transaction 
performance of the acquiring firm. 
The fourth group of variables are the motives for mergers and acquisitions which 
relate to profit increases. Ingham, Kran and Lovestam (1992)15 used questionnaires to 
explore the relationship between merger motives and performance in UK companies. 
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The three most important merger motives were to increase profitability, to gain 
additional market power and to achieve economies of scale in marketing. The results 
indicate that 77% of managers consider that in the short -run of 0 -3 years, their 
profitability increased after the merger and 68% of managers consider that over the 
long run, of more than three years, their profitability increased. 
Gains can be created in a merger through economies of scale. If an acquiring firm 
attaches great importance to the motive of economies of scale, it indicates that the 
acquiring firm would like, through the merger, to share people, equipment, and 
overheads. This sharing would reduce its per unit production cost and its 
administrative expenses, thus increasing its profits. When the acquiring film shares 
or increases its distribution channels, it can also share the acquired fine's original 
distributors and customers and increase its sales to, and benefits from, these new 
customers after the transaction. Acquiring brands, patents or copyrights or sharing 
research and development personnel or facilities will increase the acquiring firm's 
sales, improve its production quality, decrease its expenses and enhance its market 
competitiveness, therefore expanding its profits. If a fiiiii enters into a new area or 
industry and yet lacks the appropriate know -how or distribution channels, this move 
can be very risky and costly. Mergers often provide a rapid and safe way to enter new 
markets or industries. A large company will usually want to exercise as much control 
over the production process as possible to secure its sales. Merging with a supplier so 
as to control material resources can eliminate its out -of -stock probability, facilitate its 
co- ordination and administration and/or utilise its by- products and hence reduce its 
cost and increase its earnings. Different companies promise different advantages. For 
example, one firm may specialise in research and development and invent a good 
product but may not have enough finance or outstanding marketing personnel to sell 
the innovation. Another firm may have a surplus of funds and a shortage of good 
investment opportunities. If these two types of company can integrate their 
complementary resources, the combined firm can increase its sales and profits and 
even expand its total value. 
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When the earnings from two companies are less than perfectly positively correlated, 
diversification can lead to a more stable cash flow and hence reduce the chance of 
bankruptcy. Companies in different industries enjoy various levels of profitability 
and of cash flow during the changing business cycle. Stabilisation of earnings is 
certainly beneficial to a company's employees, customers and suppliers. But is it an 
advantage to the company's shareholders? The argument is that if an investor is 
worried about earnings variability, he /she can diversify through the stock market 
more easily than the company can through acquisition. Why may a company want to 
merge with another one to diversify its risk? The reasons may be as follows. (1) The 
major shareholders of a company do not want to sell their stock to diversify, because 
this would dilute their ownership and generate a tax liability. (2) If a company fails, 
its assets cannot be sold for their value `in use' and the shareholders would only 
receive a low pay -out after liquidation (because of legal and accounting expenses, 
etc.). (3) The managers' reputation may be spoiled if a company is liquidated. (4) Tax 
incentives: if the acquiring firm has net operating losses, the combined firm can 
deduct from its future profits and balance its books backwards for up to five years.16 
(5) Financial synergy: the more stable earnings of the company after a merger may 
reduce the risk of default or bankruptcy because the losses of one firm can be 
compensated for by the income of the other (Lewellen, 1971).17 If the merged firm 
can solve its financial difficulties and reduce the risk of default or bankruptcy, it may 
increase its debt capacity or financing and avail itself of cheaper borrowing than 
would be possible if the units remained separate. 
The horizontal merger of two firms can result in greater market share. This increase 
could lead to economies of scale. Stigler (1968) considers that in horizontal mergers, 
large firms have greater market share and market power, so they may have greater 
opportunities for collaboration. The anticompetitive activities of mutual dealing or 
tie -in sales result in market power -related gains (Lone and Halpern, 1970).18 
Increased market power can earn super normal profits (Singh and Montgomery, 
1987).19 If a company applies for listing on the stock market, it needs to demonstrate 
a good operating performance together with some additional requirements.20 If it can 
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achieve these requirements and be approved by the government (i.e. Securities and 
Exchange Commission), then the public will normally believe that this company's 
operating situation is very good and its future holds potential. When the company 
issues its shares on the stock market, the par value (NT $10) of one share will quickly 
increase. The newly listed company can make abnormal gains from the stock market. 
At the same time, the listed company can also enhance its public image and 
reputation. That is why many companies actively apply for a listing on the stock 
market and this motive is one of the special merger motives in Taiwanese enterprises. 
If the acquiring film can comply with the government's regulatory requirements, it 
also can enjoy some tax advantages in addition to its application for listing on the 
stock market. These tax advantages include tax exemption or deferment21 (a merger 
or consolidation may be exempt from all income tax, stamp tax and deed tax and may 
defer its land -value increment tax), accelerated depreciation22 (instruments and 
equipment for exclusive use in research and development and/or inspection of pilot 
products, machinery and equipment used for energy saving purposes or as alternate 
energy sources, or the requirements for adjustment of industrial structure and 
improvement of scale of operations and methods of production) and tax credit23 (the 
combining firm can accommodate the acquiring s net operating loss backwards 
for five years), etc. In addition, tax benefits can be created in a merger through the 
revaluation of previously depreciated assets; the advantage emerges after the 
increased depreciation related to this revaluation of assets is gained. Governmental 
encouragement or support together with tax advantages may increase the acquiring 
firm's sales and/or reduce its taxes and so further increase its net income. In 
consequence, it is more likely to have better profits after the transaction. If ineffective 
managers (including those in marketing, production, finance, personnel, purchasing 
and research and development) can be replaced by efficient managers through a 
merger, and the latter's superior operating ability is applied to the combined firm, 
there should be a creation of wealth. 
Some firms have found that it is cheaper to purchase assets through an acquisition 
than to set up a new company, especially when the target firm's assets (i.e. real 
139 
estate, machinery and equipment, or stock value) are undervalued. A less expensive 
purchase can decrease the acquiring firm's expenses and increase its profits or value. 
Jensen (1986)24 observes that if a firm is in a mature industry with a surplus of 
operating cash flow and a shortage of profitable investment opportunities, the 
managers of such a firm will want to acquire another one rather than to distribute 
their surplus cash to shareholders because the pay out of free cash reduces the 
resources under their control and thereby reduces their power. In addition, if 
managers return the surplus cash to shareholders, at a later stage the managers may 
find profitable investment chances and need to seek financing again. The difference 
of objective between shareholders and managers is an agency problem. Fama 
(1980)25 considers that compensation arrangements (based on performance which 
offers bonuses and stock options for managers) and the stock market monitoring 
devices may mitigate the agency problem. Fama and Jensen (1983)26 find that a low 
stock price puts pressure on managers to change their attitude and to operate their 
firm to meet shareholders interests. But Jensen (1986) considers that the agency costs 
that result from conflicts of interest cannot be perfectly solved. We assume that the 
stock market is efficient in the strong sense27 and the motives for merger so as to 
make use of surplus funds, buying below replacement cost, and gaining potential real 
estate or other related values is neutral for post- transaction profits performance. 
No matter what merger motives acquiring firms have, they focus their attention on 
reducing expenses or costs, increasing their distribution channels, improving their 
management efficiency, combining complementary resources, enhancing market 
competitiveness, and finally making greater profits. So we assume that the more 
important the motive to increase the level of profits or profit rate by means of merger 
or acquisition, (that is, reductions in cost or increases in revenue) the greater will be 
the post- transaction perfoiniance of the acquiring fine. 
5. The main method of payment hypothesis: The main method of payment will affect 
the post- transaction level of profits or the profit rate performance of the acquiring 
firm. 
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The main method of payment used in the merger or take -over may influence the post - 
transaction level of profits or profit rate performance of acquiring firm. These 
influences mainly involve tax factors and information and regulation effects. Carleton, 
Guilkey, Harris and Stewart (1983)28 argue that cash take -overs may be quite different 
from non -cash take -overs; failing to distinguish between them might result in 
unsatisfactory generalisations. If the acquired firm's shareholders receive common 
stock in exchange for their own stock, this results in a tax -deferred merger until the 
shareholder sells the shares. When take -overs are accomplished by an exchange of 
cash, the transactions of the target film's shareholders are taxable and any gains are 
taxed immediately. This cash offer reduces the after -tax returns to the acquired 
shareholders. Owing to the tax factor, the acquiring firm needs to pay higher 
premiums for cash offers than using stock to compensate target shareholders for the 
instant payment of taxes. 
Myers and Majluf (1984)29 mention that the method of financing an investment 
implies the holding of some infoimation. When the firm uses common stock to 
finance a new project, it may deliver the message that the acquiring firm's managers 
consider their own shares to be overvalued and this may cause the returns to bidders to 
be negative. When the acquiring firm uses debt to finance a new investment, it may 
imply that bidding managers consider their common stock to be undervalued. 
Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983)30 find that a stock -for -stock exchange needs several 
months to get approval from the Securities and Exchange Commission while cash 
payments to acquire target shares can take several weeks. Longer transaction times on 
the stock offer provide the acquired management with more chance to mount a 
defence and potential bidders may be attracted to join in the fray. As a result the 
acquiring firm needs to offer higher premiums to its target and these extra premiums 
will influence its post- transaction profit performance. 
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Samuels et al. (1994)31 state that although it is difficult to believe that the company 
share price completely reflects the true value of a share, they believe that in the long 
run the actual share price will move towards its true value as based on expected 
earnings. Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1983) found higher abnoinial returns for cash 
offers than for stock offers. The acquired fiini's cumulative average return (CAR) for 
the 41 days through to the announcement date, when the method of payment was cash, 
was 33.54%, as compared with 17.47% when securities were used. Franks, Harris, and 
Mayer (1988)32 found that over the period of analysis covering months -4 to +1, 
acquisitions paid for by cash offers had significant positive abnormal returns for the 
bidding firms in the United States, but this was not found to be significant in the 
United Kingdom. No significant abnormal returns for bidding firms which paid by 
offers of equity were found either in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Travlos (1987)33 concludes that bidding firms suffer significant losses in pure stock 
exchange acquisitions, but when paid for by cash they experience normal returns on 
the announcement day. This finding is consistent with the infouuation hypothesis, 
which implies that financing a take -over through exchange of common stock conveys 
the negative message that the bidding film is overvalued. Peterson and Peterson 
(1991)34 find that cash provides the greatest returns for the acquired firm's 
shareholders while stock provides the lowest returns. This result is consistent with the 
tax effects. The observation that the use of cash results in statistically significant 
wealth gains to acquisitions, whereas acquisitions that do not employ cash do not 
experience significant wealth gains, lends support to Jensen's free cash flow theory. 
Trifts (1991)35 concludes that cash offers show positive but insignificant returns, while 
stock offers yield significant negative returns. The conclusion that cash offers 
outperform stock offers around acquisition announcements is similar to the 
conclusions of Travlos (1987) and Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1987). Lo (1991)36 finds 
that acquiring firms reap positive cumulative average residuals when using an 
exchange of common stock but suffer negative cumulative average residuals when 
cash is used. However, neither payment method suggested significant cumulative 
average residuals for the period +6 to +15 days in Taiwanese listed companies during 
the period 1989 -1990. 
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Corporate bonds, convertible bonds, and preferred stock are seldom used as methods 
of payment for mergers or acquisitions. The main influence on the post- transaction 
profit performance is that the acquiring firm needs to pay the fixed interest or dividend 
to the acquired firm's shareholders. If the acquiring firm offers high fixed interest rates 
or dividends to attract the target company's shareholders at a time of high interest 
rates, this will decrease the post- transaction profit performance and vice versa. Interest 
payments are tax deductible but dividend payments are not. Fixed interest rates or 
dividends and tax factors will affect the offering price of the acquiring firm and further 
influence its post- transaction profit performance. Subscription warrants offer the 
target's shareholders the right to subscribe to the ordinary shares of the acquiring firm 
at a fixed date and price. Subscription prices usually exceed market prices so the issue 
of a warrant is a risk for the acquiring firm. A high (or low) subscription price will 
affect the acquiring firm's post- transaction profit perfolinance. In the light of the 
above discussion, we assume that the main method of payment will affect the post - 
transaction profit performance of the acquiring fiiiu. 
In this study, we use dummy variables to indicate the main method of payment of the 
acquiring firm. If the acquiring film chooses to use cash from reserves as the main 
method of payment, the value of the variable is set to one. If the acquiring firm does 
not, the value is set to zero. The value setting of the other choices --that is, cash (bank 
borrowing), common stock, subscription warrants or other payments --is the same as 
for reserve cash. 
6. The estimation method of the value of the transacted firm hypothesis: The method 
used to value the transacted firm will affect the post- transaction level of profits or 
profit rate performance of the acquiring firm. 
For several reasons it is not easy to estimate the value of a firm which may be 
acquired. For example, the value of acquiring superior management or the benefits 
from combining outstanding sales staff with an exceptional production department are 
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difficult to establish. These potential synergistic effects are not easy to measure using 
the historical data of the firms involved. Estimating the synergistic gain from 
combining two firms is very important but is difficult. The lack of precision in 
estimating increased market power, economies of scale, or reduction in bankruptcy 
costs, etc. makes an objective analysis hard to accomplish. 
Many methods have been advocated in the literature as ways of valuing a potential 
acquisition. Four of these are: 
(1) Book value 
The book value of a company's net worth is the value of its assets less its outstanding 
liabilities. Normally book value is not the true market value of a find's net worth 
because it is based on the historical cost of the film's assets. Although the book value 
may not indicate real market value, it can still be used as a basic method to estimate 
the value of a target firm. 
(2) Stock market value 
If the company is listed on the stock market, the estimated value can be established on 
the basis of its market value. This estimation method is based on the fact that the stock 
market price indicates the collective opinion of investors as to a firm's cash flow 
potential and to its corresponding risk. Even though the stock market value approach 
is the one most often used in estimating a listed company, the share price can change 
very quickly so bidding firms which use this method need to be very careful. 
(3) Replacement cost value 
The replacement cost estimation method uses the cost of replacing an asset, as 
opposed to its historical cost, either in its present form or as the cost of obtaining 
equivalent services. The bidding firm can value the target firm's fixed assets which 
reflect the cost of gaining comparable assets from the second hand market. 
(4) Cash flow value 
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Cash flow is the amount of cash being received and expended by a business. The 
bidding firm may use the cash flow approach to estimate what incremental net cash 
flows will be available to it as a result of the merger or acquisition. The present value 
of the cash flows are determined with this aim in mind. 
The bidding firm needs to check the accounts of the target firm to ensure that their 
estimation is acceptable. The bidding firm also needs to standardise the accounts of 
the target firm if it is to understand the impact of the merger or acquisition on its post - 
transaction profit performance. The present and future tax liability of the target firm 
should be considered too. Contingent loss or litigation problems should be deliberately 
considered if it is probable that a future issue will confirm the loss and if it can be 
estimated with reasonable accuracy. The book value estimation method using 
historical cost data may underestimate the target company's value. The estimation 
method based on stock market value is only suitable for listed companies and the share 
price varies every day. It is difficult to accurately evaluate the target firm's overall 
goods, machinery and equipment through the replacement cost estimation method. The 
cash flow method hypothesises about growth and revenues in the future and must 
include many uncertainties. 
It is very apparent that different valuation methods result in different prices. 
Theoretically speaking, significant underestimation of an acquired firm's value would 
not be accepted by its shareholders. On the other hand, an overestimation of the 
acquired firm would seriously affect the acquiring find's post- transaction profits. 
Normally the final price is negotiated by the two companies. The choice of valuation 
method will influence the acquiring fiiiii's profits perfotimance after the transaction. 
We hypothesise that the estimation method used to value the transacted firm will 
affect the post- transaction profits performance of the acquiring firm. 
The sixth group of variables are dummy variables to represent the use or otherwise of 
each of five methods to value the acquired firm. If the acquiring film chooses book 
value as the estimation method, the variable is set equal to one. If the acquiring firm 
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uses an alternative method, we set the value at zero. Dummy variables are also used to 
represent the use, or otherwise, of stock market value, replacement cost value, cash 
flow value or another estimation method (e.g. share par value or real estate 
reappraisement value, etc.). 
7. The pre -transaction performance hypothesis: The better the pre- transaction 
performance of the acquiring firm relative to that of the acquired firm, the better will 
the post- transaction level of profits or profit rate performance be of the combined firm. 
The differential efficiency theory assumes that if the acquiring firm has a superior 
operating and/or financial performance relative to that of the acquired firm and that the 
acquired firm's operating and/or financial performance is brought up to the level of the 
acquiring firm after the transaction, efficiency will be increased by the merger. It is 
reasonable to believe that an efficient management team will apply their abilities and 
resources to raise the standards of the acquired firm after the transaction. Thus, the 
acquired firm's operational performance will improve and the combined firm will 
enjoy improved post- transaction performance. 
On the issue of diversification, an acquiring diversified fini will have lower debt costs 
than a less diversified acquired firm and so the former will have a better profit rate 
than the latter. If the former acquires the latter, the benefits of lower debt costs can 
also be gained by the acquired firm and so the profit rate of the combined firm will 
increase after the acquisition. 
The superior acquiring firm, through differential efficiency and diversification, both 
upgrades the acquired firm's efficiency and reduce its debt costs. This makes it 
possible to increase sales, reduce interest expenses, and further expand income after 
the transaction. So we assume that the better the pre -transaction performance of the 
acquiring firm compared to that of the acquired firm, the better the post- transaction 
level of profits or profit rate performance of the combined firm will be. 
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(8) The transaction process problems hypothesis: The less "serious" the transaction 
process problems the better the post- transaction level of profits or profit rate 
performance of the acquiring firm will be. 
Mitchell (1988)37 found that clashes between corporate cultures are the first and most 
important reason why mergers fail. The other reasons are: people leave --the acquired 
firm's top management and other key people quit; the company has been bought at the 
wrong time in its corporate life cycle; and, culture shock --a big company swamps a 
smaller one with systems and people, etc.. Lin (1990)38 indicated that assets and 
goodwill valuation and corporate integration are the most difficult problems during the 
transaction process period. No matter what transaction process problems an acquiring 
firm may suffer -- whether corporate culture differences, management or employee 
drains, inaccurate asset valuation, shareholders resistance or litigation problems, etc.- - 
if these problems are very serious, they will highly negatively influence the acquiring 
firm's post- transaction performance. We assume that the less serious the transaction 
process problems the better will be the post -transaction level of profits or profit rate 
performance of the acquiring firm. 
The above discussion leads to the identification of different potential variables which 
may be expected to explain the probability that an acquiring firm will enjoy a superior 
post- transaction level of profits or profit rate. The hypotheses, and the variables that 
they imply, are summarised in Table 7 -2 -1. The sign ascribed to each variable 
indicates whether the probability of a superior post- transaction profit performance is 
expected to increase ( +) or decrease ( -) as that variable increases. 
7.3 UNIVARIATE RESULTS 
The questionnaire survey data was used to gain insight into the post -transaction level 
of profit and profit rate performance of acquiring firms in Taiwan between 1990 and 
1995. 
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Table 7 -3 -1 indicates that the average values for post- transaction performance 
measured in terms of levels of profit (i.e. net sales, gross profits, operation income, 
and net income) and profit rates (i.e. earnings per share, dividends per share, 
price /earning ratio, and returns on total assets) ranged from 1.966 to 2.164 and from 
2.268 to 2.330 respectively. These results indicate that the post- transaction 
perfolivance of acquiring firms was superior in all of the measured values as 
compared with their pre- transaction profit performance. Furthermore, 67 -73% of the 
firms responded that their post- transaction level of profit performance was superior or 
very superior compared to their pre- transaction performance; 21 -24% of the firms 
indicated that their post- transaction level of profit performance was the same as their 
pre- transaction performance; while 4 -8% of the firms indicated that their post - 
transaction level of profit performance was inferior or very inferior to their pre - 
transaction performance. 58 -63% of the firms claimed that their post- transaction 
profit rate performance was superior or very superior compared to their pre - 
transaction performance; 24 -31% indicated that their post- transaction profit rate 
performance was the same as their pre- transaction performance; while 9 -12% 
indicated that their post- transaction profit rate performance was inferior or very 
inferior to their pre- transaction performance. 
Table 7 -3 -2 shows that all of the T -tests or Kolmogorov- Smirnov Tests for the 
acquiring enterprise's post- transaction performance were significant. The results 
indicate that the managers of acquiring enterprises believe that the post- transaction 
performances of their companies were significantly better than their pre- transaction 
performances. 
7.4 POST -TRANSACTION PERFORMANCE BY SIZE OF ACQUIRING 
ENTERPRISES 
Various relationships may be postulated between the post -transaction performance 
achieved and the size of the assets of acquiring firms. According to the classification 
in Chapter 5, we divide the acquiring firm's total assets prior to the transaction into 
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four subgroups. The first subgroup (small enterprises) consists of acquiring firms 
with total assets of less than NT$ 100 million. There were seventy -five of these 
cases. The second subgroup (small- medium sized enterprises) consists of acquiring 
fiiins with total assets of greater than, or equal to, NT$ 100 million, but less than 
NT$ 200 million. There were thirty -five of these cases. The third subgroup (medium 
sized enterprises) consists of acquiring firms with total assets of greater than or equal 
to, NT$ 200 million, but less than NT$ 1,000 million. There were fifty -two of these 
cases. The fourth subgroup (large enterprises) consists of acquiring fiiius with total 
assets of greater than, or equal to, NT$ 1,000 million. There were fifty such cases. 
Table 7 -4 -1 indicates that on all measures of perfoiniance, managers believed on 
average that their post- transaction performance surpassed their pre- transaction 
performance. Comparing across size classes, large enterprises had the lowest mean 
post- transaction levels of profit performance in teuüs of net incomes and operating 
incomes and had the lowest mean post- transaction profit rate performance values in 
earnings per share, dividends per share, price /earning ratio and returns on total assets. 
The medium -sized enterprises had the poorest post- transaction levels of profit 
perfoimance mean values for net sales and gross profits. The small- medium sized 
enterprises had the greatest mean value of all post- transaction performances. These 
results indicate that the perceived post- transaction performance of the large and 
medium sized acquiring firms was greater than that of the small and small- medium 
sized acquiring firms. 
Table 7 -4 -2 indicates the T -test of the differences between the mean scores for each 
estimated post- transaction level of profit and profit rate performance of the four 
subgroups. Large acquiring enterprises (size x4) had significantly greater perceived 
improvement in all post- transaction performances (at a = 0.05) compared to the 
small- medium acquiring enterprises (size x2). The medium acquiring enterprises (size 
x3) had significantly greater performance improvement in all the post- transaction 
levels of profit and had significantly greater post- transaction profit rate performance 
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improvement in earnings per share and dividends per share (at a = 0.05) as compared 
to the small- medium sized acquiring enterprises. 
The large acquiring enterprises also had significantly greater post- transaction levels 
of profit performance improvement in gross profits, operating incomes and net 
incomes and greater post- transaction profit rate performance improvements in 
earnings per share, dividends per share and price /earning ratios (at a = 0.05) than did 
the small acquiring enterprises (size xi). The medium -sized acquiring enterprises had 
significantly greater post- transaction levels of profit performance improvement in 
gross profits, operating incomes and net incomes and greater post- transaction profit 
rate perfomuances improvement in earnings per share and price /earning ratios (at a = 
0.05) than did the small acquiring enterprises. 
These results indicate that the large and medium -sized acquiring enterprises achieve 
greater increases in their operating and financial performance after the transaction 
than do small and small- medium sized acquiring enterprises. That is, the greater the 
size of the acquiring firm the better its post- transaction performance improvement 
will be. Why do large acquiring firms achieve better operating and financial 
performances after the transaction in Taiwanese enterprises? In general, a large 
enterprise has greater capital, higher production scales and greater market share. 
Thus, it may have greater opportunities to achieve better operating and financial 
synergy than small enterprises have. Considering operating synergy, most of the 
mergers and acquisitions in Taiwan are horizontal (see Table 3 -6 -1) so they are more 
likely than other types of merger to yield operational synergy. Large enterprises have 
greater capital so they find it comparatively easy to enlarge their production scale, 
obtain economies of scale and ensure more earnings per dollar of investment. In the 
case of financial synergy, large enterprises have better goodwill and credit so they 
find it comparatively easy to raise funds and increase their debt capacity, and even to 
gain lower interest rates from banks or the money market. Turning to marketing 
synergy, on the whole one would expect that large enterprises have greater market 
share and market power, and so have greater opportunities for collaborative activity. 
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The anticompetitive activities of mutual dealing or tie -in sales result in market 
power -related gains (Lone and Halpern, 1970).39 The results were similar to those 
found in the previous empirical study in Taiwan (Lin, 1990).4° 
Table 7 -4 -2 also shows the Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test (U -test) 
of the difference between the median scores for each post- transaction performance of 
the four subgroup enterprises. The results of the U -test of the post- transaction 
performance for the four subgroups are similar to the results of the T -test. 
7.5 THE POST -TRANSACTION PERFORMANCE OF ACQUIRING 
ENTERPRISES CLASSIFIED BY BUSINESS GROUP 
We now discuss the acquiring enterprise's post- transaction level of profit and profit 
rate performance classified by business group. As shown in Table 7 -5 -1, if acquiring 
and acquired finis belong to the same business group, the post- transaction level of 
profit and profit rate performance's mean value for the acquiring firm ranges from 
2.029 to 2.210 and from 2.326 to 2.387 respectively. This means that, on average, the 
post- transaction level of profit and profit rate perfoimance of acquiring firms is 
superior to their pre- transaction performance. If acquiring and acquired firms do not 
belong to the same business group, the post- transaction level of profit and profit rate 
performance's mean value for the acquiring firm ranges from 1.588 to 1.878 and 
from 1.906 to 2.034 respectively. This indicates that the acquiring enterprise's post - 
transaction level of profit and profit rate performance significantly improves. 
Table 7 -5 -2 shows the T -test of the difference between the mean scores for each post - 
transaction level of profit and profit rate performance for acquisitions within the 
same business groups, compared with the corresponding mean score for acquisitions 
between members of different business groups. If acquiring and acquired films do not 
belong to the same business group, the acquiring firm has a significantly better 
estimated post- transaction level of profit performance in net sales and operating 
income, and has a significantly better estimated post- transaction profit rate 
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performance in earnings per share, dividends per share and price /earning ratio (at a = 
0.05) compared to one which belongs to the same business group. 
The results indicate that if firms do not belong to the same business group, acquiring 
firms achieve better perceived performance improvement after the transaction than 
those which belong to the same business group. Lin (1990)41 found a similar result 
but it was not statistically significant. 
One possible explanation for these results is that if acquiring and acquired firms do 
not belong to the same business group, the acquiring firm is better able to replace 
inefficient managers, lay off unnecessary employees, and increase the market power 
after the transaction than do those which belong to the same business group. Many 
members of a business group's management in Taiwan are made up of family or 
relatives. If one person is the chairperson or general manager of the large company, 
his /her family (spouse and children) or his /her relatives (brother or sister) will be 
amongst the management of the other small companies. These business group 
companies can help each other, especially with financial guarantees and assistance. 
But if the family or relatives do not have the same or superior management ability, 
the small companies will display a performance consistent with poorer management. 
When firms merge, an acquiring firm can usually replace the incompetent managers 
but this is seldom the case when family or relatives are involved. 
The other possible explanation for these results is that if acquiring and acquired firms 
do not belong to the same business group, the acquiring firm needs to raise the 
transaction money either from the firm's shareholders or from the bank or money 
market so it has to present good reasons for why the transaction is reasonable and 
profitable to the shareholders /public or the bank. If this transaction plan is approved 
by the shareholders or bank, it indicates that not only do the acquiring firm's 
managers believe in the reliability and profitability of this transaction but that this 
faith is shared by the shareholders, bankers and financial institute investors. These 
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careful preparations and considerations increase the probability that the acquiring 
firm will achieve its goal and achieve a better post- transaction performance. 
Table 7 -5 -2 also displays the Mann- Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test (U- 
test) of the difference between the median scores for each post- transaction 
performance within or outside the same business groups. The results of the U -test 
were similar to the results of the T -test. 
7.6 THE POST -TRANSACTION PERFORMANCE OF ACQUIRING 
ENTERPRISES CLASSIFIED BY THE TYPE OF THE TRANSACTION 
As shown in Table 7 -6 -1, on average, horizontal transactions by acquiring firms 
enjoyed the best post -transaction levels of profit and profit rate performances on all 
measures of performance in comparison with other types of transaction. That is, gross 
profits, operating incomes, net incomes, earnings per share, dividends per share, 
price /earning ratios and returns on total assets compared well in horizontal 
transactions as opposed to other types of transaction. 
Acquiring firms which were vertically integrated had the best post- transaction 
performance in net sales, but the worst post- transaction levels of profit performance 
in net income and in returns on total assets compared to the other types of 
transaction. Congeneric transactions by acquiring firms had the worst post - 
transaction levels of profit performance in operating income and the worst post - 
transaction profit rate performance in earnings per share, dividends per share and 
price /earning ratio than the other types of transaction. Conglomerate transactions by 
acquiring firms had the worst post- transaction levels of profit performance in net 
sales and gross profits than the other types of transaction. 
Differences in post -transaction levels of profit and profit rate performance between 
acquiring firms involved in different types of transaction are presented in Table 7 -6- 
2. The results of the T -test indicate that acquiring firms' horizontal transactions had 
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significantly better post- transaction levels of profit performance improvement in net 
sales, gross profits, and operating income and had significantly better post - 
transaction profit rate performance improvement in earnings per share (at a = 0.05) 
than did conglomerate transactions. Acquiring firms which engaged in horizontal 
transactions also had significantly better post- transaction profit rate performance 
improvements in earnings per share and dividends per share (at a = 0.05) than those 
which engaged in vertical transactions. The post -transaction level of profit 
performance of vertically transacting acquiring firms in terms of net sales had 
improved (at a = 0.05) more than did the post- transaction level of profit performance 
of conglomerate acquiring firms. These results indicate that amongst Taiwanese 
enterprises horizontal post- transaction perfoimance is much better than for 
transactions of other types. The results were similar to those found in previous 
empirical studies in Taiwan (Fang, 199042; Yang, 199643) 
Fang (1990) concludes that technology and market distribution are easier to exploit in 
horizontal transactions than in transactions of other types amongst Taiwanese 
enterprises. If firms have the funds to acquire another company, they may wish to 
acquire one from within the same industry because managers are more familiar with 
the production processes and distribution channels within their own industry and this 
may influence their post transaction perfoimance. Films engaged in a horizontal 
transaction may produce the same products or offer the same services. Firstly, it is 
easier for such firms to increase their sales or enlarge their services, to take advantage 
of economies of scale and to grab greater market share or market power than would 
be the case with conglomerate and vertical transactions. Secondly, the horizontal 
transaction film's management are familiar with the same products, distribution 
channels, production techniques and organisational characteristics. These managers 
are more likely to be able to exploit these advantages to improve their firms' levels of 
profit and profit rates than are the management of other transactions' firms. So it is 
reasonable that horizontal transactions by acquiring firms result in greater net sales, 
gross profits and operating incomes and achieve higher earnings per share and 
dividends per share than do conglomerate and vertical transactions. 
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Table 7 -6 -2 also shows the Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test (U -test) 
of the differences in the post- transaction level of profit and profit rate performance 
between acquiring firms involved in different types of transaction. The results of the 
U -test were similar to the results of the T -test. 
7.7 MOTIVES FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS AND THE POST - 
TRANSACTION PERFORMANCE OF ACQUIRING ENTERPRISES 
Speaiman's rank correlation coefficients between the importance of different motives 
for mergers and acquisitions and the post- transaction level of profit and profit rate of 
the acquiring enterprises are presented in Table 7 -7 -1. 
In general, there was a significantly positive Spearman's rank correlation coefficient 
(at a = 0.05) between the merger and acquisition performance of acquiring 
enterprises after the transaction and the importance of the motives of economies of 
scale, control of distribution channels, reducing administrative expense, acquisition 
of know -how or research and development, enhancement of market competitiveness, 
rapid entry into new markets or industries, increased market power and 
improvements to purchasing management efficiency. This result indicated that the 
better the merger and acquisition performance of acquiring enterprises after the 
transaction, the more important were the above mentioned merger motives, or vice 
versa. That is the more important the motivational emphasis on increased levels of 
profits or profit rate (reductions in cost or increases in revenue) the greater was post - 
transaction performance of the acquiring firm. These results were similar to a 
previous empirical study in Taiwan (Lin, 1990).44 
We found that the above mentioned significantly important motives were mostly 
associated with operational and market factors. The aims of such transactions were 
chiefly to reduce expenses, increase sales, control distribution channels, acquire 
know -how, enhance market competitiveness and enlarge market power. These 
motives were aimed at improving operating performance, augmenting sales and 
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profits and further increasing earnings per share, dividends per share or returns on 
total assets. It is likely that if acquiring firms are driven by these concerns, they will 
enjoy better performance after the transaction than those which are not thus 
motivated. 
There was a significantly positive correlation (at a = 0.05) between the wish to 
acquire a brand marks, patents or copyright technologies and to apply for a listing on 
the stock market and a perceived increase in net sales, earnings per share, 
price /earning ratios and returns on total assets of acquiring enterprises after the 
transaction. This indicates that acquiring a good brand or patent will significantly 
increase an acquiring firm's net sales and further affect its earnings per share, 
price /earning ratio and returns on total assets after the transaction. Applying for a 
listing on the stock market is an important motive for Taiwanese enterprises pursuit 
of merger and take -over. Such a listing can improve a firm's image and upgrade its 
public reputation. It becomes much easier to get debt financing and to qualify for 
cheaper borrowing rates. This will significantly increase the firm's sales, profits and 
income and result in better earnings per share, price /earning ratios and returns on 
total assets after the transaction. 
The importance of the motive to improve production and purchasing management 
efficiency significantly (at a = 0.05) affects the acquiring firm's gross profits, 
operating income, net income, earnings per share, dividends per share, price /earning 
ratio and returns on total assets. Improvements in production techniques and 
purchasing efficiency significantly decrease the merged firm's expenses, and this 
results in improved income, earnings and returns. 
The importance of the motives of financial synergy (solving financial difficulties and 
increasing debt capacity), tax advantages (tax considerations and government 
encouragement), and cash flow (exploiting surplus funds, buying below replacement 
costs, and gaining potential real estate or other related values) seem to have an 
insignificant correlation with the post- transaction profit performances of acquiring 
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enterprises. Higgins and Schall (1975)45 found that the coinsurance effect of debt 
merely benefits creditors at the expense of shareholders. If the total debt is permitted 
to increase, a merger may expand the debt capacity of the combined firm as Lewellen 
(1971)46 concludes. This, however, does not suggest that shareholder wealth will 
increase. Galai and Masulis (1976)47 also argue that the bondholders receive more 
protection than do the stockholders of each film because the latter have to back the 
debt claims of the former for both companies. Even though the merged film may 
improve financing difficulties and further reduce the risks and costs of default or 
bankruptcy, the gains from the low rate will be offset by the loss attached to 
guaranteeing each other's debt. The results prove that the motives of improving 
financial solvency and increasing debt capacity do not produce significant benefits to 
acquiring enterprises. 
Chapter 5 explores how tax considerations are an important merger motive in 
Taiwan. However, this only applied to a few companies and could not be verified for 
the majority. Table 5 -2 -3 also shows that the amount of tax exemption (Business 
Income Tax, Stamp Tax and Deed Tax) was small in comparison with the sums 
involved in the merger or take -over in Taiwanese enterprises. The Land Value 
Increment Tax is large but this is just a deferred tax which still falls due for payment 
by the acquiring enterprise when the land is further transferred. These data verify that 
tax considerations are very important for only a few companies and that the amounts 
are not great. The other reason for tax considerations may be that in the USA the 
losses of one firm in the combined company can be used to offset the profits of 
another so as to decrease the total amount of taxation that has to be paid. In Taiwan, 
losses can only be offset against the future profits of the same (acquiring) company. 
The effects of tax are thus significantly lessened. 
The importance of the motives "exploiting surplus funds ", "buying below 
replacement cost ", and gaining the value of potential real estate are not significantly 
correlated with the post- transaction profit perfoiniances of acquiring enterprises. 
There are two possible reasons why. First, Roll (1986)48 points out that if there are no 
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gains from the acquisition, hubris may account for why managers do not abandon it 
nor reflect on why their bids' valuation is wrong. The managers of acquiring firms 
using cash flow for acquisition purposes commit an error of over -optimism in 
assessing the merger opportunity. Second, Jensen and Meckling (1976)49 consider 
that a problem with the separation of ownership and control arises when managers 
possess only a very small portion of the ownership shares of the fine; thus, the 
managers' aims may differ from those of the shareholders. Marris (1968)50 considers 
that managers pursue growth to satisfy their power, dominance and prestige. Baumol 
(1959)51 argues that a manager's salary and security does not depend on profits, but 
on the growth of the firm. A wrong assessment or a different motive may lead to the 
managers of the acquiring firm using free cash flow to acquire another company 
although this choice may not be the optimal or best investment selection, and may 
thus result in a normal post- transaction profit performance. 
The Pearson product- moment correlation coefficients between the importance of 
different motives for mergers and acquisitions and the post- transaction performances 
of acquiring enterprises, are also presented in Appendices 7 -7 -1 to 7 -7 -8. The results 
indicate that they are similar to the Spearman's rank correlation. 
7.8 THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE PRE -TRANSACTION 
PERFORMANCE OF THE ACQUIRING ENTERPRISE RELATIVE TO 
THAT OF THE ACQUIRED ENTERPRISE, AND THE POST - 
TRANSACTION PERFORMANCE OF THE ACQUIRING ENTERPRISE 
The pre- transaction level of profit and profit rate performance of acquiring 
enterprises relative to those of acquired enterprises is presented in Table 7 -8 -1. The 
average values ranged from 1.966 to 2.185 and from 2.243 to 2.300 respectively. 
This suggests that the pre- transaction performance of acquiring firms is superior to 
that of acquired firms in our sample. If we further review the detailed data of the 
respondents, we find that 66 -73% and 58 -64% of the acquiring firms claimed that 
their pre- transaction levels of profit and profit rate performances were superior, or 
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very superior, to those of the acquired enterprises. About 15 -20% and 20 -28% of the 
acquiring firms indicated that their pre- transaction levels of profit and profit rate 
performances were the same as those of the acquired enterprises. In addition, 11 -14% 
and 14 -16% of the acquiring firms indicated that their pre- transaction levels of profit 
and profit rate performances were inferior or very inferior to those of the acquired 
enterprises. 
Article 75 of Company Law states "A continuing company or a new company created 
by merger or consolidation shall succeed to all the rights, powers and privileges of 
the merged or consolidated company ". The Inland Revenue Service recognises that 
after the transaction the continuing company can cover its net losses for the preceding 
five years but it cannot absorb the net losses of the merged or consolidated company 
for the preceding five years.52 Some companies utilising this net losses regulation, 
nominate the net losses company as the continuing firm and the net incomes 
company as the merged firm, so as to take advantage of the tax deduction. Soon after 
the transaction is completed, the acquiring fitni (originally the net losses company) 
applies to change the company name to the acquired firm's name (originally the net 
incomes company) so as to trade with the better and/or more famous company name. 
The Inland Revenue Service knows of this manoeuvre but does not want to change its 
regulations. It is afraid of losing revenue if the net incomes company should always 
try to acquire a net losses company to exploit the tax deduction advantage. This 
accounts why 11 -14% and 14 -16% of acquiring firms' pre- transaction levels of profit 
and profit rate perfoimances are inferior or very inferior to those of acquired 
enterprises. 
Spearman's rank correlation coefficients between the pre- transaction level of profit 
and profit rate performance of acquiring enterprises relative to those of acquired 
enterprises and the post- transaction increase in levels of profit (net sales, gross 
profits, operating income and net income) and profit rates (earnings and dividends 
per share, price /earning ratios, and returns on total assets) of acquiring enterprises are 
shown in Tables 7 -8 -2 to 7 -8 -9. In general there is a positive correlation between the 
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pre- transaction performance of acquiring enterprises relative to acquired enterprises 
and post- transaction performances except for the returns on total assets of the 
acquiring enterprises. However this is statistically significant in only a few cases. 
This indicates that when acquiring enterprises have superior pre- transaction 
performance compared with the acquired enterprises, acquiring firms perform better 
after the transaction. 
There is a significant positive rank correlation between the pre- transaction dividends 
per share of acquiring enterprises relative to those of acquired enterprises and the 
post- transaction net sales, dividends per share (at a = 0.05), net income, and earnings 
per share (at a = 0.10) performance of acquiring enterprises (Tables 7 -8 -2, 7 -8 -7, 7- 
8-5 and 7 -8 -6). If an acquiring firm has a superior dividends per share relative to an 
acquired enterprise, it probably indicates that the operating performance of the 
acquiring firm is much better than its target, so the former can distribute more 
dividends to its shareholders. After the transaction, the managers of the acquiring 
firm can apply their managerial skills to the acquired firms to take advantage of 
operating or financial synergy to increase sales and decrease costs. They can exploit 
the transaction to get tax reductions53 (accelerated depreciation) and tax credits (the 
combined firm can absorb the acquiring firm's net operating loss backwards for up to 
five years) to reduce expenses or to gain from the disposal of the duplicated fixed 
assets of the acquiring or acquired firm. It is highly likely that the acquiring firm can 
increase its sales and income and then offer superior earnings per share and dividends 
per share to their shareholders after the transaction. 
The rank correlation is significant (but only at a = 0.10) between the pre- transaction 
net sales of acquiring enterprises relative to acquired enterprises and the post - 
transaction net sales, operating incomes, net incomes and dividends per share 
performance of acquiring enterprises. If the acquiring firm has superior net sales 
relative to the acquired enterprise, the acquiring firm is usually larger or has a better 
operating performance than the acquired firm. According to efficiency theories, the 
managers of the acquiring firm will deploy their superior management ability to 
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improve the operating performance of the acquired firm and to utilise the merger's 
advantages after the transaction. If combined firms can increase their post -transaction 
net sales, it is reasonable to expect that they would also have better operating 
incomes, net incomes and dividends per share. 
7.9 THE TRANSACTION PROCESS PROBLEMS OF ACQUIRING 
ENTERPRISES 
Table 7 -9 -1 indicates that the transactional process problem average values were 
from 1.256 to 1.822. This suggests that the transactional problems of the sample 
acquiring firms varied from "not at all serious" to "a little serious ". The least serious 
problems were litigation and raising finance, while "a little serious" problem was 
asset valuation. 
In 85.7% of the sample cases acquiring and acquired firms belonged to the same 
business group while 14.3% did not (see Table 3 -4 -1). This may explain the finding 
that the issues of litigation and of raising finance were not serious. Where acquiring 
and acquired firms belong to the same business group, they will share major 
shareholders. So when they merge, the combined firm encounters the least serious 
difficulties in raising finance, and any lawsuit problems are minimal. 
Asset valuation was the greatest transaction process problem for acquiring firms in 
Taiwanese mergers and acquisitions. This result is consistent with Lin's (1990)54 
finding. Determining a firm's value is not easy. The value of a firm depends not only 
upon its cash flow amounts, but also upon the operating and financial characteristics 
of the acquiring firm. As a result, no single value exists for a firm. The final price is 
negotiated by the two companies. Table 6 -8 -1 indicates that 70.7% of the sample 
acquiring firms mainly used book value to estimate the value of their acquired firms. 
15.3% chiefly used replacement cost value to estimate the value of acquired firms. In 
only 3.3% of the sample did acquiring firms mainly use stock market value to 
estimate the value. The high percentage (85.7 %) of transactions within the same 
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business group together with the very small number (17 cases) of companies listed on 
the securities exchange may explain why so many companies used the book value 
estimation method and so few used the stock market value estimation method. If the 
acquiring and acquired fiiiu belong to the same business group, their main 
shareholders are the same. The book value estimation method is simple and easy to 
use within a business group. There were only 199 firms listed on the Taiwanese stock 
market in 1990, and 347 in 1995. As most acquiring and acquired firms are not listed, 
they cannot avail themselves of the stock market estimation method. 
The differences in post- transaction levels of profit and profit rate performance 
between acquiring firms which met with transaction process problems and those 
which did not are presented in Table 7 -9 -2. As shown in Table 7 -9 -2, the results of 
the Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test (U -test) indicate that if 
acquiring firms did not have asset valuation problems, or such problems were just a 
"little serious" during the transaction process, they enjoyed significantly better post - 
transaction dividends per share (at a = 0.05) than those of acquiring firms which had 
a "serious ", "fairly serious" or "very serious" asset valuation problem. The results are 
consistent with overestimation of acquired firms' asset values which significantly 
increase an acquiring film's expenditure, decrease its earnings and then further 
affecting its shareholders' dividends per share after the transaction. 
Contingent loss and personnel arrangements problems are important (at a = 0.05) 
factors affecting the post- transaction earnings per share, dividends per share and 
returns on total assets of acquiring firms. The results indicate that if an acquiring film 
has serious or very serious contingent loss problems during the transaction process, 
the loss costs the acquiring film dearly, deeply damages the company's earnings and 
further reduces its earnings per share, dividends per share and returns on total assets 
after the transaction. Personnel arrangements pose a considerable difficulty to 
Taiwanese mergers and acquisitions. If an acquiring firm cannot appropriately deploy 
its personnel, this may significantly damage employee or managers' morale, 
undermine personal or departmental communication or co- operation, lessen the 
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company's operating efficiency and finally result in a drop in the firm's earnings per 
share, dividends per share and returns on total assets. 
If acquiring films encounter none or few problems with litigation, raising finance, or 
meeting government regulations during the transaction process, they have 
significantly (at a = 0.05) better post- transaction net sales than acquiring firms which 
report "serious ", "fairly serious" or "very serious" difficulties in these areas. The 
result indicates that litigation problems significantly influence an acquiring firm's 
ability to manage its affairs, and to operate efficiency without distraction or 
tarnishing its reputation, all of which may affect its net sales. 
The problem of raising finance is consistent with the argument that if an acquiring 
firm has a serious problem in this respect, it needs to present its plans to its 
shareholders, bank or money market to obtain the finance and explain why the 
proposed transaction might improve its operating performance and increase its 
profits. If the acquiring firm can raise the finance from the shareholders, bank or 
money market, this indicates that all the parties believe in the reliability and 
profitability of this transaction. These careful preparations and considerations mean 
that the acquiring firm has a better chance of achieving its goal and of improving its 
post- transaction net sales. 
The government regulation problem may refer to three issues. First, there is the 
question of tax exemption or deferment. If "a company is specially approved by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs to go into merger or consolidation for the purpose of 
promoting reasonable operation and management ", it is exempt from all income tax, 
stamp tax and deed tax as a result of such a merger or consolidation and may defer 
the land -value increment tax which is charged to the account of the enterprise 
surviving after the merger or consolidation.55 Second, there is the issue of 
applications for a listing on the stock market. A few companies merge or take -over 
another company so as to apply for a listing on the stock market. Owing to the 
prosperity of the economy and increases in individual incomes, the stock market was 
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booming from 1988. The government imposed qualifying requirements for 
companies, especially ones which had good operating profits in their most recent year 
and ones which had capital in excess of NT$ 200,000,000.56 Finally, there is the 
question of accelerated depreciation and tax credit. "To meet the requirement for 
industrial upgrading, the service life of instruments and equipment for exclusive use 
for research and development purposes and/or inspection of pilot products, or 
machinery and equipment used for energy saving purposes or as alternate energy 
sources may be accelerated by two years "; "Based on the requirements for adjusting 
industrial structure and improving the scale of operations and methods of production, 
depreciation of the machinery and equipment of specially designated industries may 
be accelerated by half the number of years of the service life of fixed assets as 
prescribed in the Income Tax Law ". "A company may credit 5% to 20% funds 
disbursed for any of the following purposes against the amount of profit - seeking 
enterprise income tax payable for the current year .... 1. The funds invested in 
equipment for automation of production or production technology; 2. The funds 
invested in equipment or technology used for reclamation of resources and/or 
pollution control; 3. The funds used in research and development, professional 
personnel training and creation of internationally acceptable brand(s) of product(s); 4. 
The funds used for the equipment or technology required for energy saving and 
reuses of industrial water. The total amount of investment credit against tax in each 
ensuing year as referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be limited to a level not 
in excess of 50% of the amount of profit -seeking enterprise income tax payable in the 
current year provided, however, that this limitation shall not apply to the investment 
credit to be made in the year prior. "57 
Table 7 -9 -3 shows that there are about forty -three acquiring firms which encountered 
a "serious ", "fairly serious" or "very serious" government regulation problem during 
the transaction process, i.e. about 18% of the sample. A few companies apply so as to 
qualify for the above mentioned tax benefits but have many disagreements with the 
authorised government official. The government is involved in "promoting 
reasonable operation and management ", "having good operating profit" or "to meet 
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the requirement for industrial upgrading ". If acquiring firms apply to enjoy the tax or 
listing advantages and have problems conforming to these regulations, then this 
indicates that the acquiring firms have better operations and managements. So when 
acquiring firms have a serious or very serious government regulation problem during 
the transaction process, they may still enjoy better post- transaction net sales than 
those which met with none or few difficulties of this kind. 
The differences in post- transaction performance between acquiring firms whose 
shareholders were resistant to the bidding during the transaction process and those 
whose were not are not significant, so we cannot generalise for the population. Table 
7 -9 -4 shows that there were only 2.1 %, 2.1% and 4.9% of the sample of acquiring 
firms in which a "very serious ", "fairly serious" and "serious" problem manifested 
itself over shareholders' hostility during the transaction process. These small 
percentages are associated with the high percentage of transactions which were 
within the same business group. If shareholders do not agree to a transaction, 
acquiring firms hold a shareholders' meeting attended by shareholders holding and 
representing at least two -thirds of the total number of issued and outstanding shares; 
at this meeting, a majority of the votes held by the shareholders present is cast in 
favour of the resolution.58 If a few shareholders still object, they may request the 
company to redeem all their shares at a current fair price.59 The acquiring firms can 
redeem all shares held by opposing shareholders at a current fair price so this 
problem does not greatly affect post- transaction performance. 
The T -tests of the differences in post- transaction performance between acquiring 
firms which were involved in different transaction problems during the transaction 
process are shown in Appendices 7 -9 -1 to 7 -9 -11. The results of the T -test were 
similar to the results of the U -test. 
7.10 CONCLUSION 
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In general the post- transaction perfornuances of acquiring firms are superior to their 
pre- transaction performances. On average, medium and large acquiring enterprises 
gain greater improvements after the transaction than do small and small -medium 
acquiring enterprises. If firms do not belong to the same business group, the 
acquiring finii achieves a better performance after the transaction than does one 
which belongs to the same business group. 
Acquiring firms transacting horizontally have significantly better post- transaction 
performance in terms of net sales, gross profits, operating incomes, earnings per 
share and dividends per share than do conglomerate transactions. Acquiring firms 
transacting horizontally also have significantly better post- transaction improvement 
in earnings per share, dividends per share and price /earning ratios than do firms 
transacting vertically. Firms acquiring vertically have greater post- transaction 
performance of net sales than do firms engaging in diversifying transactions. 
There was a significantly positive Spearman's rank correlation between the merger 
and acquisition performance of acquiring enterprises after the transaction and the 
importance of the motives of economies of scale, control of distribution channels, 
reducing administrative expense, acquiring know -how or research and development, 
enhancing market competitiveness, gaining rapid entry into new markets or 
industries, increased market power and improving purchasing management 
efficiency. This result indicates that the better the merger and acquisition 
performance of acquiring enterprises after the transaction the more important were 
the above mentioned merger motives and vice versa, i.e. the more important these 
merger motives, the better the merger and acquisition performance of the acquiring 
enterpri ses after the transaction. 
When acquiring firms had superior net sales relative to acquired enterprises, the 
acquiring firms had better net sales, operating incomes, net incomes and dividends 
per share performance after the transaction. When acquiring firms had superior 
dividends per share relative to acquired enterprises, the acquiring firms enjoyed 
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better net sales, net incomes, earnings per share and dividends per share after the 
transaction. 
Asset valuation was the greatest transaction process problem for acquiring films in 
Taiwanese mergers and acquisitions. This result is consistent with Lin's (1990) 
finding. The findings indicate that if an acquiring firm has serious or very serious 
contingent loss problems during the transaction process, the loss costs the acquiring 
firm dearly, deeply damages the company's earnings and further reduces its earnings 
per share, dividends per share and returns on total assets after the transaction. 
Personnel arrangements pose a considerable difficulty to Taiwanese mergers and 
acquisitions. If an acquiring firm cannot appropriately deploy its personnel, this may 
significantly damage employee or managers' morale, undermine personal or 
departmental communication or co- operation, lessen the company's operating 
efficiency and finally result in a drop in the firm's earnings per share, dividends per 
share and returns on total assets. 
The problem of raising finance is consistent with the argument that if an acquiring 
firm has a serious problem during the transaction process, it needs to present its plans 
to its shareholders, bank or money market to obtain the finance and explain why the 
proposed transaction might improve its operating performance and increase its 
profits. If the acquiring fiuu can raise the finance from the shareholders, bank or 
money market, this indicates that all the parties believe in the reliability and 
profitability of this transaction. These careful preparations and considerations mean 
that the acquiring firm has a better chance of achieving its goal and of improving its 
post- transaction net sales. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE POST -TRANSACTION PERFORMANCE OF MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS -- MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Why do some firms enjoy a superior post- transaction performance and others an 
inferior one? Can we identify some variables to predict which firms will perform 
better or worse in Taiwan following a merger or acquisition? A variety of 
multivariate statistical methods can be used to predict a dichotomous dependent 
variable from many independent variables. In this chapter we use the logistic 
regression model to predict an event (i.e. superior post- transaction performance) as 
occurring or not. 
In the next section we describe the methodology and hypotheses of how to predict 
whether or not a transaction will result in superior post- transaction levels of profit 
and profit rate performances in Taiwanese enterprises' mergers and acquisitions. 
Several different logistic regression algorithms for variable selection, together with 
their results, are compared in the third section. Finally, a brief conclusion is 
presented. 
8.2 METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES OF POST -TRANSACTION 
PERFORMANCE 
In simple regression analysis, we can test whether two variables are linearly related 
and calculate the strength of the linear relationship. The equation of the probabilistic 
simple regression model is 
Y =ßo +ß1X +E 
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Where: 
Y = the value of the dependent variable, 
13o = the population Y intercept, 
13i = the population slope, 
X = a given value of independent variable, and 
e = the error of prediction. 
The assumptions of simple regression analysis are as follows: 
1. The model is linear. 
2. The expectation of error terms (ei) is zero. E(Ei) = 0 for all i. 
3. The error terms have constant variances. V(ei) = 62 for all i. 
4. The error terms are independent. E(eiei) = 0 for all i # j. 
5. The error terms are normally distributed. 
We can extend this model to the multiple regression case such that the general 
equation for the probabilistic multiple regression model is 
Y= 130 +131X1 +132X2 +133X3+... + 13kXk +e 
Where: 
Y = the value of the dependent variable 
130 = the regression constant 
13i = the partial regression coefficient for independent variable 1 
132 = the partial regression coefficient for independent variable 2 
133 = the partial regression coefficient for independent variable 3 
13k = the partial regression coefficient for independent variable k 
k = the number of independent variables 
E = the error of prediction. 
In multiple regression analysis, the dependent variable, Y, is the response variable. 
The partial regression coefficient of an independent variable, 13i, represents the 
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change in Y associated with a one -unit increase in X if all other variables are held 
constant. 
In reality, the population values of the regression constant and the partial regression 
coefficients of a multiple regression model are unknown. Normally we use a sample 
to estimate the population value. The form of the equation for estimating Y with 
sample information is: 
y = b0 + b1X1+ b2X2 + b3X3 + ... + bkXk 
Where: 
y = the predicted value of Y 
b0 = estimate of regression constant 
b1 = estimate of regression coefficient 1 
b2 = estimate of regression coefficient 2 
b3 = estimate of regression coefficient 3 
bk = estimate of regression coefficient k 
k = the number of independent variables. 
In multiple regression, the dependent variable must be of a metric nature. In this 
study, the dependent variable is measured in binary, non -metric, teims. Discriminant 
analysis is also applicable when the dependent variable is nonmetric. But logit 
analysis (or logistic regression) may be more suitable for the study. The reason for 
this is that discriminant analysis relies on the population values of x values fulfilling 
the assumptions of multivariate normality and equal variance- covariance matrices 
across groups, features which are not found in all our data. Logit analysis does not 
need these strict assumptions, so it is a more suitable tool for our study. 
This study applies the logistic regression model to identify the relationship between a 
firm's characteristics and its post- transaction performance in Taiwanese mergers and 
acquisitions from 1990 to 1995. The posterior probability of an event occurring, in 
this case that the acquiring films will enjoy a superior post- transaction performance, 
is modelled as 
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Prob(event)i = / (1+ ezi) or Prob(event); = 1 / (1+ e-z') 
Where Zi = Bo + B 1Xti + B2X2i + ... + BPXPi + Ei. 
This implies that 
Logit(Y) = ln{Prob(event) / [1 - Prob(event)11 = Bo + B1X1i + B2X2i + ... + BpXP; + E; 
Bo, B1, ... , Bp are coefficients estimated from the questionnaire data, X1i, X2i, ... , XPi 
are the values of each variable for case i, Ei is the error for case i, and e is the base of 
the natural logarithms. 
A popular methodology in recent years has been to conduct empirical studies that 
assess the effect of acquisition on share prices. In Taiwanese enterprises there were 
only 17 transactions involving listed companies over the period 1990 to 1995. This is 
too small a sample to generalise about the effects of mergers and acquisitions on 
so we are using questionnaire data to explore the post - 
transaction performance of Taiwanese enterprises. The questionnaires were mailed to 
the acquiring firms from May to June in 1996 as detailed in Chapter 2. The 
questionnaire asked the enterprises that merged or acquired between 1990 to 1995 to 
assess their post -transaction performance. There were 245 usable respondent cases. 
The period of assessment of post -transaction performances related to acquisitions 
ranged between those that had occurred between five months and five years 
previously. 
The questionnaire included the question : "How would you rate the post- transaction 
performance of your company as a whole, compared with its performance before the 
transaction ? ". We chose two groups of variables to gauge firm's performance. The 
first group referred to levels of profit performance which included net sales, gross 
profits, operation income and net income. The second group referred to profit rate 
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performances which included earnings per share, dividends per share, price /earning 
ratio and returns on total assets. The respondent could choose "1 ", "2 ", "3 ", "4 ", or 
"5" to correspond with "Very superior ", "Superior ", "Same ", "Inferior ", or "Very 
inferior" respectively. To apply logistic regression analysis to identify which 
variables could be used to predict that a firm will have a superior post- transaction 
performance we then divided the responses into two groups. The first group 
consisted of responses numbered "1" or "2" and the second of responses "3 ", "4" or 
"5 ". This meant that managers ticking the first group of responses believed that their 
firm's post- transaction performance exceeded its pre- transaction level while those 
ticking the second group considered that their film's post- transaction perforniance 
was the same as, or inferior to, its pre- transaction level. 
Statistical inference in logistic regression analysis mainly depends on the asymptotic 
properties of the sample statistics. This means that when the sample size increases 
toward infinity, the asymptotic property will obtain. To get valid statistics for these 
asymptotic properties, we merged the cell size where the cell sample size was less than 
5 in Table 6 -5 -1. There are only two, zero and four cases respectively using corporate 
bonds, preferred stock and convertible bonds as the main method of payment in their 
transactions. So we merged these three payment methods into the "other payment 
methods" category. The above categorisation leads to the identification of different 
potential variables of the probability that an acquiring firm will reach superior post - 
transaction levels of profit or profit rate. The hypotheses, and the variables that they 
imply, are summarised in Table 8 -2 -1. The sign ascribed to each variable indicates 
whether the probability of a superior post- transaction profit perfoimance is expected to 
increase ( +) or decrease ( -) as that variable increases. 
8.3 THE RESULTS OF THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF 
POST -TRANSACTION PROFITS PERFORMANCE 
In logistic regression, we try to identify independent variables that can act as 
significant predictors of superior post- transaction levels of profit or profit rate. To 
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achieve this we have used various stepwise routines. Various stepwise algorithms are 
available but none of them result in a "best" model in any statistical operations 
because different samples and variables may fit different models. We examine several 
possible models provided by SPSS LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS software 
and choose from them on the basis of interpretability and parsimony. 
Tables 8 -3 -1 and 8 -3 -2 compare the overall results for (a) the eight measures of profit 
performance, and (b) the six methods of selecting the independent variables. The six 
different stepwise algorithms for variable selection are compared. The significance of 
the model's Chi- Squire2, the correct classification percentage and the number of 
variables in the equation are presented in Table 8 -3 -1 and Table 8 -3 -2. The level of 
significance of the Chi -Square for all six models is 0.000. This indicates that we can 
reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients for all the terms in the logistic regression 
model, except the constant, are zero. This result implies that information contained in 
the independent variables allows us to predict the value of the dependent variable (i.e. 
relative probability of a superior post- transaction performance) better than we could 
without the independent variables. 
Table 8 -3 -1 shows that the forced entry method is the basic model which retains all the 
fifty -four independent variables (excluding the constant) in the equation; the 
proportion of cases correctly classified range from 84.26% to 86.29 %. In the case of 
the three forward stepwise routines, removal testing is based on the probability of the 
likelihood -ratio statistic based on conditional parameter estimates (Conditional); on 
the probability of the likelihood -ratio statistic based on the maximum -likelihood 
estimates (LR); and on the probability of the Wald statistic (Wald). In all three cases, 
the probability for entry is 0.05 and for removal is 0.10. In all three cases only three or 
four variables (excluding the constant) are included in the equation and the proportion 
of cases correctly classified ranges from 71.07% to 75.63 %. In the case of the 
backward Wald stepwise selection routine, the probability for entry stepwise is 0.05 
and for removal stepwise is 0.10. This resulted in 19 to 25 variables (excluding the 
constant) being included in the equation, and the proportion of cases correctly 
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classified ranged from 79.70% to 84.26 %. To avert a failure to find a relationship 
when one exists, and to find an appropriate model, we relax the level of statistical 
significance from 0.05 to 0.10, i.e. the probability of entering stepwise is 0.10 and of 
removal stepwise is still 0.10. The relaxed statistical significance criterion of this 
forward Wald stepwise selection includes six to 13 variables (excluding the constant) 
in the equation, and the proportion of cases correctly classified ranges from 75.63% to 
78.17 %. 
Table 8 -3 -2 shows when the forced entry method of profit rate measures is used and 
all of the 54 independent variables (excluding the constant) are in the equation, the 
proportion of cases correctly classified ranges from 82.29% to 87.31 %. In the case of 
the three forward stepwise routines, the probability of entry is 0.05 and of removal is 
0.10. There were between one and eight variables (excluding the constant) included in 
the equation, and the proportion of cases correctly classified ranges from 70.77% to 
76.14 %. In the case of the backward Wald stepwise selection routine, the probability 
of entry stepwise is 0.05 and of removal stepwise is 0.10. This resulted in 15 to 18 
variables (excluding the constant) being included in the equation, and the proportion 
of cases correctly classified ranges from 75.52% to 80.71 %. Again, to avert a failure to 
find a relationship when one exists, and to find the appropriate model, we relax the 
level of statistical significance from 0.05 to 0.10, i.e. the probability of entering 
stepwise is 0.10 and of removal stepwise is still 0.10. The relaxed statistical 
significance criterion of the forward Wald stepwise selection includes four to 10 
variables (excluding the constant) in the equation, and the proportion of cases 
correctly classified ranges from 71.28% to 76.14 %. 
The forced entry model correctly predicts the highest percentage of cases (82.29% to 
87.31 %) but it includes all the variables in the equation. The forward Wald method, 
where the probability of entering stepwise is 0.05 and of removal stepwise is 0.10, 
yields good predictive efficiency (70.77% to 76.14 %) in very few variables. Although 
backward elimination poses less risk of failing to find a relationship when one exists, 
nevertheless the backward Wald method, where the probability of entering stepwise is 
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0.05 and of removal stepwise is 0.10, includes too many variables in the equation. The 
forward Wald method, where the probability of entering stepwise is 0.10 and of 
removal stepwise is 0.10, includes a few more variables in the equation, and achieves 
a small improvement of predictive efficiency (71.28% to 78.17%) compared to the 
forward Wald method, where the probability of entering stepwise is 0.05 and of 
removal stepwise is 0.10. 
If our objective is to maximise the percentage correctly classified, the best routine is 
the forced entry method. If our objective is to understand what causes superior or 
inferior post- transaction performance, the best model is that which combines low 
collinearity with highest Model Chi -Square (x2) for, the difference between Initial Log 
Likelihood ( -2 Log Likelihood3) and the model yielding the lowest -2 Log 
Likelihood4. Considering this, this study aims to develop a purely predictive empirical 
model, to identify a model which includes a set of predictors that provide a greater 
percentage that is correctly classified, and that can reveal what is causing superior or 
inferior post- transaction performance in Taiwanese enterprises' mergers and 
acquisitions. Thus, we choose the forward Wald method, where the probability of 
entering stepwise is 0.10 and of removal stepwise is 0.10, as our selection criteria. 
There are 54 independent variables (excluding the constant) in the initial logistic 
regression model. The results detail the estimated coefficients, the standard error, the 
Wald statistic, the significance level for the Wald statistic and the partial correlation. 
A positive sign on a coefficient indicates that an increase in the independent variable 
is associated with an increase in logit(Y) and a negative sign the opposite. 
The contribution of individual variables in logistic regression is difficult to determine. 
Each variable's contribution depends on the other variables in the model, especially if 
the independent variables are highly correlated. We could consider the partial 
correlation between the dependent variable and each of the independent variables. The 
value of a partial correlation coefficient can range from -1 to +1. 
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The relationships between the acquiring firm's post- transaction performance and the 
independent variables are presented in Tables 8 -3 -3 to 8 -3 -10. The chi -squares 
statistics are all statistically significant. This indicates that we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients for all of the terms collectively in the logistic 
regression model, except the constant, are zero. This result indicates that information 
about the independent variables allows us to make better predictions of the dependent 
variable (i.e. superior post- transaction levels of profit and profit rate performances) 
than we could make without the independent variables. 
The predictive perfolinance of the eight logistic regression models which correctly 
classify high proportions of the cases are presented in Tables 8 -3 -11 and 8 -3 -12. 
These proportions range from 71.28% to 78.17 %, using the forward Wald method, 
with a probability of entering stepwise of 0.10 and of removal stepwise of 0.10. 
These compare with the proportions which could be expected to be correctly 
classified by chance from 51.76% to 58.88 %5. This indicates that the logistic 
regression models have hugely improved our ability to identify the correct 
classifications. 
The variable control of distribution channels is significant for profit levels (gross 
profits, operating incomes and net incomes) and profit rates (earnings per share, 
dividends per share, price /earning ratios and returns on total assets), indicating that the 
more control of distribution channels drives the motive to merge, the more likely it is 
that the acquiring firm will enjoy an improved post- transaction performance (see 
Tables 8 -3 -4 to 8- 3 -10). Thus, controlling distribution channels emerges as a very 
important merger motive in Taiwanese enterprises. When the acquiring firm shares its 
distribution channels with the target or increases them as an outcome of the merger, it 
can share the acquired firm's original distributors and customers to increase its net 
sales, get more quantity discounts from its suppliers, reduce any duplicate personnel, 
offices, equipment and inventory to decrease its costs and expenses after the 
transaction. Therefore, it is more likely to increase the acquiring fiiiu's incomes, 
earnings and returns after the transaction. Alternatively greater control of distribution 
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by acquiring customers enhances profit rates perhaps by increasing demand for its 
products. 
The more important the merger motive of reducing administration expenses, the more 
likely it is that the acquiring firm's post- transaction performance improves in terms of 
net sales, gross profits, operating incomes, and earnings per share (see Tables 8 -3 -3 to 
8 -3 -5 and Table 8 -3 -7). This indicates that reducing administrative costs can not only 
effectively downsize the combined company by decreasing duplicate or inefficient 
employees, office space and equipment, but can also increase the flexibility and 
adaptability of the organisation and improve personnel morale and performance, and 
so increase the firm's sales, income and earnings. 
As shown in Table 8 -3 -6, economies of scale are statistically significant and display 
the expected signs. This indicates that (1) the average cost of producing a commodity 
decreases as its output is increased; the product can be offered at a more competitive 
prices; (2) large firms is likely to be accomplished arranging for the specialisation of 
labour or equipment which can increase productivity; (3) large firms being able to 
afford the overhead of research and development which may improve the quality of 
established products or innovate with new ones; (4) large firms gains quantity 
discounts from their suppliers; (5) in the case of financial synergy, large enterprises 
having better goodwill and credit so they find it relatively easy to raise funds, to 
increase their debt capacity, and even to acquire lower rates from banks or the money 
market. The more important is the motive of economies of scale (that is, the smaller 
the coefficient) the more likely it is that the net income post- transaction performance 
of the acquiring firm surpasses its pre- transaction level. 
Table 8 -3 -3 shows that the variable representing the motive of rapid entry into new 
markets or industries is statistically significant, and displays the expected sign. Thus if 
a firm merges to rapidly enter a new market perhaps aiming to enter a high profit 
industry then its net sales increase. It may choose merger because it lacks the know - 
how to develop new products or does not have appropriate distribution channels to 
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access different market. Through the merger, the acquiring firm can better deploy its 
production technology and its important distribution channels and this is likely to 
increase the acquiring firm's net sales performance after the transaction. 
The more important is the merger motive of increased market power the more likely it 
is that the acquiring firm will enjoy superior net sales, gross profits, and price /earning 
ratio performance after the transaction (see Tables 8 -3 -3, 8 -3 -4 and 8 -3 -9). A firm can 
increase its market share after a horizontal merger. Increasing market share means 
increasing the size of the firm relative to other films in an industry. This result 
indicates that the combined film can exercise its influence over the price and output in 
a particular market. Samuels et al. (1994)6 mention that the higher the level of 
concentration in an industry, the greater are the levels of profit. If a firm can dictate the 
conditions of the sale of its product, has the ability to act as a price leader, can deter 
other firms' entry, or is able to make persistently super -normal profits, then it is highly 
likely to increase its net sales, gross profits and its price /earning ratio performance 
after the transaction. The results are consistent with the conclusions of Singh and 
Montgomery (1987)7 and Seth (1990)8 who found that increased market power can 
earn super normal profits. 
Table 8 -3 -5 shows that the coefficients of acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright 
technologies and of combining complementary resources are significant, but have 
positive signs which are contrary to the merger motive hypothesis. The positive sign 
of a merger motive implies that the less important the merger motive of acquiring 
brand marks, patents or copyright technologies and of combining complementary 
resources the more likely it is that the acquiring firm will achieve a superior post - 
transaction operating income perfoimance and vice versa, i.e. as those particular 
motives become more relevant, the likelihood of improved post- transaction 
perfoimance diminishes. The results indicate that when the acquiring firm wishes to 
exploit the brand marks, patents or copyright technologies of the acquired firm, it 
does not achieve its expected gains. Sales and administrative expenses and/or research 
and development costs may increase rather than decrease and so result in poorer 
181 
operating incomes. The same outcome may be experienced by the acquiring firm 
when its motive is to combine complementary resources but it cannot achieve its 
expected goal. This may result from an over -optimism in evaluating the merger's 
advantages and/or an overestimation of the value of the brand marks, patents or 
copyright technologies and of combining complementary resources. Roll (1986)9 
points out that if there are no gains in acquisition, hubris provides an explanation as to 
why managers do not abandon these acquisitions or reflect on why their bids' 
valuation is wrong. The managers of acquiring films using cash flow for acquisition 
commit an over -optimistic error in assessing the merger opportunity due to excessive 
pride or hubris. Marris (1968)1° considers that managers pursue growth to satisfy their 
power and prestige. Mueller (1969)11 finds that managers' prestige and power are 
more closely related to the size and growth of the firm than to its profitability. Baumol 
(1959)12 argues that a manager's salary and security does not depend on profits but on 
the growth of the firm. A flawed assessment or a conflicting purpose may lead to the 
managers of the acquiring firm using free cash flow to acquire another firm, which is 
not the optimal or best investment selection and so may result in inferior operating 
income performance after the transaction. 
As shown in Tables 8 -3 -8 and 8 -3 -10, government encouragement or support is an 
important factor which can encourage companies to merge or consolidate (exempt 
from all income tax, stamp tax and deed tax and with a defeiiiient of the land -value 
increment tax payable as a result of such merger or consolidation)13; to purchase new 
instruments, machinery and equipment (for exclusive use in research and 
development, energy saving, or to meet the requirements for adjusting the industrial 
structure and improving the scale of operations and methods of production which may 
be accelerated depreciation by two years or by one half of the number of years of the 
service life of the fixed assets)14; to backdate net operating losses (the combined firm 
can absorb the acquiring firm's net operating losses backward to five years)15 and to 
apply for a listing on the stock market.16 These government encouragements are more 
likely to decrease the acquiring firm's expenses, increase dividends per share and 
return on total assets after the transaction. 
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The coefficient of buying below replacement cost is significant but has a positive sign 
(see Tables 8 -3 -3 and 8 -3 -4) indicating that where the merger motive of buying below 
replacement cost is unimportant, superior post -transaction net sales and gross profits 
performance of the acquiring firm are more likely and vice versa, i.e. the more 
important the merger motive of buying below replacement cost, the less likely is 
improved post -transaction net sales and gross profits performance. The results indicate 
that managers may prefer to spend surplus cash flow on an unjustified merger, based 
on cheap replacement assets, rather than distribute the cash to the firm's shareholders, 
because they are motivated to increase the size of their firms (Mueller, 1969).17 Jensen 
(1986)18 observes that the difference of objective between shareholders and managers 
is an agency problem. In this situation, the managers are more likely to overestimate 
the merger's advantages and/or to underestimate its disadvantages. A merger motive 
which is not based on best or optimal investment selection criteria may result in poorer 
net sales and gross profits performance after the transaction. 
The coefficient of control over material resources is significant but has a positive sign 
which is contrary to the merger motive hypothesis (see Tables 8 -3 -6, and 8 -3 -8 to 8 -3- 
10). The positive sign of the merger motive is consistent with the argument that when 
the acquiring firm, through a vertical merger tries to control its material resources, the 
scale of purchases of materials may not result in economies of scale and the firm may 
suffer huge inventory losses and interest expenses instead. It may also imply that the 
merger fails due to a cultural clash between the two companies or that the operating 
performance of the acquired firm fails to reach the acquiring firm's original superior 
standard so it is more likely to decrease the acquiring firm's net income, earnings and 
returns after the transaction. 
If an acquiring firm borrows cash from the bank as its main payment method for the 
acquisition, it is more likely to improve its operating income, net income and earnings 
per share after the transaction (see Tables 8 -3 -5 to 8 -3 -7). This result may imply that 
(1) The interest expenses are deductible from a company's earnings. (2) Following a 
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presentation of plans to the shareholders, bank or money market and their approval of 
the scheme, it is not only the acquiring firm's managers who believe in the transaction 
but the shareholders, bankers and financial institute investors also have faith in its 
reliability and profitability. These deductible interest expenses and deliberate 
preparations and considerations increase the chances that the acquiring firm will 
achieve its goal of better incomes and earnings per share after the transaction. The 
result is similar to the conclusions of Wansley et al. (1983)19 who find that cash offers 
yield higher abnomial returns than do stock offers after the transaction. Myers and 
Majluf (1984)20 consider that the method of financing an investment implies some 
information. When the acquiring firm uses debt to finance a new investment, it may 
imply that bidding managers consider their common stock to be undervalued and this 
can cause the returns to bidders to be positive. 
The variable of "the other main payment methods" is statistically significant but has a 
negative sign which implies that when an acquiring firm uses, for example, corporate 
bonds or convertible bonds as the main method of payment, it decreases its chances of 
obtaining a better post- transaction operating income performance (see Table 8 -3 -5). 
This result implies that if the acquiring firm issues corporate bonds or convertible 
bonds to raise the finance to merge with another firm, the interest rate of the corporate 
bonds or the convertible premium (i.e. the exchange ratio of shares to bonds) is too 
high in advance. It will significantly increase the acquiring firm's interest expenses or 
repayments and so curtail the likelihood of superior post- transaction operating income 
performance. 
As shown in Tables 8 -3 -7 and 8 -3 -8, replacement cost value is statistically significant 
and has a positive sign indicating that when the acquiring firm uses replacement cost 
value as the method of valuing the target firm, it increases the likelihood of higher 
earnings per share and dividends per share after the transaction. It may indicate that 
when the acquiring fiuii uses replacement cost value, i.e. assets are valued at their 
current cost instead of their historical cost, to value the acquired firm, the acquiring 
firm can benefit from the relatively high depreciation of the acquired firm's assets, 
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including its buildings, machinery and equipment, etc.. The acquiring firm can enlarge 
or upgrade the tax basis of the target firm's assets to their fair market value and take 
advantage of depreciation charges through this method. The expansion of the tax basis 
of the target's assets may release a greater cash flow and result in an increase in the 
acquiring firm's earnings per share and dividends per share after the transaction. 
The variable prior net sales performance is statistically significant and has the 
expected sign (see Table 8 -3 -5), indicating that if the acquiring firm has a better net 
sales pre- transaction performance relative to that of the acquired firm, the more 
efficient managers of the acquiring firm will deploy their extra managerial resources to 
the acquired firm after the transaction, such that the acquired firm's operation 
performance will improve and the combined firm will yield a superior post- transaction 
operating income performance. The variable return on total assets is statistically 
significant but has a positive sign which is contrary to the pre- transaction performance 
hypothesis (see Table 8 -3 -5). This result indicates that if the acquiring film has 
superior returns on its total assets before the transaction relative to the acquired finii 
but it cannot effectively integrate and utilise the two merging films' resources 
(including employees, materials and equipment) then it may lessen the firm's 
productivity and generate more expenses. This will increase the likelihood of inferior 
operating incomes after the transaction. 
The variable representing the existence of a customer drain problem is statistically 
significant and has the expected sign (see Table 8 -3 -5) indicating that if an acquiring 
firm does not have a serious customer drain problem in the transaction process or the 
problem is slight, then the firm does not need to spend heavily on advertising to 
promote its ideas, goods or services to keep its customers. It is more likely to increase 
the probability of an improved operating income perfoniiance after the transaction. 
The coefficient of government regulation problems is significant but has the opposite 
sign to that expected (see Tables 8 -3 -3 and 8 -3 -5) indicating that if an acquiring finii 
meets a serious government regulation problem in the transaction process, this 
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increases the probability of the firm having a superior net sales and operating income 
post- transaction performance. This is consistent with the argument that if an acquiring 
firm needs to comply with government regulations to apply for a listing on the stock 
market21, to enjoy a tax exemption or deferment22 (merger or consolidation), to gain 
from accelerated depreciation23 (instruments and equipment for exclusive use in 
research and development, or for energy saving purposes or as alternate energy 
sources, or to meet the requirements for adjusting the industrial structure and 
improving the scale of operations and methods of production) and to earn tax credit24 
(the combined firm can absorb the acquiring fiiiu's net operating loss backward for up 
to five years), etc., and can finally conform with these regulations' requirements, it can 
then enjoy tax benefits or listing advantages. These changes, in turn, improve the 
film's public image and reputation and are more likely to lead to better net sales and 
operating incomes after the transaction. 
As shown in Tables 8 -3 -7 and 8 -3 -8, contingent loss is significant and has the 
expected sign indicating that if an acquiring firm does not meet with a serious 
contingent loss problem in the transaction process, then it is more likely to have better 
earnings per share and dividends per share in its post- transaction performance and vice 
versa, i.e. if an acquiring firm has a serious contingent loss problem in the transaction 
process, then it is more likely to have poorer earnings per share and dividends per 
share after the transaction. This result is similar to that found in our univariate 
analysis. It indicates that this hidden liability (contingent loss) is an important factor 
affecting the performance of the acquiring firm which may cost the bidder heavily 
after the acquisition. This is likely to influence the acquiring firm's shareholders' 
earnings and dividends after the transaction. 
The variable personnel arrangements is significant and has the expected sign (see 
Tables 8 -3 -8 and 8 -3 -10) indicating that if an acquiring firm does not encounter a 
serious personnel problem in the transaction process, then it is more likely to enjoy 
better dividends per share and returns on total assets after the transaction and vice 
versa, i.e. if an acquiring firm becomes embroiled in a serious personnel problem in 
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the transaction process, it increases the probability of poorer dividends per share and 
returns on total assets after the transaction. The results indicate that personnel 
arrangements are an important issue in Taiwanese enterprises' mergers and 
acquisitions. Two different companies merging into one involves some personnel 
restructuring. If the acquiring firm cannot appropriately deploy its staff after the 
transaction, it may lower employees' morale, undermine personal or departmental 
communication and co- operation, lessen the firm's operating efficiency, and then 
reduce its dividends per share and returns on total assets. 
The merger motives of solving financial difficulties, increasing corporate debt capacity 
or financing, risk diversification, tax considerations, and using mergers to mop up 
surplus funds and potential real estate etc. are insignificant as are the transaction 
process problems of goodwill valuation, shareholders being against the bidding, and 
corporate culture differences. This result is consistent with the univariate analysis 
presented in the previous Chapter. The variable of acquiring know -how or research 
and development does not significantly affect the acquiring firms' post- transaction 
performance, indicating that R & D is not the key factor in assessing a firm's profit 
performance, especially for small and medium sized Taiwanese enterprises. 
8.4 CONCLUSION 
A variety of multivariate statistical methods have been used to predict an event (i.e. 
improved post- transaction perfoimance) as occurring or not. The estimated 
coefficients of the 54 independent variables are grouped in five clusters. Different 
algorithms for variable selection generate different models. This study tries to develop 
a purely predictive model, that is, to identify a model which includes a set of 
predictors that provides a greater percentage of correctly classified variables and 
reveals what is causing superior or inferior post- transaction perfoimances in 
Taiwanese enterprises' mergers and acquisitions. For this reason, we have chosen the 
forward Wald method, the probability with a stepwise of 0.10 and of removal 
stepwise of 0.10, as our research method. 
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The relationship between the acquiring firm's post- transaction performance and all of 
the independent variables collectively, is statistically significant for all of them. This 
indicates that we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the terms in the 
logistic regression model, except the constant, are jointly zero. This result implies that 
information about the independent variables allows us to make better predictions of 
the dependent variable (i.e. improved post- transaction performance) than we could 
make without knowing about the independent variables. 
The eight logistic regression models correctly classify high proportions of the 
observed outcomes, with such proportions varying from 71.28% to 78.17 %. The 
variables of control of distribution channels, reducing administrative expense, 
economies of scale, gaining rapid entry into new markets or industries, increased 
market power, government encouragement or support, cash (bank borrowing), 
replacement cost value, prior net sales and returns on total assets performance, 
customer drain, contingent loss, and personnel arrangement problems are statistically 
significant and have the expected signs. The coefficients of acquiring brand marks, 
patents or copyright technologies, of combining complementary resources, of buying 
below replacement cost, of controlling of material resources, and of government 
regulation problems are also significant, but have contrary signs. 
1 SPSS Advanced Statistics 6.1, Surrey, UK: SPSS UK Ltd., 1994, P. 14. 
2 The Chi -Square coefficient is an indicator of how well or poorly the model fits with all of the 
independent variables in the equation. 
3 The value of -2 Log Likelihood for the logistic regression model when only the intercept is included. 
4 The value of -2 Log Likelihood for the logistic regression model that includes the independent 
variables as well as the intercept. 
5 C(net sales) = [(26 +31)/(26 +31 +13 +127)]2 + [(13 +127)/( 26 +31 +13 +127)]2 = 58.88 %. 
C(gross profits) _ [(31 +32)/(31 +32 +15 +119)]2 + [(15 +119)/(31 +32 +15 +119)]2= 56.49 %. 
C(operating income) = [(37 +28)/(37 +28 +15 +117)]2 + [(15 +117)/(37 +28 +15 +117)]2 = 55.78 %. 
C(net income) = [(31 +37)/(31 +37 +11 +118)]2 + [(11 +118)/(31 +37 +11 +118)]2 = 54.79 %. 
C(earnings per share) = [(42 +32)/(42 +32 +19 +104)]2 + [(19 +104)/(42 +32 +19 +104)] 2= 53.09 %. 
C(dividends per share) = [(51 +29)/(51 +29 +18 +99)]2 + [(18 +99)/(51 +29 +18 +99)] 2= 51.76 %. 
C(price /earning ratio) = [(45 +30)/(45 +30 +26 +94)]2 + [(26 +94)445 +30 +26 +94)] 2= 52.66 %. 
C(return on total assets) = [(40 +31)/(40 +31 +18 +103)]2 + [(18 +103)/(40 +31 +18 +103)] 2= 53.39 %. 
6 Samuels, J. M., F. M. Wilkes, and.R. E. Brayshaw, Management of Company Finance, London: 
Chapman & Hall, Fifth edition, 1994, p. 612. 
7 Singh, H. And C. Montgomery, "Corporate Acquisition Strategies and Economic Performance," 
Strategic Management Journal, 8, 1987, pp. 377 -386. 
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8 Seth, A., "Value Creation in Acquisitions: A Re- Examination of Performance Issues ", Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 11, 1990, pp. 99 -115. 
9 Roll, R., "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers," Journal of Business, 59, 1986, pp. 197- 
216. 
lo Marris, R. L., "Review of J. K. Galbraith: The New Industrial State ", American Economic Review, 
1968, pp. 240 -245. 
11 Mueller, D. C., "A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 83, 1969, 
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13 Article 38 of Statute for Encouragement of Investment and Article 13 of Statute for Upgrading 
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pp. 643 -659. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE PRE -TRANSACTION SIZE AND PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 
-- UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
Merger and acquisition activities in Taiwan have increasingly gained the attention of 
government officials, company management and the public in recent years. There 
were about one million business units in Taiwan in 1995.1 The business scale on 
average remains very sma11.2 The government, however, favours larger business units 
in the belief that this helps the economy in the face of growing international 
competition. Both domestic and international markets demand that firms attempt to 
maximise profits and only the most efficient firms can survive. Basically, the 
government encourages small and medium enterprises to merge or consolidate for the 
purposes of promoting reasonable operations and management and of offering some 
tax benefits. Business managers look to a target firm to increase their firm's size 
through this quick and less costly external growth method, and to exploit the tax 
benefits of merging.3 The public or shareholders of acquired and acquiring firms hope 
to profit from these transactions. 
Theoretically, the merger and take -over mechanism is very important in capitalist 
economies. The threat of a merger or take -over forces management to improve their 
performance and hence achieve better profitability. What is more important, a merger 
or take -over offers a firm an opportunity to rethink or refine its organisation and to 
reallocate its resources where necessary. This, in itself, may lead to improvements in 
the efficiency and profitability of the amalgamated company. Thus, we need to 
understand the characteristics of mergers and take -overs in Taiwanese enterprises 
prior to their taking place. Their difference is mentioned in the literature. 
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Unfortunately, empirical studies of such acquired and acquiring firms' characteristics 
do not yield consistent results (Harris et al. 1982).4 The reasons may be as follows. 
First, the problem is complicated by the fact that a merger or acquisition 
simultaneously involves both the acquired and the acquiring firm. Their interaction 
will thus affect the outcome of the merger or acquisition. Second, the literature is 
focused on testing specific theories on a population or on applying general models to 
particular sets of acquired and/or acquiring films. Third, the documented studies 
cover a variety of time periods and the characteristics of acquired and acquiring firms 
may change over time (Powell 1997).5 
This chapter has two main objectives: (1) to assess the nature of the merger and take- 
over selection process. Do the acquired firms differ from acquiring or non -transaction 
ones in terms of size, profitability and liquidity amongst Taiwanese enterprises. (2) 
Does the efficiency of the merger and take -over mechanism comply with a theory of 
the firm? That is, we need to examine whether or not the assumption of profit 
maximisation in the economic theory of the firm is suitable for examining mergers 
and acquisitions. If the theory of profit maximisation does not explain the 
phenomenon, can we call on any other hypothesis or theory to appropriately explain 
the empirical results? 
In this chapter we present the results of a univariate comparison of the financial data 
between the acquired, acquiring and non -transaction firms' size and their operating 
and financial performance over the one year prior to the transaction year. In the next 
chapter we present the multivariate results. The sample using in the following two 
chapters is completely different from the previous questionnaire survey. I have 
gained access to a very large data set which is more accurate and comprehensive than 
any existing one. The databases are thus the largest ever assembled by a considerable 
margin and so allow me to gain particular insights into the size and operating and 
financial performance comparisons of Taiwanese enterprises. This means that the 
conclusions of this study have much greater validity than any previous work carried 
out on Taiwanese mergers by any other researcher. 
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This chapter is arranged as follows. A review of previous studies is discussed in the 
next section. The samples and variables are described in the third section. The size 
and operating and financial performance comparisons of Taiwanese enterprises over 
the one year prior to the transaction year are presented in the fourth section. The 
results of T -tests applied to comparisons between acquired and non - acquired firms; 
between acquired and acquiring firms; between acquired and non -transaction furies; 
and between acquiring and non -transaction firms are discussed in the fifth section. 
The sixth section uses paired sample tests of differences between acquired and 
acquiring firms. Finally we offer a brief conclusion. 
9.2 REVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 
9.2.1 RELATED THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
The theory of the firm traditionally assumes that producers aim to maximise profits, 
regardless of market structure. Empirical studies do not offer satisfactory evidence to 
explain the phenomenon of take -overs in tears of that classical theory of the firm. 
Winter (1964)6 has argued that the assumption of profit maximisation can be 
criticised in three ways. The first is that films do have goals, but it is not appropriate 
to summarise these goals as the "maximisation of profits ". One main reason for this 
is that ownership and control are separated in modern large corporations. 
Stockholders only have very limited control over the selection of top management 
and no direct control at all over the operations of the firm. Senior managers, who 
have the powers to control the operations of the firm, may have goals that are not 
solely focused on profits. 
The second criticism is that no single individual's preferences wholly control a firm's 
destiny except in the smallest companies. The firm is a set of individuals and groups 
each of whom have their own agendas. The interests of these individuals are not 
always the same. Different departments within the same company may have different 
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performance objectives. The Marketing Department may hope to increase its 
advertisement budget so as to increase sales. The Research and Development 
Department may press for more research personnel and facilities so as to innovate or 
improve existing products. The Finance Department focuses on the firm's cash flow 
and earnings. These groups, sometimes in coalition and sometimes not, make 
decisions about the firm's activities and this leads to the pursuit of many complex 
objectives. This situation of more than one person being involved in the decision 
making process implies that procedures exist for forging compromises among the 
decision - makers or for determining whose preferences should prevail when the firm 
addresses any special issue. The existence of a multiplicity of conflicting objectives 
implies that the firm's profits are not always uppermost. 
The third criticism emphasises that the limitations on the information available to 
management result in the impossibility of profit maximisation. It is recognised that 
completely static and perfect information, as is assumed by the classical theory of the 
film, does not exist in the real world. Usually it is costly to obtain and process 
infouüation. The traditional formulations of the theory of the firm do not consider the 
costs of obtaining and processing information when deducing price and output 
policies to maximise a firm's profit. The highly complex and complicated decision - 
making process is usually accompanied by many uncertainties, so large companies try 
to find satisfactory rather than optimal solutions. Winter mentions that these 
characteristics of firms' behaviour are "satisficing "; actions are aimed at achieving a 
satisfactory completion of objectives, rather than striving for a maximal outcome. 
Critics (Cyert and March, 1963; Williamson, 19758) of optimisation argue that 
information is not complete, reliable, or cheap, and that human rationality is limited. 
Thus, when choosing between all possible alternatives, optimising is impossible. Any 
fiiiu which has found a rule of conduct whose results they regard as satisfactory (such 
as setting the price of a product at average cost plus n per cent) will not change that 
rule until it no longer produces satisfactory results, or the conduct proves to be 
seriously wrong. Even so, they do not try to optimise, but to search for better rules by 
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trial and error. Once they find an acceptable new rule, they will adopt it. This foliu of 
conduct is called satisficing. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976)9, focusing on the separation of ownership and control, 
issued the famous "agency costs" proposition. They considered that an agency 
problem arises when the principal (shareholders or employer) of a large modern 
company appoints an agent (manager or employee), who usually owns only a very 
small fraction of the ownership shares of the firm, to make decisions on their behalf 
but they cannot ensure that the agent performs those tasks in exactly the way the 
principal would like. This partial ownership may cause managers to work less 
actively and energetically than the employer and/or to expend more perquisites 
(luxurious offices, company car, etc.) because the majority shareholders pay the cost. 
When the manager's ownership claim falls, his incentive to apply himself to creative 
activities such as finding new profitable ventures falls. The manager may avoid such 
ventures simply because they require him to learn new knowledge and methods or to 
take too high a risk. The widely dispersed ownership of the large corporation affects 
whether the individual owners have enough time and/or use effective ways to 
monitor the behaviour of managers. Managers' incentives differ from those of 
shareholders. The problem is how to devise incentives that lead managers to report 
truthfully to shareholders on the issues they face and the actions they take so as to 
ensure they will act for the shareholders' benefit. The agency problem does not arise 
if a detailed contract can be drawn up to specify all the duties of the managers and the 
monitoring mechanism works well. In fact, management is a continuous decision 
making process so it is difficult to specify completely all the conditions which 
managers ought to answer. Jensen and Meckling considered that the costs involved in 
writing such provisions and the costs of enforcing them may not be a trivial 
expenditure. This may reduce the profitability of the firm as the limitations may 
prevent the manager from taking optimal actions. Therefore, managerial efforts are 
difficult or expensive to monitor and control. 
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Modern theories of the firm attempt to find an appropriate approach to represent our 
highly complicated society, especially concerning the separation of ownership from 
control and the imperfect product markets within which modern companies operate. 
Marris (1964)10 considered that managers are presumed to satisfy instincts of power, 
dominance and prestige by pursuing growth as an objective. Baumol (1959)11 argued 
that a manager's salary and security do not depend on profits but on the growth of the 
firm, as measured by the increase in its total sales revenue. The executives of a large 
company may desire prestige and perquisites which do not directly and uniquely 
relate to the fiiiii's profits. In spite of these complications, neo- classical economists 
argue that even allowing for the separation of ownership and control, managers are 
still constrained to' pursue profit maximisation through the disciplining effect of the 
merger or take -over mechanism. Winter (1964) considered that threats to the firm's 
survival or where profits persist on a downward trend stimulates managers to engage 
in profit maximising behaviour. If managers merely pursue their own self -interest at 
the expense of shareholders, the possibility of a take -over offers a possible resource 
for controlling this impulse ( Marris, 1964; Manne, 196512; Malatesta, 198313). 
Hay and Morris (1991)14describe the alternative possibility that the firm may acquire 
resources by merger or take -over. They consider that the traditional motives for 
merger or take -over carry three assumptions. The first is that managers are entirely 
efficient in their use of resources; there is no slack in the internal allocation of 
resources, and external resources are used effectively in the firm's interest. The 
second assumes that there are no agency problems. There is no divergence between 
the merger motives of managers and shareholders. The managers of firms in merger 
operations perfounl in the best interests of their shareholders. Third, the assumption 
is that the stock market is efficient in the strong sense.15 The value of shares is fully 
reflected in the stock market so the market valuation of the firm is maximised. 
If managers are not using assets to maximise the firm's value, then resources are not 
being efficiently allocated. A merger or take -over may be effected by those who can 
effectively reallocate assets and make better use of resources. In practice, the free 
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rider problem16 can significantly weaken the take -over constraint mechanism, even 
though a number of strategies can be deployed to minimise its effects. Grossman and 
Hart (1980)17 point out that when a firm does not maximise profits, the take -over 
raider offers a price to the target firm's shareholders, and then improves its 
performance and raises its market value. The free rider shareholders may reject the 
bid to wait for other shareholders to accept the offer and to enjoy the post- transaction 
performance improvement and valuation increase. But if the free rider shareholders 
account for more than 50 per cent of the total, then the take -over must fail. The free - 
riding element therefore can allow real discrepancies to appear between full 
efficiency and partial inefficiency, without sacking the managers through take -over. 
Managers may seek their own objectives if there are not many constraints upon them. 
Hay and Morris state that this leads to one motive for mergers called `managerial 
take- over'. The growth strategy of managerially controlled firms may allow for three 
possibilities for acquiring another firm. The first is the acquisition of a well managed 
and profit- maximising firm. Heal and Silberston (1972)18 consider that it is possible 
to acquire such a firm since the growth- oriented firm is willing to pay more than 
existing market value to acquire it. The raider not only values the future stream of 
profits which are shown on the stock market in the shares' valuation, but also the 
assets and sales of the firm which thereby contribute to the size of the acquiring firm. 
The second possibility is that the raider will target another growth- maximising firm. 
The lower valuation of this firm tempts the raider to decrease its victim's growth and 
so increase its share price. The third possibility is the inefficient firm. The aim is to 
purchase it for the simple purpose of improving its efficiency and so reaping the 
attendant gains. 
Managers are interested not only in profit and growth but also in security. If two 
merged firms do not have perfectly correlated returns, the variance of the post - 
merger firm's earnings stream will decrease and hence reduce its risk (Hay and 
Morris, 1991).19 Managers are particularly interested in the conglomerate merger, 
because it simultaneously offers more stable earnings and faster growth 
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opportunities. Managers also deploy many defences against being taken over (e.g. 
poison pi1120, shark repellent21, greenmail22, white knight23, golden parachutes24, etc.) 
so as to prevent themselves becoming the victim. These defences may impose fairly 
large obstacles to the proper working of the stock market and may misallocate 
resources to growth- maximising but less efficient firms. Apparently, managerial 
motives for take -overs or for developing defences against being taken over distort the 
efficient use of resources and so affect the take -over mechanism. 
Hay and Morris point out that the conglomerate merger can reduce risk only when 
the stock market is imperfect in some respect and/or the investors are not fully 
reasonable in every regard, and both of these are likely characteristics. First, small 
shareholders may not diversify adequately because the relatively high transaction 
cost of small share deals. Second, even if transaction costs are zero, many investors 
do not have enough information or expertise to judge the returns or risk of different 
shares. Third, Lewellen (1971)25 considers that mergers can decrease the risk of 
default because the losses of one firm can be compensated for by the income of the 
other firm. Fourth, the shareholders are easy to diversify their portfolio of assets but 
the manager's wealth is closely tied to the performance of his /her own company. 
Conglomerate mergers can stabilise the earnings of a film and therefore increase the 
manager's wealth and job security. 
9.2.2 RELATED EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
No similar empirical studies relating to Taiwanese enterprises could be found. 
Therefore I discuss only studies relating to the UK and US. 
9.2.2.1 SIZE 
Singh (1975)26, Harris et al. (1982)27, Cosh et al. (1989)28 and Ambrose and 
Megginson (1992)29 all conclude that size is an important pre- transaction 
characteristic when using a univariate analysis. Singh (1975) and Cosh et al. (1980)3° 
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conclude that size (net assets or In net assets) is one of the most important 
characteristics differentiating between acquired and acquiring companies. Acquiring 
firms are, on average, bigger than those they acquire. 
Singh (1975) 
Singh used data from the Department of Trade and Industry's standardised 
accounting records of all quoted companies in four UK manufacturing industries 
(food, drink, clothing and footwear, and non -electrical engineering) for the years 
1963 -70. 112 of the 463 quoted firms had been taken over between 1967 -1970 
period, i.e. about 24.2% of the population. 
To find the precise character of the take -over selection process during the years 
studied, both acquired and surviving firms, and acquired and acquiring firms were 
compared on a univariate and a multivariate basis. The relationship between size 
within a company's own industry and its probability of being acquired indicated that 
the probability of acquisition declines significantly as the firm's size increases, 
except for the smallest size quintile. Thus he found a curvilinear (non -linear) 
relationship between the two variables. The results of the differences between 
acquiring and acquired companies showed that size is one of the most important 
distinguishing characteristics. He found that where smaller firms increased their size, 
they reduced the probability of being taken over. 
Cosh, A. D., A. Hughes, and A. Singh (1980) 
Cosh et al. analysis two kinds of merger. First, there are those that involve the 
acquisition of 50 percent or more of the shares of one company A by another B. The 
second category consists of those in which two companies A and B amalgamate to 
form a new legal entity C. This study concentrates upon the microeconomic aspects 
of take -overs and considers their impact on the individual company, especially those 
take -overs that took place in 1967 -1969 among those large public companies quoted 
on the United Kingdom stock exchanges that managed primarily in the UK and in the 
manufacturing and distributive industries. The sample of firms, drawn from the 
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control group, that matched the acquired or acquiring firms by industry and by size 
for each acquired or acquiring firm. 
The size differences between acquiring and acquired companies and between 
acquiring and nonacquiring companies are all statistically significant. The acquiring 
companies are on average larger (in teens of In net assets) than the acquired 
companies and larger (in terms of In sales, In total assets, and In net assets) than 
nonacquiring companies. The acquired firms are significantly larger (in terms of In 
sales) than nonacquired companies. But when the tests on alternative measures of 
size (in terms of In total assets and In net assets), the results are not statistical 
significance. 
Harris, R. S., John F. Stewart., David K. Guilkey, and Willard T. Carleton. (1982) 
Harris et al. study both the financial and product market characteristics of acquired 
companies to understand if such characteristics differ considerably from the 
characteristics of nonaquired companies. The sample consists of 45 acquired films in 
1974 and 1975, 61 acquired firms in 1976 and 1977, and approximately 1,200 
nonacquired firms to identify those characteristics of a film that have a statistically 
significant impact on the probability that the firm will be acquired. The primary data 
resources are from five parts.: (1) the COMPUSTAT Expanded Annual Industrial 
Tape. (2) the COMPUSTAT Expanded Annual Industrial Research File; (3) the 
Federal Trade Commission's Merger Series; (4) the 1972 Census of Manufacturers; 
and (5) the Federal Trade Commission Annual Line of Business Data. The variables 
fall into two broad categories: A) financial statement variables and B) industry 
product market characteristics. All financial variables are based only on individual 
company data and normalised by the industry average. Product market variables are 
developed at the industry level using the 1972 Census of Manufacturers and FTC 
Line of Business Report. 
The univariate result shows that the difference of size (in terms of total assets) is 
statistically significant between acquired and non -acquired companies in both time 
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periods. Acquired firms are significantly smaller than non -acquired ones. This result 
indicates that increasing size can decrease the chance of being taken -over. 
Cosh, A. D., A. Hughes, K. Lee, and A. Singh (1989) 
Cosh et al. analysed two samples of films, one relating to mergers in the period 
1981 -83, when the level of take -over activity was relatively low, and the other 
relating to mergers in the take -over boom year of 1986 in the UK. There were 59 and 
77 companies involved in a merger in the period 1981 -83 and 1986 respectively for 
which data were available on the Exstat UK Company Accounts databank. The study 
focused on the characteristics of the take -over selection process and compared the 
pre- merger characteristics of acquiring and acquired firms. The variable of size was 
compared with their industry averages. 
On a univariate basis, acquired firms were significantly smaller than their industrial 
averages and than their acquiring firms in the period 1981 -83 and in the boom year 
1986. The size of acquiring films compared with their industrial averages was mixed 
(smaller in the period 1981 -83 and greater in the period 1986) and not significant in 
both periods. 
Ambrose and Megginson (1992) 
This study extends the Palepu (1986) acquisition likelihood model by examining 
which variables influence the probability that a firm will receive a take -over bid. The 
sample includes 169 target firms and 267 nontargets that are listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (ASE) during the period 
January 1981 to December 1986. The financial variables of size, average excess 
return, growth, liquidity, leverage, growth- resource dummy, market -to -book ratio, 
price- earning ratio, and tangible (fixed) assets -to -total assets were analysed. These 
variables were compared with their temporally- matched subsample of target and 
nontarget firms. 
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The univariate comparison of targets and nontargets indicate that size (in tenus of net 
book assets' value) is the variable possessing significantly different means for target 
and nontarget firms. Target firms are significantly smaller than nontarget ones in the 
1980s. The conclusion is similar to the Palepu's finding for the 1970s. The empirical 
study indicates that take -over discipline is strong for smaller firms but is slim for 
large firms. 
9.2.2.2 PROFITABILITY 
Kuehn (1975)31 found that increases in profits reduce the chances of being taken 
over. Singh (1975) presents that acquired companies have significantly smaller 
profitability than surviving companies. Cosh et al. (1980) indicate that acquired firms 
were significantly less profitable than their acquiring firms and than non -acquired 
firms. Cosh et al. (1989) show that acquired firms demonstrated significantly poorer 
profitability than their acquiring films and than their industry averages respectively. 
Acquiring firms show significantly higher profitability than their industrial averages. 
Weir (1997)32 found that target firms have a significantly lower profitability than 
non -targets. 
Kuehn (1975) 
Kuehn studied take -over activity in the UK over the period 1957 -69 and attempted to 
relate the take -over phenomenon to developments in the theory of the firm. He chose 
1,554 out of 3,566 take -overs of publicly quoted UK companies, allocated over 67 
industrial groups. The financial and stock market variables of profit rate, growth rate, 
retention ratio, liquidity ratio, size (in terms of net assets), and valuation ratio were 
included to discriminate between firms that had been taken over and firms that had 
not so as to understand the causes of take -over. The examination of take -overs is 
considered separately for each industry. 
Kuehn found, using univariate analysis that profits and growth were as significant as 
expected in a majority of industries. That is, increases in profits and growth reduce 
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the probability of being take -over. Kuehn considered that managers desire security so 
the sacrifice of profits to the objective of growth is constrained because low profits 
may result in the possibility of take -over. This indicates that firms avoid being taken 
over by achieving high growth or high profit or both. Empirical results indicate that 
the take -over mechanism can apply readily to low profit firms. 
Singh (1975) 
The results of the univariate analysis indicate that profitability (over 1 -year and 3- 
years) revealed significant differences between acquired and surviving companies 
during 1967 -70. The acquired companies had, on average, worse profitability than 
surviving firms. He found that where smaller firms increased their size, they reduced 
the probability of being taken over, whilst an increase in profitability offered little 
protection to firms. 
Singh argued that take -over discipline was strong for smaller unprofitable firms but 
was weak for large firms. These results may encourage managers of large companies 
to increase their size rather than improve their profitability. Therefore, for larger 
companies the empirical evidence about the nature of the take -over mechanism 
supports the behavioural and agency theories of the firm, i.e. finis attempt to 
satisfice rather than to adopt maximising behaviour and that the find is a set of 
individuals and groups each of which has its own aspirations. The findings give very 
little support to the neo- classical theory of the firm and to the associated belief in 
economic natural selection. 
Cosh, A. D., A. Hughes, and A. Singh (1980) 
Cosh et al. show that in only nine of the fourteen individual industries the average 
profitability of acquired firms were significantly less profitable (in terms of pre -tax 
return on net assets) than their acquiring firms in their 1967 -69 sample. There are 
highly significant negative differences between acquiring firms and the control group 
of all non -acquiring firms concerning pre -tax profitability (in terms of net income / 
net assets). But when they use trading profits -sales as a measure of profitability, the 
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result is not significant between the two groups. On the other hand, the results 
indicate an unambiguous conclusion with respect to profitability between the 
acquired and control group firms. The acquired firms are on average significantly 
less profitable than the control group firms. 
Cosh, A. D., A. Hughes, K. Lee, and A. Singh (1989) 
Cosh et al. found that acquired firms were less profitable (in terms of pre -tax return 
on average net assets) than their industrial averages (one -year and three -years) and 
than their acquiring firms in the period 1981 -83 though not in the boom year 1986. 
Acquiring firms showed significantly higher profitability than their industrial 
averages (one -year and three -years) in both periods. 
Weir (1997) 
Weir collected 94 UK public companies which were acquired and fully quoted on the 
London Stock Exchange during the period 1990 -93. The sample included all sectors 
of the economy. The control sample of non -acquired firms was chosen which 
matched the acquired firms by company type, size and sector, as defined by the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). 
The univariate analysis shows that acquired firms have a significantly lower mean 
profitability (in terms of return on capital before tax / net assets) than non -acquired 
firms. It indicates that poor performance of the acquired firms makes it a take -over 
target. However, when this measures firm profitability relative to the industry 
average, the performance differences become insignificant across all samples. 
9.2.2.3 LIQUIDITY 
High liquidity (i.e. low levels of short-term debt) may provide a motive for take -over 
even though it is possible that low liquidity can signal that the company is actually, 
or potentially, in trouble and therefore a likely target. Singh (1975)33 found that 
acquiring firms during the years 1967 -70 were significant more liquid (over two year 
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averages) than those they acquired. Kuehn (1975)34 showed that firms exhibiting low 
liquidity relative to the industrial average were taken over. Harris et al. (1982)35 
indicated that acquired firms had significantly higher liquidity than non -acquired 
firms. But the study of Ambrose and Megginson (1992)36 showed that differences in 
liquidity (in terms of net liquid assets / total assets) between targets and non -targets 
were not significant for their 1981 -86 data. 
Kuehn (1975) 
Kuehn concluded that liquidity plays a role in the take -over process such that the less 
liquid relative to the industrial average was taken over. He found, liquidity was 
seldom significant but, when measured as an average of the three years before the 
offer divided by the appropriate industry averages, it became more frequently 
significant than one or two years average prior to the offer. This implies that acquired 
firm had liquidity difficulty before the offer a few years, it has made progress in 
improving its liquidity up to the time it was acquired. 
Harris, R. S., John F. Stewart., David K. Guilkey, and Willard T. Carleton. (1982) 
They found that liquidity (in terms of net working capital / assets) has an effect on 
the probability of acquisition in the 1974 -75 period but the effect is statistically 
insignificant in the 1976 -77 period. Acquired firms tend to have more liquidity than 
non -acquired firms 
9.3 VARIABLES, HYPOTHESES AND SAMPLES 
9.3.1 VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES 
To present a clear and accurate picture of the merger and take -over selection process 
during 1990 -95 in Taiwanese enterprises, we compared the size, profitability, 
liquidity and growth between acquired firms, acquiring films, non -transaction firms 
and non -acquired firms. 
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9.3.1.1 SIZE 
The probability of being merged or being taken -over decreases as the size of the fill i1 
increases. This hypothesis is based on the premise that there are many transaction 
costs associated with merger and acquisitions related to firm's assets. The transaction 
costs include merger or acquisition costs, administration fees (including lawyer, 
chartered accountant, bank and miscellenance fees), and management defences 
which may create fairly large obstacles and hence impose hefty extra costs. 
Acquiring a large firm places greater constraints on the sources of finance for the 
transaction. In other words, a large acquired film has fewer potential raiders than a 
small acquired firm and thereby stands a smaller chance of being taken over. The 
large acquiring film has greater financial ability (in tenus of its own funds or term 
borrowing from the banks) to merge or take -over a small firm. These transaction 
costs are likely to increase with target size, so we assume that acquired films are 
smaller than non -acquired, acquiring, and non -transaction films and acquiring films 
are larger than non -transaction firms. To test this hypothesis, the size of companies 
was measured by the following variables: (1) total assets; and (2) net sales. Total 
assets include current assets, fixed assets, long -term investments, net intangible 
assets, and other assets. Net sales are defined as total sales minus sales returns and 
discounts. 
9.3.1.2 PROFITABILITY 
Empirical studies indicate that acquired films are significantly less profitable than 
their acquiring films and than nonacquired firms. In spite of the separation of 
ownership and control in modern companies, managers are still constrained to pursue 
profit maximisation through the disciplining effect of the merger or take -over 
mechanism. Firms with low profits are likely to be targeted by films with high 
profits. This hypothesis is based on the premise that mergers or acquisitions are a 
mechanism by which managers who cannot or will not achieve market value 
maximisation of their firms are replaced. So I assume that acquired firms are less 
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profitable than non -acquired, acquiring, and non -transaction firms. Prior empirical 
results of the profitability between acquiring and non -transaction firms are not clear 
so I do not make any prediction about the direction in this case. The profitability 
performance of companies was measured by the following variables: (1) earnings per 
share; and (2) return on total assets. The earnings per share is measured by the money 
earned in profit per ordinary share (the total profits after tax and after deducting 
preference dividends divided by the number of shares). The return on total assets is 
the amount of profit over a financial period (normally 12 months, although it may be 
less) as a percentage of the total assets of a company. 
9.3.1.3 LIQUIDITY 
High liquidity or cash flow may signal excess current assets or cash and imply that 
the asset allocation is not efficient. Highly liquid firms may be attractive to other 
firms and provide a motive for take -over. However, it is likely that the low liquidity 
fitini may be indicating that its operating perfomuance is not good and hence 
indicating itself to be an acquisition candidate. Previous empirical results are 
ambiguous so we do not make any prediction about the direction of the liquidity of 
acquired and acquiring firms. Thus the variable liquidity may be of either sign. The 
liquidity of companies is measured by (1) : current ratio; and (2) : cash flow ratio. 
The current ratio is the ratio of current assets of a business to current liabilities. The 
cash flow ratio is used for assessing the solvency of a company. It is calculated by 
dividing the operational cash flow by current liabilities. The cash flow ratio indicates 
a company's ability to satisfy its short term debts. 
9.3.1.4 GROWTH 
Growth has been used by many studies (e.g. Singh, 1975; Palepu, 1986; Cosh et al., 
1989; Harris et al., 1982; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; and Powell, 1997) to 
distinguish acquired films from non -acquired or acquiring firms. The first three of 
these studies indicate that non -acquired or acquiring thins enjoy significantly greater 
206 
growth than acquired ones but the last three studies show that the rate of growth is 
negative and is not significant and that acquired finis have had lower growth than 
non -acquired finis. 
If the small firm is an easy target, then its managers will try to increase its size, i.e. 
pursuing growth, to avoid an acquisition. On the other hand, such growth is likely to 
increase a fine's probability of becoming a target. The bidding company may prefer to 
merge with a higher growth firm. Marris (1964)37 found that finis that attempt to 
maximise their growth rate may become take -over candidates because the pursuit of 
growth may result in a loss of control and in a failure to meet the valuation ratio38 
constraint. For acquiring films, mergers and take -overs are a common and feasible way 
for the firm to expand but we do not know if the average growth rate of acquiring films 
is greater than the average growth rate of nonacquiring firms before the transaction. 
The empirical study of growth of acquired and acquiring firms is not apparent so we do 
not assume the direction of growth of them. The firm's growth is measured by the 
growth percentage of total assets in year t -1 being equal to the total assets in year t -1 
minus the total assets in year t -2 over the total assets in year t -2. 
9.3.2 SAMPLES 
Lists of acquired and acquiring firms which were involved in mergers and take -overs 
during the period 1990 -1995 were obtained from three government departments: The 
Department of Commerce of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, The Bureau of 
Industrial Affairs of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and The Securities and 
Exchange Commission of the Ministry of Finance of The Republic of China. The 
financial data on these firms was collected from the Joint Credit Information Centre 
(JCIC) in Taiwan in August 1997. All the banks were controlled by the government 
(including local, provincial, and central government) in Taiwan until 1992. The JCIC 
is organised by all of the banks which operate in Taipei city, i.e. it is a quasi- official 
organisation, and they share the collected information. The Ministry of Finance of 
The Republic of China demand all chartered accountants when they examine a firm's 
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financing, to present an auditors' report (for amounts of capital over NT$ 50 or 30 
million) to related organisations, and they demand since July 1980 that one copy be 
issued to the Joint Credit Information Centre.39 The Centre collects data from almost 
all the large companies (including listed and unlisted companies) which have 
borrowed money from the banks. This data includes balance sheet, statement of 
income, statement of changes in stockholders' equity and statement of cash flows. 
The quality of the JCIC's data is relatively reliable but the weakness of the JCIC's 
data is that it does not include data relating to companies with capital less than NT$ 
50 or 30 million or those which do not borrow money from the banks. 
The findings of this study are described in the following sections using univariate 
comparisons of the mean values of the variables for the following groups of finis. 
1. Acquired firms (Acd) --the group of observed firms that were merged or acquired 
in the years 1991 -1995; 
2. Acquiring firms (Acg) -- the group of observed firms that merged or acquired other 
observed firms in the years 1991 -1995; 
3. Non -transaction firms [Non(Trans.)] --the control group of firms, none of which 
were merged or acquired nor enacted any merger or acquisition over the period 1991- 
1995. 
4. Non -acquired firms [Non(Acd)] --the group of firms which includes acquiring 
firms and non -transaction fims. 
Since there are fewer government regulations and restrictions in Taiwan than in other 
countries, we have an opportunity to observe, in Taiwanese enterprises, the merger 
and take -over operations of a relatively free market. As shown in Table 9 -3 -1, there 
were 83 acquired firms and 186 acquiring firms collected from the JCIC database 
between 1990 and 1995. We also collected 1,791 non -transaction firms, including all 
the JCIC database, that offer comparatively complete financial data during the period 
1988 -1995. This enables an accurate comparison of the size, operating and financial 
characteristics of Taiwanese enterprises. 
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More acquired and acquiring firms are observed in 1995 than in any of the other 
years when there were 25 and 56 firms respectively. The fewest observed acquired 
and acquiring firms in a year were one and 11 in 1990 respectively. There has been 
an upward trend in the number of acquired and acquiring firms since 1990. 
A test was carried out to see if the sample was similar to the identified populations in 
acquired and acquiring firms obtained from government lists in terms of the 
distribution of transactions over the years. We used the Chi -Square goodness -of -fit 
test. The null (H0) and alternative hypotheses (Hi) were as follows: 
Ho : Yi = Yio for categories i = 1990, ... , 1995, Yio are specified probabilities. 
Y;o = Ni I Ni , where Ni is the identified number in category i. 
and 
H1 : At least one of the cell probabilities differs from the hypothesised value. 
x2 =Zd [ (ni -Ei)2 / Ei ] , where ni is the observed number in category i and 
Eì = nYio is the identified number under Ho 
As shown in Table 9 -3 -2 and Table 9 -3 -3, the computed value of x2 = 3.7962 for 
acquired firms and x2 = 2.2741 for acquiring firms are all smaller than the critical 
value of 11.0705, so the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and it can be concluded 
that there are no significant differences in the distribution of numbers of transaction 
over the years 1990 -1995 between the population (gleaned from government 
departments' lists) and the acquired firms, and between the population and the 
acquiring firms. 
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9.4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS RELATING TO AVERAGE SIZE AND 
OPERATING AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OVER THE ONE YEAR 
PRIOR TO THE TRANSACTION YEAR 
There was only one acquired firm in 1990. This sample is too small to be a suitable 
representation for that year. Our comparisons start from 1991 to 1995. As shown in 
Table 9 -4 -1, on the whole, the mean size (in tetras of total assets and net sales) of 
acquired firms was smallest in 1991 and greatest in 1995. The smallest and greatest 
average profitability (in terms of earnings per share and return on total assets) of 
acquired firms was in 1991 and 1995 respectively and which indicated an upward 
trend. The average size, profitability and liquidity of acquiring firers do not have 
apparent regularity in research years. Non -transaction firms had an upward trend in 
size (in terms of total assets and net sales) and liquidity (in terrus of current ratio) 
during the period 1991 -1995. The earnings per share and return on total assets of non - 
transaction firmus was about the same during the period 1992 -1995. 
If we consider general economic growth and inflation, the slightly upward trend of 
size (in terms of total assets and net sales) of non -transaction enterprises is 
reasonable. The various sizes and operating and financial performances of the 
acquired and acquiring firms over different years indicate that the sample of acquired 
and acquiring firms is not large and is easily affected by the nature of the industry or 
for other reasons, such as the economic depression in 1990 (see Figure 9 -3 -1) and the 
bear stock market from 1991 to 1993 (see Figure 9 -3 -2) in Taiwan. 
When we compare the size and operating and financial performance of acquired, 
acquiring and non -transaction firms over the transaction years, the results are 
probably affected by the following four phenomena: (1) the business cycle: economic 
booms in 1987, recession in 1988 -89, depressions in 1990, and recovery in 1991 -95. 
(2) important government -led financial or economic policy changes: for example, the 
government approved the setting up of new securities companies in 1988 and of new 
private banks in 1992. (3) Special industries' need for mergers and acquisitions: e.g. 
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the fluctuation of electrical & electronic industries (including information products) 
and the mergers and acquisitions of the securities industry during the years 1990- 
1995. (4) extreme values or cases: the average firm's size or operating and financial 
performance may be affected by extreme values or cases, especially when the 
acquired or acquiring firms' samples are small. 
As shown in Table 9 -4 -2, the Taiwanese economy experienced a period of prosperity 
in 1987 owing to many years of economic growth. In 1988, the government approved 
the setting up of new securities companies. There were only 28 securities brokers (in 
headquarters) in 1987, but this abruptly increased to 373 in 1990. Due to limited 
investment opportunities, excess cash flowed into the stock market and into real 
estate. In the meantime, foreign investors and speculators expected that the New 
Taiwan Dollar would appreciate so monies moved quickly from other countries to 
Taiwanese banks and into the Taiwanese stock market in order to realise opportunities 
for profit. The government became concerned that sharply rising stock market prices 
would affect economic stability and in September 1989, it announced that it would 
levy a stock income tax. This news caused the stock market to suddenly slump in 
1990. The stock market yearly average price rapidly fell from 8,616.14 in 1989 to 6, 
775.32 in 1990. The decreased aggregate demand caused the growth rate to fall from 
8.23% in 1989 to 5.39% in 1990. Although growth recovered a little in 1991, the 
stock market did not recover until 1994. This serious recession in Taiwanese 
economic development deeply affected firms' operations and profitability. It is 
therefore likely that we need to observe the whole situation during the years 1991- 
1995 rather than merely making year -by -year comparisons. 
9.5 INDEPENDENT SAMPLES T -TESTS FOR AVERAGE SIZE AND 
OPERATING AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OVER THE ONE YEAR 
PRIOR TO THE TRANSACTION YEAR 
In this section we compare the size, operating and financial performance between 
acquired firms, acquiring firms and non -transaction firms over the one year prior to 
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the transaction year during the period 1991 -1995 as a whole, rather than on a year - 
by -year basis. The value of non -transaction firms in every year is calculated the 
average value of all non -transaction firms first and then calculated the one year prior 
to the transaction (acquired and acquiring) year during the period 1991 -1995. The 
results are shown in Table 9 -5 -1. As a total analysis of the whole period, it shows 
that acquiring firms have the greatest average total assets, net sales and return on 
total assets. Acquired firms are smaller in total assets, net sales, earnings per share 
and return on total assets. But the acquired firms get greater average current ratio and 
cash flow ratio, and the acquiring firms hold the smallest cash flow ratio. 
Table 9 -5 -2 indicates that acquired firms had significantly smaller average total 
assets, net sales and returns on total assets (at a = 0.05) than acquiring firms did. 
Acquiring firms had significantly greater average total assets and net sales (at a = 
0.05) than non -transaction firms. Acquired firms also had significantly smaller 
average net sales and returns on total assets (at a = 0.05) than both non - acquired and 
non -transaction funs. ns But the acquired firms had significantly greater average current 
ratio (at a = 0.05) than both non -acquired and non -transaction firms. 
The results indicate that acquiring fines in Taiwan are greater in size (in terms of total 
assets and net sales) than both acquired and non -transaction firms over the one year 
prior to the transaction year during the period 1991 -1995. Acquired firms are smaller 
in size (in terms of net sales), and have lower profitability (in teems of returns on total 
assets) and greater liquidity (in terms of current ratio) than non -acquired and non - 
transaction firms over the one year prior to the transaction in the 1991 -1995 period. 
Acquiring firms were larger and more profitable (in terms of returns on total assets) 
than the acquired firms over the one year prior to the transaction year. But acquiring 
firms did not have significantly better earnings per share than did acquired firms over 
the one year prior to the transaction year. This may indicate: (1) The standard 
deviation of earnings per share is apparently higher than return on total assets so the 
difference of average earnings per share is not significant. (2) The acquiring firms 
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have many more shares outstanding than acquired firms which works to reduce the 
earnings per share below that of acquired firms. The higher current ratio of acquiring 
firms as compared to non -transaction firms (a = 0.063) indicates that the former's 
short-tenu financial position (i.e. its liquidity ability) is better or healthier than the 
latter' s. 
The extraordinarily high average current ratio of the acquired firms indicates that 
they have relatively high current assets (or relatively low current liabilities) 
compared to those of non -transaction firms. The result indicates that managers would 
like to hold more net current assets within the firm. Greater levels of current assets in 
the firm mean that managers have more resources under their control, and hence this 
increases their power. At the same time, high current assets attracts raiders and may 
act as an important pre- condition for take -over. The relatively high liquidity (current 
ratio) may explain why acquired firms are easy targets for acquiring firms. 
Our finding that acquiring firms are bigger and more profitable than their targets 
matches that found by Singh (1975) and Cosh et al. (1980 and 1989). It indicates that 
acquiring firms are normally large and profitable so they have relatively more finance 
(either as their own funds or as borrowings from banks) and better abilities to merge 
with, or take -over, small and less profitable firms. The managers of the less profitable 
companies are then replaced by managers from the more profitable companies. The 
take -over mechanism can thus act as an efficient means of reallocating resources. This 
situation is consistent with the result predicted by the theory of the film i.e. the firm's 
objective is to pursue profit maximisation. 
The results of the univariate comparisons of the average characteristics of the 
acquired, acquiring, and non -transaction firms in the period 1991 -1995 over the one 
year prior to the transaction year may be summarised as follows: 
Total assets 
Net sales 
Acg > Non(Trans.) >_ Acd 
Acg > Non(Trans.) > Acd 
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Earnings per share 
Return on total assets 
Current ratio 
Cash flow 
Acg >_ Acd; Non(Trans.) >_ Acd; Non(Trans.) >_ Acg 
Acg > Acd; Non(Trans.) > Acd; Acg >_ Non(Trans.) 
Acd >_ Acg; Acd > Non(Trans.); Acg >_ Non(Trans.) 
Acd >_ Acg; Acd >_ Non(Trans.); Non(Trans.) >_ Acg 
In the above summary, > presents statistical significance (a = 0.05) between the 
groups; similarly, >_ presents a positive difference though not a statistical significance 
(at a = 0.05) between the groups. 
9.6 PAIRED SAMPLES T -TESTS FOR AVERAGE SIZE AND OPERATING 
AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OVER THE ONE YEAR PRIOR TO 
THE TRANSACTION YEAR 
In the previous section, we used pooled data to compare the size, operating and 
financial performance between acquired, acquiring and non -transaction firms over the 
one year prior to the transaction year over the period 1991 -1995. Although this 
method can elucidate the general tendency in the observed samples it may sometimes 
also dilute or weaken some characteristics by dint of aggregating different companies 
together. To reveal the exact relationship between acquiring and acquired firms in this 
section, we use paired samples to compare the average size and average operating and 
financial performance over the one year prior to the transaction year during the period 
1991 -1995. We also need to notice that owing to the incomplete nature of the data 
obtained, the number of paired samples is reduced to fifty. Thus, the analysis in this 
section may produce slightly different results compared with those of the last section. 
For the same reasons discussed in Sections 9.4 and 9.5, we test the size and operating 
and financial performance between acquired and acquiring films over the one year 
prior to the transaction year during the period 1991 -1995 as a whole, rather than as a 
year -by -year comparison. The results are shown in Table 9 -6 -1. The paired samples 
T -tests indicate that acquiring firms had significantly greater than average total assets, 
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net sales (at a = 0.05) and returns on total assets (at a = 0.10) than did acquired firms. 
No other comparisons showed statistically significant differences. 
The results indicate that acquiring firms in Taiwan are still bigger (in terms of total 
assets and net sales) than are acquired firms over the one year prior to the transaction 
year in the 1991 -1995 period. It is a similar result to that found by Singh (1975) and 
Cosh et al. (1980 and 1989). Acquiring firms also have significantly better 
profitability performances especially in terms of returns on total assets than do 
acquired firms over the one year prior to the transaction year. The level of 
significance has decreased from the last section's T -tests a = 0.041 to this section's 
paired samples T -tests a = 0.065. Though acquiring firms had better profitability 
performance (in teens of earnings per share) than did acquired films over the one 
year prior to the transaction year, this difference is not significant. The other factor 
complicating the findings on the earnings per share is that acquiring firms may have 
many more shares outstanding than do acquired firms so they may not have better 
earnings per share than do those of acquired firms. The less profitable companies 
merge with the more profitable companies. This implies that the take -over discipline 
is strong for small and low profit firms. The take -over threat forces firms to improve 
their profitability. The empirical evidence on the nature of the take -over mechanism, 
as experienced by acquired firms, supports the predictions of the traditional theory of 
the firm. The result of the paired samples T -tests between acquiring and acquired 
firms is similar to the result of independent samples T- tests. 
9.7 CONCLUSION 
The results of independent samples T -tests on all the observed Taiwanese data 
indicate that acquiring firms are bigger and more profitable than are acquired firms 
over the one year prior to the transaction year during the period 1991 -1995. Acquired 
firms are smaller and have poorer returns on total assets than do non - acquired firms. 
This indicates that acquiring firms are normally large and profitable; they have 
sufficient funds or access to credit (e.g. borrowing from banks or financial institutes) 
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to afford to merge with or take -over smaller and less profitable firms. Merger or take- 
over is an option chosen by those who can effectively reallocate and make better use 
of resources. This situation is consistent with the theory of the firm as we can see how 
firms aim to maximise profits. 
The paired samples T -tests indicate that acquiring firms are greater in size and more 
profitable, particularly in terms of return on total assets, than are acquired firms over 
the one year prior to the transaction year. Acquiring firms enjoyed better profitability 
performances (in terms of earnings per share) than did acquired firms, but the 
differences are not significant. Less profitable companies merge with more profitable 
companies. This implies that the take -over discipline is strong for small and low 
profit firms. The take -over threat forces firms to improve their profitability. The 
empirical evidence on the nature of the take -over mechanism as experienced by 
acquired firms supports the traditional theory of the firm. The result of the paired 
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CHAPTER 10 
A COMPARISON OF PRE -TRANSACTION SIZE AND PERFORMANCE 
-- MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
To more accurately determine whether there are differences between two or more 
kinds of firm (i.e, acquired, acquiring or non -transaction) we conduct a multivariate 
test. Such an analysis provides more accurate findings than are possible with a 
univariate comparison, because the residual variance is reduced. With a univariate 
analysis, significant differences among acquired, acquiring and non -transaction firms 
may be obscured by the poor fit of a single explanatory variable model. In this sense, 
univariate results may not shed light on important aspects of the data. For this reason, 
method of multivariate analysis, logistic regression analysis, is carried out in this 
chapter. 
This chapter aims to address the following questions: (1) Do acquired firms differ 
from their acquirers or from non -transaction firms in terms of their size, growth, 
profitability and liquidity? (2) Can the traditional theory of the firm, based as it is on 
profit maximisation, account for the nature of mergers or take -overs? If the theory of 
profit maximisation cannot explain this economic phenomenon, can we identify any 
other hypothesis or theory able to explain the empirical results? 
This chapter is arranged as follows. Previous empirical studies on this topic are 
reviewed in the next section. In the third section I outline why I have chosen to apply 
five logit models as part of the analysis. In the fourth section I use these logit models 
to separately examine differences between acquired and non -acquired firms; between 
acquired and acquiring firms; between acquired and non -transaction firms; and 
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between acquiring and non -transaction firms in terms of their size, growth, 
profitability and liquidity. Finally, in the fifth section I draw some conclusions. 
10.2 REVIEW OF PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
10.2.1 SIZE 
For the UK, Singh (1975)1, Cosh et al. (1989)2, Powell and Thomas (1994)3, Powell 
(1997)4 and, for the US, Harris et al. (1982)5, Dietrich and Sorensen (1984)6, 
Hasbrouck (1985)' and Palepu (1986)8 all concluded that size is an important factor 
that decreases the likelihood of becoming an acquired firm. This means that the 
smaller the firm, the greater the likelihood of its being taken -over. Singh (1975) 
showed that the most important discriminator between acquired and acquiring 
companies during 1967 -70 was size (net assets or gross income). Small companies 
are highly likely to be acquired. He found that smaller firms which increased in size 
could reduce their probability of being acquired. Harris et al. (1982) noted that 
smaller firms are more likely to be acquired. Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) indicated 
that size (market value of the equity) is significant. The probability that a film 
becomes a merger target increases as size decreases. Hasbrouck (1985) concluded 
that size (logarithm of market value of equity) is the most significant characteristic of 
target firms when control groups (non- target firms) are matched by industry. Target 
firms were significantly smaller than non -target firms. Palepu (1986) pointed out that 
size (net book assets) is statistically significant. The smaller a company is, the more 
likely it is to become a target. Cosh et al. (1989) found that size (logarithm of net 
assets) is the most important discriminator between acquired and acquiring firms. 
Acquired firms are significantly smaller than their industry averages and than their 
acquirers. Powell and Thomas (1994) found firm size to be an important variable in 
explaining take -over likelihood; the smaller the size, the higher the likelihood of 
being taken -over. Powell (1997) found that size (logarithm of total assets) is an 
important determinant of take -over likelihood; the smaller the fun, the higher the 
likelihood of take -over. Overall, UK and US empirical studies indicate that size is an 
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important element and the smaller the firm the greater the likelihood of being taken - 
over. Acquiring firms are larger than those acquired. 
10.2.2 PROFITABILITY 
Using UK data, Singh (1975) concluded that changes in profitability and levels of 
profitability are important discriminators in multivariate analyses conducted on data 
covering the period 1967 -70. Acquiring firms are more profitable than those they 
acquire. Using US data, Palepu (1986) showed that average excess returns9 (target 
firms versus non -target firms) are statistically significant indicating that inefficiency 
is likely to increase a firm's probability of becoming a target. However when he used 
accounting returns on equity to replace average excess returns as a proxy for 
management efficiency, this variable was not significant. Cosh et al. (1989) could not 
find evidence to support the hypothesis that acquiring firms have significantly higher 
profitability (pre -tax returns on average net assets) than their acquired firms. Powell 
and Thomas (1994) found that firm profitability is an important variable in 
explaining take -over likelihood. The lower the fine's return on equity, the higher the 
likelihood of being taken -over. Weir (1997)1° found that acquired firms have 
significantly lower profitability (return on capital) than do non -acquired firms. Less 
profitable firms are more likely to become take -over targets. On the whole, acquiring 
firms are more profitable than those they acquire and acquired firms have lower 
profitability than non -acquired firms. 
10.2.3 LIQUIDITY 
Stevens (1973)11 concluded that acquired firms tend to be more liquid than non - 
acquired firms. Harris et al. (1982) found that during 1974 -75 higher liquidity (net 
working capital / assets) increased the possibility of acquisition but in the period 
1976 -77 the effect was reversed and was not statistically significant. Dietrich and 
Sorensen (1984) found that the probability that a firm will become a merger target 
increases as the current ratio increases but it is not significant. Hasbrouck (1985) and 
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Ambrose and Megginson (1992)12 also indicate that target firms are characterised by 
their high liquidity (current financial assets net of current liabilities / market value of 
equity or net liquid assets / total assets) but this trait is not significant. Powell and 
Thomas (1994) found firm liquidity (net liquid assets / total assets) to be an 
important variable in explaining the likelihood of take -over. In contrast to Stevens' 
(1973) findings, they conclude that the lower the liquidity of the firm the higher the 
likelihood of being taken -over. Powell (1997) found that liquidity (cash and 
marketable securities / total assets) and free cash flow (operating cash flow / total 
assets) are important determinants of the likelihood of being taken -over in the 
periods 1984 -1987 and 1988 -1991. The lower the liquidity and the greater the free 
cash flows of the firm, the higher the take -over likelihood is. Generally speaking, 
acquired firms have higher liquidity than non -acquired films but, in some cases, 
possessing low liquidity indicates that a film's operating performance is poor and 
hence it is more open to becoming an acquisition target. 
10.2.4 GROWTH 
Singh (1975) found growth to be an important discriminator between acquired and 
surviving companies in his multivariate analysis. Acquired firms' growth is slower 
than that of surviving fines. Palepu (1986) showed that the coefficient of growth 
(average change in sales) is negative and statistically significant. This indicates that 
acquired firms are distinguished by their slow growth. Cosh et al. (1989) found 
growth (change in net assets) to be an important discriminator between acquired and 
acquiring firms. Acquired firms featured only sluggish growth relative to their 
acquirers. Harris et al. (1982), Ambrose and Megginson (1992) and Powell (1997) all 
found the coefficient of growth (average change in sales) to be negative indicating 
that acquired firms have poorer growth than non -acquired firms, but the difference 
between them is not significant. Overall, previous empirical studies indicate that 
acquired firms grow less readily than do non -acquired or acquiring ones. 
10.3 METHODOLOGY 
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On a univariate basis, during the period 1991 -95 acquiring Taiwanese firms were 
larger in size (total assets and net sales) than both acquired and non -transaction firms 
over the year prior to the transaction. Acquired firms were smaller (total assets and 
net sales) and displayed lower profitability (return on total assets) than acquiring and 
non -transaction firms over the year prior to the transaction. The higher current ratio 
of the acquiring firms indicates that their short-teiiii financial position (liquidity) is 
healthier than that of the non -transaction firms. But high liquidity (i.e. low levels of 
short-term debt) may itself become a motive for take -over. It is useful to ask whether 
the same results hold when a multivariate analysis is conducted. In this section, I 
consider the firm's size (natural logarithm of total assets), profitability (return on 
total assets), and liquidity (current ratio) in the year prior to the transaction. I also 
examine whether the importance of individual variables, when analysed on a 
multivariate basis, differs from their significance as identified by a univariate 
technique. This chapter applies a logistic regression model to identify the relationship 
between the pre- transaction characteristics of Taiwanese enterprises over the period 
1990 to 1995 and the probability of their being involved in a merger or take -over. 
The posterior probability of an event occurring such that the firm will belong to the 
acquired or acquiring film group is estimated as 
Prob(event)i = ezi / (1+ ezi) or Prob(event)i = 1 / (1+ e-z') 
Where Zi= Bo +B1X11 +B2X2i +... +BPXPi +Ei 
This implies that: 
Logit(Y) = ln{ Prob(event) / [1 - Prob(event)] } = Bo + B 1X11 + B2X21 + ... + BPXPi + Ei 
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Bo, B1, ... , Bp are coefficients estimated from financial data. X1i, X2i, ... , Xpi are the 
values of the explanatory variables, E; is the error for case i and e is the base of the 
natural logarithms. 
Five models are considered. The first model includes three independent variables 
(excluding the constant) --size (natural logarithm of total assets), profitability (return 
on total assets) and liquidity (current ratio) --in the initial logistic regression model. I 
chose forced entry as my research method, setting the variables with a probability of 
entry at 0.05 and probability of removal at 0.10. The results detail the estimated 
coefficients, Wald statistic, significance level for the Wald statistic, -2 Log 
Likelihood, Modél Chi -Square, degrees of freedom and number of cases. A positive 
sign on a coefficient indicates that each one -unit increase in the independent variable 
is associated with an increase in logit(Y), and vice versa for negative entries. 
The second model extends the first model to test for the existence of a non -linear 
(curvilinear) relationship between the dependent and independent variables. This 
model encompasses the firm's size, the square of its size, profitability, the square of 
its profitability, liquidity, and the square of its liquidity in the year prior to the 
transaction. I have considered a non- linear relationship because Singh (1975) found 
that the probability of acquisition declines significantly with increases in film size 
but for firms in the smallest size quintile within their own industry, the probability of 
being taken -over within a year is at its lowest. That is to say, that there is a 
curvilinear (non -linear) relationship between the two variables which are not 
identified by the earlier linear analysis. 
Cosh et al. (1989) found that a change in profitability is a significant pre -merger 
characteristic distinguishing acquiring firms from those acquired. Singh (1975) tested 
the important discriminators of acquiring and acquired companies and identified that 
a change in profitability is significant. Palepu (1986) suggested that the coefficient of 
growth is statistically significant in determining the likelihood of being involved in a 
take -over and concludes that targets are characterised by their sluggish growth. 
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Powell (1997) found that size seems to be an important determinant of the likelihood 
of being involved in a take -over; the smaller the firm, the higher the likelihood is of 
being acquired, though he found that growth per se is not significant. 
In view of the findings by Cosh et al., etc., the third model focuses not only on size 
and profitability but also on the change in size (growth) and the change in profitability 
among acquired, acquiring and non -transaction films. The firm's size and profitability 
are calculated for the year prior to the transaction. The firm's growth (the growth 
percentage of total assets in year t -1) and changes in profitability are measured as 
follows: 
Growth in assets= [(TAt_1- TAt_2) /TAt_2], where TAt = total assets in the transaction 
year; and, 
Change in profitability = (ROTAt_1- ROTAt_2), where ROTAI = return on total assets in 
the transaction year. 
We argue that all variables may be expected to be related to the probability that a 
firm may be acquired. Therefore the fourth model includes all the variables. However 
it is possible that high levels of collinearity may exist between these variables. The 
correlation matrix for those variables included in the logistic regressions is presented 
in Table 10 -3 -1. This indicates that a firm's size is strongly and positively correlated 
with the square of firm size (r = 0.997) and that profitability is also highly correlated 
with the square of profitability (r = 0.857). So these two variables, the square of firm 
size and the square of profitability, can be deleted and the results presented as the 
fifth logit model. 
10.4 RESULTS 
10.4.1 ACQUIRED VERSUS NON -ACQUIRED FIRMS 
In the first instance, we may distinguish between acquired firms and non - acquired 
firms. The relationship between the logit and all the independent variables is presented 
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in Table 10 -4 -1. The Model Chi -Square values range from 21.986 to 43.672 with 3 to 
8 degrees of freedom. All the Chi -Square statistics are significant at the 5% level. This 
indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients for all the terms in 
the logistic regression model, except the constant, are zero. We can conclude that 
infounation about the independent variables allows us to make better predictions of 
the dependent variable (the acquired firms) than we could make without the 
independent variables. 
Profitability and change of profitability are statistically significant (at a = 0.05) and 
have a negative sign, indicating that the lower the profitability and change of 
profitability of a firm the more likely it is to be acquired and vice versa, i.e. the greater 
the profitability and change of profitability of a firm the less likely it is to be acquired. 
The coefficient of liquidity (current ratio) is positive but it is significant only in the 
second model. The positive sign of the coefficient for liquidity implies that the greater 
the current ratio the more likely it is that the film will be acquired and vice versa. Size 
is not statistically significant although it has the expected sign, indicating that the 
smaller the firm the more likely it is to be acquired. 
According to the test results in Table 10 -4 -1, profitability and change of profitability 
are important determinants of the likelihood of being involved in a take -over. The 
results indicate that poorer profitability and a smaller change of profitability increases 
the probability of being taken -over. In contrast, small size does not in itself increase 
the probability of being taken -over. This means that less efficient films or firms with 
little market power have a greater likelihood of being acquired. Less profitable 
managers will be replaced by more profitable managers. This implies that take -over 
discipline is strong for low profitability firms and for firms with a small change in 
their profitability but is not so influential for small firms. 
The findings for the liquidity variable suggest that bidding companies prefer to acquire 
firms which have high current assets or low current liabilities. The square of liquidity 
is statistically significant (at a = 0.05) in the second model but has a negative sign, 
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indicating that as a finii's liquidity increases up to a maximum point the logit value 
will also increase, reach a maximum, and then decrease. Using partial derivatives we 
can calculate the inflection (maximum) point as 18.636.13 This indicates that when a 
firm's liquidity increases, so too the likelihood of it being acquired will increase; but 
when a firm's liquidity is very large (e.g. liquid ratio equal to 18.636), the likelihood 
of being acquired decreases. There are a range of possible explanations for this result: 
(1) Firms belonging to the same business or family group. High current ratio finis 
may be controlled by the same business or family group so they are relatively exempt 
from being taken -over. (2) Firms operating outwith the stock market or the active 
market. Firms with comparatively high current ratios are not listed or do not 
participate in an active market so potential bidding firms cannot approach their shares. 
(3) Government regulations or industrial requirements. The government regulates 
banks and other financial institutions which need to hold a high reserve ratio to ensure 
solvency. 
These results are not consistent with the findings of Singh (1975), Palepu (1986), 
Ambrose and Megginson (1992) and Powell (1997). Singh's study indicates that the 
best discriminators during 1967 -70 were change in profitability, level of profitability 
and growth. The coefficient of size (in terms of net book assets) and growth (in terms 
of average sales growth) is statistically significant, but liquidity (in terms of net liquid 
assets / total assets) and return on equity are insignificant in Palepu's study. Ambrose 
and Megginson (1992) showed that there is no significant difference between target 
and non -target films in size (in terms of net book assets), growth (in terms of net sales 
change), average excess return, and liquidity (in terms of net liquid assets / total 
assets). Powell found that size (in Willis of log of total assets) and liquidity (in terms 
of cash and marketable securities / total assets) are important but that prior 
performance (as measured by operating profit / capital employed and market -to -book 
ratio) and growth (in terms of average change in total sales) do not significantly affect 
the take -over likelihood of a firm. 
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The threat of take -over forces firms to improve their profitability and use their current 
asset holdings for profitable investment rather than simply to increase their size. The 
reorganisation or reallocation of capital resources through merger or take -over is one 
of the normal devices of a market economy. More profitable managers replace less 
profitable managers. The empirical evidence as to the nature of the take -over 
mechanism of acquired firms supports the traditional theory of the firm. 
Table 10 -4 -2 shows that 1,477 to 1,837 non -acquired firms were correctly predicted by 
the five models, that is 99.93% to 100 %. Only one to four acquired firms were 
correctly predicted by the models, that is 1.59% to 9.30 %. The results indicate that 
when there are many non - acquired firms (1,478 to 1,838) and very few acquired firms 
(43 to 63), the former's range of size, growth, profitability and liquidity almost 
matches the range of the latter. According to these variables, the models predict that 
all (or all but one) cases are non - acquired firms. Overall, 96.05% to 97.82% of all 
firms were correctly classified. This compares with the proportion which would be 
expected to be correctly classified by chance, Cprop is 92.30% to 95.53 %.14 
10.4.2 ACQUIRED VERSUS ACQUIRING FIRMS 
The next stage of the analysis was to distinguish between acquired and acquiring 
funs. The relationship between them in terms of size, profitability, growth and 
liquidity is presented in Table 10 -4 -3. The coefficients of Chi -Square are from 27.795 
to 39.412 with 3 to 8 degrees of freedom. All the Chi -Square statistics are significant 
at the 5% level and indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
of all of the terms in the logistic regression model, except the constant, are zero. 
Size is statistically significant in the first, third and fifth models and has the expected 
signs, indicating that the smaller the size of a firm the more likely it is to become an 
acquisition target rather than an acquiring firm. The coefficient of profitability has 
the expected sign but is not statistically significant except in the third model where it 
is significant only at a = 0.10. Growth, liquidity and change in profitability are not 
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statistically significant, indicating that they are not important determinants of the 
likelihood of being acquired. 
This result suggests that size is a significant variable distinguishing acquired from 
acquiring firms and is an important consideration in take -overs. A smaller size 
increases a firm's probability of becoming a target rather than an acquiring firm. This 
result is not consistent with Singh's (1975) finding. He found that size, followed by 
change in profitability and level of profitability, were the most important 
discriminators between acquired and acquiring firms. The result is consistent, 
however, with Cosh et al.'s (1989). They found that size was the most important 
discriminator but that profitability was not significant in discriminating between 
acquired and acquiring firms. The traditional theory of the firm assumes that producers 
aim to maximise profits; that a low profitability firm will be replaced by a high 
profitability firm. The empirical evidence from Taiwan about the nature of the take- 
over mechanism of acquired firms does not support this theory. 
The finding that profitability is not a significant discriminator between acquired and 
acquiring firms indicates that acquiring firms' managers are no more efficient than the 
managers of acquired films. It is possible that neither seek to maximise profits for 
their firms before the transaction. 
The results indicate that acquiring films' managers seek to increase their firms' size 
and to just maintain a noimal or slightly improved level of profitability. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)15 considered that a problem with the separation of ownership and 
control arises when the shareholders of a large company assign an agent (a manager), 
who usually owns only a very small proportion of the total number of shares of the 
firm, to run the firm on their behalf. The problem is that the manager's objectives may 
be different from those of the shareholders. Hay and Morris (1991)16 state that, in 
addition to merging inefficient firms, managers may seek other opportunities to 
acquire targets. Managers of acquiring companies not only value the future stream of 
profits which may flow from an acquisition but they also value the assets and sales of 
229 
the target firm which contribute to the well -being of the acquiring firm. Managers are 
interested in conglomerate mergers in particular, because this kind of transaction can 
provide stability of earnings and therefore increase their own job security. It is 
important to emphasise that managers are interested not only in profits but also in their 
own personal security. If two merged firms do not have perfectly correlated returns, 
the variance of the post- merger find's earnings stream will decrease and hence reduce 
this kind of risk. Lewellen (1971)17 also considered that mergers can decrease the risk 
of default because the losses of one fieli can be compensated for by the income of the 
other. 
Whilst the coefficient of profitability is not statistically significant, the square of 
profitability is statistically significant (but only at a = 0.10) and has a positive sign in 
the second model. This indicates that as a firm's profitability increases the logit value 
will decrease, reach a minimum, and then increase. Using partial derivatives we can 
calculate the inflection (minimum) point as the value 0.04428.18 This indicates that 
when a filln's profitability increases, it will decrease the likelihood that it will be 
targeted for acquisition; but once its profitability reaches 0.04428, the likelihood of it 
being an acquired film rather than an acquirer will increase. This result suggests that: 
(1) A low profitability company has a greater likelihood of being acquired. (2) When a 
less efficient company improves its operating performance, the likelihood of it being 
acquired decreases. (3) When a company's profitability increases beyond 4.428 %, the 
likelihood of it being acquired increases. 
Table 10 -4 -4 shows that 88 to 111 acquiring firms were correctly predicted by the five 
models, that is 89.43% to 95.74 %. Similarly, 18 to 28 acquired firms were correctly 
predicted by the models, that is 41.86% to 46.51 %. Overall, 73.86% to 80.29% of all 
films were correctly classified. This compares with a proportion which would be 
expected to be correctly classified by chance (Cprop) of 55.20% to 56.93 %.19 
10.4.3 ACQUIRED VERSUS NON -TRANSACTION FIRMS 
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My analysis also distinguishes between acquired firms and non -transaction films. The 
relationship between being an acquired rather than a non -transaction firm and the 
explanatory variables is presented in Table 10 -4 -5. The coefficients of Chi -Square are 
from 21.406 to 46.929 with 3 to 8 degrees of freedom. All the Chi -Square statistics are 
significant. This indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of 
all of the terms in the logistic regression model, except the constant, are zero. 
Profitability (return on total assets) and change of profitability are statistically 
significant (at a = 0.05) and have a negative sign in all models, indicating that the 
lower the profitability and change of profitability of a firm, the more likely it is to be 
acquired rather thán to be uninvolved in a transaction. The coefficient of liquidity 
(current ratio) has a positive sign and is significant except in the first model. The 
positive sign of the current ratio implies that when the current ratio increases, the 
probability of a firm becoming a take -over target increases. The coefficient of size has 
a negative sign but is not significant. These results are similar to those found for 
acquired and non -acquired firms. They indicate that lower profitability, change of 
profitability and greater liquidity significantly increase the probability of being taken 
over but that firm size does not. 
The discipline of the merger or take -over mechanism forces firms to improve their 
profitability and deploy their current assets in advantageous investments. Take -overs 
appear to restrict the power of managers to pursue their own self- interest at the 
expense of shareholders interests. Managers with inferior operating skills can be 
replaced by managers who will efficiently deploy the firm's resources no matter what 
size it is. This supports the traditional theory of the film, that is, that managers are 
constrained to pursue profit maximisation. 
The coefficient of liquidity (current ratio) has a positive sign and is significant. The 
square of liquidity, is statistically significant in the second model but has a negative 
sign, indicating that as a firm's liquidity increases up to a maximum point the logit 
value will increase, reach a maximum, and then decrease. Using partial derivatives we 
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can calculate that the value of the liquidity ratio at which the probability of being 
acquired is at a maximum is 19.458.20 This indicates that when a firm's liquidity 
increases, so too will its likelihood of being acquired; but when a film's liquidity is 
very large (e.g. liquid ratio above 19.458), the likelihood of being acquired decreases. 
These results suggest that: (1) Less efficient companies or firms with high current 
assets / current liabilities have a greater likelihood of being acquired than have more 
efficient or less liquid firms. (2) When a company increases its current ratio (within a 
realistic range), the likelihood of being acquired increases. (3) When a company's 
liquidity increases beyond the very high level of 19.458, the likelihood of acquisition 
decreases. The most likely interpretation of these results mirror those suggested in 
Section 10.4.1. (á) Firms with a greater current ratio are controlled by the same 
business / family group so they are relatively immune from being taken -over. (b) In the 
case of highly liquid firms which are not listed companies, potential bidding firms 
simply do not have the access to acquire their shares. (c) Government regulations or 
industrial requirements on banks or financial institution demand that they retain 
comparatively high current assets to ensure their solvency. 
Table 10 -4 -6 shows that between 1,382 and 1,743 out of 1,384 and 1,744 non - 
transaction firms respectively were correctly predicted by the five models, i.e. between 
99.86% and 100 %. Only one to six acquired films were correctly predicted by the 
models, that is, 1.59% to 13.95 %. The reason for this is the same as was previously 
mentioned in Table 10 -4 -2. There are so many non -transaction films (1,384 or 1,744) 
and so very few acquired firms (43 or 63), that the former's range of size, growth, 
profitability and liquidity covers almost all those of the latter. Using these variables, 
the models predict that all, or all but one or two, cases are non -acquired firms. Overall, 
95.65% to 97.82% of all firms were correctly classified. This compares with a 
proportion which would be expected to be correctly classified by chance (Cprop) of 
91.67% to 95.30 %.21 
10.4.4 ACQUIRING VERSUS NON -TRANSACTION FIRMS 
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Finally, we distinguish between acquiring and non -transaction firms. The estimated 
relationship between being an acquirer and a non -transaction firm is presented in 
Table 10 -4 -7. The values of Chi -Square range from 48.661 to 98.078 with between 3 
and 8 degrees of freedom. All the Chi -Square statistics are significant. This indicates 
that we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients for all of the terms in the 
logistic regression model, except the constant, are zero. 
As shown in Table 10 -4 -7, size and growth are statistically significant and have a 
positive sign in all models indicating that the greater the size and the faster the 
growth of a firm the more likely it is to become an acquiring firm rather than be 
uninvolved in a tránsaction. The coefficient on profitability is negative (in four out of 
the five models) and not significant except in the second model in which the 
significance level is only at a = 0.10. The coefficient of change in profitability is 
significant and has a negative sign. The negative sign of profitability and change in 
profitability indicates that the profitability of acquirers is lower than that of non - 
transaction firms. Liquidity is statistically significant and has a positive sign, 
indicating that acquiring firms are likely to display a greater current assets / current 
liabilities ratio than do non -transaction firms. 
These results indicate that: (1) Large firms are more likely to merge with or take -over 
another firm. (2) Acquiring firms, on average, enjoy a higher growth rate than do 
non -transaction firms before the merger or take -over. (3) Acquiring firms' managers 
are no more efficient than the managers of non -transaction firm nor do they seek to 
maximise profits for their firms before the transaction. (4) Acquiring firms usually 
process more current assets than do non -transaction firms. This may imply that large 
companies often soak up their excess current assets by acquiring other companies. 
Why do acquiring firms' managers seek to expand their firms' size and growth and 
yet remain content with sustaining ordinary profitability? Hay and Morris (1991)22 
state that if there are too few constraints upon managers, they may only pursue their 
own objectives and this leads to just one merger motive, the `managerial take -over'. 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) consider that a problem arises when the shareholders of 
a large company assign an agent (manager), who usually owns only a very small 
fraction of the firm's shares, to run the company on their behalf but the agent does 
not perform in exactly the way the shareholders would like. This kind of partial 
ownership may cause managers to work less actively and energetically, and their 
objectives may differ from shareholders' desires to pursue profit maximisation. 
Winter (1964)23 has argued that stockholders only have very limited control over the 
choice of senior managers and no direct control at all over the operations of the firm. 
Managing Directors, who have the power to manage the operations of the firm, have 
goals that may transcend the focus on profits. Baumol (1959)24 has claimed that 
managers salaries and security do not depend on their firms' profits but on the growth 
of their sales revenues. A large company's managers may long for prestige and 
perquisites which do not directly or uniquely relate to the film's profits. Marris 
(1964)25 assumed that managers attempt to satisfy instincts of power, dominance and 
prestige by setting growth as their primary objective. 
The empirical evidence is consistent with the view that managers of large companies 
do not regard profit as a goal to be maximised, but as a constraint on their other aims. 
Although a critical level of profit must be demonstrated, managers' priorities are 
attached to maximising growth. Thus, they may deploy a firm's excess cash to 
acquire another company so they can enlarge the firm's size or market share rather 
than holding surplus cash in reserve to achieve maximum profitability. The 
assumption of profit maximisation underpinning the economic theory of the firm 
does not apply to acquiring firms. 
In addition to this issue, a number of other merger motives may be at work. (1) 
Managers aim for power and influence. The larger the film, the more resources the 
manager can use; they can command more staff and exert more influence in their 
industry. Such power and influence may satisfy managers' ambitions, enabling them to 
enjoy increased prestige in the community. (2) Managers need esteem and self - 
actualisation. By controlling a large firm, managers may improve their reputation and 
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social position. After satisfying their physiological needs (salary) and safety needs 
(safe job, fringe benefits and job security) they will aim to satisfy their need for esteem 
(recognition, status and appreciation from others) and for self -actualisation 
(developing their full potential, increasing their competence and becoming better 
people). The needs for esteem and self- actualisation can be met by their demonstrating 
that their companies are growing. (3) Managers must be responsive to their firms' 
shareholders. Shareholders are concerned not only with a firm's earnings and 
dividends but also with its sales and size. Economic and management magazines often 
rank the biggest 500 or 1000 companies according to the criteria of sales or total 
assets. Sales and growth are two of the most important indices of a firm's 
performance. Shareholders' judgement of a manager's skill depends not only on the 
film's earnings but also on its sales and growth. These pressures push the managers of 
large firms towards maintaining noiival profitability and, concurrently, towards 
increasing the firms' size and growth by means of take -overs. This phenomenon of 
acquiring firms' managers attempting to achieve a satisfactory level of profitability yet 
retaining a priority focus on increased size and growth suggests satisficing behaviour 
rather than profit maximising behaviour. 
Size is statistically significant (at a = 0.05) and has a positive sign, indicating that 
being large increases the probability that a fiiiu will be an acquirer rather than 
remaining uninvolved in a transaction. The variable, the square of size, is statistically 
significant (at a = 0.10) and has a negative sign in the fourth model, indicating that as 
a firm's size increases up to a maximum point the logit value will increase, reach a 
maximum and then decrease. Using partial derivatives we can calculate the inflection 
(maximum) point as the value NT$ 11,139,412,000.26 This indicates that when the 
firm's size increases, so too will the likelihood of being an acquirer; but when the 
firm's size is very large (e.g. total assets equal to NT$ 11,139,412,000), the 
likelihood of being an acquiring firm decreases. This result may imply that: (1) The 
needs for power and privilege are not overwhelming. A very large company's 
managers do not need to acquire another firm to increase size and gain greater power 
and privilege. (2) There may be diseconomies of scale. As firm size increases, the 
235 
problems and costs of administration and co- ordination also increase; the growth in 
bureaucracy and agency loss may result in diseconomies of scale. (3) The Fair Trade 
Law forbids certain acquisition activities. If the merged film should hold a market 
share of 33 %, or if one of the firms participating in the combination already holds a 
market share of one fourth, then the Fair Trade Commission does not permit the 
transaction to go ahead.27 So as a firm's size increases, so too will the likelihood of it 
being an acquiring firm; but when the firm's size is already very large, the chances of 
it being an acquirer decrease. 
Table 10 -4 -8 shows that between 1,383 and 1,743 out of 1,384 and 1,744 non - 
transaction firms 'respectively were correctly predicted by the five models, that is 
between 99.93% and 100 %. Only zero to eight acquiring firms were correctly 
predicted by the models, that is 0% to 8.42 %. Overall, 91.71% to 95.16% of all finds 
were correctly classified. This compares with the proportion which would be expected 
to be correctly classified by chance (Cprop) of 84.91% to 90.20 %.28 
10.5 CONCLUSION 
On the whole, the results of the multivariate analyses are supportive of the univariate 
findings. The smaller the profitability and the greater the liquidity of a firm the more 
likely it is to be an acquired firm. The greater the size and liquidity of the firm the 
more likely it is to be an acquiring firm. 
Multivariate analysis offers us a tool for understanding the differences among 
acquired, acquiring and non -transaction firms when an individual variable changes but 
the others remain constant. The traditional theory of the firm assumes that producers 
aim to maximise profits, regardless of whether the market structure is a monopoly or 
perfect competition. Previous empirical studies do not suggest that the take -over 
phenomenon can be statistically explained in terms of the classical model premised 
solely on profit maximisation. 
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In this study, all the Chi -Square statistics are significant at the 5% significance level. 
This indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients for all of the 
terms in the logistic regression model, except the constant, are zero. We conclude 
that information about the independent variables allows us to make better predictions 
of the dependent variable i.e. the acquired firms in the Section 10.4.1, 10.4.2 and 
10.4.3 and the acquiring firms in the Section 10.4.4, than we could make without the 
independent variables. The correct prediction rate in identifying acquired from non - 
acquired or non -transaction firms, or acquiring from non -transaction firms ranges 
from 91.71% to 97.82 %. The highest correct prediction rate for identifying acquired 
from acquiring firms is found in the third model with 80.29% accuracy. 
The results indicate that profitability and change in profitability are important 
variables for discriminating between acquired and non -acquired firms and between 
acquired and non -transaction firms. The results mean that films with lower 
profitability have a significantly increased probability of being taken -over, but that 
smaller firms do not meet a significant increase in the probability of their being 
acquired. This implies that take -over discipline is strong for low profitability firms 
but is not strong for small firms. This result is not consistent with the findings of 
Singh (1975), Palepu (1986), Ambrose and Megginson (1992) or Powell (1997). The 
take -over threat forces firms to improve their profitability rather than to increase their 
size. The reorganisation or reallocation of resources through merger or take -over is 
one of the normal devices of a market economy. The empirical evidence as to the 
nature of the take -over mechanism of acquired firms supports the traditional theory 
of the firm. 
Table 10 -4 -3 shows that size is an important variable for distinguishing between 
acquired and acquiring firms in the first, third and fifth models. This indicates that 
the smaller the firm, the greater the likelihood of being taken -over. This result is not 
consistent with Singh's (1975) finding but is consistent, however, with Cosh et al.'s 
(1989). 
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Size and growth are important variables in distinguishing between acquiring and non - 
transaction firms. Acquiring firms are significantly larger and grow faster than do non - 
transaction firms but their profitability need not differ. This indicates that acquiring 
firms' managers tend to pursue growth rather than profitability. This emphasis on 
growth rather than profit maximisation may enable managers to enjoy greater power 
and influence in the company, to earn social prestige and achieve self -actualisation, 
and to satisfy shareholders' needs. This phenomenon of acquiring firms' managers 
sustaining normal levels of profitability while prioritising growth is evidence of 
satisficing behaviour. 
The second model' extends the first model to test the existence of a non -linear 
(curvilinear) relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The 
results indicate that curvilinear characteristics exist between acquired and non - 
acquired firms and between acquired and non -transaction firms, especially with 
regard to liquidity. This indicates that as a firm's liquidity increases, so too does the 
likelihood of it being acquired. However when a firm's liquidity reaches a large 
value, the likelihood of being acquired decreases. 
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The primary purpose of this study is to advance previous empirical work by means of 
a comprehensive questionnaire survey and by the analysis of financial data relating to 
a large sample of companies involved in mergers and take -overs. The aim is to 
examine merger motives and methods of payment and to compare the pre- and post - 
transaction performance of Taiwanese enterprises. The samples of mergers and 
acquisitions in Taiwan which are analysed in this study are relatively comprehensive 
and are the largest which have ever been collected for academic research. This 
research yields several insights into the motives and effects of mergers and 
acquisitions in Taiwan and the conclusions of this study have much greater validity 
than those found in previous work carried out on Taiwanese mergers. In this chapter, 
a summary of the findings of the research is first presented. This is followed in 
Section 2 by a discussion on the limitations of the research. Finally, Section 3 
presents some suggestions for future research. 
11.1 CONCLUSIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
11.1.1 THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TAIWANESE ACQUIRING 
AND ACQUIRED ENTERPRISES 
1. The industry with the largest number of acquiring firms was Electrical and 
Electronic Machinery, Manufacturing and Repairing. The technologies involved in 
this industry (especially in information and semi -conductor) have advanced very 
quickly in recent years. This sector now needs to develop new technologies, improve 
production processes, increase market power, and improve their managerial 
efficiency in order to meet the demands of international market competition. The 
requirements of high technological development and high market competitiveness 
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may account for why this sector has had the most instances of merger and acquisition 
in Taiwan from 1990 to 1995. 
2. The largest and smallest number of merger and take -overs cases occurred in 1995 
and in 1990 respectively. There has been an upward trend in their frequency in 
Taiwan since 1990. The numbers indicate that mergers and take -overs are growing 
and have considerable significance and importance. 
3. Most merger and acquisition activity in Taiwan occurs within the same business 
group. The major reasons for a high proportion of transactions occurring between 
members of the same business group were ease of negotiation, less managerial 
resistance, similar organisational culture and structure and the management can 
access more and better information to assess and analyse the transaction. 
4. The most common type of transaction was `merger', the combination of two or 
more firms to form a single firm, such that only one of the firms continues to exist 
after the combination. The least common was `consolidation' where two or more 
firms form a single firm, such that all the firms are dissolved with the combination 
and a new company is incorporated instead. Government encouragement (tax 
benefits) and simple and cheap administrative procedures were the primary 
incentives for the acquiring company to choose a merger as the form of transaction. 
Where the acquiring company chooses consolidation as the form of taking over 
another company, both the acquiring and acquired companies need to liquidate their 
assets, repay their debts and close their companies before setting up a new company. 
Consolidation procedures are complicated and administrative costs are very high. 
This is why few companies adopt a consolidation approach. 
5. The most common transaction direction for acquiring and acquired firms was 
horizontal. We argue that this is due to management's familiarity with the 
production, distribution and technology of the partner fiiill, such that they stand to 
gain most from economies on a larger production scale, from increasing market share 
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or market power, and from realising the special tax benefits that accompany the 
merger of small enterprises. 
6. Most transactions were considered friendly because management is usually the 
owning group or the main shareholders. Most acquiring and acquired firms (85.7% 
of the sample) belong to the same business group, and Chinese business culture is 
more at ease with `friendly negotiation' than `hostile competition'. The leveraged 
buy -out or management buy -out is not popular in Taiwan as capital markets and 
money markets are in an early stage of development and government -controlled 
banks are very conservative so they cannot offer the variety of financial instruments 
that facilitate a high level of operating leverage. 
7. Acquiring firms that did not target companies from within the same business 
group had larger mean assets than those which did. The result indicates that where 
the acquiring firm did not have a prior relationship with the target firm, the former 
required considerable assets (cash or stocks) to acquire the latter. In contrast, where 
the acquiring and acquired firms belong to the same business group, the main 
shareholders of both companies are the same so it is easier to agree to the transaction 
and the acquiring firm does not need to have large assets to pursue the merger. 
8. The largest average assets pre- and post- transaction occurred when the `acquisition 
of stock' by the acquiring firm took sizeable financing to purchase the target's shares 
(over 50% of total shares). The average size of acquiring and acquired firms was 
lowest when the transaction was a consolidation. When the acquiring company 
chooses consolidation as the form of taking over another company, the bidding and 
target companies separately need to liquidate their assets, repay their debts and close 
their companies, prior to setting up a new company. After the liquidation, the total 
assets of the consolidated firm are apparently reduced. 
9. The largest average value of assets occurred in congeneric transactions. Horizontal 
transactions are subject to the Fair Trade Law so their scale cannot be very large. The 
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congeneric combination firms belong within the same general industry but they do 
not produce the same type of goods or service so the Fair Trade Commission does 
not forbid their combination. 
10. The mean value of assets of acquiring firms pre- transaction is larger than that for 
acquired films in all directions of transaction. 
11.1.2 THE MOTIVES FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
1. The most important reasons for mergers and acquisitions were reducing 
administrative expenses, combining complementary resources, achieving economies 
of scale and improving financial management efficiency. This indicates that 
operational synergy is a fairly important merger motive for Taiwanese enterprises. The 
results echo those found in previous empirical studies in Taiwan (Huang, 1977; 
Chang, 1980; Wu, Y. C., 1982; Lin, 1990; Wu, A. N., 1992; Yang, 1996). The least 
important motives were acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright technologies, 
controlling material resources, buying below replacement cost, and diversifying risk. 
The results indicate that the economies of vertical integration, buying below 
replacement cost and diversification are not important merger motives for Taiwanese 
enterprises between 1990 and 1995. 
2. This study's relatively large sample and its in -depth analysis resolve some of the 
puzzling features of tax and stock market considerations as they relate to Taiwanese 
enterprises. The findings indicate that the merger motives of either gaining a listing 
on the stock market or tax considerations were very important for only a few 
companies in Taiwan in the 1990s. The majority of firms did not claim the primacy 
of these motives. This confirm previous empirical studies which have indicated that 
tax considerations and/or applying for a listing on the stock market are not 
statistically significant merger motives for Taiwanese enterprises. 
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3. The relative importance of different motives varies with the size of the acquiring 
firms. The four subgroups identified by this study, classified by the size of their total 
assets before the transaction, provide further information about the merger motives of 
differently sized acquiring firms. In brief, aiding operational synergy was a very 
important merger motive for firms of all sizes. Large enterprises were additionally 
motivated to take -over other firms by the market competitiveness and market power. 
4. The motive of increasing corporate debt capacity was more important for small 
acquiring enterprises than for large ones. These results are similar to those found in 
previous studies (Teng and Chen, 1979; Liao, 1985; Liu, 1993; Li, Chen, and Chang, 
1993) i.e. that small acquiring enterprises encounter relatively greater financing 
problems than do large companies. Although the Statute for Development of Medium 
and Small Business is intended to help provide financial facilities, loans and 
guarantees to medium and small businesses, such businesses still face significant 
financial hurdles. This indicates that the Statute for Development of Medium and 
Small Business is not completely successful in meeting its aims. 
5. The government set up five requirements for companies applying for a listing on the 
stock market. The company must be in existence for over five years, paid -in capital 
exceed NT$ 200,000,000, good profitability and capital structure and dispersion of 
shareholdings. The business public believe that if a company can meet the approval 
criteria laid down by the government, then the operating performance of that company 
must be very good. When the company issues its shares on the stock market, the share 
value increases quickly. 
6. Where both the acquiring and acquired firm belong to the same business group, the 
acquiring firm is significantly motivated by the wish to achieve operating synergy, to 
realise tax advantages, to use free cash flow and to improve management efficiencies. 
The results indicate that when firms belong to the same business group, they may have 
access to more and better information to accurately assess the merger's advantages. If 
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they find the transaction is beneficial for themselves and/or their target, they go ahead 
with the deal. 
7. The merger motives underpinning horizontal transactions are mainly to achieve 
operational and financial synergies, to increase market power and to improve 
management efficiency. The goals behind vertical transactions are the desire to gain 
operational and financial synergies, to apply for a listing on the stock market, to realise 
tax advantages and to improve management efficiency. In congeneric transactions, 
firms are chiefly motivated by an aspiration for operational synergy, market power and 
improved purchasing management efficiency. Risk diversification was of overriding 
importance as a motive for conglomerate transactions between 1990 and 1995. 
8. When the total pre- transaction assets of acquiring enterprises are larger, the merger 
motives of applying for a listing on the stock market is of greatest importance. This 
finding verifies the hypothesis of many Taiwanese economists and managers and 
resolves the puzzle that large films merge with others so as to gamer sufficient capital 
stock (i.e. at least NT$ 200,000,000) to enable the combined find to apply for a listing 
on the stock market. When the total pre- transaction assets of acquiring enterprises are 
smaller, the motives of resolving financial difficulties, increasing corporate debt 
capacity or financing and improving marketing management efficiency assumes 
dominance. This indicates that the merger motives of the smaller acquiring firms focus 
on improving financial and operational problems. 
9. The greater the increase in assets after a merger or acquisition the more important 
are the motives of economies of scale, reducing administrative expense and 
application for a listing on the stock market. A large increase in the assets of the 
acquiring firm after a merger or acquisition also verifies the hypothesis that applying 
for a listing on the stock market is sometimes extremely relevant and sometimes 
immaterial, depending on the acquiring firm's asset size. 
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10. Using factor analysis we conclude that improving management efficiency, market 
control and new product introduction, finance and stock market considerations are 
important factors which affect acquisition decisions. These factors were not consistent 
with Fang's (1990), Lin's (1990) and Yang's (1996) results. 
11.1.3 THE MAIN METHOD OF PAYMENT FOR MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS 
1. Payment is made either by means of a cash offer or by an exchange of shares 
depending on three considerations. The first is tax and government regulations. The 
second is the future prospects of the acquiring enterprise as perceived by the acquired 
firm's shareholders. The third is the level of activity of the stock market. If a 
transaction involves equity securities, capital gains taxes may be deferred until the new 
securities are sold, while for cash transactions, all relevant income tax must be paid in 
the year of the transaction (Article 14 of Income Tax Law). Under Taiwan's tax code, 
if the acquiring firm pays by means of a cash offer, it can increase the tax basis of the 
acquired firm's assets to its fair market value and levy depreciation charges on this new 
basis. This step -up generates higher tax -deductible depreciation allowances which are 
not available for all -stock bids. The interest payments on the debt can be deducted 
from the enterprise's income tax (Article 30 of Income Tax Law). Acquiring firms' 
management use cash when they believe that the stock of their fiiiii is undervalued 
relative to its perceived value (Hansen, 1987; and Brown and Ryngaert, 1989). The 
stock market entered a bull phase in 1988 in Taiwan, the acquired enterprise's 
shareholders may prefer to accept stock and the acquiring firm can afford to haggle 
over the amount of stock it offers. 
2. The average pre- transaction assets of acquiring films which use common stock as 
the main method of payment were significantly greater than those of acquirers which 
use cash from reserves. This finding may imply that the dispersal of shares in large 
funs may already be substantial such that the acquiring fine's managers are not afraid 
to issue new shares to the acquired firm and the acquired enterprise's shareholders 
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perceive or predict that the large acquiring enterprise may offer their own company 
better future prospects. If the acquiring firm uses cash from reserves as the main 
payment method, then, as cash availability is limited, so the bidding firm tends to be 
relatively small. 
3. The average change in assets of acquiring firms using common stock as the main 
method of payment was significantly greater than that of acquiring films which use 
mainly cash from reserves or cash from borrowings. It indicates that the government - 
controlled banks in Taiwan do not like to offer substantial funding to acquiring firms to 
buy relatively large firms in order to avoid assuming too much risk. Accordingly, 
acquiring firms can only use a limited amount of cash from borrowings in order to 
merge with a smaller target. This also suggests that issuing common stock through the 
original shareholders or inviting the public to subscribe to shares is an important means 
of increasing a film's total assets. This implies that the exchange of common stock 
offers greater funds to the acquiring firm in the acquisition of a new firm than does a 
cash offer. 
4. There is a significant negative association between acquiring enterprises paying 
with cash from reserves and their using book value to estimate the worth of their 
acquired enterprises. However, there was a significant positive association between the 
use of cash (reserves or borrowings) to pay for the acquisition and the use of 
replacement cost and cash flow values to estimate the worth of the acquired enterprise. 
A book value estimation suggests an apparent underestimation of the value of the 
acquired firm such that a target firm's shareholders are not likely to accept the cash 
offer. In contrast, replacement cost or cash flow value estimation method are more 
accurate indication of acquired firm's value. In these circumstances, banks are highly 
likely to offer funds to bidders and the target firm's shareholders are more likely to 
accept the cash offer. 
11.1.4 POST -TRANSACTION PERFORMANCE 
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1. In general, the post- transaction performances of acquiring firms are superior to their 
pre- transaction performances. It indicates that mergers and acquisitions can improve 
the acquired firm's efficiency and/or operational or financial synergy offer advantages 
to the combined firm. On average, large and medium -sized acquiring enterprises 
achieve greater increases in their post- transaction operational and financial 
perfouuiance than do small and small- medium sized acquiring enterprises. These 
results are similar to those found in a previous empirical study of Taiwan (Lin, 1990). 
Most of the mergers and acquisitions in Taiwan are horizontal so large enterprises are 
more likely than other types of merger to yield operational synergy. Large enterprises 
have greater capital so they are comparatively easy to enlarge their production scale 
and ensure more earnings per dollar of investment. In the case of financial synergy, 
large enterprises have better goodwill and credit so they find it comparatively easy to 
raise funds and increase their debt capacity, and even to gain lower interest rates from 
banks or the money market. 
2. If firms do not belong to the same business group, acquiring fi 1 I achieve better 
perceived perfoiniance improvement after the transaction than those which belong to 
the same business group. Lin (1990) found a similar result but it was not statistically 
significant. If acquiring and acquired firms do not belong to the same business group, 
the acquiring firm is better able to replace inefficient managers, lay off unnecessary 
employees, and increase the market power after the transaction. The acquiring firm 
also needs to present its plans to its shareholders, bank or money market to obtain the 
funds and to explain why the proposed transaction might improve its operating 
performance and increase its profits. If the acquiring film can raise the finance from 
the shareholders, bank or money market, this indicates that all the parties believe in 
the reliability and profitability of this transaction. These careful preparations and 
considerations mean that the acquiring firm has a better chance of achieving its goal 
and of improving its post- transaction performance. 
3. Horizontal post- transaction performance improvements are more marked than are 
found with transactions of other types amongst Taiwanese enterprises. This finding is 
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similar to that found in previous empirical studies in Taiwan (Fang, 1990; Yang, 
1996). Firms engaged in a horizontal transaction may produce the same products or 
offer the same services. It is easier for such firms to increase their sales or enlarge 
their services, to take advantage of economies of scale and to grab greater market 
share or market power than conglomerate or vertical transactions. The horizontal 
transaction firnu's management are familiar with the same products, distribution 
channels, production techniques and organisational characteristics. These managers 
are more likely to be able to exploit these advantages to improve their firms' levels of 
profit and profit rates than are the management of other transactions' films. 
4. Applying for a- listing on the stock market is an important motive for Taiwanese 
enterprises pursuit of merger and take -over. Such a listing can improve a firm's image 
and upgrade its public reputation. It becomes much easier to get debt financing and to 
qualify for cheaper borrowing rates. This will significantly increase the firm's sales, 
profits and income and result in better earnings and returns after the transaction. 
5. Asset valuation was the greatest transaction process problem for acquiring films in 
Taiwanese mergers and acquisitions. This result is consistent with Lin's (1990) 
conclusion. The value of a firm depends not only upon its cash flow amounts, but 
also upon the operating and financial characteristics of the acquiring firm. As a 
result, no single value exists for a firm. If acquiring firms did not have or just had a 
little asset valuation problem during the transaction process, they enjoyed 
significantly better post- transaction dividends per share than those of acquiring firms 
which had a serious asset valuation problem. The results are consistent with 
overestimation of acquired films' asset values which significantly increase an 
acquiring firm's expenditure, decrease its earnings and then further affect its 
shareholders' dividends per share after the transaction. 
6. The findings indicate that if an acquiring firm has serious or very serious contingent 
loss problems during the transaction process, the loss costs the acquiring firm dearly, 
250 
deeply damages the company's earnings and further reduces its earnings per share, 
dividends per share and returns on total assets after the transaction. 
7. Personnel arrangements pose a considerable difficulty in Taiwanese mergers and 
acquisitions. If an acquiring firm cannot appropriately deploy its personnel, this may 
significantly damage employee or managers' morale, undermine personal or 
departmental communication or co- operation, lessen the company's operating 
efficiency and finally result in a drop in the firm's earnings, dividends and returns. 
The results indicate that personnel arrangements are an important issue in Taiwanese 
enterprises' mergers and acquisitions. 
8. If acquiring firms encounter none or few problems with litigation during the 
transaction process, they have significantly better post- transaction net sales than 
acquiring firms which report serious difficulties in these areas. The result indicates 
that litigation problems significantly influence an acquiring firm's ability to manage 
its affairs, and to operate efficiency without distraction or tarnishing its reputation, all 
of which may affect its net sales. 
9. The variable control of distribution channels is significant for profit levels and 
profit rates suggesting that the more control of distribution channels drives the motive 
to merge, the more likely it is that the acquiring firm will enjoy an improved post - 
transaction performance. When the acquiring firm shares its distribution channels with 
the target or increases them as an outcome of the merger, it can share the acquired 
firm's original distributors and customers to increase its net sales, get more quantity 
discounts from its suppliers, reduce any duplicate personnel, offices, equipment and 
inventory to decrease its costs and expenses after the transaction. Therefore, it is more 
likely to increase the acquiring firm's incomes, earnings and returns after the 
transaction. 
10. The more important the merger motive of reducing administration expenses, the 
more likely it is that the acquiring firm's post -transaction performance improves. The 
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findings indicate that reducing administrative costs can not only result from effectively 
downsizing the combined company by decreasing duplicate or inefficient employees, 
office space and equipment, but can also increase the flexibility and adaptability of the 
organisation and improve personnel morale and performance, and so increase the 
firm's sales, income and earnings. 
11. The tests showed that the more important is the motive of economies of scale, the 
more likely it is that the net income post- transaction performance of the acquiring firm 
surpasses its pre- transaction level. This is consistent with our hypothesis that large 
firms can arrange for the specialisation of labour or equipment which can increase 
productivity; the average cost of producing a commodity decreases as its output is 
increased; affording the overhead of research and development which may improve 
the quality of established products; getting quantity discounts from their suppliers; 
having better goodwill and credit so they find it relatively easy to raise funds and even 
to acquire lower rates from banks or the money market. 
12. Gaining rapid entry into new markets or industries significantly affects post - 
transaction net sales performance indicating that if a firm lacks the know -how to 
develop new products or does not have appropriate distribution channels to access 
different markets, mergers can often provide a rapid and safe way of entering new 
markets or industries. Through the merger, the acquiring firm can better deploy its 
production technology and its important distribution channels to increase its sales after 
the transaction. 
13. The more important the motive of increased market power the more likely it is that 
the acquiring firm will enjoy superior net sales, gross profits, and price /earning ratio 
performance after the transaction. The results are consistent with the conclusions of 
Singh and Montgomery (1987) and Seth (1990) who found that increased market 
power can earn super normal profits. A firm can increase its market share after a 
horizontal merger. This result indicates that the combined firm can exercise its 
influence over the price and output in a particular market. Samuels et al. (1994) 
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mention that the higher the level of concentration in an industry, the greater are the 
levels of profit. If a finii can dictate the conditions of the sale of its product, has the 
ability to act as a price leader, can deter other films' entry, or is able to make 
persistently super -normal profits, then it is highly likely to increase its sales, profits 
and its price /earning ratio performance after the transaction. 
14. The results suggest that the less important acquiring brand marks, patents or 
copyright technologies and combining complementary resources are as merger 
motives, the more likely it is that the acquiring firm will achieve a superior post - 
transaction operating income performance. This is counter to our expectation. The 
results indicate that when the acquiring firm wishes to exploit the brand marks, 
patents or copyright technologies of the acquired film, it does not achieve its expected 
gains. Sales and administrative expenses and/or research and development costs may 
increase rather than decrease and so result in poorer operating incomes. The same 
outcome may be experienced by the acquiring firm when its motive is to combine 
complementary resources but it cannot achieve its expected goal. This may result 
from an over -optimism in evaluating the merger's advantages and/or an 
overestimation of the value of the brand marks, patents or copyright technologies and 
of combining complementary resources. Roll (1986) points out that if there are no 
gains in acquisition, hubris provides an explanation as to why managers do not 
abandon these acquisitions or reflect on why their bids' valuation are wrong. The 
managers of acquiring firms using cash flow for acquisition commit an over- 
optimistic error in assessing the merger opportunity due to excessive pride or hubris. 
15. Government encouragement or support is an important factor which can encourage 
companies to merge or consolidate (exempt from all income tax, stamp tax and deed 
tax and with a deferment of the land -value increment tax); to purchase new 
instruments, machinery and equipment (for exclusive use in research and 
development, energy saving, or to meet the requirements for adjusting the industrial 
structure which may be accelerated depreciation by two years or by one half of the 
number of years of the service life of the fixed assets); to backdate net operating losses 
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(the combined firm can absorb the acquiring firm's net operating losses backward to 
five years) and to apply for a listing on the stock market. These government 
encouragements are more likely to decrease the acquiring firm's expenses, increase 
dividends per share and returns on total assets after the transaction. 
16. We find that the more important is the motive of buying below replacement cost, 
the less likely is improved post- transaction net sales and gross profits perfoimance. 
This is consistent with managers preferring to spend surplus cash flow on unjustified 
mergers, based on cheap replacement assets, rather than distribute the cash to the 
firm's shareholders, because they are primarily motivated to increase the size of their 
firms (Mueller, 1969). Jensen (1986) observes that the difference of objective between 
shareholders and managers is an agency problem. In this situation, the managers are 
more likely to overestimate the merger's advantages and/or to underestimate its 
disadvantages. 
17. We find that when the acquiring firm, through a vertical merger, tries to control its 
material resources, the product scale of the material may not result in economies of 
scale and the firm may suffer huge inventory losses and interest expenses. It may also 
imply that the merger fails due to a culture clash between the two companies or that 
the operating performance of the acquired fiiiu will fail to reach the acquiring firm's 
original superior standard so it is more likely to decrease the acquiring firm's net 
income, earnings and returns after the transaction. 
18. If an acquiring firm borrows cash from the bank as its main payment method for 
the acquisition, it is more likely to improve its operating income, net income and 
earnings per share after the transaction. The possible explanations for this might be: 
(1) the interest expenses are deductible from a company's earnings. (2) following a 
presentation of plans to the shareholders or bank and their approval of the scheme, it is 
not only the acquiring firm's managers who believe in the transaction but the 
shareholders and bankers also have faith in its reliability and profitability. These 
deductible interest expenses and deliberate preparations and considerations increase 
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the chances that the acquiring firm will achieve its goal of better incomes and earnings 
per share after the transaction. This conclusion is similar to those conclusions of 
Wansley et al. (1983) who find that cash offers yield higher abnormal returns than do 
stock offers after the transaction. Myers and Majluf (1984) consider that the method of 
financing an investment implies certain tacit information. When the acquiring 
uses debt to finance a new investment, it may imply that the bidding managers 
consider their common stock to be undervalued and this can cause the returns to 
bidders to be positive. 
19. The study shows that when an acquiring film uses replacement cost value as the 
method of valuing its target, it increases the likelihood of higher earnings per share 
and dividends per share after the transaction. This may indicate that when the 
acquiring firm uses replacement cost value, i.e. assets are valued at their current cost 
instead of their historical cost, to value the acquired firm, the acquiring firm can 
benefit from the relatively high depreciation of the acquired film's assets. The 
acquiring filar can enlarge the tax basis of the target film's assets to their fair market 
value and take advantage of depreciation charges through this method. The expansion 
of the tax basis of the target's assets may release a greater cash flow and result in an 
increase of the acquiring firm's earnings and dividends after the transaction. 
20. We also conclude that if the acquiring firm has a better net sales pre- transaction 
perfotivance relative to that of the acquired firm, the profit rate of the acquiring firm 
will increase. The explanation for this is that the more efficient managers of the 
acquiring firm will deploy their extra managerial resources to the acquired firm after 
the transaction, such that the acquired film's operational perfouuance will improve 
and the combined firm will yield a superior post- transaction operating income 
perfoituance. 
21. If an acquiring filar does not encounter customer drain problem in the transaction 
process or if the problem is slight, the probability of an improved operating income 
perfoituance after the transaction increases. One explanation for this is that the firm 
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does not need to spend heavily on advertising to promote its ideas, goods or services 
to keep its customers and this increases the probability of a better post- transaction 
operating income performance. 
22. If an acquiring firm meets a serious government regulation problem in the 
transaction process, the probability of the firm having a superior net sales and 
operating income post- transaction performance is increased. This is consistent with the 
argument that if an acquiring firm needs to comply with government regulations to 
apply for a listing on the stock market, to enjoy a tax exemption or deferment (merger 
or consolidation), to gain from accelerated depreciation and to earn tax credit (the 
combined firm can absorb the acquiring firm's net operating loss backwards for up to 
five years), etc., and can finally conform with these regulations' requirements, then it 
can enjoy tax benefits or listing advantages. These changes, in turn, improve the firm's 
public image and reputation and are more likely to lead to better net sales and 
operating incomes after the transaction. 
11.1.5 PRE -TRANSACTION SIZE AND PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 
1. The results of logit analysis indicate that profitability and changes in profitability 
are important variables for discriminating between acquired and non -acquired firms. 
The findings mean that firms with lower profitability have a significantly increased 
probability of being taken -over, but that smaller firms do not see a significant increase 
in the likelihood of being acquired. This implies that take -over discipline is strong for 
low profitability firms but is not strong for small firms. The take -over threat forces 
firms to improve their profitability rather than to increase their size. The empirical 
evidence as to the nature of the take -over mechanism of acquired films supports the 
traditional theory of the firm. 
2. The findings of multivariate analysis suggest that size is a significant variable in 
identifying acquired from acquiring firms and is an important consideration in 
predicting take -over activity. Smaller size increases a firm's probability of becoming a 
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target rather than an acquiring firm. This result is not consistent with Singh's (1975) 
findings but is consistent, however, with Cosh et al.'s study (1989). 
3. Size and growth are important variables in distinguishing between acquiring and 
non -transaction firms. Acquiring firms are larger and grow faster than do non - 
transaction finds although their profitability is not noticeably different. This indicates 
that an acquiring firm's managers tend to pursue growth rather than profitability. This, 
in turn, may imply that the managers of acquiring firms prefer to garner greater power 
and influence in the company; to earn social prestige; to achieve self -actualisation; and 
to satisfy shareholders' needs rather than to increase profits. This phenomenon of 
managerial behaviour whereby they attempt to achieve a noiiiial level of profitability 
but prioritise their companies' size and growth rate resembles the satisficing behaviour 
identified by organisational theorists such as Marris (1964) and Baumol (1959). 
4. The findings indicate that as a firm's liquidity increases, the likelihood of it being 
targeted for acquisition increases, but when a firm's liquidity becomes sufficiently 
great, the likelihood of it being acquired starts to diminish. The possible explanations 
for this result: (1) high current ratio firms may be controlled by the same business or 
family group so they are relatively exempt from being taken -over. (2) firms with 
comparatively high current ratios are not listed or do not participate in an active 
market so potential bidding firms cannot approach their shares. (3) the government 
regulates banks and other financial institutions which need to hold a high reserve 
ratio to ensure solvency. 
11.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
There are a number of limitations which must be borne in mind when interpreting the 
results. 
1. The limitation of data resources. 
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It is very difficult to collect merger cases from any source other than the government. 
The government could only identify 3 merger cases which were transacted prior to 
1990. The private data centre which I accessed only collects limited data (e.g. publicly 
issued companies' financial statements) and, except for large and important cases, 
newspapers do not report merger events. In consequence we are restricted to 1990- 
1995 as our study period. 
2. Very few listed companies. 
There were only 17 transactions involving listed companies in Taiwan over the 
period 1990 to 1995. This is too small a sample to permit generalisations about the 
effects of mergers and acquisitions in Taiwan, so no further analysis of the listed 
companies' data has been carried out. 
3. The limitations of questionnaires and their related measurement scales. 
Owing to the difficulty of collecting financial statements and of teasing out the 
relevant merger information from available financial data, postal questionnaires were 
used as the primary research instrument. This method carries its own hazards. For 
example, some questions, such as the importance of merger motives, are posed along 
an ordinal scale. Respondents may differ in their personal assessment as to where they 
position themselves along that scale, and the comparability of their responses may be 
somewhat compromised. Thus, questionnaire uses five rather than seven or nine rating 
scales to make clear the appropriate position so as to reduce the bias or misjudgement. 
4. The limitations and weakness of financial data. 
The financial data for the study was collected from the Joint Credit Information 
Centre (JCIC) in Taiwan in August 1997. The JCIC is organised by all the banks 
which operate in Taipei city, i.e. it is a quasi -official organisation, which collates and 
distributes shared information. In general, JCIC only returns that information to its 
members. The quality of JCIC's data is relatively reliable but there are gaps for it does 
not include data relating to companies with less than NT $ 50 or 30 million capital or 
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to those which have not borrowed money from the banks. So these data do not include 
small acquiring and acquired firms. 
5. Industry based comparisons. 
Different industries display varying merger motives and specific operational and 
financial characteristics. There were few acquisitions in Taiwan between 1990 and 
1995. My 245 mergers and acquisitions cases range over 40 industries, but over 60% 
of these industries experienced five or fewer mergers in their sector over the period of 
my study. Hence, I have not attempted to classify my findings in terms of sectoral 
comparisons. 
11.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. To further understand how the characteristics of different industries affect mergers 
and acquisitions, it is necessary to conduct an industry -based comparison and analysis. 
2. Questionnaires have many advantages over considering purely financial statements 
to learn about transaction motives. But in a small number of cases they may elicit 
answers which are not correct. If it was possible to collect the financial statements of 
all firms involved in mergers and acquisitions, the data could provide an interesting 
alternative basis for analysing mergers and take -overs. 
3. Considering the requirements of industrial development and market competition, 
many large Taiwanese companies or business groups tend to want to acquire overseas 
enterprises. Even though there are few of these at present, this trend deserves to be 
observed and analysed. 
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1990 8 4 12 
1991 8 21 3 32 
1992 22 15 12 6 55 
1993 20 38 12 2 72 
1994 47 49 6 9 111 
1995 51 45 20 1 117 
Subtotal 148 147 79 25 399 
* There are 68 duplicate cases among government departments. 
Sources: (1) Department of Commerce, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC 
(2) Bureau of Industrial Affairs, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC 
(3) Securities and Exchange Commission, Ministry of Finance, ROC 
(4) Taiwan Economic Journal Databank, Business Enterprises' 
Prospectuses /Annual Reports & Others 
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Table 3 -2 -1 Acquiring Enterprise's Standard Industrial Classification of Identified and Respondent Firms 







Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Hunting 1 2 .7 1 .4 
Fishing 3 3 1.1 3 1.2 
Quarrying 9 1 .4 1 .4 
Food Products Manufacturing 11 18 6.3 16 6.5 
Textile Industry 13 13 4.6 13 5.3 
Wearing Apparel & Accessories Manufacturing 14 2 .7 2 .8 
Leather & Fur Products Manufacturing 15 4 1.4 3 1.2 
Wood Bamboo Products Manufacturing 16 1 .4 1 .4 
Non -Metallic Furniture and Fixture Manufacturing 17 1 .4 1 .4 
Pulp, Paper & Paper Products Manufacturing 18 3 1.1 3 1.2 
Printing Processings 19 3 1.1 3 1.2 
Chemical Materials Manufacturing 21 6 2.1 6 2.4 
Chemical Products Manufacturing 22 13 4.6 13 5.3 
Plastic Products Manufacturing 25 10 3.5 8 3.3 
Non -Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing 26 7 2.5 6 2.4 
Basic Metal Industries 27 13 4.6 11 4.5 
Fabricated Metal Products Manufacturing 28 8 2.8 6 2.4 
Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing and Repairing 29 11 3.9 11 4.5 
Electrical & Electronic Machinery Manufacturing and 
Repairing 31 53 18.6 43 17.6 
Transport Equipment Manufacturing and Repairing 32 2 .7 2 .8 
Precision Instruments Manufacturing 33 2 .7 2 .8 
Miscellaneous Industrial Products Manufacturing 39 2 .7 2 .8 
Electric Power Supply 41 0 0 0 0 
Infrastructure Construction 45 2 .7 1 .4 
Building Construction 46 10 3.5 7 2.9 
Other Construction 49 0 0 0 0 
Wholesale Trade 52 3 1.1 0 0 
Retail Trade 55 9 3.2 9 3.7 
General Retail Trade 56 2 .7 2 .8 
International Trade 57 14 4.9 12 4.9 
Transport 61 6 2.1 6 2.4 
Storage and Warehousing 62 0 0 0 0 
Financing 65 6 2.1 4 1.6 
Securities & Futures 66 30 10.5 26 10.6 
Real Estate 68 3 1.1 0 0 
Architectural Services 72 1 .4 1 .4 
Consultation Services 74 5 1.8 5 2.0 
Data Processing & Information Services 75 1 .4 1 .4 
Advertising Services 76 1 .4 1 .4 
Designing Services 77 1 .4 1 .4 
Rental & Leasing Services 78 2 .7 2 .8 
Other Business Services 79 1 .4 1 .4 
Sanitary and Pollution Controlling Services 81 4 1.4 4 1.6 
Publishing 83 2 .7 2 .8 
Entertainments 87 1 .4 1 .4 
Hotel, Camps and Other Lodging Places 88 2 .7 0 0 
Missing data 2 .7 2 .8 
Total 286 100.0 245 100.0 
Source: Questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May --July 1996 
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Mining and Quarrying 
6 5 5.13 -.13 
Manufacturing 172 152 147.17 4.83 
Construction 12 8 10.27 -2.27 
Commerce 28 23 23.96 -.96 
Transport and 
Communication 
6 6 5.13 .87 
Financing, Insurance and 
Real Estate 
38 30 32.51 -2.51 
Business Services and 
Others 
22 19 18.82 .18 
Total 284 243 243.00 
Chi -Square 1.0433 
Sources: 
D.F. 6 Significance .9839 
(1)Questionnaire Survey in Taiwan, May --July 1996 
(2)Department of Commerce, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC 
(3)Bureau of Industrial Affairs, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC 
(4)Securities and Exchange Commission, Ministry of Finance, ROC 
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Mining and Quarrying 
8 6 6.71 -.71 
Manufacturing 164 142 137.64 4.36 
Construction 10 6 8.39 -2.39 
Commerce 25 21 20.98 .02 
Transport and 
Communication 
6 6 5.04 .96 
Financing, Insurance and 
Real Estate 
55 43 46.16 -3.16 
Business Services and 
Others 
12 11 10.07 .93 
Total 280 235 235.00 
Chi -Square 1.3828 
Sources: 
(1)Questionnaire Survey in Taiwan, May --July 1996 
(2)Department of Commerce, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC 
(3)Bureau of Industrial Affairs, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC 
(4)Securities and Exchange Commission, Ministry of Finance, ROC 
D.F. 6 Significance .9669 
263 
Table 3 -2 -4 The Number of Business Units in Taiwan in 1995 --bv Indus 





Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Hunting 1 1,486 .15 
Fishing 3 14,833 1.50 
Quarrying 9 1,578 .16 
Food Products Manufacturing 11 18,097 1.82 
Textile Industry 13 7,332 .74 
Wearing Apparel & Accessories Manufacturing 14 3,841 .39 
Leather & Fur Products Manufacturing 15 1,135 .11 
Wood Bamboo Products Manufacturing 16 4,811 .48 
Non -Metallic Furniture and Fixture Manufacturing 17 2,176 .22 
Pulp, Paper & Paper Products Manufacturing 18 3,271 .33 
Printing Processings 19 7,650 .77 
Chemical Materials Manufacturing 21 1,566 .16 
Chemical Products Manufacturing 22 2,086 .21 
Plastic Products Manufacturing 25 13,166 1.32 
Non -Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing 26 4,554 .46 
Basic Metal Industries 27 7,823 .79 
Fabricated Metal Products Manufacturing 28 38,023 3.82 
Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing and Repairing 29 13,421 1.35 
Electrical & Electronic Machinery Manufacturing and 
Repairing 31 11,617 1.17 
Transport Equipment Manufacturing and Repairing 32 5,135 .52 
Precision Instruments Manufacturing 33 1,521 .15 
Miscellaneous Industrial Products Manufacturing 39 6,155 .62 
Electric Power Supply 41 574 .06 
Infrastructure Construction 45 16,441 1.65 
Building Construction 46 3,925 .39 
Other Construction 49 9,705 .98 
Wholesale Trade 52 110,415 11.10 
Retail Trade 55 377,108 37.93 
General Retail Trade 56 7,623 .77 
International Trade 57 46,767 4.70 
Transport 61 36,168 3.64 
Storage and Warehousing 62 638 .06 
Financing 65 5,742 .58 
Securities & Futures 66 864 .09 
Real Estate 68 16,572 1.67 
Architectural Services 72 190 .02 
Consultation Services 74 6,635 .67 
Data Processing & Information Services 75 2,870 .29 
Advertising Services 76 8,026 .81 
Designing Services 77 2,408 .24 
Rental & Leasing Services 78 7,766 .78 
Other Business Services 79 3,760 .38 
Sanitary and Pollution Controlling Services 81 3,544 .36 
Publishing 83 2,263 .23 
Entertainments 87 11,138 1.12 
Hotel, Camps and Other Lodging Places 88 3,718 .37 
Others 138,168 13.90 
Total 994,305 100 
Source: Monthly Statistics of Finance of The Republic of China, April 1996 
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1982 27 29 12 21 
1983 27 29 12 22 
1984 27 28 12 22 
1985 27 29 10 23 
1986 28 29 10 23 
1987 28 29 10 22 
1988 102 29 18 30 
1989 247 28 32 41 
1990 373 30 50 60 
1991 347 68 55 61 
1992 331 88 54 61 
Source: The major index of securities exchange market, April 1992 
I `a securities brokers' for a securities firm which operates the business specified in item 3 (securities 
brokerage or commission agency) of the preceding Article (Article 16 of Securities and Exchange 
Law). 
2 `a securities dealers' for a securities firm which operates the business specified in item 2 (securities 
dealings) of the preceding Article (Article 16 of Securities and Exchange Law). 
3 `a securities underwriters' for a securities firm which operates the business specified in item 1 
(securities underwriting) of the preceding Article (Article 16 of Securities and Exchange Law). 
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1976 77 27 145,941 327.20 
1981 107 54 209,217 551.03 
1986 130 182 675,656 1,039.11 
1987 771,861 141 199 2,663,633 2,135.03 
1988 793,439 163 226 7,868,024 5,202.21 
1989 816,488 181 319 25,407,963 8,616.14 
1990 828,834 199 571 19,031,282 6,775.32 
1991 863,664 221 726 9,682,738 4,928.83 
1992 909,236 256 814 5,917,078 4,271.63 
1993 943,232 285 863 9,056,717 4,214.78 
1994 975,549 313 931 18,812,112 6,252.99 
1995 994,305 347 1040 10,151,536 5,543.75 
Source: Monthly Statistics of Finance of The Republic of China, April 1996 
Monthly Statistics of the Republic of China, June 1997. 
*An issuer of securities publicly issued under this Law may file an application with a 
stock exchange for listing. (Article 139 of Securities and Exchange Law) 
* *A company shall apply to have its shares offered to the public if its authorised 
capital exceeds a certain amount (NT$ 200 million) as prescribed by the competent 
authority provided. (Article 156 of Company Law) 
Sterling Pound: New Taiwan Dollar = 1: 42 (1995) 
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Table 3 -3 -1 Respondent and Expected Cases for Transaction Year 







1990 12 12 10.12 1.88 
1991 31 27 26.15 .85 
1992 40 34 33.47 .26 
1993 55 40 46.39 -6.39 
1994 67 59 53.14 5.86 
1995 80 65 67.47 -2.47 
Total 285 237 237.00 
Chi -Square 1.9964 
Sources: 
(1)Questionnaire Survey in Taiwan, May --July 1996 
(2)Department of Commerce, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC 
(3)Bureau of Industrial Affairs, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC 
(4)Securities and Exchange Commission, Ministry of Finance, ROC 
D.F. 5 Significance .8496 
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Table 3 -4 -1 Statistics of Transaction Enterprise by Business Grou 
Same Business Group Cases Percent 
Yes 210 85.7 
No 35 14.3 
Total 245 100 
Source: Questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May --July 1996 
Table 3 -5 -1 Statistics of Transaction Enterprise by Forms of Mercer and Acquisition 
Type Cases Percent 
Merger 217 88.6 
Consolidation 4 1.6 
Acquisition of Stock 14 5.7 
Acquisition of Asset 10 4.1 
Total 245 100 
Source: Questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May --July 1996 
Table 3 -6 -1 Statistics of Transaction Enterprise by T of Transaction 
Form of transaction Cases Percent 
Horizontal Transaction 142 58.0 
Vertical Transaction 36 14.7 
Congeneric Transaction 24 9.8 
Conglomerate Transaction 43 17.5 
Total 245 100.0 
Source: Questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May --July 1996 
Table 3 -7 -1 Statistics of Transaction Enterprise by Friendly and Hostile Bids 
Cases Percent 
Friendly Transaction 244 99.6 
Hostile Transaction 1 .4 
Total 245 100.0 
Source: uestionnaire survey in Taiwan, May --July 1996 
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Table 3 -8 -1 Total Assets Before or After Transaction of Acquiring and Acquired 
Enterprises 
Unit: NT$ 10,000 










34,536,240 500 291,626 5.63E +12 14.095 203.737 217 
After 
Transaction 





4,118,702 50 60,616 9.44E +10 11.590 147.326 214 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May --July 1996 
Table 3 -8 -2 The Average Assets Before or After Transaction of Acquiring and 












Before Yes 277,754 2,515,700 189 
Transaction No 385,275 970,870 28 
After Yes 331,179 2,651,443 189 
Transaction No 440,990 1,018,366 28 
Acquired 
Enterprise 
Before Yes 61,867 327,984 186 
Transaction No 52,303 87,136 28 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May --July 1996 
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Table 3 -8 -3 The Average Assets Before or After Transaction of Acquiring and 











Before Merger 293,667 2,462,317 201 
Transaction Consolidation 3,000 4,330 3 
Acq. of stock 421,938 543,075 9 
Acq. of asset 112,447 121,319 4 
After Merger 348,591 2,608,370 205 
Transaction Consolidation 7,500 8,336 4 
Acq. of stock 496,780 603,187 10 
Acq. of asset 117,175 117,125 4 
Acquired 
Enterprise 
Before Merger 63,386 318,699 198 
Transaction Consolidation 2,500 2,345 4 
Acq. of stock 51,437 108,239 7 
Acq. of asset 10,263 12,612 5 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May --July 1996 
Table 3 -8 -4 The Average Assets Before or After Transaction of Acquiring and 











Before Horizontal 99,507 216,769 125 
Transaction Vertical 78,049 120,591 33 
Congeneric 2,023,288 8,116,335 18 
Conglomerate 289,026 855,518 41 
After Horizontal 139,369 335,701 130 
Transaction Vertical 107,662 136,741 33 
Congeneric 2,130,761 8,417,622 19 
Conglomerate 360,301 917,053 41 
Acquired 
Enterprise 
Before Horizontal 40,555 156,567 127 
Transaction Vertical 27,742 39,212 30 
Congeneric 261,172 938,061 19 
Conglomerate 53,336 87,940 38 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May --July 1996 
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Table 4 -1 -1 Alternative Motives or Reasons for Mergers and Acquisitions 
1. Efficiency theories 
1.1 Differential efficiency 
1.2 Inefficient management 
1.3 Operating synergy 
1.4 Financial synergy 
1.5 Undervaluation 
1.6 Pure diversification 
2. Information and signalling 
3. Market power 
4. Tax considerations 
5. Stock market consideration 
6. Agency problems 
7. Free cash flow 
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2. Carryover of net 
operating losses 
3. Carryover of 















































1973 -1976 31 1. Economies of scale 




1974 -1979 8 1. Economies of scale 
2. Growth of firm 
Important 
Wu, Y. C. 
(1982) 
1975 -1980 32 Economies of scale Important 




2 1. Market 
competitiveness 




1987 20 1. Personnel & 
management cost 
reductions 
2. Technology and 
R &D 




1985 -1989 42 1. Profitability 
2. Economies of scale 
Important 
Chen, C. R. 
(1990) 
1990 1 1. Acquiring brand 
mark 
2. Marketing channel 
Important 
Wu, A. N. 
(1992) 
1985 -1988 13 Economies of scale Significant 
Yang 
(1996) 
1979 -1995 94 1. Operating and 
management 
modernisation 






1974 -1979 8 Diversification Not Important 
Wu, Y. C. 
(1982) 





1987 20 1. Benefits from bank 
2. Diversification 











1979 -1995 94 1. Diversification 









1973 -1976 31 Market share Not Important 
Chang 
(1980) 
1974 -1979 8 Business grow Not Important 
Wu, Y. C. 
(1982) 
1975 -1980 32 Market share Not Important 
Wu, C. M. 1977 and 2 Market share Not 
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(1984) 1981 Important 
Sung 
(1989) 
1987 20 Market share Significant 
Lin 
(1990) 
1985 -1989 42 Market share Not Important 
Chen, C. R. 
(1990) 
1990 1 Market share Not 
Important 
Wu, A. N. 
(1992) 
1985 -1988 13 Market share Significant 
Yang 
(1996) 





1973 -1976 31 Tax benefits Not Important 
Chang 
(1980) 
1974 -1979 8 Tax deductions Not Important 
Wu, Y. C. 
(1982) 











1985 -1989 42 Tax deductions Not Important 
Wu, A. N. 
(1992) 












1985 -1989 42 ' Stock on listing or 
counter 
Not Important 
Chen, C. R. 
(1990) 
1989 1 Stock on listing Important 
Wu, A. N. 
(1992) 









1985 -1989 42 Enterprise growth Important 
Chen, C. R. 
(1990) 
1989 1 1. Growth- 
maximisation 




Wu, A. N. 
(1992) 




1979 -1995 94 Improving managers 
social position 
Important 
Remark: All the authors used questionnaires to do their research except Chen, C. R and Wu, Y. C. 
who look specific case studies and Wu, A. N. who used financial statements. 
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Table 5 -2 -1 Descriptive Sample Statistics of the Acquiring Enterprise's Merger and 
Acquisition Motives 
Motive Mean* Variance Cases 
(No.) 
Reducing administrative expense 2.322 1.687 245 
Combining complementary resources 2.596 2.045 245 
Economies of scale 2.629 2.415 245 
Improving finance management efficiency 2.800 2.284 245 
Improving management efficiency generally 2.843 2.105 215 
Enhancing market competitiveness 2.864 2.44 243 
Increased market power 2.869 2.360 245 
Improving personnel management efficiency 2.939 2.295 245 
Improving marketing management efficiency 2.963 2.290 245 
Control of distribution channels 3.053 2.206 245 
Improving production management efficiency 3.143 2.296 244 
Improving purchasing management efficiency 3.180 2.181 245 
Tax considerations 3.347 2.129 245 
Improving R &D management efficiency 3.381 2.097 244 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or financing 3.469 1.947 245 
Acquiring know -how or research and development 3.498 1.735 245 
Gaining potential real estate or other related values 3.531 1.939 245 
Resolving financial difficulties 3.539 2.094 245 
Exploiting surplus funds 3.571 1.779 245 
Applying for a listing on the stock market 3.620 1.999 245 
Government encouragement or support 3.633 1.692 245 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or industries 3.642 1.751 243 
Risk diversification 3.679 1.682 243 
Buying below replacement cost 3.722 1.759 245 
Controlling of material resources 3.748 1.808 242 
Acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright 
technologies 
3.934 1.558 243 
* Coding 1 represents very important, 2 represents fairly important, 3 represents 
important, 4 represents slightly important, 5 represents not at all important. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 5 -2 -2 Frequency Table for Applying for a Listing on the Stock Market and Tax 
Considerations 
Applying for a listing on the stock 
market 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent 
Very important 1 25 10.2 
Fairly important 2 44 18.0 
Important 3 26 10.6 
Slightly important 4 54 22.0 
Not at all important 5 96 39.2 
Total 245 100.0 
Tax Considerations 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent 
Very important , 1 38 15.5 
Fairly important 2 40 16.3 
Important 3 44 18.0 
Slightly important 4 45 18.4 
Not at all important 5 78 31.8 
Total 245 100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 5 -2 -3 Tax Reductions Due to Implementation of the Statute for Encouragement of 
Investment or the Statute for Upgrading Industries (1990 -1995) 
Items Implementation 













Business Item 1 of The profit -seeking enterprise shall be 9 (1990) 51,350 
Income Article 38 exempt from all income tax payable as a 1 (1991) 409 
Tax (This Tax 
reduction 
abolished of 




Article 40 The existing productive enterprises, if 6 (1990) 39,396 





criteria prescribed by the Government 
after a merger or consolidation, shall be 
entitled to a fifteen per cent (15 %) 
deduction of the profit- seeking 
enterprise income tax for two years 
after a merger or consolidation. 
2 (1992) 3,374 
Stamp Items 1, 3, 4 The profit- seeking enterprise shall be - (1990) - 
Tax of Article 38 exempt from all stamp tax payable as a - (1991) - 
(Items 1, 3, 4 result for such merger or consolidation. - (1992) - 
of Article 13) - (1993) - 
i (1994) 151,358 
2 (1995) 3,641 
Land Item 2 of Where the land previously used by 47 (1990) 337,722 
Value Article 38 these enterprises directly is transferred 10 (1991) 30,504 
Increment (Item 2 of along with the merger or consolidation, 64 (1992) 615,030 
Tax Article 13) registration shall be effected for the 200 (1993) 319,037 
transfer of the ownership of the land 60 (1994) 1,865,949 
immediately after the current value of 
the land has been duly assessed 
according to law; the land -value 
increment tax payable may be entered 
to credit and paid by the enterprise 
existing as a result of the merger or 
consolidation at the time the land is 
further transferred. 
111 (1995) 1,000,345 
Item 5 of If as a result of merger and 1 (1990) 882 
Article 38 consolidation, land previously used by 87 (1991) 362,410 
(Item 5 of these enterprises directly for factories is - (1992) - 
Article 13) sold and other land is purchased for - (1993) - 
construction of plant building in - (1994) - 
another industrial district, or ..., and the 
area of such land is not in excess of that 
- (1995) - 
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of the original land by 300 %, and the 
price paid for such land is in excess of 
the selling price of the original land 
after deduction of the land -value 
increment tax, then for such deficit 
amount for the purchase of the new 
land, the merged enterprise may request 
the competent authority -in- charge of tax 
collection to refund, to the extent of 
such deficit, the amount of land -value 
increment tax already paid. 
Item 6 of The provision in the preceding Item 5 - (1990) - 
Article 38 shall apply, matatis mutandis, to the 15 (1991) 853 
(Item 6 of case where the purchase of land for - (1992) - 
Article 13) construction of factory has to be - (1993) - 
effected prior to the sale of the land of - (1994) - 
original factory in order to satisfy the 
needs of production operation. 
- (1995) - 
Deed Tax Item 1 of The profit -seeking enterprise shall be 24 (1990) 9,585 
Article 38 exempt from all deed tax payable as a 32 (1991) 14,374 
(Item 1 of result for such merger or consolidation. 34 (1992) 48,761 
Article 13) 20 (1993) 60,977 
22 (1994) 10,130 
43 (1995) 10,961 
Item 4 of Where the land and plant buildings 6 (1990) 3,522 
Article 38 previously used by these enterprises 1 (1991) 5 
(Item 4 of 
Article 13) 
directly for factories and/or mining are 
sold in accordance with the approved 
merger and consolidation plan, the 
proceeds so realised from the sale, 
being used or deducted for payment in 
whole for purchase or acquisition of 
new land and plant buildings under the 
merger and consolidation plan, shall be 
exempt from any deed tax payable by 
the merged enterprise. 
1 (1992) 356 
* Promulgated on December 29, 1990. 
Sources: Yearbook of financial statistics of the Republic of China, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 
1994,1995. 
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Table 5 -3 -1 The Size Groups of the Acquiring Enterprises 
Size 
group 












Greater than or equal NT$ 100 million 






Greater than or equal NT$ 200 million 






Greater than or equal NT$ 1,000 million 50 23.0 
Total 217 100 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 5 -3 -2 Descriptive Four Subgroup Sample Statistics of the Acquiring Enterprise's Merger 

























Subgroup number of 
cases 
77 35 55 50 
Economies of scale 2.779 3.000 2.418 2.640 x2 >x3 x2 >x3 
Control of distribution 
channels 
2.961 3.257 3.236 3.140 
Reducing administrative 
expense 
2.259 2.257 2.290 2.220 
Acquiring know -how or 
research and development 
3.363 3.657 3.563 3.580 
Acquiring brand marks, 
patents or copyright 
technologies 
3.831 3.942 4.000 4.160 
Enhancing market 
competitiveness 
2.779 3.371 2.849 2.880 xi <x2 x1 <x2 x3<x2 
Gaining rapid entry into 
new markets or industries 
3.610 3.914 3.566 3.760 
Controlling of material 
resources 
3.545 3.628 3.692 4.000 x1 <x4 
Combining 
complementary resources 
2.545 2.314 2.472 2.620 
Resolving financial 
difficulties 




x1 <x4 xi<x3 
x2 <x4 
Increasing corporate debt 
capacity or financing 
3.181 3.457 3.509 3.840 x1 <x4 x1 <x4 
Risk diversification 3.532 3.657 3.717 3.660 
Increased market power 2.883 3.400 2.890 2.920 xi<x2 
Applying for a listing on 
the stock market 





Tax considerations 3.363 3.085 3.236 3.460 
Government 
encouragement or support 
3.636 3.800 3.509 3.660 
Exploiting surplus funds 3.623 3.457 3.545 3.620 
Buying below 
replacement cost 
3.636 3.800 3.690 3.820 
Gaining potential real 
estate or other related 
values 
3.610 3.285 3.436 3.620 





2.610 3.085 2.927 3.280 xl <x4 xl <x4 xl <x2 
Improving production 
management efficiency 
3.026 3.114 2.927 3.489 x3 <x4 x3<x4 
Improving finance 
management efficiency 
2.558 2.942 2.600 3.020 xl <x4 
Improving personnel 
management efficiency 
2.740 3.028 2.818 3.080 
Improving purchasing 
management efficiency 
2.974 3.342 3.036 3.440 
Improving R &D 
management efficiency 
3.144 3.800 3.236 3.560 xl<x2 x2 >x3 x1 <x2 
x2 >x3 
* Coding 1 represents very important, 2 represents fairly important, 3 represents important, 4 
represents slightly important, 5 represents not at all important. 
XI represents the mean motive value of rating scale score of the subgroup of the total assets of 
acquiring firms less than NT$ 100 million. 
X2 represents the mean motive value of rating scale score of the subgroup of the total assets 
of acquiring firms greater than or equal to NT$ 100 million but less than NT$ 200 million. 
X3 represents the mean motive value of rating scale score of the subgroup of the total assets of 
acquiring firms greater than or equal to NT$ 200 million but less than NT$ 1,000 million. 
X4 represents the mean motive value of rating scale score of the subgroup of the total assets of 
acquiring firms greater than or equal to NT$ 1,000 million. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 5 -4 -1 Descriptive Sample Statistics of the Acquiring Enterprise's Merger and 




Mean* Std Dev Cases 
(No.) 
Economies of scale Yes 2.65 1.54 210 
No 2.48 1.59 35 
Control of distribution channels Yes 3.10 1.49 210 
No 2.74 1.42 35 
Reducing administrative expense Yes 2.23 1.26 210 
No 2.82 1.38 35 
Acquiring know -how or research and Yes 3.48 1.31 210 
development No 3.57 1.35 35 
Acquiring brand marks, patents or Yes 3.93 1.24 208 
copyright technologies No 3.94 1.28 35 
Enhancing market competitiveness Yes 2.89 1.56 208 
No 2.65 1.55 35 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets Yes 3.68 1.30 208 
or industries No 3.37 1.39 35 
Controlling of material resources Yes 3.74 1.33 207 
No 3.77 1.39 35 
Combining complementary resources Yes 2.50 1.41 210 
No 117 1.42 35 
Resolving financial difficulties Yes 3.48 1.46 210 
No 3.88 1.27 35 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or Yes 3.41 1.41 210 
financing No 3.77 1.23 35 
Risk diversification Yes 3.69 1.29 208 
No 3.57 1.33 35 
Increased market power Yes 2.96 1.51 210 
No 2.28 1.56 35 
Applying for a listing on the stock Yes 3.55 1.43 210 
market No 4.00 1.21 35 
Tax considerations Yes 3.23 1.48 210 
No 4.00 1.13 35 
Government encouragement or support Yes 3.60 1.32 210 
No 3.82 1.15 35 
Exploiting surplus funds Yes 3.48 1.36 210 
No 4.11 1.02 35 
Buying below replacement cost Yes 3.67 1.33 210 
No 4.00 1.28 35 
Gaining potential real estate or other Yes 3.52 1.41 210 
related values No 3.57 1.29 35 
Improving management efficiency Yes 2.71 1.43 185 
generally No 3.58 1.33 31 
Improving marketing management Yes 2.84 1.48 210 
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efficiency No 3.68 1.53 35 
Improving production management Yes 3.04 1.50 209 
efficiency No 3.74 1.48 35 
Improving finance management Yes 2.70 1.50 210 
efficiency No 3.40 1.43 35 
Improving personnel management Yes 2.84 1.51 210 
efficiency No 3.48 1.44 35 
Improving purchasing management Yes 3.09 1.47 210 
efficiency No 3.71 1.36 35 
Improving R &D management Yes 3.32 1.46 210 
efficiency No 3.70 1.33 34 
* Coding 1 represents very important, 2 represents fairly important, 3 represents 
important, 4 represents slightly important, 5 represents not at all important. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 5 -4 -2 T -test for Independent Acquiring Enterprise's Merger and Acquisition 
Motives by Business Grou 
Motive T -value 2 -Tail 
Sig. 
Economies of scale .59 .558 
Control of distribution channels 1.34 .183 
Reducing administrative expense -2.52 .012 
Acquiring know -how or research and development -.36 .722 
Acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright technologies -.04 .965 
Enhancing market competitiveness .85 .398 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or industries 1.31 .192 
Controlling of material resources -.11 .911 
Combining complementary resources -2.60 .010 
Resolving financial difficulties -1.70 .096 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or financing -1.39 .167 
Risk diversification .53 .597 
Increased market power 2.45 .015 
Applying for a listing on the stock market -1.94 .057 
Tax considerations -3.50 .001 
Government encouragement or support -1.06 .292 
Exploiting surplus funds -3.22 .002 
Buying below replacement cost -1.34 .182 
Gaining potential real estate or other related values -.19 .852 
Improving management efficiency generally -3.12 .002 
Improving marketing management efficiency -3.10 .002 
Improving production management efficiency -2.56 .011 
Improving finance management efficiency -2.57 .011 
Improving personnel management efficiency -2.33 .021 
Improving purchasing management efficiency -2.33 .020 
Improving R &D management efficiency -1.41 .159 
H0 : µmy = µmn 
H1 : µmy # µmn 
where p,my = mean value of rating scale score, motive m, same business group 
= mean value of rating scale score, motive m, different business group 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
286 
Table 5 -5 -1 Descriptive Sample Statistics of Acquiring Enterprise's Merger and 
Acquisition Motives Classified by Tvne of Transaction 
Motive Type of 
transaction 
Mean* Std Dev Cases 
(No.) 
Economies of scale Horizontal 2.33 1.41 142 
Vertical 2.63 1.55 36 
Congeneric 2.83 1.57 24 
Conglomerate 3.48 1.69 43 
Control of distribution Horizontal 2.81 1.41 142 
channels Vertical 3.05 1.53 36 
Congeneric 3.12 1.48 24 
Conglomerate 3.79 1.48 43 
Reducing administrative Horizontal 2.16 1.11 142 
expense Vertical 2.41 1.36 36 
Congeneric 2.08 1.34 24 
Conglomerate 2.88 1.62 43 
Acquiring know -how or Horizontal 3.50 1.28 142 
research and Vertical 3.22 1.37 36 
development Congeneric 3.33 1.23 24 
Conglomerate 3.79 1.40 43 
Acquiring brand marks, 









technologies Congeneric 3.58 1.38 24 
Conglomerate 4.25 1.11 43 
Enhancing market Horizontal 2.65 1.49 140 
competitiveness Vertical 36 
Congeneric 2.91 1.61 24 
Conglomerate 3.90 1.37 43 
Gaining rapid entry into Horizontal 3.66 1.27 140 
new markets or Vertical 3.36 1.45 36 
industries Congeneric 3.66 1.20 24 
Conglomerate 3.79 1.42 43 
Controlling of material Horizontal 3.72 1.34 139 
resources Vertical 3.41 1.53 36 
Congeneric 3.83 1.23 24 
Conglomerate 4.04 1.21 43 
Combining Horizontal 2.66 1.44 142 
complementary Vertical 2.27 1.23 36 
resources Congeneric 2.33 1.40 24 
Conglomerate 2.79 1.52 43 
Resolving financial Horizontal 3.57 1.36 142 
difficulties Vertical 3.58 1.48 36 
Congeneric 3.75 1.51 24 
Con:lomerate 3.25 1.64 43 
Increasing corporate Horizontal 3.39 1.41 142 










Risk diversification Horizontal 3.72 1.23 140 
Vertical 3.69 1.21 36 
Congeneric 4.16 .91 24 
Conglomerate 3.25 1.63 43 
Increased market power Horizontal 2.59 1.48 142 
Vertical 2.69 1.47 36 
Congeneric 2.91 1.55 24 
Conglomerate 3.90 1.32 43 
Applying for a listing on Horizontal 3.68 1.39 142 
the stock market Vertical 3.13 1.49 36 
Congeneric 3.37 1.49 24 
Conglomerate 3.95 1.29 43 
Tax considerations Horizontal 3.54 1.39 142 
Vertical 2.58 1.36 36 
Congeneric 3.20 1.47 24 
Conglomerate 3.39 1.57 43 
Government Horizontal 3.72 1.22 142 
encouragement or Vertical 3.22 1.29 36 
support Congeneric 3.41 1.17 24 
Conglomerate 3.79 1.55 43 
Exploiting surplus funds Horizontal 3.64 1.30 142 
Vertical 3.52 1.27 36 
Congeneric 3.66 1.20 24 
Conglomerate 3.32 1.53 43 
Buying below Horizontal 3.71 1.31 142 
replacement cost Vertical 3.63 1.19 36 
Congeneric 3.79 1.31 24 
Conglomerate 3.76 1.49 43 
Gaining potential real Horizontal 3.53 1.39 142 
estate or other related Vertical 3.61 1.27 36 
values Congeneric 3.83 1.27 24 
Conglomerate 3.27 1.53 43 
Improving management Horizontal 2.71 1.35 127 
efficiency generally Vertical 2.70 1.46 34 
Congeneric 2.95 1.43 20 
Conglomerate 3.37 1.69 35 
Improving marketing Horizontal 2.78 1.44 142 
management efficiency Vertical 2.77 1.47 36 
Congeneric 3.25 1.48 24 
Conglomerate 3.55 1.63 43 
Improving production Horizontal 3.06 1.48 142 
management efficiency Vertical 3.00 1.53 36 
Congeneric 3.21 1.41 24 




















Improving personnel Horizontal 2.78 1.45 142 
management efficiency Vertical 2.91 1.48 36 
Congeneric 3.08 1.44 24 
Conglomerate 3.37 1.71 43 
Improving purchasing Horizontal 3.04 1.44 142 
management efficiency Vertical 2.94 1.45 36 
Congeneric 3.08 1.47 24 
Conglomerate 3.86 1.47 43 
Improving R &D Horizontal 3.33 1.43 142 
management efficiency Vertical 3.00 1.47 35 
Congeneric 3.33 1.43 24 
Conglomerate 3.88 1.40 43 
* Coding 1 represents very important, 2 represents fairly important, 3 represents 
important, 4 represents slightly important, 5 represents not at all important. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 5 -5 -2 T -test for Independent Acquiring Enterprise's Merger and Acquisition 
Motives by Tvne of Transaction 
Motive Type of transaction T -value 2 -Tail 
Sig. 
Economies of scale Horizontal -Vertical -1.14 .254 
Horizontal -Congeneric -1.58 .115 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -4.49 .000 
Vertical -Congeneric -2.30 .024 
Vertical -Conglomerate -.47 .639 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -1.55 .125 
Control of distribution Horizontal -Vertical -.89 .374 
channels Horizontal- Congeneric -.98 .328 
Horizontal -Conglomerate -3.91 .000 
Vertical- Congeneric -.17 .862 
Vertical -Conglomerate -2.16 .034 
Congeneric- Conglomerate -1.76 .084 
Reducing Horizontal -Vertical -1.01 .318 
administrative expense Horizontal -Congeneric .34 .737 
Horizontal -Conglomerate -2.70 .009 
Vertical- Congeneric .93 .355 
Vertical -Conglomerate -1.39 .168 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -2.16 .035 
Acquiring know -how or Horizontal -Vertical 1.17 .242 
research and Horizontal -Congeneric .62 .538 
development Horizontal -Conglomerate -1.24 .216 
Vertical- Congeneric -.32 .751 
Vertical- Conglomerate -1.81 .075 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -1.33 .188 
Acquiring brand marks, 







technologies Horizontal -Conglomerate -1.44 .150 
Vertical- Congeneric .40 .691 
Vertical -Conglomerate -1.98 .051 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -2.17 .034 
Enhancing market Horizontal -Vertical .83 .406 
competitiveness Horizontal- Congeneric -.80 .427 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -4.90 .000 
Vertical- Congeneric -1.23 .225 
Vertical -Conglomerate -4.60 .000 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -2.54 .015 
Gaining rapid entry into Horizontal -Vertical 1.23 .219 
new markets or Horizontal- Congeneric -.01 .993 
industries Horizontal -Conglomerate -.55 .582 
Vertical- Congeneric -.85 .398 
Vertical -Conglomerate -1.32 .190 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -.36 .720 
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Combining Horizontal -Vertical 1.61 .113 
complementary Horizontal- Congeneric 1.03 .303 
resources Horizontal -Conglomerate -.50 .614 
Vertical- Congeneric -.16 .872 
Vertical -Conglomerate -1.60 .102 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -1.21 .230 
Resolving financial Horizontal -Vertical -.02 .982 
difficulties Horizontal- Congeneric -.56 .574 
Horizontal -Conglomerate 1.16 .249 
Vertical- Congeneric -.42 .673 
Vertical -Conglomerate .92 .360 
Congeneric -Conglomerate 1.21 .230 
Increasing corporate Horizontal -Vertical 1.27 .205 
debt capacity or Horizontal -Congeneric -2.06 .047 
financing Horizontal- Conglomerate -1.73 .085 
Vertical- Congeneric -2.59 .012 
Vertical -Conglomerate -2.42 .018 
Congeneric- Conglomerate .32 .747 
Risk diversification Horizontal- Vertical .12 .906 
Horizontal -Congeneric -2.08 .044 
Horizontal- Conglomerate 1.72 .090 
Vertical- Congeneric -1.71 .092 
Vertical -Conglomerate 1.37 .176 
Congeneric- Conglomerate 2.92 .005 
Increased market power Horizontal- Vertical -.37 .711 
Horizontal- Congeneric -.98 .327 
Horizontal -Conglomerate -5.20 .000 
Vertical- Congeneric -.56 .578 
Vertical -Conglomerate -3.86 .000 
Congeneric- Conglomerate -2.75 .008 
Applying for a listing Horizontal -Vertical 2.07 .040 
on the stock market Horizontal -Congeneric .99 .322 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -1.18 .241 
Vertical- Congeneric -.60 .552 
Vertical -Conglomerate -2.57 .012 
Congeneric- Conglomerate -1.66 .102 
Tax considerations Horizontal -Vertical 3.74 .000 
Horizontal -Congeneric 1.10 .273 
Horizontal- Conglomerate .62 .539 








Government Horizontal- Vertical 2.17 .031 
encouragement or Horizontal- Congeneric 1.15 .253 
support Horizontal- Conglomerate -.25 .801 
Vertical- Congeneric -.59 .556 
Vertical -Conglomerate -1.75 .084 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -1.03 .309 
Exploiting surplus Horizontal -Vertical .47 .642 
funds Horizontal- Congeneric -.09 .928 
Horizontal- Conglomerate 1.22 .228 
Vertical- Congeneric -.42 .674 
Vertical -Conglomerate .64 .525 
Congeneric -Conglomerate 1.00 .320 
Buying below Horizontal -Vertical .33 .743 
replacement cost Horizontal- Congeneric -.25 .801 
Horizontal -Conglomerate -.21 .836 
Vertical- Congeneric -.46 .644 
Vertical -Conglomerate -.42 .673 
Congeneric -Conglomerate .07 .947 
Gaining potential real Horizontal -Vertical -.30 .767 
estate or other related Horizontal- Congeneric -.98 .329 
values Horizontal- Conglomerate 1.03 .305 
Vertical- Congeneric -.66 .510 
Vertical- Conglomerate i .04 .304 
Congeneric- Conglomerate 1.50 .137 
Improving management Horizontal -Vertical .04 .968 
efficiency generally Horizontal- Congeneric -.71 .479 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -2.10 .041 
Vertical- Congeneric -.60 .554 
Vertical -Conglomerate -1.74 .086 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -.98 .332 
Improving marketing Horizontal -Vertical .01 .989 
management efficiency Horizontal- Congeneric -1.46 .146 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -2.98 .003 
Vertical- Congeneric -1.21 .230 
Vertical -Conglomerate -2.21 .030 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -.76 .448 
Improving production Horizontal -Vertical .23 .821 
management efficiency Horizontal- Congeneric -.46 .644 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -1.60 .111 
Vertical- Congeneric -.55 .586 
Vertical -Conglomerate -1.36 .178 
Congeneric- Conglomerate -.67 .505 
Improving finance Horizontal -Vertical -.17 .869 














Improving personnel Horizontal -Vertical -.47 .640 
management efficiency Horizontal -Congeneric -.92 .360 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -2.02 .048 
Vertical- Congeneric -.43 .668 
Vertical- Conglomerate -1.27 .210 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -.73 .467 
Improving purchasing Horizontal- Vertical .39 .697 
management efficiency Horizontal- Congeneric -.11 .915 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -3.22 .002 
Vertical- Congeneric -.36 .720 
Vertical- Conglomerate -2.77 .007 
Congeneric- Conglomerate -2.07 .042 
Improving R &D Horizontal- Vertical 1.22 225 
management efficiency Horizontal- Congeneric -.01 .994 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -2.23 .027 
Vertical- Congeneric -.86 .392 
Vertical- Conglomerate -2.71 .008 
Congeneric- Conglomerate -1.53 .131 
Ho : = lame 
H1 : timid #µme 
where µmd = mean value of rating scale score, motive m, type d 
¡Lime = mean value of rating scale score, motive m, type e 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 5 -6 -1 The Pearson Linear Correlation Between the Motives for Mergers and 







Economies of scale -.0743 .276 217 
Control of distribution channels .0285 .676 217 
Reducing administrative expense -.0094 .890 217 
Acquiring know -how or research and development .0384 .573 217 
Acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright 
technologies 
.0901 .188 215 
Enhancing market competitiveness .0061 .929 215 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or industries .0428 .533 215 
Controlling of material resources .1045 .128 214 
Combining complementary resources .0025 .971 217 
Resolving financial difficulties .1861 .006 217 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or financing .1588 .019 217 
Risk diversification .0358 .602 215 
Increased market power -.0280 .681 217 
Applying for a listing on the stock market -.1963 .004 217 
Tax considerations .0109 .873 217 
Government encouragement or support -.0335 .624 217 
Exploiting surplus funds .0301 .660 217 
Buying below replacement cost .0119 .861 217 
Gaining potential real estate or other related values -.0064 .925 217 
Improving management efficiency generally .1785 .014 188 
Improving marketing management efficiency .1421 .036 217 
Improving production management efficiency .0728 .287 216 
Improving finance management efficiency .0592 .386 217 
Improving personnel management efficiency .0566 .407 217 
Improving purchasing management efficiency .1077 .114 217 
Improving R &D management efficiency .0760 .266 216 
Ho:p =O 
H1:p#0 
where p lies between -1 and +1. p > 0 indicates a positive linear relationship and p < 0 
indicates a negative linear relationship between merger motives and total assets before 
each transaction of acquiring enterprises. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 5 -7 -1 The Pearson Linear Correlation between the Motives for Mergers and 







Economies of scale -.2007 .005 198 
Control of distribution channels -.0247 .730 198 
Reducing administrative expense -.1472 .039 198 
Acquiring know -how or research and development -.0389 .586 198 
Acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright 
technologies 
.0046 .949 196 
Enhancing market competitiveness -.0333 .643 196 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or industries .0997 .164 196 
Controlling of material resources .0977 .174 195 
Combining complementary resources -.0475 .506 198 
Resolving financial difficulties .0711 .319 198 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or financing .1059 .138 198 
Risk diversification .0357 .620 196 
Increased market power -.1197 .093 198 
Applying for a listing on the stock market -.2362 .001 198 
Tax considerations -.0872 .222 198 
Government encouragement or support -.1233 .084 198 
Exploiting surplus funds .0267 .709 198 
Buying below replacement cost -.0227 .751 198 
Gaining potential real estate or other related values .0409 .568 198 
Improving management efficiency generally .0353 .644 173 
Improving marketing management efficiency .0444 .534 198 
Improving production management efficiency -.0828 .247 197 
Improving finance management efficiency -.0434 .543 198 
Improving personnel management efficiency -.0037 .958 198 
Improving purchasing management efficiency .0014 .985 198 
Improving R &D management efficiency -.0419 .559 197 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis Ho against H1 
Ho :p =O 
H1:p#0 
where p lies between -1 and +1. p > 0 indicates a positive linear relationship and p < 
indicates a negative linear relationship between merger motives and the change in assets 
after mergers and acquisitions of acquiring enterprises. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 5 -8 -1 Unrotated Principal Components Analysis Factor Loadings for the Motives 
for Mercers and Acquisitions 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Comm- 
unality 
Economies of scale .602 -.065 .344 -.008 1.00 
Control of distribution channels .603 -.174 .500 .045 1.00 
Administrative expense reduction .520 -.392 -.183 .278 1.00 
Acquiring know -how or research and 
development 
.699 -.112 .375 .211 1.00 
Acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright 
technologies 
.657 .141 .308 -.077 1.00 
Enhancing market competitiveness .652 -.081 .521 -.020 1.00 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or 
industries 
.562 .225 .334 .233 1.00 
Control of material resources .663 .226 .115 .087 1.00 
Combining complementary resources .595 -.092 -.164 .337 1.00 
Resolving financial difficulties .541 .463 -.231 .368 1.00 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or 
financing 
.611 .389 -.148 .204 1.00 
Risk diversification .682 .339 -.041 .237 1.00 
Increased market power .655 -.086 .383 -.169 1.00 
Applying for a listing on the stock market .544 .122 .108 -.521 1.00 
Tax considerations .593 .283 -.334 -.017 1.00 
Government encouragement or support .634 .348 -.112 -.117 1.00 
Exploiting surplus funds .642 .428 -.148 -.116 1.00 
Buying below replacement cost .610 .427 -.078 -.140 1.00 
Gaining potential real estate or other related 
values 
.437 .390 -.151 -.394 1.00 
Improving marketing management efficiency .761 -.460 -.195 -.009 1.00 
Improving production management efficiency .761 -.273 -.274 -.087 1.00 
Improving finance management efficiency .734 -.301 -.402 -.087 1.00 
Improving personnel management efficiency .732 -.389 -.308 -.091 1.00 
Improving purchasing management efficiency .808 -.401 -.068 -.079 1.00 
Improving R &D management efficiency .793 -.340 -.048 -.049 1.00 
Total 
Sum of squares (eigenvalue) 10.566 2.369 1.852 1.072 15.859 
Percentage of Variance 42.3 9.5 7.4 4.3 63.4 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 5 -8 -2 VARIMAX Rotated Principal Components Analysis Factor Loadings 
Matrix for the Motives for Mercers and Acouisitions 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Comm- 
unality 
.830 Improving marketing management efficiency .847 .292 .124 .106 
Improving personnel management efficiency .835 .170 .152 .204 .792 
Improving finance management efficiency .822 .085 .241 .240 .800 
Improving purchasing management efficiency .777 .413 .119 .190 .825 
Improving production management efficiency .761 .203 .237 .245 .737 
Improving R &D management efficiency .720 .418 .161 .177 .750 
Administrative expense reduction .655 .182 .177 -.201 .535 
Combining complementary resources .497 .214 .439 -.131 .503 
Enhancing market competitiveness .202 .794 .114 .140 .704 
Control of distribution channels .244 .762 .063 .037 .646 
Acquiring know -how or research and 
development 
.321 .715 .266 -.046 .687 
Increased market power .269 .672 .083 .285 .612 
Economies of scale .243 .619 .156 .137 .486 
Acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright 
technologies 
.157 .595 .301 .287 .553 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or 
industries 
.037 .577 .442 .016 .530 
Resolving financial difficulties .133 .080 .820 .016 .697 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or 
financing 
.183 .184 .706 .150 .589 
Risk diversification .209 .318 .693 .115 .638 
Exploiting surplus funds .173 .177 .601 .457 .632 
Tax considerations .325 .016 .577 .324 .544 
Buying below replacement cost .121 .217 .553 .461 .581 
Government encouragement or support .203 .210 .531 .425 .549 
Control of material resources .197 .440 .493 .189 .512 
Applying for a listing on the stock market .190 .341 .086 .659 .594 
Gaining potential real estate or other related 
values 
.072 .050 .344 .628 .521 
Total 
Sum of squares (eigenvalue) 10.566 2.369 1.852 1.072 15.859 
Percentage of Variance 42.3 9.5 7.4 4.3 63.4 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 6 -5 -1 Descriptive Sample Statistics of the Main Method of Payment in Mergers 
and Acquisitions 
Item Main method of payment No.of Cases* Percent 
1 Cash (reserves) 50 19.45 
2 Cash (bank borrowing) 34 13.23 
3 Common stock 147 57.20 
4 Corporate bonds 2 .78 
5 Convertible bonds 4 1.56 
6 Subscription warrants 13 5.06 
7 Others 7 2.72 
Total 257 100.00 
* One firm ticked three main methods of payment, item 1, 2 and 3, and five firms 
ticked item 1 and 2, two firms ticked item 1 and 3, two firms ticked item 2 and 5, one 
firm ticked item 2 and 7 and one firm ticked item 5 and 7. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May --July 1996. 
Table 6 -6 -1 T -test for Independent Acquiring Enterprise's Average Assets Before 
Transaction by the Main Method of Payment 

















2.17 .031 178 
39 


































-.16 .876 207 
10 
H0 : lPy = JPn 
H1 : PpY # Ppn 
where µp, = mean(ln assets) of acquiring enterprise before transaction, payment 
method p, same method of payment. 
µPQ = mean(ln assets) of acquiring enterprise before transaction, payment 
method p, different method of payment. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May --July 1996. 
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Table 6 -6 -2 T -test for Independent Acquiring Enterprise's Average Assets Before 
Transaction by the Different Main Methods of Payment 










Cash (reserves) 9.1972 1.713 -.75 .454 32 
Cash (bank borrowing) 9.5876 1.911 19 
Cash (reserves) 9.1972 1.713 -3.09 .002 32 
Common stock 10.3478 1.937 137 
Cash (reserves) 9.1972 1.713 -.91 .367 32 
Subscription warrants 9.8037 2.395 11 
Cash (reserves) 9.1972 1.713 -1.61 .117 32 
Others 10.5217 2.566 6 
Cash (bank borrowing) 9.5876 1.911 -1.61 .110 19 
Common stock 10.3478 1.937 137 
Cash (bank borrowing) 9.5876 1.911 -.27 .788 19 
Subscription warrants 9.8037 2.395 11 
Cash (bank borrowing) 9.5876 1.911 -.96 .345 19 
Others 10.5217 2.566 6 
Common stock 10.3478 1.937 .88 .380 137 
Subscription warrants 9.8037 2.395 11 
Common stock 10.3478 1.937 -.21 .832 137 
Others 10.5217 2.566 6 
Subscription warrants 9.8037 2.395 -.58 .573 11 
Others 10.5217 2.566 6 
110 : µ,r = µq 
H1 : ß$µq 
where µ = mean(ln assets) of acquiring enterprise before transaction, method of 
payment p or q but p # q. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May --July 1996 
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Table 6 -7 -1 T -test for Independent Acquiring Enterprise's Average Change in Total 
Assets by the Main Method of Payment 

















1.33 .188 164 
34 


































-.07 .947 188 
10 
Hp : µ,ßy = lpn 
H1 : µPy # Ptpn 
where µ.1,y = ln(change in total assets) of acquiring enterprise, payment method p. 
µyn = ln(change in total assets) of acquiring enterprise, payment method not p. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May --July 1996. 
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Table 6 -7 -2 T -test for Independent Acquiring Enterprise's Average Change in Total 
Assets by the Different Main Methods of Payment 










Cash (reserves) 8.6509 1.298 1.24 .222 27 
Cash (bank borrowing) 8.0701 1.851 18 
Cash (reserves) 8.6509 1.298 -2.54 .014 27 
Common stock 9.4528 2.151 125 
Cash (reserves) 8.6509 1.298 .73 .473 27 
Subscription warrants 8.2339 2.122 10 
Cash (reserves) 8.6509 1.298 -1.52 .139 27 
Others 9.5141 1.512 7 
Cash (bank borrowing) 8.0701 1.851 -2.59 .011 18 
Common stock 9.4528 2.151 125 
Cash (bank borrowing) 8.0701 1.851 -.21 .833 18 
Subscription warrants 8.2339 2.122 10 
Cash (bank borrowing) 8.0701 1.851 -1.83 .080 18 
Others 9.5141 1.512 7 
Common stock 9.4528 2.151 1.73 .087 125 
Subscription warrants 8.2339 2.122 10 
Common stock 9.4528 2.151 -.07 .941 125 
Others 9.5141 1.512 7 
Subscription warrants 8.2339 2.122 -1.37 .192 10 
Others 9.5141 1.51'2 7 
H0 : µp = µq 
Hi : µp#µq 
where µ = ln(change in assets) of acquiring enterprise each transaction, method of 
payment p or q but p # q 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May --July 1996 
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Table 6 -8 -1 Tests of Independence of the Main Method of Payment and Estimated 















Cash 21 1 11 4 2 39 
(reserves) 27.6 1.3 6.0 1.1 3.1 18.1% 
Cash 11 1 6 1 1 20 
(bank borrowing) 14.1 .7 3.1 .6 1.6 9.3% 
Common stock 103 5 13 1 12 134 
94.7 4.4 20.6 3.7 10.6 62.3% 
Subscription 8 0 3 0 2 13 
warrants 9.2 .4 2.0 .4 1.0 6.0% 
Other methods of 9 0 0 0 0 9 
payment 6.4 .3 1.4 .3 .7 4.2% 
Column Total 152 7 33 6 17 215 
70.7% 3.3% 15.3% 2.8% 7.9% 100.0% 
Chi -Square = 30.1256 DF = 16 Significance = .01736 
Ho: The two variables are independent. 
H1: The two variables are associated. 
Test statistic: x2 = E [ (Nii- Ei)2 / Ell] 
where Nii, the upper figures, and Eii, the lower figures, are respectively the observed 
and expected number of measurements falling in the cell for the ith row and the jth 
column. 
Eii = (row i total)(column j total) / N 
df = (r- 1)(c -1), where 
r = number of rows in the table 
c = number of columns in the table 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
302 
Table 6 -8 -2 The Correlation between the Main Method of Payment and the 












Cash (1)= -.154 (I)= -.021 =.127 4)=.181 =.010 
(reserves) P =.015 P =.742 P =.048 P =.005 P =.876 
Cash (bank cl?= -.080 (I)= -.036 =.153 =.257 (1)= -.005 
borrowing) P =.212 P =.569 P =.016 P =.000 P =.943 
Common =.189 =.031 (1)= -.112 (1)= -.266 c =.061 
stock P =.003 P =.629 P =.078 P =.000 P =.337 
Subscription (I)= -.064 (I)= -.054 =.018 (I)= -.058 4)=.048 
warrants P =.317 P =.400 P =.776 P =.362 P =.450 
Other methods =.094 (1)= -.052 (1)= -.066 c= -.056 (ID= -.070 
of payment P =.143 P =.420 P =.300 P =.382 P =.274 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis Ho against Hl 
where 
Ho: The two variables are independent. 
Hl: The two variables are associated. 
where 
(x2 / N)"2, The phi coefficient between the acquiring film's main method of 
payment and the estimated value of the acquired firm. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 7 -2 -1 Superior Post -Transaction Profits Performance Hypotheses and Independent 
Variables 
Hypothesis Variables* Expected 
sign** 
+ 1. Size hypothesis Total assets 
2. Business group 
hypothesis 
Business group - 











4. Merger motive 
hypothesis 
Economies of scale + 
Control of distribution channels + 
Reducing administrative expense + 
Acquiring know -how or research and development + 
Acquiring brand marks, patent or copyright technology + 
Enhancing market competitiveness + 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or industries + 
Controlling of material resources + 
Combining complementary resources + 
Resolving financial difficulties + 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or financing + 
Risk diversification + 
Increased market power + 
Applying for a listing on the stock market + 
Tax considerations + 
Government encouragement or support + 
Exploiting surplus funds ? 
Buying below replacement cost ? 
Gaining potential real estate or other related values 
Improving marketing management efficiency + 
Improving production management efficiency + 
Improving finance management efficiency + 
Improving personnel management efficiency + 
Improving purchasing management efficiency + 
5. The main method of 
payment hypothesis 
Cash (reserves) + 
Cash (bank borrowing) + 
Common stock ? 
Subscription warrants ? 
The other payment methods ? 
6. Acquired firm's 
estimation method 
hypothesis 
Book value ? 
Stock market value 
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Replacement cost value ? 
Cash flow value ? 
The others estimation method ? 
7. Pre -transaction 
performance hypothesis 
Net sales + 
Gross profits + 
Operating income + 
Net income + 
Earnings per share + 
Dividends per share + 
Price/Earning ratio + 
Return on total assets + 
8. Transaction process 
problems hypothesis 
Asset valuation - 
Goodwill valuation - 
Contingent loss - 
Customer drain - 
Manager or employee drain - 
Personnel arrangements - 
Shareholders against bidding - 
Corporate culture differences - 
Litigation - 
Raising finance - 
Government regulations - 
* 1. Merger motives coding: 1 very important, 2 fairly important, 3 important, 4 slightly 
important, 5 not at all important. 
2. Payment methods dummy coding: The dummy is assigned a value one if the acquiring 
firm choose one of the main methods of payment. 
3. Acquired firm's estimation method dummy coding: The dummy is assigned a value one 
if the acquiring firm choose one of the estimation methods for the acquired firm. 
4. Pre -transaction performance coding: 1 very superior, 2 superior, 3 same, 4 inferior, 5 
very inferior. 
5. Transaction process problems coding: 1 not at all serious, 2 a little serious, 3 serious, 4 
fairly serious, 5 very serious. 
* *A positive sign of merger motives, pre -transaction performance, the main method of 
payment and the acquired firm's estimation method implies that the variable increases the 
likelihood of superior post -transaction performance and a negative sign implies the opposite. 
A negative sign of transaction process problem implies that the variable increases the 
likelihood of superior post- transaction performance and a positive sign implies the opposite. 
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Level of profit 
Net sales 1.966 .799 236 72.9 22.9 4.2 
Gross profits 2.162 .837 235 69.8 21.7 8.5 
Operating income 2.155 .838 233 68.2 23.6 8.2 
Net income 2.164 .865 232 67.2 24.1 8.7 
Profit rate 
Earnings per share 2.268 .955 228 61.8 27.6 10.6 
Dividends per share 2.330 .930 227 58.1 31.3 10.6 
Price/Earning ratio 2.303 .839 218 61.0 29.8 9.2 
Return on total assets 2.289 .916 218 63.3 24.3 12.4 
* 1 very superior, 2 superior, 3 same, 4 inferior, 5 very inferior. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
Table 7 -3 -2 T -test and Kolmogorov -Smirnov Test for Independent Acquiring 
Ente rise's Post -Transaction Performance 






Level of profit 
Net sales -17.77 .000 7.35 .000 
Gross profits -14.05 .000 6.86 .000 
Operating income -14.10 .000 6.60 .000 
Net income -13.70 .000 6.43 .000 
Profit rate 
Earnings per share -11.32 .000 5.96 .000 
Dividends per share -10.46 .000 5.94 .000 
Price/Earning ratio -11.24 .000 6.02 .000 
Return on total assets -10.79 .000 5.65 .000 
1.H0:µ =3 
H1 : µ #3 
where µ = mean value of rating scale score, post- transaction performance p. 
2. H0 : The observed cumulative distribution function for the post- transaction 
performance p of the sample is a uniform distribution. 
H1 : The observed cumulative distribution function for the post- transaction 
performance p of the sample is not a uniform distribution. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 7 -4 -1 Descriptive Sample Statistics of Acquiring Enterprise's Post -Transaction 























Level of profit 
Net sales 2.066 2.285 1.826 1.860 
Gross profits 2.293 2.600 1.961 1.979 
Operating income 2.274 2.600 1.980 1.938 
Net income 2.319 2.628 1.980 1.898 
Profit rate 
Earnings per share 2.462 2.628 2.113 2.061 
Dividends per share 2.477 2.724 2.207 2.145 
Price/Earning ratio 2.507 2.531 2.200 2.066 
Return on total assets 2.403 2.575 2.204 2.085 
No. of Cases 75 35 52 50 
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** 1 very superior, 2 superior, 3 same, 4 inferior, 5 very inferior. 
* X1 represents the mean post -transaction performance value of rating scale score of 
the subgroup of the total assets of acquiring firms less than NT$ 100 million. 
X2 represents the mean post -transaction performance value of rating scale score of 
the subgroup of the total assets of acquiring firms greater than or equal NT$ 100 
million but less than NT$ 200 million. 
X3 represents the mean post- transaction performance value of rating scale score of the 
subgroup of the total assets of acquiring firms greater than or equal NT$ 200 
million but less than NT$ 1,000 million. 
X4 represents the mean post- transaction performance value of rating scale score of the 
subgroup of the total assets of acquiring firms greater than or equal NT$ 1,000 
million. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 7 -4 -2 T -test and Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test (U -test) for 
Independent Acauirina Enterprise's Post -Transaction Performance 
Post -transaction 
performance 
T -test T -value 2 -Tail 
Sig. 
U -test Z -value 2 -Tail 
Sig. 
Level of profit 
Net sales X1 -X2 -1.03 .307 X1 -X2 -.721 .470 
XI -X3 1.58 .116 X1 -X3 -1.741 .081 
X1 -X4 1.38 .170 X1 -X4 -1.421 .155 
X2 -X3 2.13 .036 X2 -X3 -1.893 .058 
X2 -X4 2.00 .048 X2 -X4 -1.674 .094 
X3 -X4 -.19 .846 X3 -X4 -.307 .758 
Gross profits X1 -X2 -1.51 .138 X1 -X2 -1.314 .188 
XI -X3 2.22 .028 X1 -X3 -2.450 .014 
X1 -X4 2.19 .031 X1 -X4 -2.375 .017 
X2 -X3 2.93 .004 X2 -X3 -2.749 .006 
X2 -X4 2.83 .006 X2 -X4 -2.721 .006 
X3 -X4 -.10 .918 X3 -X4 -.280 .779 
Operating X1 -X2 -1.63 .109 X1 -X2 -1.611 .107 
income X1 -X3 2.01 .047 X1 -X3 -2.301 .021 
X1 -X4 2.23 .027 X1 -X4 -2.398 .016 
X2 -X3 2.86 .006 X2 -X3 -2.808 .005 
X2 -X4 3.08 .003 X2 -X4 -2.872 .004 
X3 -X4 .24 .812 X3 -X4 -.276 .782 
Net income X1 -X2 -1.54 .129 X1 -X2 -1.591 .111 
X1 -X3 2.26 .026 X1 -X3 -2.484 .013 
X1 -X4 2.77 .006 X1 -X4 -2.909 .003 
X2 -X3 3.07 .003 X2 -X3 -2.907 .003 
X2 -X4 3.41 .001 X2 -X4 -3.178 .001 
X3 -X4 .46 .643 X3 -X4 -.500 .616 
Profit rate 
Earnings per X1 -X2 -.83 .390 X1 -X2 -.713 .475 
share X1 -X3 2.13 .035 X1 -X3 -2.290 .022 
X1 -X4 2.41 .018 X1 -X4 -2.681 .007 
X2 -X3 2.32 .023 X2 -X3 -2.245 .024 
X2 -X4 2.52 .014 X2 -X4 -2.528 .011 
X3 -X4 .27 .787 X3 -X4 -.290 .771 
Dividends per X1 -X2 -1.39 .167 X1 -X2 -1.275 .202 
share X1 -X3 1.65 .101 X1 -X3 -1.751 .079 
X1 -X4 2.03 .045 X1 -X4 -2.229 .025 
X2 -X3 2.44 .017 X2 -X3 -2.333 .019 
X2 -X4 2.73 .008 X2 -X4 -2.701 .006 
X3 -X4 .33 .744 X3 -X4 -.322 .747 
Price/Earning X1 -X2 -.14 .891 X1 -X2 -.257 .796 
ratio X1 -X3 1.99 .049 X1 -X3 -2.032 .042 
X1 -X4 2.66 .009 X1 -X4 -2.970 .003 














Return on total X1-X2 -.89 .377 X1-X2 -.829 .407 
assets X1-X3 1.19 .236 X1-X3 -1.396 .162 
X1-X4 1.83 .071 X1-X4 -2.068 .038 
X2-X3 1.74 .086 X2-X3 -1.759 .078 
X2-X4 2.19 .031 X2-X4 -2.250 .024 
X3-X4 .62 .538 X3-X4 -.732 .463 
Hp : Xpd = Xpe 
H1 : Xpd # Xpe 
where Xpd = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction 
performance p, group d 
Xpe = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction perfollrance 
p, group e 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 7 -5 -1 Descriptive Sample Statistics of the Acquiring Enterprise's Post- 
Transaction Performance Classified by Business Grou 
Post -transaction performance Same business 
group 
Mean* Std Dev Cases 
(No.) 
Level of profit 
Net sales No 1.588 .743 34 
Yes 2.029 .903 202 
Gross profits No 1.878 . 781 33 
Yes 2.207 .928 202 
Operating income No 1.818 .808 33 
Yes 2.210 .922 200 
Net income No 1.875 .833 32 
Yes 2.210 .938 200 
Profit rate 
Earnings per share No 1.906 .818 32 
Yes 2.326 .990 196 
Dividends per share No 1.967 .836 31 
Yes 2.387 .973 196 
Price/Earning ratio No 2.000 .856 31 
Yes 2.352 .918 187 
Return on total assets No 2.034 .944 29 
Yes 2.328 .956 189 
* 1 very superior, 2 superior, 3 same, 4 inferior, 5 very inferior. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 7 -5 -2 T -test and Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test (U -test) for 
Independent Acquiring Enterprise's Post -Transaction Performance by Business 
Group 
Post -transaction performance T -value 2 -Tail 
Sig. 
Z -value 2 -Tail 
Sig. 
Level of profit 
Net sales -2.70 .007 -2.772 .005 
Gross profits -1.93 .055 -2.007 .044 
Operating income -2.30 .022 -2.419 .015 
Net income -1.90 .058 -1.976 .048 
Profit rate 
Earnings per share -2.28 .024 -2.233 .025 
Dividends per share -2.27 .024 -2.232 .025 
Price/Earning ratio -2.00 .047 -2.072 .038 





where µpy = mean or median value of rating scale score, post -transaction performance 
p, same business group 
µpp = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction performance 
p, different business group 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 7 -6 -1 Descriptive Sample Statistics of Acquiring Enterprise's Post -Transaction 





Mean* Std Dev Cases 
(No.) 
Level of profit 
Net sales Horizontal 1.835 .801 140 
Vertical 1.764 .855 34 
Congeneric 2.190 1.078 21 
Conglomerate 2.463 .951 41 
Gross profits Horizontal 2.014 .816 139 
Vertical 2.205 .946 34 
Congeneric 2.428 1.165 21 
Conglomerate 2.487 .978 41 
Operating income Horizontal 2.043 .879 138 
Vertical 2.264 .963 34 
Congeneric 2.350 1.089 20 
Conglomerate 2.341 .883 41 
Net income Horizontal 2.065 .893 137 
Vertical 2.352 .981 34 
Congeneric 2.350 1.089 20 
Conglomerate 2.243 .916 41 
Profit rate 
Earnings per share Horizontal 2.075 .853 132 
Vertical 2.588 1.158 34 
Congeneric 2.600 1.231 20 
Conglomerate 2.452 .942 42 
Dividends per share Horizontal 2.167 .861 131 
Vertical 2.617 1.155 34 
Congeneric 2.650 1.226 20 
Conglomerate 2.452 .889 42 
Price/Earning ratio Horizontal 2.173 .808 127 
Vertical 2.562 1.105 32 
Congeneric 2.578 1.216 19 
Conglomerate 2.375 .868 40 
Return on total assets Horizontal 2.198 .877 126 
Vertical 2.545 1.148 33 
Congeneric 2.421 1.216 19 
Conglomerate 2.300 .883 40 
* 1 very superior, 2 superior, 3 same, 4 inferior, 5 very inferior. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 7 -6 -2 T -test and Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test (U -test) for 












Level of profit 
Net sales Horizontal -Vertical .46 .648 -.588 .556 
Horizontal- Congeneric -1.80 .073 -1.381 .167 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -4.22 .000 -3.823 .000 
Vertical- Congeneric -1.62 .111 -1.480 .138 
Vertical -Conglomerate -3.31 .001 -3.158 .001 
Congeneric- Conglomerate -1.02 .311 -1.249 .211 
Gross profits Horizontal -Vertical -1.19 .237 -1.019 .308 
Horizontal- Congeneric -1.57 .130 -1.533 .125 
Horizontal -Conglomerate -2.82 .007 -2.892 .003 
Vertical- Congeneric -.78 .441 -.617 .537 
Vertical -Conglomerate -1.26 .211 -1.271 .203 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -.21 .833 -.341 .732 
Operating Horizontal- Vertical -1.29 .199 -1.171 .241 
income Horizontal- Congeneric -1.20 .241 -1.174 .240 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -1.90 .058 -2.109 .034 
Vertical- Congeneric -.30 .766 -.235 .813 
Vertical -Conglomerate -.36 .720 -.577 .563 
Congeneric -Conglomerate .03 .974 -.112 .910 
Net income Horizontal -Vertical -1.65 .102 -1.609 .107 
Horizontal- Congeneric -1.29 .198 -1.085 .277 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -1.11 .267 -1.270 .204 
Vertical- Congeneric .01 .992 -.074 .940 
Vertical -Conglomerate .50 .621 -.395 .692 
Congeneric -Conglomerate .40 .691 -.256 .797 
Profit rate 
Earnings per Horizontal -Vertical -2.42 .020 -2.430 .015 
share Horizontal- Congeneric -1.84 .080 -1.832 .066 
Horizontal -Conglomerate -2.43 .016 -2.388 .016 
Vertical- Congeneric -.04 .972 -.110 .911 
Vertical -Conglomerate .55 .583 -.618 .536 
Congeneric- Conglomerate .52 .604 -.268 .788 
Dividends per Horizontal -Vertical -2.12 .040 -2.208 .027 
share Horizontal- Congeneric -1.70 .104 -1.718 .085 
Horizontal -Conglomerate -1.85 .066 -1.879 .060 
Vertical- Congeneric -.10 .923 -.073 .941 
Vertical- Conglomerate .69 .495 -.811 .417 
Congeneric- Conglomerate .72 .473 -.516 .605 
Price/Earning Horizontal -Vertical -1.87 .069 -1.961 .049 
ratio Horizontal- Congeneric -1.41 .174 -1.433 .151 

















Return on total Horizontal- Vertical -1.62 .113 -1.521 .128 
assets Horizontal- Congeneric -.77 .451 -.592 .553 
Horizontal -Conglomerate -.64 .525 -.802 .422 
Vertical- Congeneric .37 .714 -.433 .665 
Vertical -Conglomerate 1.01 .318 -.847 .396 
Congeneric- Conglomerate .43 .666 -.144 .885 
H0 : µpd = 
!Ape H1 : PIA # lApe 
where µpd = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction 
performance p, type d 
'Ape = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction 
performance p, type e 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 7 -7 -1 The Spearman's Rank Correlation between the Merger Motives* and the Post- 
Transaction Performance ** of Acauirina Enterprises 





















Economies of scale .282 a .283 a .332 a .306 a .304 a .270 a .314 a .302 a 
Control of distribution 
channels 
.232 a .263 a .269 a .232 a .278 a .249 a .302 a .267 a 
Reducing administrative 
expense 
.135 a .160 a .153 a .141, .162, .179 a .213 a .193 a 
Acquiring know -how or 
research and development 
.171a .154a .179a .157, .180a .149, .194a .146, 
Acquiring brand marks, 
patents or copyright 
technologies 
.125 .099 .088 .079 .132 a .109 .174 a .143 a 
Enhancing market 
competitiveness 
.218a .195a .225 a .174 a .172 a .151 a .191 a .138 a 
Gaining rapid entry into new 
markets or industries 
.208 a .185 a .175 a .143 a .212 a .209 a .180 a .156, 
Controlling of material 
resources 
.131 a .051 .068 .041 .069 .022 .093 .052 
Combining complementary 
resources 
.082 .001 .032 -.010 .025 -.009 .017 .062 
Resolving financial 
difficulties 
.104 .088 .116 .078 .054 .040 .037 .084 
Increasing corporate debt 
capacity or financing 
.175 a .077 .108 .037 .033 .021 .018 .029 
Risk diversification .099 .097 .116 .109 .115 .118 .146a .152a 
Increased market power .321, .294 a. .274 a .227 a .244 a .239 a .282 a .211 a 
Applying fora listing on 
the stock market 
.123 .141a .135a .114 .132a .117 .202a .154a 
Tax considerations .145 a .086 .113 .075 .066 .035 .076 .097 
Government encouragement 
or support 
.145 a .108 .155 a .125 .066 .058 .107 .137 a 
Exploiting surplus funds .041 .073 .081 .048 .090 .087 .134 a .128 
Buying below replacement 
cost 
.097 .113 .120 .086 .104 .128 .099 .086 
Gaining potential real estate 
or other related values 
-.025 -.022 -.002 -.027 .047 .062 .065 .054 
Improving management 
efficiency generally 
.031 .034 .054 .057 .050 .032 .072 .136 
Improving marketing 
management efficiency 
.087 .117 .128 .125 . 1 5 4 a . 1 1 2 . 1 6 5 . 1 9 7 , 
Improving production 
management efficiency 




.071 .045 .087 .052 .080 .049 .080 .116 
Improving personnel 
management efficiency 
.108 .079 .084 .076 .114 .081 .125 .125 
Improving purchasing 
management efficiency 
.166, .136 a .149 .150 .190 a .165 a .196 a .221 a 
Improving R &D 
management efficiency 
.151a .091 .116 .111 .168a .154a .173a .172a 
I 
* Merger motives 1 very important, 2 fairly important 3 important, 4 slightly important, 5 not 
at all important. 
** Post -transaction performance 1 very superior, 2 superior, 3 same, 4 inferior, 5 very inferior. 
a = Significant at the 0.05 level, two -tailed test. 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis H against H1 
where 110 : p = 0 
H1:p #0 
where p = Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between score on rating scale of 
the merger motives and the post -transaction performance of acquiring enterprises. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 7 -8 -1 Descriptive Sample Statistics of Pre -Transaction Perfouiiance of the 
Acauirin Enterprises relative to that of the Acquired Enterprises 
Pre -transaction 
performance of the 
acquiring enterprises 
relative to that of the 
acquired enterprises 










Level of profit 
Net sales 1.966 1.213 235 73.2 15.3 11.5 
Gross profits 2.133 1.297 233 69.1 18.0 12.9 
Operating income 2.185 1.269 232 66.4 19.8 13.8 
Net income 2.154 1.267 228 67.5 19.3 13.2 
Profit rate 
Earnings per share 2.268 1.363 224 62.1 21.9 16.1 
Dividends per share 2.300 1.276 217 58.5 27.6 13.8 
Price/Earning ratio 2.243 1.293 214 62.6 23.4 14.0 
Return on total assets 2.289 1.394 225 63.6 20.0 16.4 
* 1 very superior, 2 superior, 3 same, 4 inferior, 5 very inferior. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 7 -8 -2 The Spearman's Rank Correlation Between the Pre -Transaction 
Performance of Acquiring Enterprises relative to that of the Acquired Enterprises 
and the Post -Transaction Net Sales of Acquiring Enterprises 
Pre -transaction performance of 
acquiring enterprises relative to 




2 -Tail Sig. Cases 
(No.) 
Level of profit 
Net sales .120 .067 231 
Gross profits .102 .122 229 
Operating income .120 .069 228 
Net income .129 .053 224 
Profit rate 
Earnings per share .108 .108 221 
Dividends per share .140 .039 214 
Price/Earning ratio .102 .139 211 
Return on total assets .098 .143 221 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis H0 against H1 
where Ho:p =0 
H1:p#0 
where p = Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between score on rating scale of 
the pre- transaction performance of acquiring enterprises relative to that of the 
acquired enterprises and the post -transaction net sales of acquiring enterprises 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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1 
Table 7 -8 -3 The Spearman's Rank Correlation between the Pre -Transaction 
Performance of Acquiring Enterprises relative to that of the Acquired Enterprises 
and the Post -Transaction Gross profits of Acauirin Enterprises 
Pre -transaction performance of 
acquiring enterprises relative to 




2 -Tail Sig. Cases 
(No.) 
Level of profit 
Net sales .074 .264 230 
Gross profits .069 .298 229 
Operating income .075 .255 228 
Net income .086 .195 224 
Profit rate 
Earnings per share .035 .596 220 
Dividends per share .094 .170 214 
Price/Earning ratio -.025 .712 211 
Return on total assets .020 .762 221 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis Ho against H1 
where Ho: p =0 
H1 : p #0 
where p = Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between score on rating scale of 
the pre- transaction performance of acquiring enterprises relative to that of the 
acquired enterprises and the post- transaction gross profits of acquiring enterprises 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 7 -8 -4 The Spearman's Rank Correlation between the Pre -Transaction 
Performance of Acquiring Enterprises relative to that of the Acquired Enterprises and 
the Post -Transaction Operating Income of Acquiring Enterprises 
Pre -transaction performance of 
acquiring enterprises relative to 




2 -Tail Sig. Cases 
(No.) 
Level of profit 
Net sales .122 .065 228 
Gross profits .077 .242 228 
Operating income .044 .506 227 
Net income .078 .240 224 
Profit rate 
Earnings per share .030 .652 220 
Dividends per share .111 .105 214 
Price/Earning ratio .002 .976 211 
Return on total assets .025 .707 221 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis Ho against Hi 
where Ho: p =0 
Hl : p#0 
where p = Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between score on rating scale of 
the pre- transaction performance of acquiring enterprises relative to that of the 
acquired enterprises and the post -transaction operating income of acquiring enterprises 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 7 -8 -5 The Spearman's Rank Correlation between the Pre -Transaction 
Performance of Acquiring Enterprises relative to that of the Acquired Enterprises and 
the Post -Transaction Net Income of Acquiring Enterprises 
Pre -transaction performance of 
acquiring enterprises relative to 




2 -Tail Sig. Cases 
(No.) 
Level of profit 
Net sales .111 .095 227 
Gross profits .088 .186 227 
Operating income .054 .413 226 
Net income .106 .112 224 
Profit rate 
Earnings per share .037 .576 220 
Dividends per share .119 .082 214 
Price/Earning ratio .009 .887 211 
Return on total assets .043 .525 221 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis H0 against H1 
where H0 : p = 0 
H1 : p #0 
where p = Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between score on rating scale of 
the pre- transaction performance of acquiring enterprises relative to that of the 
acquired enterprises and the post -transaction net income of acquiring enterprises 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 7 -8 -6 The Spearman's Rank Correlation between the Pre -Transaction 
Performance of Acquiring Enterprises relative to that of the Acquired Enterprises 
and the Post -Transaction Earnings Per Share of Acauirin Ente rises 
Pre -transaction performance of 
acquiring enterprises relative to 




2 -Tail Sig. Cases 
(No.) 
Level of profit 
Net sales .101 .129 224 
Gross profits .063 .348 222 
Operating income .057 .395 222 
Net income .055 .413 222 
Profit rate 
Earnings per share .055 .410 221 
Dividends per share .124 .070 214 
Price/Earning ratio .009 .894 210 
Return on total assets .027 .684 219 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis Ho against H1 
where Ho : p = 
H1:p #0 
where p = Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between score on rating scale of 
the pre -transaction performance of acquiring enterprises relative to that of the 
acquired enterprises and the post- transaction earnings per share of acquiring 
enterprises 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 7 -8 -7 The Spearman's Rank Correlation between the Pre -Transaction 
Performance of Acquiring Enterprises relative to that of the Acquired Enterprises 
and the Post -Transaction Dividends Per Share of Acquiring Enterprises 
Pre- transaction performance of 
acquiring enterprises relative to 




2 -Tail Sig. Cases 
(No.) 
Level of profit 
Net sales .117 .081 223 
Gross profits .105 .118 222 
Operating income .080 .230 222 
Net income .105 .119 222 
Profit rate 
Earnings per share .107 .111 220 
Dividends per share .168 .014 214 
Price/Earning ratio .042 .545 210 
Return on total assets .086 .201 219 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis Ho against H1 
where Ho : p = 0 
H1:p #0 
where p = Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between score on rating scale of 
the pre- transaction performance of acquiring enterprises relative to that of the 
acquired enterprises and the post -transaction dividends per share of acquiring 
enterprises 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 7 -8 -8 The Spearman's Rank Correlation between the Pre -Transaction 
Performance of Acquiring Enterprises relative to that of the Acquired Enterprises 
and the Post -Transaction Price/Earnin Ratio of Acquiring Ente rises 
Pre -transaction performance of 
acquiring enterprises relative to 




2 -Tail Sig. Cases 
(No.) 
Level of profit 
Net sales .056 .413 215 
Gross profits .029 .673 214 
Operating income .081 .236 214 
Net income .048 .479 214 
Profit rate 
Earnings per share .038 .576 212 
Dividends per share .104 .135 206 
Price/Earning ratio .052 .452 208 
Return on total assets .057 .409 212 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis H0 against H1 
where H0 : p = 0 
H1:p#0 
where p = Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between score on rating scale of 
the pre- transaction performance of acquiring enterprises relative to that of the 
acquired enterprises and the post- transaction price /earning ratio of acquiring 
enterprises 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 7 -8 -9 The Spearman's Rank Correlation between the Pre -Transaction 
Performance of Acquiring Enterprises relative to that of the Acquired Enterprises 
and the Post -Transaction Return on Total Assets of Acauirina Enterprises 
Pre -transaction performance of 
acquiring enterprises relative to 




2 -Tail Sig. Cases 
(No.) 
Level of profit 
Net sales .036 .596 215 
Gross profits -.042 .539 214 
Operating income -.016 .806 214 
Net income -.042 .537 214 
Profit rate 
Earnings per share -.060 .379 212 
Dividends per share .006 .930 206 
Price/Earning ratio -.038 .583 205 
Return on total assets -.051 .459 213 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis Ho against Hl 
where Ho:p =0 
H1:p#0 
where p = Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between score on rating scale of 
the pre- transaction performance of acquiring enterprises relative to that of the 
acquired enterprises and the post -transaction return on total assets of acquiring 
enterprises 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
Table 7 -9 -1 Descriptive Sample Statistics of the Acquiring Enterprise's Transaction 
Process Problems 
Transaction process problems Mean* Variance Cases 
(No.) 
Asset Valuation 1.822 1.450 242 
Goodwill Valuation 1.535 1.027 243 
Contingent Loss 1.580 1.104 243 
Customer Drain 1.354 0.577 243 
Manager or Employee Drain 1.527 0.854 243 
Personnel Arrangements 1.584 1.046 243 
Shareholders against Bidding 1.362 0.703 243 
Corporate Culture Differences 1.506 0.920 243 
Litigation 1.256 0.374 242 
Raising Finance 1.281 0.427 242 
Government Regulations 1.579 1.108 242 
* 1 not at all serious, 2 a little serious, 3 serious, 4 fairly serious, 5 very serious. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 7 -9 -2 Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test for Independent Acquiring 
























Asset valuation -.502 -1.117 -1.133 -1.287 -1.950 -2.048 a -.328 -1.509 
Goodwill valuation -.677 -.983 -1.004 -.732 -1.377 -1.491 -.088 -.920 
Contingent loss -.017 -1.461 -1.480 -1.853 -2.874 a -2.443 a -1.258 -2.124 a 
Customer drain -.480 -1.093 -1.074 -.800 -1.280 -1.147 -.722 -1.163 
Manager or 
employee drain 
-1.171 -.407 -.144 -.779 -.382 -.149 -.525 -.857 
Personnel 
arrangements 
-.643 -1.404 -1.316 -1.895 -2.589 a -2.722 a -1.356 -2.399 a 
Shareholders 
against bidding 
-.401 -1.132 -.959 -1.233 -1.056 -1.483 -.477 -1.486 
Corporate culture 
differences 
-1.427 -.540 -.118 -.315 -1.079 -.995 -.741 -.794 
Litigation -1.956a -1.214 -1.112 -1.167 -1.110 -1.624 -.085 -.126 
Raising finance -2.422a -.780 -.173 -1.102 -.415 -.246 -.278 -.230 
Government 
regulations 
-2.568 a -1.646 -.785 -.627 -.143 -.030 -.146 -.082 
Ho : lApn = Nps 
H1 : # pips 
where µpn = median value of rating scale score, post- transaction performance p, not at all or 
a little serious asset valuation problem 
pips = median value of rating scale score, post- transaction performance p, serious or 
fairly serious or very serious asset valuation problem 
a = Significant at the 0.05 level, two -tailed test. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996 
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Table 7 -9 -3 Descriptive Sample Statistics of the Acquiring Enterprise's Government 
Regulations Problem (Transaction Process) 
Government regulations 
Problem 
Cases Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Not at all serious 171 70.7 70.7 
A little serious 28 11.6 82.2 
Serious 26 10.7 93.0 
Fairly serious 8 3.3 96.3 
Very serious 9 3.7 100.0 
Total 242 100.0 100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
Table 7 -9 -4 Descriptive Sample Statistics of the Acquiring Enterprise's Shareholders 
against Bidding Problem (Transaction Process) 
Shareholders against 
Bidding Problem 
Cases Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Not at all serious 192 79.0 79.0 
A little serious 29 11.9 90.9 
Serious 12 4.9 95.9 
Fairly serious 5 2.1 97.9 
Very serious 5 2.1 100.0 
Total 243 100.0 100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 8 -2 -1 Superior Post -Transaction Profits Performance Likelihood Hypotheses 
and Independent Variables 
Hypothesis Dependent Variables 
0 = same or inferior post- transaction performance 




1. Merger motive 
hypothesis 
Economies of scale - 
Control of distribution channels - 
Reducing administrative expense - 
Acquiring know -how or research and development - 
Acquiring brand marks, patent or copyright 
technology 
- 
Enhancing market competitiveness - 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or industries - 
Controlling of material resources - 
Combining complementary resources - 
Resolving financial difficulties - 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or financing - 
Risk diversification - 
Increased market power - 
Applying for a listing on the stock market - 
Tax considerations - 
Government encouragement or support - 
Exploiting surplus funds ? 
Buying below replacement cost ? 
Gaining potential real estate or other related values ? 
Improving marketing management efficiency - 
Improving production management efficiency - 
Improving finance management efficiency - 
Improving personnel management efficiency - 
Improving purchasing management efficiency - 
2. The main method of 
payment hypothesis 
Cash (reserves) + 
Cash (bank borrowing) + 
Common stock ? 
Subscription warrants ? 
The other payment methods ? 
3. Acquired firm's 
estimation method 
hypothesis 
Book value ? 
Stock market value ? 
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Replacement cost value ? 
Cash flow value ? 
The others estimation method ? 
4. Pre -transaction 
performance 
hypothesis 
Net sales - 
Gross profits - 
Operating income - 
Net income - 
Earnings per share - 
Dividends per share - 
Price/Earning ratio - 




Asset valuation - 
Goodwill valuation - 
Contingent loss - 
Customer drain - 
Manager or employee drain - 
Personnel arrangements - 
Shareholders against bidding - 
Corporate culture differences - 
Litigation - 
Raising finance - 
Government regulations - 
* 1. Merger motives : 1 very important, 2 fairly important, 3 important, 4 slightly 
important, 5 not at all important. 
2. Payment methods dummy : The dummy is assigned a value one if the acquiring 
firm choose one of the main methods of payment. 
3. Acquired firm's estimation method dummy : The dummy is assigned a value one 
if the acquiring firm choose one of the estimation methods for the acquired firm. 
4. Pre -transaction performance : 1 very superior, 2 superior, 3 same, 4 inferior, 5 
very inferior. 
5. Transaction process problems : 1 not at all serious, 2 a little serious, 3 serious, 4 
fairly serious, 5 very serious. 
* *A negative sign of merger motives, pre- transaction performance and transaction 
process problems implies that the variable increases the likelihood of superior post - 
transaction performance and a positive sign implies the opposite. 
A positive sign of the main method of payment and the acquired firm's estimation 
method implies that the variable increases the likelihood of superior post- transaction 
performance and a negative sign implies the opposite. 
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Table 8 -3 -1 Level of Profits Measures of Different Method Selection Comparisons of SPSS 




























Model Chi -Squire 
Significance 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Correct 
classification ( %) 
86.29 75.63 75.63 75.63 81.22 77.66 
No. of variables 
in the equation 
54 4 4 4 19 7 
Gross profits 
Model Chi -Squire 
Significance 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Correct 
classification ( %) 
85.79 72.08 72.08 72.08 79.70 76.14 
No. of variables 
in the equation 
54 4 4 4 25 6 
Operating income 
Model Chi -Squire 
Significance 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Correct 
classification ( %) 
85.79 75.63 75.63 75.63 81.22 78.17 
No. of variables 
in the equation 
54 4 4 4 24 13 
Net income 
Model Chi -Squire 
Significance 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Correct 
classification ( %) 
84.26 71.07 71.07 71.07 84.26 75.63 
No. of variables 
in the equation 
54 3 3 3 25 7 
Cases 197 197 197 197 197 197 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Correct 
classification ( %) 
87.31 73.60 73.60 73.60 80.71 74.11 
No. of variables 
in the equation 
54 3 3 3 16 5 
Dividends per 
share 
Model Chi -Squire 
Significance 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Correct 
classification ( %) 
83.25 76.14 76.14 76.14 78.68 76.14 
No. of variables 
in the equation 
54 8 8 8 15 10 
Price/Earnings 
ratio 
Model Chi -Squire 
Significance 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Correct 
classification ( %) 
82.56 71.28 
No. of variables 
in the equation 
54 3 3 3 16 4 
Return on total 
assets 
Model Chi -Squire 
Significance 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Correct 
classification ( %) 
82.29 72.40 72.40 72.40 75.52 74.48 
No. of variables 
in the equation 
54 1 1 1 18 4 
Cases 197 197 197 197 197 197 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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-.409 .159 6.609 .010 -.139 
Gaining rapid entry 
into new markets or 
industries 
-.502 .193 6.748 .009 -.141 
Increased market 
power 
-.528 .143 13.588 .000 -.221 
Buying below 
replacement cost 
.344 .167 4.256 .039 .097 
Cash (bank 
borrowing) 
1.151 .670 2.949 .085 .063 
Personnel 
arrangements 
-.413 .226 3.337 .067 -.075 
Government 
regulations 
.438 .209 4.407 .035 .100 
Constant 4.051 .938 18.630 .000 
Model Chi -Square 
(df =7) 
49.688 .000 
Cases = 197 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 8 -3 -4 Parameter Estimates for the Logistic Regression Model (Gross Profits 



















-.332 .155 4.575 .032 -.102 
Increased market 
power 
-.296 .146 4.066 .043 -.091 
Buying below 
replacement cost 
1.465 .653 5.031 .024 .110 
Dividends per share 
relative to that of 
acquired firm before 
the transaction 
-.792 .473 2.804 .094 -.057 
Price/Earning ratio 
relative to that of 
acquired firm before 
the transaction 
1.119 .479 5.450 .019 .118 
Constant 2.953 .617 22.866 .000 
Model Chi -Square 
(df = 6) 
44.726 .000 
Cases = 197 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 8 -3 -5 Parameter Estimates for the Logistic Regression Model (Operating 
Income Post -Transaction Performance) 
















-.538 .190 8.023 .004 -.155 
Acquiring brand 
marks, patents or 
copyright 
technologies 




.314 .161 3.791 .051 .087 
Applying for a listing 
on the stock market 








-.276 .168 2.678 .101 -.052 
Cash (bank 
borrowing) 
2.781 .859 10.485 .001 .184 
The other payment 
methods 
-2.135 1.019 4.386 .036 -.097 
Net sales relative to 
that of acquired firm 
before the transaction 
-.938 .284 10.912 .001 -.188 
Return on total assets 
relative to that of 
acquired firm before 
the transaction 
.998 .273 13.334 .000 .213 
Customer drain -.738 .297 6.157 .013 -.129 
Government 
regulations 
.508 .235 4.671 .030 .103 
Constant 4.601 1.168 15.515 .000 
Model Chi -Square 
(df = 13) 
73.781 .000 
Cases = 197 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 8 -3 -6 Parameter Estimates for the Logistic Regression Model (Net Income 













Economies of scale -.262 .133 3.847 .049 -.085 
Control of 
distribution channels 




-.289 .164 3.093 .078 -.065 
Controlling of 
material resources 




-.350 .149 5.456 .019 -.116 
Cash (bank 
borrowing) 
2.061 .709 8.445 .003 .159 
The other payment 
methods 
-1.726 .956 3.260 .071 -.070 
Constant 2.649 .605 19.153 .000 
Model Chi -Square 
(df =7) 
48.303 .000 
Cases = 197 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 8 -3 -7 Parameter Estimates for the Logistic Regression Model (Earnings Per 



















-.362 .153 5.582 .018 -.117 
Cash (bank 
borrowing) 
1.453 .654 4.939 .026 .106 
Replacement cost 
value 
.902 .454 3.954 .046 .086 
Contingent loss -.417 .170 6.006 .014 -.124 
Constant 3.907 .691 31.938 .000 
Model Chi -Square 
(df = 5) 
49.029 .000 
Cases = 197 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 8 -3 -8 Parameter Estimates for the Logistic Regression Model (Dividends Per 















-.546 .157 12.086 .000 -.194 
Controlling of 
material resources 








-.370 .160 5.323 .021 -.111 
Stock market value 2.155 1.142 3.557 .059 .076 
Replacement cost 
value 
1.541 .476 10.455 .001 .178 
Goodwill valuation .478 .295 2.623 .105 .048 
Contingent loss -.638 .269 5.600 .018 -.116 
Manager or 
employee drain 
.848 .413 4.202 .040 .091 
Personnel 
arrangements 
-1.090 .360 9.154 .002 -.164 
Constant 3.319 .884 14.100 .000 
Model Chi -Square 
(df = 10) 
63.297 .000 
Cases = 197 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 8 -3 -9 Parameter Estimates for the Logistic Regression Model (Price/Earning 















-.486 .154 9.926 .001 -.174 
Controlling of 
material resources 
.327 .157 4.304 .038 .094 
Increased market 
power 
-.368 .147 6.232 .012 -.127 
The other payment 
methods 
-1.508 .909 2.749 .097 -.053 
Constant 2.062 .532 15.015 .000 
Model Chi -Square 
(df = 4) 
40.723 .000 
Cases = 195 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 8 -3 -10 Parameter Estimates for the Logistic Regression Model (Return on total 















-.717 .147 23.705 .000 -.292 
Controlling of 
material resources 




-.411 .151 7.425 .006 -.146 
Personnel 
arrangements 
-.417 .189 4.823 .028 -.105 
Constant 3.803 .811 21.988 .000 
Model Chi -Square 
(df =7) 
40.898 .000 
Cases = 192 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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26 31 45.61 










31 32 49.21 










37 28 56.92 




Same or inferior Superior Percent 





31 37 45.59 
Superior 11 118 91.47 
Overall 75.63 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 8 -3 -12 Classification Table for the Acquiring Firm's Post -Transaction Profit Rate 
Performance 
Predicted 
(Earnings Per Share) 
Same or inferior Superior Percent Correct 
( %) 
Observed 
(Earnings Per Share) 
Same or 
inferior 
42 32 56.76 
Superior 19 104 84.55 
Overall 74.11 
Predicted 
(Dividends Per Share) 
Same or inferior Superior Percent Correct 
( %) 
Observed 
(Dividends Per Share) 
Same or 
inferior 
51 29 63.75 










45 30 60.00 
Superior 26 94 78.33 
Overall 71.28 
Predicted 
(Return on total assets) 
Same or inferior Superior Percent Correct 
( %) 
Observed 
(Return on total assets) 
Same or 
inferior 
40 31 56.34 
Superior 18 103 85.12 
Overall 74.48 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Table 9 -3 -1 Descriptive Sample Statistics of Taiwanese Enterprises' Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
Acquired firms Acquiring firms Non -transaction firms 
1990 1 11 1,791 
1991 11 18 1,791 
1992 8 23 1,791 
1993 16 34 1,791 
1994 22 44 1,791 
1995 25 56 1,791 
Total 83 186 
Sources: 
(1)Joint Credit Information Centre Database, Taiwan, ROC, August 1997 
(2)Department of Commerce, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC, March 1996 
(3)Bureau of Industrial Affairs, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC, March 1996 
(4)Securities and Exchange Commission, Ministry of Finance, ROC, March 1996 
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Table 9 -3 -2 Observed and Expected Acquired Firms for Transaction Year 







1990 12 1 3.49 -2.49 
1991 31 11 9.03 1.97 
1992 40 8 11.65 -3.65 
1993 55 16 16.02 -.02 
1994 67 22 19.51 2.49 
1995 80 25 23.30 1.70 
Total 285 83 83 0 
Chi -Square 3.7962 D.F. 5 
Sources: 
(1)Joint Credit Information Centre Database, Taiwan, ROC, August 1997 
(2)Department of Commerce, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC, March 1996 
(3)Bureau of, Industrial Affairs, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC, March 1996 
(4)Securities and Exchange Commission, Ministry of Finance, ROC, March 1996 
Significance .5791 










1990 12 11 7.83 3.17 
1991 31 18 20.23 -2.23 
1992 40 23 26.11 -3.11 
1993 55 34 35.89 -1.89 
1994 67 44 43.73 .27 
1995 80 56 52.21 3.79 
Total 285 186 186 0 
Chi -Square 2.2741 
Sources: 
(1)Joint Credit Information Centre Database, Taiwan, ROC, August 1997 
(2)Department of Commerce, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC, March 1996 
(3)Bureau of Industrial Affairs, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC, March 1996 
(4)Securities and Exchange Commission, Ministry of Finance, ROC, March 1996 
D.F. 5 Significance .8101 
344 
Table 9 -4 -1 Descriptive Sample Statistics of Taiwanese Enterprises' Average Size and 




1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Total assets 
Acquired firms 
Mean 229,605,000 1,416,353,000 843,792,000 367,652,000 1,482,744,000 
Std. Dev. 83,554,000 2,271,418,000 834,730,000 521,425,000 3,717,569,000 
Cases 11 6 10 14 23 
Acquiring firms 
Mean 3,615,074,000 2,843,349,000 2,047,069,000 2,274,787,000 2,730,932,000 
Std. Dev. 4,173,768,000 4,958,855,000 2,537,422,000 3,568,706,000 6,623,874,000 
Cases 14 18 24 29 44 
Non -trans. 
firms 
Mean 967,499,000 1,101,121,000 1,208,884,000 1,342,081,000 1,537,487,000 
Std. Dev. 2,912,586,000 3,232,070,000 3,550,505,000 3,874,093,000 4,583,418,000 
Cases 1,744 1,744 1,744 1,744 1,744 
Net sales 
Acquired firms 
Mean 279,483,000 485,554,000 613,765,000 567,502,000 794,624,000 
Std. Dev. 284,083,000 605,852,000 311,594,000 1,222,594,000 1,738,916,000 
Cases 11 6 10 14 23 
Acquiring firms 
Mean 6,557,602,000 2,215,979,000 1,187,968,000 1,810,663,000 1,970,067,000 
Std. Dev. 8,162,134,000 4,813,016,000 1,422,265,000 3,975,016,000 6,168,595,000 
Cases 14 18 24 29 44 
Non -trans. 
firms 
Mean 794,554,000 903,832,000 951,989,000 1,010,213,000 1,148,797,000 
Std. Dev. 2,255,767,000 2,569,502,000 2,643,198,000 2,767,009,000 3,260,805,000 




Mean -.177 -.127 -.068 .078 .194 
Std. Dev. .334 .354 .601 .327 .469 
Cases 11 6 10 14 23 
Acquiring firms 
Mean .094 .346 .115 .049 .035 
Std. Dev. .125 .619 .370 .167 .390 
Cases 14 18 24 29 44 
Non -trans. 
firms 
Mean .189 .113 .119 .105 .123 
Std. Dev. 4.204 .630 .636 .594 .579 
Cases 1,740 1,744 1 ,740 1,744 1,744 




Mean -.098 -.028 -.005 -.008 .023 
Std. Dev. .210 .065 .131 .102 .099 
Cases 11 6 10 14 23 
Acquiring firms 
Mean .030 .053 .008 .017 .018 
Std. Dev. .044 .081 .082 .054 .061 
Cases 14 18 24 29 44 
Non -trans. 
firms 
Mean .014 .021 .020 .018 .023 
Std. Dev. .068 .062 .077 .072 .070 
Cases 1,744 1,744 1,744 1,744 1,744 
Current ratio 
Acquired firms 
Mean 2.823 4.416 1.015 3.251 2.758 
Std. Dev. 2.875 8.025 1.040 7.145 4.081 
Cases 11 6 10 14 23 
Acquiring firms 
Mean 6.386 2.340 3.012 1.621 1.813 
Std. Dev. 12.680 2.522 9.246 2.268 3.582 
Cases 14 18 24 29 44 
Non -trans. 
firms 
Mean 1.273 1.415 1.513 1.578 1.773 
Std. Dev. 1.595 3.569 4.536 6.195 9.955 
Cases 1,384 1,383 1,383 1,383 1,383 
Cash flow ratio 
Acquired firms 
Mean .320 1.926 .311 
Std. Dev. .625 6.775 .720 
Cases 10 14 21 
Acquiring firms 
Mean .056 .042 .001 
Std. Dev. .332 .445 .476 
Cases 22 29 42 
Non -trans. 
firms 
Mean .206 .100 .177 
Std. Dev. .931 2.791 .813 
Cases 1,743 1,742 1,744 
Sources: 
(1)Joint Credit Information Centre Database, Taiwan, ROC, August 1997 
(2)Department of Commerce, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC, March 1996 
(3)Bureau of Industrial Affairs, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC, March 1996 
(4)Securities and Exchange Commission, Ministry of Finance, ROC, March 1996 
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Table 9 -4 -2 Stock Market Yearly Average Price Index and Economic Growth Rate 
In Taiwan 
Stock Market Yearly Average Price 
Index (1966 =100) 
Economic Growth Rate 
( %) 
1987 2,135.03 12.74 
1988 5,202.21 7.84 
1989 8,616.14 8.23 
1990 6,775.32 5.39 
1991 4,928.83 7.55 
1992 4,271.63 6.76 
1993 4,214.78 6.32 
1994 6,252.99 6.54 
1995 5,543.75 6.03 
1996 6,003.72 5.71 













Figure 9 -4 -1 Taiwan Stock Price Index Trends (1966 = 100) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Source: Monthly Statistics of the Republic of China, June 1997. 
1994 
Figure 9 -4 -2 Economic Growth Trends in Taiwan 
I + Economic growth rate ( %) 
1995 1996 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Source: Monthly Statistics of the Republic of China, June 1997. 
1994 1995 1996 
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Table 9 -5 -1 Descriptive Sample Statistics of Taiwanese Enterprises' Average Size and 





Earnings per share 
Acquired firms 
Mean 12.669 12.367 .033 
Std. Deviation 1.286 1.722 .447 
Cases 64 64 64 
Acquiring films 
Mean 13.783 13.302 .103 
Std. Deviation 1.396 1.700 .380 
Cases 129 129 129 
Non -trans. films 
Mean 12.904 12.799 .130 
Std. Deviation, 1.300 1.275 1.956 
Cases 1,744 1,741 1,740 
Return on total 
assets 
Current ratio Cash flow ratio 
Acquired fiinis 
Mean -.013 2.760 .815 
Std. Deviation .131 4.871 3.801 
Cases 64 64 45 
Acquiring firms 
Mean .022 2.563 .026 
Std. Deviation .066 6.325 .433 
Cases 129 129 93 
Non -trans. firms 
Mean .019 1.510 .161 
Std. Deviation .070 5.888 1.762 
Cases 1,744 1,383 1,742 
Sources: 
(1)Joint Credit Infoimation Centre Database, Taiwan, ROC, August 1997 
(2)Department of Commerce, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC, March 1996 
(3)Bureau of Industrial Affairs, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC, March 1996 
(4)Securities and Exchange Commission, Ministry of Finance, ROC, March 1996 
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Table 9 -5 -2 Independent Samples T -tests for Average Size and Operating and 







Acd = Non(Acd) 
T -value -1.51 -2.72 -.40 
2 -Tail Sign. .131 .006 .693 
Acd =Acg 
T -value -5.50 -3.58 -1.12 
2 -Tail Sign. .000 .000 .263 
Acd = Non(Trans.) 
T -value -1.44 -2.70 -.39 
2 -Tail Sign. .150 .007 .693 
Acg = Non(Trans.) 
T -value 7.62 3.34 -.16 
2 -Tail Sign. .000 .001 .875 
Return on total 
assets 
Current ratio Cash flow 
ratio 
Acd = Non(Acd) 
T -value -2.03 2.01 1.16 
2 -Tail Sign. .047 .049 .253 
Acd =Acg 
T -value -2.08 .22 1.39 
2 -Tail Sign. .041 .827 .172 
Acd = Non(Trans.) 
T -value -2.02 2.04 1.15 
2 -Tail Sign. .047 .046 .255 
Acg = Non(Trans.) 
T -value .47 1.87 -.74 
2 -Tail Sign. .641 .063 .462 
Hp : µnp = I..tnq 
HI : µnp # µnq 
where µp = mean value of firm's size or performance n, group p 
= mean value of firm's size or performance n, group q 
Source: Own calculations based on financial data from the Joint Credit Information 
Centre Database, Taiwan, ROC, August 1997. 
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Table 9 -6 -1 Paired Samples T -tests for Average Size and Operating and Financial 








Mean 12.689 12.376 .030 
Std. Dev. 1.410 1.830 .467 
Acquiring firms 
Mean 14.249 13.861 .200 
Std. Dev. 1.336 1.733 .932 
Number of Pairs 50 50 50 
Acd = Acg 
T -value -6.92 -4.16 -1.14 
2 -Tail Sign. .000 .000 .261 
Return on total 
assets 
Current ratio Cash flow ratio 
Acquired filins 
Mean -.018 2.781 .975 
Std. Dev. .141 4.951 4.245 
Acquiring firms 
Mean .023 5.138 .038 
Std. Dev. .075 12.419 .407 
Number of Pairs 50 50 36 
Acd = Acg 
T -value -1.89 -1.29 1.31 
2 -Tail Sign. .065 .203 .199 
HQ 
: µnP = µa9 
H1 : jt # µn9 
where µnP = mean value of firm's size or performance n, group of acquired firms 
µn9 = mean value of firm's size or performance n, group of acquiring firms 
Source: Own calculations based on financial data from the Joint Credit Information Centre 
Database, Taiwan, ROC, August 1997. 
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Size 1.000 .997a .065a .007 -.029 .282a -.001 -.023 
Size2 997a 1.000 .065a .008 -.028 .281a .001 -.024 
Growth .065a .065a 1.000 .009 .000 -.003 -.012 .023 
Profit- 
ability 
.007 .008 .009 1.000 .857a .035 .020 -.051b 
Profit- 
ability2 




.282a .281a -.003 .035 -.019 1.000 -.294a .248a 
Liquid- 
ity 
-.001 .001 -.012 .020 .008 -.294a 1.000 -.126a 
Liquid- 
ity2 
-.023 -.024 .023 -.051b -.037 .248a -.126a 1.000 
a = Significant at the 0.01 level, two -tailed test. 
b = Significant at the 0.05 level, two -tailed test. 
Source: Own calculations based on financial data from the Joint Credit Information 
Centre Database, Taiwan, ROC, August 1997. 
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Table 10 -4 -1 Parameter Estimates for Various Logistic Regression Models to 
Distinguish between Acquired and Non -Acquired Firms Over the One Year Prior to 
the Transaction Year 
(Dependent variable is Log [Prob.(f is acquired) / 1- Prob.(f is acquired)]) 
Independent Variable Estimated 
coefficient 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Size -.144 -.625 -.049 .367 -.075 
[ Ln(total assetst_i)] (1.695), (.187) (.143) (.028) (.326) 
Size2 .018 -.016 
[Ln(total assetst_i)] 2 (.106) (.039) 
Growth .021 .017 .018 
[(TAt_i- TAt_2) /TAt_2] (.141) (.082) (.108) 
Profitability -7.316a -8.720a -6.453a -8.485a -6.533a 
(Return on total assetst_i) (14.734) (12.509) (6.201) (7.251) (6.915) 
Profitability2 -1.186 -7.883 
(Return on total assetst_i) 2 (.063) (.840) 
Change in Profitability -8.617a -7.619a -7.290a 
(ROTAt_i- ROTAt_2) (14.412) (11.822) (11.355) 
Liquidity .019 .410a .080 .080 
(Current ratiot_i) (2.290) (14.750) (2.215) (2.307) 
Liquidity2 -.011a -.000 -.000 
(Current ratiot_i) 2 (5.846) (.566) (.651) 
Constant -1.313 1.318 -3.183b -5.700 -2.748 
(.857) (.019) (3.594) (.160) (2.640) 
-2 Log Likelihood 506.629 484.943 380.300 360.515 361.787 
Chi -Square 21.986 43.672 29.648 30.928 29.655 
Degree of Freedom 3 6 4 8 6 
Significance Levels .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Number of Cases 1,570 1,570 1,881 1,521 1,521 
a = Significant at the 0.05 level, two -tailed test. 
b = Significant at the 0.10 level, two -tailed test. 
The Wald statistic Wk2 = [bk / (standard error of bk)] 2, computed to test for the 
statistical significance of individual coefficients, is shown in parentheses for each 
coefficient estimate. 
Source: Own calculations based on financial data from the Joint Credit Information 
Centre Database, Taiwan, ROC, August 1997. 
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Table 10 -4 -2 Classification Table for the Acquired and Non -Acquired Firms 
Model 1 Predicted 
Non -Acquired 
firms 
Acquired firms Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Non -Acquired 
firms 
1,507 0 100.00 
Acquired firms 62 1 1.59 
Overall 96.05 
Model 2 Predicted 
Non -Acquired 
firms 
Acquired firms Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Non -Acquired 
firms 
1,506 1 99.93 
Acquired firms 60 3 4.76 
Overall 96.11 
Model 3 Predicted 
Non -Acquired 
firms 
Acquired firms Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Non -Acquired 
films 
1,837 1 99.95 
Acquired films 40 3 6.98 
Overall 97.82 
Model 4 Predicted 
Non -Acquired 
firms 
Acquired fit ins Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Non -Acquired 
firms 
1,477 1 99.93 
Acquired firms 39 4 9.30 
Overall 97.37 
Model 5 Predicted 
Non -Acquired 
firms 
Acquired firms Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Non -Acquired 
firms 
1,477 1 99.93 
Acquired firms 39 4 9.30 
Overall 97.37 
Source: Own calculations based on financial data from the Joint Credit Information 
Centre Database, Taiwan, ROC, August 1997. 
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Table 10 -4 -3 Parameter Estimates for Various Logistic Regression Models to 
Distinguish between Acquired and Acquiring Firms Over the One Year Prior to the 
Transaction Year 
(Dependent variable is Log [Prob.(f is acquired) / 1- Prob.(f is acquired)]) 
Independent Variable Estimated 
coefficient 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Size -.654a -2.538 -.664a -4.696 -.675a 
[ Ln(total assetst_1)] (18.998) (1.108) (13.420) (2.555) (13.728) 
Size2 .070 .147 
[Ln(total assetst_1)] 2 (.625) (1.906) 
Growth -.170 -.186 -.212 
[(TAt_1- TAt_2) /TAt_2] (.627) (.570) (.770) 
Profitability -2.861 -2.635 -5.196b -4.503 -4.686 
(Return on total assetst_1) (2.174) (1.234) (2.969) (1.976) (2.240) 
Profitability2 29.955b 22.413 
(Return on total assetst_1) 2 (3.245) (1.092) 
Change in Profitability -1.175 -1.713 -1.803 
(ROTAt_1- ROTAt_2) (.340) (.574) (.665) 
Liquidity .009 .150 -.108 -.094 
(Current ratiot_1) (.120) (1.861) (.737) (.593) 
Liquidity2 -.004 .002 .002 
(Current ratiot_1) 2 (1.109) (.551) (.441) 
Constant 7.926a 20.037 8.139a 35.461b 8.423a 
(16.492) (1.527) (11.744) (3.121) (12.139) 
-2 Log Likelihood 206.944 198.733 142.678 138.740 142.024 
Chi -Square 31.201 39.412 27.795 31.732 28.448 
Degree of Freedom 3 6 4 8 6 
Significance Levels .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Number of Cases 186 186 137 137 137 
a = Significant at the 0.05 level, two -tailed test. 
b = Significant at the 0.10 level, two -tailed test. 
The Wald statistic Wk2 = [bk / (standard error of bk)] 
21 computed to test for the 
statistical significance of individual coefficients, is shown in parentheses for each 
coefficient estimate. 
Source: Own calculations based on financial data from the Joint Credit Information 
Centre Database, Taiwan, ROC, August 1997. 
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Table 10 -4 -4 Classification Table for the Acquired and Acquiring Firms 
Model 1 Predicted 
Acquiring firms Acquired films Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Acquiring firms 110 13 89.43 
Acquired firms 36 27 42.86 
Overall 73.68 
Model 2 Predicted 
Acquiring firms Acquired firms Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Acquiring firms 111 12 90.24 
Acquired fiuns 35 28 44.44 
Overall 74.73 
Model 3 Predicted 
Acquiring firms Acquired firms Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Acquiring films 90 4 95.74 
Acquired firms 23 20 46.51 
Overall 80.29 
Model 4 Predicted 
Acquiring filins Acquired firms Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Acquiring firms 88 6 93.62 
Acquired firms 25 18 41.86 
Overall 77.37 
Model 5 Predicted 
Acquiring firms Acquired firms Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Acquiring firms 88 6 93.62 
Acquired firms 25 18 41.86 
Overall 77.37 
Source: Own calculations based on financial data from the Joint Credit Information 
Centre Database, Taiwan, ROC, August 1997. 
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Table 10 -4 -5 Parameter Estimates for Various Logistic Regression Models to 
Distinguish between Acquired and Non -Transaction Firms Over the One Year Prior to 
the Transaction Year 
(Dependent variable is Log [Prob.(f is acquired) / 1- Prob.(f is acquired)]) 
Independent Variable Estimated 
coefficient 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Models 
Size -.091 -.585 -.032 -.143 -.047 
[Ln(total assetst_1)] (.664), (.162) (.056) (.004) (.122) 
Size2 .018 .004 
[Ln(total assetst_1)] 2 (.113) (.003) 
Growth .540 .551 .593b 
[(TAt_1- TAt_2) /TAt_2] (2.482) (2.403) (3.052) 
Profitability -7.643a -9.784a -5.434b -8.132a -5.822a 
(Return on total assetst_1) (15.174) (14.511) (3.346) (5.478) (4.500) 
Profitability2 -2.803 -10.764 
(Return on total assetst_1) 2 (.322) (1.101) 
Change in Profitability -10.393a -9.588a -8.571a 
(ROTAt_1- ROTAt_2) (9.993) (7.940) (8.660) 
Liquidity .021 .467a .134a .133a 
(Current ratiot_1) (2.548) (18.062) (4.928) (5.095) 
Liquidity2 -.012a -.000 -.000 
(Current ratiot_1) 2 (6.997) (1.502) (1.638) 
Constant -1.907 .726 -3.440a -2.686 -3.207b 
(1.761) (.005) (3.901) (.038) (3.353) 
-2 Log Likelihood 496.708 471.185 370.786 347.521 349.293 
Chi -Square 21.406 46.929 34.701 38.353 36.581 
Degree of Freedom 3 6 4 8 6 
Significance Levels .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Number of Cases 1,447 1,447 1,787 1,427 1,427 
a = Significant at the 0.05 level, two -tailed test. 
b = Significant at the 0.10 level, two -tailed test. 
c = The Wald statistic Wk2 = [bk / (standard error of bk)] 2, computed to test for the 
statistical significance of individual coefficients, is shown in parentheses for each 
coefficient estimate. 
Source: Own calculations based on financial data from the Joint Credit Information 
Centre Database, Taiwan, ROC, August 1997. 
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Table 10 -4 -6 Classification Table for the Acquired and Non -Transaction Firms 
Model 1 Predicted 
Non -Transaction 
firms 
Acquired firms Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Non -Transaction 
films 
1,383 1 99.93 
Acquired fil mis 62 1 1.59 
Overall 95.65 
Model 2 Predicted 
Non -Transaction 
firms 
Acquired films Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Non -Transaction 
firms 
1,382 2 99.86 
Acquired fill is 60 3 4.76 
Overall 95.72 
Model 3 Predicted 
Non -Transaction 
films 
Acquired firms Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Non -Transaction 
filins 
1,743 1 99.94 
Acquired films 38 5 11.63 
Overall 97.82 
Model 4 Predicted 
Non -Transaction 
firms 
Acquired firms Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Non -Transaction 
fig is 
1,384 0 100.00 
Acquired firms 37 6 13.95 
Overall 97.41 
Model 5 Predicted 
Non -Transaction 
firms 
Acquired films Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Non -Transaction 
films 
1,383 1 99.93 
Acquired firms 37 6 13.95 
Overall 97.34 
Source: Own calculations based on financial data from the Joint Credit Information 
Centre Database, Taiwan, ROC, August 1997. 
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Table 10 -4 -7 Parameter Estimates for Various Logistic Regression Models to 
Distinguish between Acquiring and Non -Transaction Firms Over the One Year Prior 
to the Transaction Year 
(Dependent variable is Log [ Prob.(f is acquiring) / 1- Prob.(f is acquiring)]) 
Independent Variable Estimated 
coefficient 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Models 
Size .468a 2.319b .447a 3.375a .449a 
[Ln(total assetst_1)] (45.472), (3.704) (32.107) (4.911) (30.247) 
Size2 -.067 -.104b 
[Ln(total assetst_1)] 2 (2.399) (3.688) 
Growth 1.436a 1.398a 1.426a 
[(TAt_1- TAt_2) /TAt_2] (21.030) (17.846) (18.156) 
Profitability -2.758 -3.401b 1.971 -.141 -.122 
(Return on totál assetst_1) (2.119) (2.896) (.739) (.003) (.002) 
Profitability2 -5.619 -4.103 
(Return on total assetst_1) 2 (.402) (.269) 
Change in Profitability -10.027a -7.297a -6.809a 
(ROTAt_1- ROTAt_2) (12.914) (5.862) (5.411) 
Liquidity .026a .137a .254a .249a 
(Current ratiot_1) (4.451) (9.461) (6.349) (5.772) 
Liquidity2 -.000 -.006 -.005 
(Current ratiot_1) 2 (1.294) (2.284) (1.847) 
Constant -8.650a -21.415a -9.294a -29.605a -9.379a 
(84.061) (6.604) (75.036) (7.826) (70.601) 
-2 Log Likelihood 808.419 794.460 659.006 607.281 611.725 
Chi -Square 48.661 62.620 88.989 98.078 93.635 
Degree of Freedom 3 6 4 8 6 
Significance Levels .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Number of Cases 1,508 1,508 1,839 1,479 1,479 
a = Significant at the 0.05 level, two -tailed test. 
b = Significant at the 0.10 level, two -tailed test. 
° The Wald statistic Wk2= [bk / (standard error of bk)]2, computed to test for the 
statistical significance of individual coefficients, is shown in parentheses for each 
coefficient estimate. 
Source: Own calculations based on financial data from the Joint Credit Information 
Centre Database, Taiwan, ROC, August 1997. 
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Table 10 -4 -8 Classification Table for the Acauirina and Non -Transaction Firms 
Model 1 Predicted 
Non -Transaction 
firms 
Acquiring firms Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Non -Transaction 
films 
1,383 1 99.93 
Acquiring firms 124 0 .00 
Overall 91.71 
Model 2 Predicted 
Non -Transaction 
firms 
Acquiring firms Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Non -Transaction 
films 
1,384 0 100.00 
Acquiring films 120 4 3.23 
Overall 92.04 
Model 3 Predicted 
Non -Transaction 
firms 
Acquiring firms Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Non -Transaction 
firms 
1,743 1 99.94 
Acquiring firms 88 7 7.37 
Overall 95.16 
Model 4 Predicted 
Non -Transaction 
firms 
Acquiring firms Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Non -Transaction 
firms 
1,383 1 99.93 
Acquiring firms 88 7 7.37 
Overall 93.98 
Model 5 Predicted 
Non -Transaction 
firms 
Acquiring firms Percent 
Correct ( %) 
Observed Non -Transaction 
firms 
1,383 1 99.93 
Acquiring firms 87 8 8.42 
Overall 94.05 
Source: Own calculations based on financial data from the Joint Credit Information 
Centre Database, Taiwan, ROC, August 1997. 
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Questionnaire Addressing Mergers and Acquisitions in Taiwan 
Date: 27 May 1996 
To whom it may concern: 
We are studying mergers and acquisitions in the context of Taiwan's economic 
environment. This questionnaire is for the purpose of academic research, and 
your co- operation will make a significant contribution to our knowledge. We 
would appreciate it if you would give us 20 minutes of your time and complete 
this questionnaire. Your responses will remain confidential. Please mark the 
appropriate column(s) accompanying each question. You may return your 
completed questionnaire in the pre -paid envelope provided. If you are interested 
in the findings of this research, please attach your business card to your reply. 
Thank you very much for your co- operation. 
Yours sincerely, 
The University of Edinburgh 
Department of Business Studies 
Supervisor: Mr. Jonathan N. Crook (Senior Lecturer) 
Mr. Nicholas G. Terry (Senior Lecturer) 
Postgraduate student: Mr. Kuo -cheng Kuo 
Contact Address in Taiwan: Floor 5, No. 19, Lane 88, Yung -an Street 
Shin -tien Taipei Taiwan 
Republic of China 
Tel: (02) 946 -9428 Fax: (02) 948 -6258 
Please complete and return the questionnaire before 15 June 1996. 
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Questionnaire Addressing Mergers and Acquisitions in Taiwan 
(Transactions during 1990 to 1995) 
1. If your company has acquired another between 1990 and 1995, how many of the 
following types of transaction has it been involved in? 
(1)No. of mergers 
(2)No. of consolidations 
(3)No. of acquisitions of stock 
(4)No. of acquisitions of assets 
Throughout this questionnaire, if your company has entered into more than one 
transaction, please label the largest of these (in terms of assets transacted) as "A ", the 
second largest as `B ", etc. 
2. How would you classify each of your transactions? (Please tick the appropriate 
column) 
1st transaction 2nd transaction 3rd transaction 4th transaction 
Merger 
Consolidation 
Acquisition of stock 
Acquisition of assets 
3. What is your company's industrial classification code? 
4. What were your company's total assets before each transaction? (Unit: New Taiwan 
Dollars) 
Transaction A B C D 
Total assets 
What were your company's total assets after each transaction? (Unit: New Taiwan 
Dollars) 
Transaction A B C D 
Total assets 
When did the transaction come into force? (Day, Month, Year) 
Transaction A B C D 
Date 
5. What is the industrial classification code of the company you acquired? 
Industrial classification code 
1st transaction A 
2nd transaction B 
3rd transaction C 
4th transaction D 
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What were the total assets of the company you acquired prior to the transaction? (Unit: 
New Taiwan Dollars) 
Transaction 
Total assets 
A B C D 






6. In what way, if any, did the activities of the company you acquired relate to your 
own company's main business? (Please tick the appropriate column 
Transaction A B C D 
The same kind of business activity 
(i e. a horizontal transaction) 
A different stage of your own production operations 
(i.e. a vertical transaction) 
The same general industry, but no prior customer or 
supplier relationship existed (i.e. a congeneric transaction) 
Engaged in unrelated types of business activity 
(i.e. a conglomerate transaction) 
7. Please indicate the importance of each of the following in shaping your decision to 
pursue the acquisition(s) by placing a letter (A, B, C, D, etc.) in the appropriate 
column to indicate your motives for transaction A, transaction B, etc. 






Not at all 
important 
Economies of scale 
Control of distribution channels 
Administrative expense reduction 
Acquiring know -how or research and 
development 
Acquiring brand marks, patents or 
copyright technologies 
Enhancing market competitiveness 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or 
industries 
Control of material resources 
Combining complementary resources 
Resolving financial difficulties 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or 
financing 
Risk diversification 
Increased market power 
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Applying for a listing on the stock market 
Tax considerations 
Government encouragement or support 
Exploiting surplus funds 
Buying below replacement cost 
Gaining potential real estate or other 
related values 
Improving management efficiency 
generally 
Improving marketing management 
efficiency 
Improving production management 
efficiency 
Improving finance management efficiency 
Improving personnel management 
efficiency 
Improving purchasing management 
efficiency 
Improving R &D management efficiency 
Other Motives (please specify): 
8. What was the main method your company chose to pay for the transaction? (Please 
tick the appropriate column) 
Transaction A B C D 
Cash (reserves) 






Other (please specify): 
9. How did your company estimate the value of the firm you were targeting? (Please 
tick the annronriate column 
Transaction A B C D 
Book value 
Stock market value 
Replacement cost value 
Cash flow value 
Other (please specify): 
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10. Compare the financial performance of your company with that of the firm you 
acquired, prior to the transaction. (Please label each separate transaction as "A ", "B ", 


































Earnings per share 
Dividends per share 
Price/Earning ratio 
Return on total assets 
11. Was the transaction friendly or hostile? (Please tick the appropriate column 
Transaction A B C D 
Friendly (A merger whose terms are approved by 
the management of both companies.) 
Hostile (A merger in which the target firm's 
management resist acquisition.) 
12. If you met with any difficulties during the transaction process, how serious were 
they? (Please mark "A ", `B ", "C" etc. in the appropriate column, for each of the 







Not at all 
serious 





Manager or employee drain 
Personnel arrangements 
Shareholders against bidding 




Other (please specify): 
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13. How serious were the following been in terms of their effect on your company's 
performance following the transaction? (Please mark "A ", `B ", "C" etc. in the 







Not at all 
serious 
1 2 3 4 5 
Customer drain 
Manager or employee drain 
Personnel arrangements 
Shareholders resistant 





Control over the enlarged 
company 
Other (please specify it): 
14. How would you rate the management efficiency of your company after the 
transaction as compared with before? (Please label each separate transaction as "A ", 
"B ", "C" etc., and mark the appropriate column for each 
Very 
superior 
Superior Fair Inferior Very 
inferior 






Research & Development 
Other (please specify): 
15. How would you rate the post- transaction performance of your company as a whole, 
compared with its performance before the transaction? (Please label each separate 
transaction as "A ", `B ", "C" etc., and mark the appropriate column for each) 
Very 
superior 
Superior Fair Inferior Very 
inferior 






Earnings per share 
Dividends per share 
Price/Earning ratio 
Return on total assets 
16. Would you be willing to be interviewed about the transactions which your 
company has been involved in? 
Yes( ) No( ) 
17. What is your general opinion of mergers and acquisitions in Taiwan? Please 
specify. 
Thank you very much! 
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Appendix 2 
T -test and Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test for Acquiring Enterprise's 





Samples T or U 
Test 
T -value 2 -Tail Sig. Z -value 2 -Tail Sig. 
Economies of X1 -X2 -.67 .507 -.812 .416 
scale X1 -X3 1.33 .185 -1.166 .243 
X1 -X4 .47 .636 -.462 .644 
X2 -X3 1.79 .077 -1.815 .069 
X2 -X4 1.03 .305 -1.141 .253 
X3 -X4 -.75 .454 -.634 .525 
Control of X1 -X2 -.99 .323 -1.188 .234 
distribution ' X1 -X3 -1.06 .293 -.977 .328 
channels X1 -X4 -.62 .533 -.623 .532 
X2 -X3 .07 .944 -.025 .979 
X2 -X4 .37 .715 -.472 .636 
X3 -X4 .35 .730 -.298 .765 
Reducing X1 -X2 .01 .993 -.628 .530 
administrative X1 -X3 -.14 .886 -1.269 .204 
expense X1 -X4 .16 .872 -.383 .701 
X2 -X3 -.14 .890 -.495 .620 
X2 -X4 .14 .891 -.247 .804 
X3 -X4 .32 .753 -.804 .420 
Acquiring Xi-X2 -1.10 .275 -.811 .417 
know -how or X1 -X3 -.84 .403 -.552 .580 
research and X1 -X4 -.84 .405 -.639 .522 
development X2 -X3 .35 .724 -.358 .719 
X2 -X4 .28 .782 -.189 .850 
X3 -X4 -.07 .947 -.158 .873 
Acquiring brand X1 -X2 -.40 .687 -.033 .973 
marks, patents Xi-X3 -.70 .484 -.535 .592 
or copyright Xi-X4 -1.51 .133 -.911 .361 
technologies X2 -X3 -.21 .834 -.404 .686 
X2 -X4 -.88 .383 -.756 .449 
X3 -X4 -.70 .484 -.355 .722 
Enhancing X1 -X2 -1.90 .062 -2.093 .036 
market X1 -X3 -.25 .804 -.687 .491 
competitiveness Xl -X4 -.34 .735 -.635 .524 
X2 -X3 1.63 .107 -1.691 .090 
X2 -X4 1.47 .146 -1.632 .102 
X3 -X4 -.10 .918 -.051 .959 
Gaining rapid Xi -X2 -1.22 .226 -.733 .463 
entry into new Xi -X3 .18 .858 -.426 .670 
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markets or X1 -X4 -.58 .561 -.224 .822 
industries X2 -X3 1.32 .190 -1.194 .232 
X2 -X4 .56 .574 -.313 .753 
X3 -X4 -.75 .453 -.869 .384 
Controlling of X1 -X2 -.27 .788 -.108 .913 
material X1 -X3 -.59 .556 -.202 .839 
resources X1 -X4 -1.91 .058 -1.181 .237 
X2 -X3 -.22 .823 -.148 .882 
X2 -X4 -1.33 .190 -1.084 .278 
X3 -X4 -1.32 .191 -1.201 .229 
Combining X1 -X2 .82 .416 -.029 .976 
complementary X1 -X3 .30 .765 -.716 .473 
resources X1 -X4 -.27 .789 -.910 .362 
X2 -X3 -.60 .550 -.993 .320 
X2 -X4 -1.02 .310 -.989 .322 
X3 -X4 -.58 .563 -.194 .846 
Resolving X1 -X2 -.02 .987 -.077 .938 
financial X1 -X3 -2.26 .025 -1.850 .064 
difficulties X1 -X4 -2.34 .021 -2.035 .041 
X2 -X3 -1.82 .073 -1.638 .101 
X2 -X4 -1.95 .054 -1.796 .072 
X3 -X4 -.14 .886 -.234 .814 
Increasing X1 -X2 -.88 .382 -.855 .386 
corporate debt X1 -X3 -1.33 .187 -1.118 .263 
capacity or X1 -X4 -2.64 .009 -2.095 .036 
financing X2 -X3 -.19 .853 -.136 .891 
X2 -X4 -1.36 .177 -1.192 .233 
X3 -X4 -1.39 .167 -1.424 .154 
Risk X1 -X2 -.48 .633 -.264 .791 
diversification X1 -X3 -.81 .419 -.363 .716 
X1 -X4 -.50 .621 -.317 .750 
X2 -X3 -.24 .812 -.212 .832 
X2 -X4 -.01 .992 -.189 .849 
X3 -X4 .23 .817 -.075 .940 
Increased X1 -X2 -1.64 .103 -1.649 .099 
market power X1 -X3 -.03 .977 -.066 .947 
X1 -X4 -.13 .897 -.142 .886 
X2 -X3 1.55 .124 -1.538 .123 
X2 -X4 1.40 .164 -1.397 .162 
X3 -X4 -.10 .923 -.065 .947 
Applying fora X1 -X2 1.31 .196 -.973 .330 
listing on the Xi-X3 3.71 .000 -3.643 .000 
stock market X1 -X4 2.45 .016 -2.298 .021 
X2 -X3 1.39 .168 -1.689 .091 
X2 -X4 .65 .519 -.672 .501 


































Government X1 -X2 -.59 .554 -.437 .661 
encouragement X1 -X3 .54 .588 -.721 .470 
or support X1 -X4 -.09 .925 -.005 .995 
X2 -X3 1.08 .281 -1.172 .241 
X2 -X4 .49 .627 -.427 .668 
X3 -X4 -.60 .548 -.748 .453 
Exploiting X1 -X2 .57 .573 -.493 .621 
surplus funds X1 -X3 .34 .737 -.730 .465 
X1 -X4 .01 .990 -.217 .827 
X2 -X3 -.30 .761 -.247 .804 
X2 -X4 -.53 .594 -.402 .687 
X3 -X4 -.30 .765 -.532 .594 
Buying below Xi-X2 -.55 .583 -.775 .438 
replacement X1 -X3 -.24 .807 -.148 .881 
cost X1 -X4 -.72 .470 -.469 .638 
X2 -X3 .36 .718 -.927 .353 
X2 -X4 -.06 .951 -.668 .503 
X3 -X4 -.53 .596 -.995 .319 
Gaining X1 -X2 1.09 .277 -1.115 .264 
potential real X1 -X3 .69 .489 -.850 .395 
estate or other X1 -X4 -.04 .969 -.284 .776 
related values X2 -X3 -.50 .618 -.442 .658 
X2 -X4 -1.14 .258 -1.016 .309 
X3 -X4 -.72 .473 -.647 .517 
Improving X1 -X2 -1.01 .313 -1.046 .295 
management X1 -X3 -.88 .381 -1.012 .311 
efficiency X1 -X4 -2.59 .011 -2.650 .008 
generally X2 -X3 .25 .805 -.216 .828 
X2 -X4 -1.16 .249 -1.196 .231 
X3 -X4 -1.62 .109 -1.674 .094 
Improving Xi-X2 -1.49 .140 -1.644 .100 
marketing X1 -X3 -1.18 .241 -1.624 .104 
management Xi -X4 -2.37 .019 -2.534 .011 
efficiency X2 -X3 .51 .614 -.573 .566 
X2 -X4 -.59 .556 -.524 .599 
X3 -X4 -1.25 .215 -1.214 .224 
Improving Xi-X2 -.27 .787 -.330 .740 
production Xi-X3 .37 .709 -.190 .849 
management Xi -X4 -1.59 .115 -1.358 .174 












Improving Xi-X2 -1.22 .225 -1.367 .171 
finance X1 -X3 -.16 .874 -.490 .623 
management X1 -X4 -1.63 .106 -1.725 .084 
efficiency X2 -X3 1.10 .275 -1.015 .310 
X2 -X4 -.23 .823 -.152 .878 
X3 -X4 -1.46 .148 -1.287 .197 
Improving Xi -X2 -.90 .370 -1.038 .299 
personnel Xi-X3 -.29 .772 -.544 .586 
management X1 -X4 -1.19 .236 -1.222 .221 
efficiency X2 -X3 .66 .511 -.647 .517 
X2 -X4 -.15 .880 -.041 .967 
X3 -X4 -.90 .370 -.761 .446 
Improving X1 -X2 -1.16 .247 -1.271 .203 
purchasing X1 -X3 -.24 .812 -.400 .688 
management X1 -X4 -1.64 .103 -1.528 .126 
efficiency X2 -X3 1.02 .310 -1.055 .291 
X2 -X4 -.30 .762 -.262 .793 
X3 -X4 -1.45 .149 -1.407 .159 
Improving R &D X1 -X2 -2.33 .022 -1.820 .068 
management X1 -X3 -.35 .727 -.442 .658 
efficiency Xi-X4 -1.47 .144 -1.245 .212 
X2 -X3 1.96 .053 -1.930 .053 
X2 -X4 .79 .429 -.575 .565 
X3 -X4 -1.18 .242 -1.139 .254 
Ho : Xmd = Xme 
Hi : Xmd # Xme 
where Xmd = mean value of rating scale score, motive m, group d 
Xme = mean value of rating scale score, motive m, group e 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 3 
Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test for Independent Acquiring 
Enterprise's Merger Motives by Business Grou 
Motive Z -value 2- Tailed 
P. 
Economies of scale -.869 .384 
Control of distribution channels -1.310 .190 
Reducing administrative expense -2.605 .009 
Acquiring know -how or research and development -.408 .683 
Acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright 
technologies 
-.091 .927 
Enhancing market competitiveness -.915 .359 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or industries -1.279 .200 
Controlling of material resources -.210 .833 
Combining complementary resources -2.646 .008 
Resolving financial difficulties -1.403 .160 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or financing -1.322 .186 
Risk diversification -.473 .635 
Increased market power -2.715 .006 
Applying for a listing on the stock market -1.645 .099 
Tax considerations -2.798 .005 
Government encouragement or support -.767 .443 
Exploiting surplus funds -2.453 .014 
Buying below replacement cost -1.459 .144 
Gaining potential real estate or other related values -.105 .916 
Improving management efficiency generally -2.994 .002 
Improving marketing management efficiency -2.828 .004 
Improving production management efficiency -2.450 .014 
Improving finance management efficiency -2.499 .012 
Improving personnel management efficiency -2.272 .023 
Improving purchasing management efficiency -2.260 .023 
Improving R &D management efficiency -1.343 .179 
H0 : µmy = µmn 
H1 : µmy # µmn 
where lUmy = median value of rating scale score, motive m, same business group 
= median value of rating scale score, motive m, different business group 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 4 
Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test for Independent Acquiring 
Enterprise's Merger Motives by Tvne of Transaction 
Motive Type of transaction Z -value 2- Tailed P. 
Economies of scale Horizontal- Vertical -.937 .348 
Horizontal -Congeneric -1.354 .175 
Horizontal -Conglomerate -3.671 .000 
Vertical- Congeneric -.411 .680 
Vertical -Conglomerate -2.234 .025 
Congeneric- Conglomerate -1.714 .086 
Control of distribution Horizontal -Vertical -.820 .412 
channels Horizontal- Congeneric -.952 .340 
Horizontal -Conglomerate -3.742 .000 
Vertical- Congeneric -.185 .852 
Vertical -Conglomerate -2.173 .029 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -1.840 .065 
Reducing Horizontal- Vertical -.742 .457 
administrative expense Horizontal- Congeneric -1.015 .309 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -2.260 .023 
Vertical- Congeneric -1.158 .246 
Vertical -Conglomerate -1.152 .249 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -1.972 .048 
Acquiring know -how or Horizontal -Vertical -1.135 .256 
research and Horizontal -Congeneric -.735 .462 
development Horizontal- Conglomerate -1.604 .108 
Vertical- Congeneric -.295 .767 
Vertical -Conglomerate -1.828 .067 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -1.503 .132 
Acquiring brand marks, 







technologies Horizontal -Conglomerate -1.711 .087 
Vertical- Congeneric -.375 .707 
Vertical -Conglomerate -2.020 .043 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -2.140 .032 
Enhancing market Horizontal -Vertical -.966 .333 
competitiveness Horizontal- Congeneric -.624 .532 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -4.531 .000 
Vertical- Congeneric -1.192 .233 
Vertical- Conglomerate -4.055 .000 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -2.497 .012 
Gaining rapid entry into Horizontal -Vertical -1.052 .292 
new markets or Horizontal- Congeneric -.120 .904 
industries Horizontal -Conglomerate -.855 .392 




























Combining Horizontal -Vertical -1.249 .211 
complementary Horizontal- Congeneric -1.062 .288 
resources Horizontal- Conglomerate -.505 .613 
Vertical- Congeneric -.113 .909 
Vertical -Conglomerate -1.405 .159 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -1.234 .217 
Resolving financial Horizontal -Vertical -.230 .817 
difficulties ' Horizontal- Congeneric -.842 .399 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -.949 .342 
Vertical- Congeneric -.501 .616 
Vertical -Conglomerate -.929 .352 
Congeneric- Conglomerate -1.269 .204 
Increasing corporate Horizontal- Vertical -1.210 .226 
debt capacity or Horizontal- Congeneric -1.641 .100 
financing Horizontal- Conglomerate -1.695 .089 
Vertical- Congeneric -2.306 .021 
Vertical -Conglomerate -2.267 .023 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -.089 .928 
Risk diversification Horizontal -Vertical -.131 .895 
Horizontal- Congeneric -1.523 .127 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -1.388 .165 
Vertical- Congeneric -1.423 .154 
Vertical- Conglomerate -1.098 .271 
Congeneric- Conglomerate -2.023 .043 
Increased market power Horizontal- Vertical -.542 .587 
Horizontal- Congeneric -.968 .332 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -4.744 .000 
Vertical- Congeneric -.434 .664 
Vertical -Conglomerate -3.375 .000 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -2.481 .013 
Applying for a listing Horizontal- Vertical -1.908 .056 
on the stock market Horizontal- Congeneric -.948 .342 
Horizontal -Conglomerate -.985 .324 
Vertical- Congeneric -.537 .591 
Vertical -Conglomerate -2.297 .021 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -1.468 .142 
Tax considerations Horizontal -Vertical -3.584 .000 














Government Horizontal -Vertical -2.132 .033 
encouragement or Horizontal -Congeneric -1.282 .199 
support Horizontal- Conglomerate -.928 .353 
Vertical- Congeneric -.563 .573 
Vertical -Conglomerate -1.783 .074 
Congeneric- Conglomerate -1.388 .165 
Exploiting surplus Horizontal- Vertical -.554 .579 
funds Horizontal- Congeneric -.040 .967 
Horizontal -Conglomerate -1.041 .297 
Vertical- Congeneric -.367 .713 
Vertical- Conglomerate -.486 .626 
Congeneric- Conglomerate -.781 .434 
Buying below Horizontal- Vertical -.602 .547 
replacement cost Horizontal- Congeneric -.196 .844 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -.582 .560 
Vertical- Congeneric -.682 .495 
Vertical -Conglomerate -.951 .341 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -.332 .739 
Gaining potential real Horizontal- Vertical -.200 .841 
estate or other related Horizontal - Congeneric -.921 .357 
values Horizontal -Conglomerate -.851 .394 
Vertical- Congeneric -.738 .460 
Vertical -Conglomerate -.936 .349 
Congeneric- Conglomerate -1.381 .167 
Improving management Horizontal- Vertical -.177 .859 
efficiency generally Horizontal- Congeneric -.735 .462 
Horizontal -Conglomerate -1.949 .051 
Vertical- Congeneric -.710 .477 
Vertical- Conglomerate -1.542 .122 
Congeneric- Conglomerate -.806 .419 
Improving marketing Horizontal- Vertical -.073 .941 
management efficiency Horizontal- Congeneric -1.507 .131 
Horizontal -Conglomerate -2.543 .011 
Vertical- Congeneric -1.294 .195 
Vertical -Conglomerate -1.956 .050 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -.736 .461 
Improving production Horizontal -Vertical -.196 .844 
management efficiency Horizontal- Congeneric -.554 .579 
Horizontal -Conglomerate -1.646 .099 
Vertical- Congeneric -.632 .527 
Vertical- Conglomerate -1.350 .176 






















Improving personnel Horizontal -Vertical -.516 .605 
management efficiency Horizontal- Congeneric -1.057 .290 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -1.873 .061 
Vertical- Congeneric -.489 .624 
Vertical -Conglomerate -1.140 .253 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -.598 .549 
Improving purchasing Horizontal- Vertical -.358 .720 
management efficiency Horizontal- Congeneric -.171 .863 
Horizontal- Conglomerate -3.177 .001 
Vertical- Congeneric -.419 .675 
Vertical -Conglomerate -2.650 .008 
Congeneric -Conglomerate -2.027 .042 
Improving R &D Horizontal -Vertical -1.187 .235 
management efficiency Horizontal- Congeneric -.016 .986 
Horizontal -Conglomerate -2.336 .019 
Vertical- Congeneric -.873 .382 
Vertical -Conglomerate -2.599 .009 
Congeneric- Conglomerate -1.545 .122 
Hp : jLmd = time 
H1 : I Lmd # time 
where Ilimd = mean value of rating scale score, motive m, type d 
lame = mean value of rating scale score, motive m, type e 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 5 
The Spearman's Rank Correlation Between the Motives for Mergers and Acquisitions 







Economies of scale -.0735 .281 217 
Control of distribution channels .0403 .555 217 
Reducing administrative expense .0526 .441 217 
Acquiring know -how or research and development .0211 .757 217 
Acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright 
technologies 
.0491 .474 215 
Enhancing market competitiveness .0284 .678 215 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or industries .0079 .908 215 
Controlling of material resources .0542 .430 214 
Combining complementary resources .0823 .227 217 
Resolving financial difficulties .1666 .014 217 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or financing .1394 .040 217 
Risk diversification .0086 .900 215 
Increased market power -.0178 .795 217 
Applying for a listing on the stock market -.2107 .002 217 
Tax considerations .0011 .987 217 
Government encouragement or support -.0314 .645 217 
Exploiting surplus funds -.0123 .858 _217 
Buying below replacement cost .0021 .976 217 
Gaining potential real estate or other related values -.0062 .927 217 
Improving management efficiency generally .1751 .016 188 
Improving marketing management efficiency .1592 .019 217 
Improving production management efficiency .0559 .414 216 
Improving finance management efficiency .0800 .240 217 
Improving personnel management efficiency .0708 .299 217 
Improving purchasing management efficiency .1021 .134 217 
Improving R &D management efficiency .0667 .329 216 
Ho:p =O 
H1:p#0 
where p lies between -1 and +1. p > 0 indicates a positive linear relationship and p < 
indicates a negative linear relationship between the rank of the merger motives and total 
assets before each transaction of acquiring enterprises. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 6 
The Spearman's Rank Correlation between the Motives for Mergers and Acquisitions 







Economies of scale -.1905 .007 198 
Control of distribution channels -.0304 .671 198 
Reducing administrative expense -.1426 .045 198 
Acquiring know -how or research and development -.0411 .566 198 
Acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright 
technologies 
.0296 .680 196 
Enhancing market competitiveness -.0295 .681 196 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or industries .0820 .253 196 
Controlling of material resources .0630 .382 195 
Combining complementary resources -.0126 .860 198 
Resolving financial difficulties .0624 .382 198 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or financing .0863 .227 198 
Risk diversification .0359 .617 196 
Increased market power -.1218 .087 198 
Applying for a listing on the stock market -.2250 .001 198 
Tax considerations -.0709 .321 198 
Government encouragement or support -.1126 .114 198 
Exploiting surplus funds .0088 .902 198 
Buying below replacement cost -.0017 .981 198 
Gaining potential real estate or other related values .0435 .543 198 
Improving management efficiency generally .0176 .818 173 
Improving marketing management efficiency .0349 .625 198 
Improving production management efficiency -.0937 .190 197 
Improving finance management efficiency -.0617 .388 198 
Improving personnel management efficiency -.0328 .646 198 
Improving purchasing management efficiency -.0137 .848 198 
Improving R &D management efficiency -.0622 .386 197 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis Ho against H1 
Ho:p =O 
H1:p#0 
where p lies between -1 and +1. p > 0 indicates a positive linear relationship and p < 0 
indicates a negative linear relationship between merger motives and the change in assets 
after mergers and acquisitions of acquiring enterprises. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 7 -7 -1 The Pearson Linear and Spearman's Rank Correlation between the Merger 
Motives* and the Post -Transaction Net Sales ** of Acquiring Enterprises 















Economies of scale .267 .000 .282 .000 236 
Control of distribution channels .212 .001 .232 .000 236 
Reducing administrative expense .157 .015 .135 .038 236 
Acquiring know -how or research and 
development 
.156 .016 .171 .008 236 
Acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright 
technologies 
.116 .076 .125 .054 234 
Enhancing market competitiveness .229 .000 .218 .001 234 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or 
industries 
.219 .001 .208 .001 234 
Controlling ofmaterial resources .128 .050 .131 .045 233 
Combining complementary resources .055 .398 .082 .207 236 
Resolving financial difficulties .095 .144 .104 .109 236 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or 
financing 
.158 .015 .175 .007 236 
Risk diversification .065 .316 .099 .130 234 
Increased market power .278 .000 .321 .000 236 
Applying for a listing on the stock market .119 .068 .123 .059 236 
Tax considerations .135 .038 .145 .026 236 
Government encouragement or support .135 .038 .145 .026 236 
Exploiting surplus funds .012 .845 .041 .528 236 
Buying below replacement cost .052 .424 .097 .135 236 
Gaining potential real estate or other related 
values 
-.048 .463 -.025 .700 236 
Improving management efficiency generally .000 .994 .031 .649 207 
Improving marketing management efficiency .070 .278 .087 .179 236 
Improving production management efficiency .097 .136 .122 .061 235 
Improving finance management efficiency .048 .463 .071 .274 236 
Improving personnel management efficiency .117 .071 .108 .098 236 
Improving purchasing management efficiency .150 .021 .166 .010 236 
Improving R &D management efficiency .150 .021 .151 .020 235 
* Merger motives 1 very important, 2 fairly important, 3 important, 4 slightly important, 5 not 
at all important. 
** Post -transaction net sales 1 very superior, 2 superior, 3 same, 4 inferior, 5 very inferior. 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis Ho against H1 
where Ho : p =0 
H1 : p #0 
where p lies between -1 and +1. p > 0 indicates a positive linear relationship and p < 0 
indicates a negative linear relationship between merger motives and post -transaction 
performance in net sales of acquiring enterprises. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 7 -7 -2 The Pearson Linear and Spearman's Rank Correlation between the Merger 
Motives* and the Post -Transaction Gross profits ** of Acquiring Ente rises 















Economies of scale .244 .000 .283 .000 235 
Control of distribution channels .231 .000 .263 .000 235 
Reducing administrative expense .164 .012 .160 .014 235 
Acquiring know -how or research and 
development 
.129 .047 .154 .018 235 
Acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright 
technologies 
.051 .430 .099 .130 233 
Enhancing market competitiveness .203 .002 .195 .003 233 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or 
industries 
.180 .006 .185 .004 233 
Controlling ofmaterial resources .040 .537 .051 .437 232 
Combining complementary resources -.024 .714 .001 .984 235 
Resolving financial difficulties .083 .203 .088 .176 235 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or 
financing 
.055 .399 .077 .236 235 
Risk diversification .074 .255 .097 .140 233 
Increased market power .229 .000 .294 .000 235 
Applying for a listing on the stock market .109 .093 .141 .030 235 
Tax considerations .073 .263 .086 .188 235 
Government encouragement or support .084 .198 .108 .097 235 
Exploiting surplus funds .051 .431 .073 .261 235 
Buying below replacement cost .080 .221 .113 .082 235 
Gaining potential real estate or other related 
values 
-.047 .471 -.022 .731 235 
Improving management efficiency generally -.009 .896 .034 .622 206 
Improving marketing management efficiency .087 .179 .117 .072 235 
Improving production management efficiency .125 .055 .154 .018 234 
Improving finance management efficiency .002 .966 .045 .484 235 
Improving personnel management efficiency .072 .270 .079 .222 235 
Improving purchasing management efficiency .109 .095 .136 .036 235 
Improving R &D management efficiency .079 .227 .091 .164 234 
* Merger motives 1 very important, 2 fairly important, 3 important, 4 slightly important, 5 not 
at all important. 
** Post -transaction gross profits 1 very superior, 2 superior, 3 same, 4 inferior, 5 very inferior. 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis Ho against H1 
where Ho : p =0 
H1 : p #0 
where p lies between -1 and +1. p > 0 indicates a positive linear relationship and p < 0 
indicates a negative linear relationship between merger motives and post -transaction 
performance in gross profits of acquiring enterprises. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 7 -7 -3 The Pearson Linear and Spearman's Rank Correlation between the Merger 
Motives* and the Post -Transaction Operating Income ** of Acquiring Enterprises 















Economies of scale .276 .000 .332 .000 233 
Control of distribution channels .232 .000 .269 .000 233 
Reducing administrative expense .149 .023 .153 .019 233 
Acquiring know -how or research and 
development 
.151 .021 .179 .006 233 
Acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright 
technologies 
.044 .504 .088 .181 231 
Enhancing market competitiveness .205 .002 .225 .001 231 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or 
industries 
.163 .013 .175 .007 231 
Controlling of material resources .052 .425 .068 .302 230 
Combining complementary resources .003 .953 .032 .620 233 
Resolving financial difficulties .109 .095 .116 .075 233 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or 
financing 
.081 .215 .108 .099 233 
Risk diversification .106 .106 .116 .076 231 
Increased market power .210 .001 .274 .000 233 
Applying for a listing on the stock market .117 .073 .135 .038 233 
Tax considerations .101 .122 .113 .085 233 
Government encouragement or support .124 .058 .155 .017 233 
Exploiting surplus funds .076 .244 .081 .217 233 
Buying below replacement cost .106 .106 .120 .066 233 
Gaining potential real estate or other related 
values 
-.016 .801 -.002 .967 233 
Improving management efficiency generally .026 .706 .054 .438 204 
Improving marketing management efficiency .105 .107 .128 .051 233 
Improving production management efficiency .160 .015 .181 .006 232 
Improving finance management efficiency .047 .470 .087 .184 233 
Improving personnel management efficiency .061 .349 .084 .199 233 
Improving purchasing management efficiency .122 .062 .149 .023 233 
Improving R &D management efficiency .093 .154 .116 .076 232 
* Merger motives 1 very important, 2 fairly important, 3 important, 4 slightly important, 5 not 
at all important. 
** Post -transaction operating income 1 very superior, 2 superior, 3 same, 4 inferior, 5 very 
inferior. 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis Ho against H1 
where Ho : p =0 
H1 : p*0 
where p lies between -1 and +1. p > 0 indicates a positive linear relationship and p < 0 
indicates a negative linear relationship between merger motives and post- transaction 
performance in operating income of acquiring enterprises. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 7 -7 -4 The Pearson Linear and Spearman's Rank Correlation between the Merger 
Motives* and the Post -Transaction Net Income ** of Acquiring Ente rises 















Economies of scale .248 .000 .306 .000 232 
Control of distribution channels .196 .003 .232 .000 232 
Reducing administrative expense .144 .027 .141 .032 232 
Acquiring know -how or research and 
development 
.129 .049 .157 .017 232 
Acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright 
technologies 
.033 .616 .079 .228 230 
Enhancing market competitiveness .166 .011 .174 .008 230 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or 
industries 
.130 .049 .143 .030 230 
Controlling of-material resources .021 .752 .041 .530 229 
Combining complementary resources -.033 .610 -.010 .872 232 
Resolving financial difficulties .065 .318 .078 .232 232 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or 
financing 
.015 .816 .037 .575 232 
Risk diversification .098 .138 .109 .097 230 
Increased market power .171 .009 .227 .000 232 
Applying for a listing on the stock market .099 .131 .114 .082 232 
Tax considerations .064 .329 .075 .255 232 
Government encouragement or support .090 .169 .125 .055 232 
Exploiting surplus funds .038 .563 .048 .460 232 
Buying below replacement cost .069 .291 .086 .191 232 
Gaining potential real estate or other related 
values 
-.038 .555 -.027 .673 232 
Improving management efficiency generally .025 .716 .057 .419 203 
Improving marketing management efficiency .103 .117 .125 .056 232 
Improving production management efficiency .168 .010 .192 .003 231 
Improving finance management efficiency .015 .814 .052 .426 232 
Improving personnel management efficiency .050 .445 .076 .247 232 
Improving purchasing management efficiency .121 .065 .150 .022 232 
Improving R &D management efficiency .088 .178 .111 .092 231 
* Merger motives 1 very important, 2 fairly important, 3 important, 4 slightly important, 5 not 
at all important. 
** Post -transaction net income 1 very superior, 2 superior, 3 same, 4 inferior, 5 very inferior. 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis Ho against H1 
where Ho : p = 
H1 : p #0 
where p lies between -1 and +1. p > 0 indicates a positive linear relationship and p < 0 
indicates a negative linear relationship between merger motives and post- transaction 
performance in net income of acquiring enterprises. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 7 -7 -5 The Pearson Linear and Spearman's Rank Correlation between the Merger 
Motives* and the Post -Transaction Earnings per Share ** of Acquiring Enterprises 















Economies of scale .256 .000 .304 .000 228 
Control of distribution channels .243 .000 .278 .000 228 
Reducing administrative expense .177 .007 .162 .014 228 
Acquiring know -how or research and 
development 
.150 .023 .180 .006 228 
Acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright 
technologies 
.068 .303 .132 .047 226 
Enhancing market competitiveness .164 .013 .172 .010 226 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or 
industries 
.188 .004 .212 .001 226 
Controlling of- material resources .041 .533 .069 .299 225 
Combining complementary resources -.004 .947 .025 .705 228 
Resolving financial difficulties .044 .500 .054 .414 228 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or 
financing 
.015 .859 .033 .614 228 
Risk diversification .091 .172 .115 .083 228 
Increased market power .181 .006 .244 .000 228 
Applying for a listing on the stock market .107 .104 .132 .045 228 
Tax considerations .047 .472 .066 .317 228 
Government encouragement or support .033 .615 .066 .318 228 
Exploiting surplus funds .068 .306 .090 .175 228 
Buying below replacement cost .068 .303 .104 .115 228 
Gaining potential real estate or other related 
values 
.031 .633 .047 .471 228 
Improving management efficiency generally .016 .821 .050 .483 199 
Improving marketing management efficiency .122 .065 .154 .019 228 
Improving production management efficiency .161 .015 .192 .004 227 
Improving finance management efficiency .048 .464 .080 .227 228 
Improving personnel management efficiency .092 .162 .114 .084 228 
Improving purchasing management efficiency .149 .024 .190 .004 228 
Improving R &D management efficiency .137 .039 .168 .011 227 
* Merger motives 1 very important, 2 fairly important, 3 important, 4 slightly important, 5 not 
at all important. 
** Post -transaction earnings per share 1 very superior, 2 superior, 3 same, 4 inferior, 5 very 
inferior. 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis Ho against H1 
where Ho : p =0 
H1 : p #0 
where p lies between -1 and +1. p > 0 indicates a positive linear relationship and p < 0 
indicates a negative linear relationship between merger motives and post- transaction 
performance in earnings per share of acquiring enterprises. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 7 -7 -6 The Pearson Linear and Spearman's Rank Correlation between the Merger 
Motives* and the Post -Transaction Dividends ner Share ** of Acauirine Enterprises 















Economies of scale .223 .001 .270 .000 227 
Control of distribution channels .214 .001 .249 .000 227 
Reducing administrative expense .177 .007 .179 .007 227 
Acquiring know -how or research and 
development 
.127 .055 .149 .024 227 
Acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright 
technologies 
.051 .440 .109 .100 225 
Enhancing market competitiveness .135 .042 .151 .023 225 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or 
industries 
.187 .005 .209 .002 225 
Controlling of material resources .001 .987 .022 .734 224 
Combining complementary resources -.048 .472 -.009 .888 227 
Resolving financial difficulties .046 .485 .040 .541 227 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or 
financing 
.008 .896 .021 .747 227 
Risk diversification .106 .110 .118 .077 225 
Increased market power .172 .009 .239 .000 227 
Applying for a listing on the stock market .101 .128 .117 .077 227 
Tax considerations .026 .698 .035 .598 227 
Government encouragement or support .033 .619 .058 .382 227 
Exploiting surplus funds .071 .285 .087 .187 227 
Buying below replacement cost .104 .118 .128 .053 227 
Gaining potential real estate or other related 
values 
.048 .469 .062 .347 227 
Improving management efficiency generally .000 .999 .032 .647 198 
Improving marketing management efficiency .078 .238 .112 .090 227 
Improving production management efficiency .139 .036 .168 .011 226 
Improving finance management efficiency .015 .812 .049 .460 227 
Improving personnel management efficiency .054 .414 .081 .222 227 
Improving purchasing management efficiency .122 .064 .165 .013 227 
Improving R &D management efficiency .125 .060 .154 .020 226 
* Merger motives 1 very important, 2 fairly important, 3 important, 4 slightly important, 5 not 
at all important. 
** Post -transaction dividends per share 1 very superior, 2 superior, 3 same, 4 inferior, 5 very 
inferior. 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis Ho against H1 
where Ho : p =0 
H1 : p #0 
where p lies between -1 and +1. p > 0 indicates a positive linear relationship and p < 0 
indicates a negative linear relationship between merger motives and post- transaction 
performance in dividends per share of acquiring enterprises. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 7 -7 -7 The Pearson Linear and Spearman's Rank Correlation between the Merger 
Motives* and the Post -Transaction Price/Earnina Ratio ** of Acauirin Enterprises 















Economies of scale .275 .000 .314 .000 218 
Control of distribution channels .272 .000 .302 .000 218 
Reducing administrative expense .213 .001 .213 .002 218 
Acquiring know -how or research and 
development 
.165 .015 .194 .004 218 
Acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright 
technologies 
.104 .127 .174 .010 216 
Enhancing market competitiveness .175 .010 .191 .005 216 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or 
industries 
.157 .021 .180 .008 216 
Controlling of'material resources .054 .423 .093 .172 216 
Combining complementary resources -.000 .994 .017 .792 218 
Resolving financial difficulties .022 .740 .037 .585 218 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or 
financing 
-.010 .881 .018 .784 218 
Risk diversification .124 .068 .146 .031 216 
Increased market power .227 .001 .282 .000 218 
Applying for a listing on the stock market .194 .004 .202 .003 218 
Tax considerations .061 .370 .076 .261 218 
Government encouragement or support .069 .309 .107 .113 218 
Exploiting surplus funds .124 .067 .134 .048 218 
Buying below replacement cost .088 .193 .099 .144 218 
Gaining potential real estate or other related 
values 
.050 .460 .065 .337 218 
Improving management efficiency generally .054 .452 .072 .319 191 
Improving marketing management efficiency .148 .029 .165 .014 218 
Improving production management efficiency .147 .030 .165 .014 217 
Improving finance management efficiency .050 .459 .080 .237 218 
Improving personnel management efficiency .096 .155 .125 .065 218 
Improving purchasing management efficiency .162 .016 .196 .004 218 
Improving R &D management efficiency .139 .040 .173 .011 217 
* Merger motives 1 very important, 2 fairly important, 3 important, 4 slightly important, 5 not 
at all important. 
** Post -transaction price /earning ratio 1 very superior, 2 superior, 3 same, 4 inferior, 5 very 
inferior. 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis Ho against H1 
where Ho : p =0 
H1 : p 
p lies between -1 and +1. p > 0 indicates a positive linear relationship and p < 0 indicates 
a negative linear relationship between merger motives and post- transaction performance in 
price /earning ratio of acquiring enterprises. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 7 -7 -8 The Pearson Linear and Spearman's Rank Correlation between the Merger 
Motives* and the Post -Transaction Return on Total Assets ** of Acquiring Enterprises 















Economies of scale .254 .000 .302 .000 218 
Control of distribution channels .235 .000 .267 .000 218 
Reducing administrative expense .201 .003 .193 .004 218 
Acquiring know -how or research and 
development 
.111 .102 .146 .031 218 
Acquiring brand marks, patents or copyright 
technologies 
.083 .224 .143 .036 216 
Enhancing market competitiveness .107 .114 .138 .043 216 
Gaining rapid entry into new markets or 
industries 
.143 .035 .156 .022 216 
Controlling of material resources .028 .677 .052 .444 216 
Combining complementary resources .025 .710 .062 .359 218 
Resolving financial difficulties .071 .296 .084 .213 218 
Increasing corporate debt capacity or 
financing 
.003 .961 .029 .663 218 
Risk diversification .137 .044 .152 .025 216 
Increased market power .158 .020 .211 .002 218 
Applying for a listing on the stock market .146 .030 .154 .022 218 
Tax considerations .079 .245 .097 .151 218 
Government encouragement or support .100 .141 .137 .042 218 
Exploiting surplus funds .124 .067 .128 .059 218 
Buying below replacement cost .071 .296 .086 .204 218 
Gaining potential real estate or other related 
values 
.044 .516 .054 .423 218 
Improving management efficiency generally .110 .132 .136 .061 189 
Improving marketing management efficiency .172 .011 .197 .003 218 
Improving production management efficiency .193 .004 .221 .001 217 
Improving finance management efficiency .088 .193 .116 .085 218 
Improving personnel management efficiency .103 .128 .125 .065 218 
Improving purchasing management efficiency .187 .005 .221 .001 218 
Improving R &D management efficiency .136 .045 .172 .011 217 
* Merger motives 1 very important, 2 fairly important, 3 important, 4 slightly important, 5 not 
at all important. 
** Post -transaction return on total assets 1 very superior, 2 superior, 3 same, 4 inferior, 5 very 
inferior. 
P = Probability of type I error of the null hypothesis Ho against H1 
where Ho : p =0 
H1:p #O 
where p lies between -1 and +1. p > 0 indicates a positive linear relationship and p < 0 indicates 
a negative linear relationship between merger motives and post- transaction performance in 
return on total assets of acquiring enterprises. 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 7 -9 -1 Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test and T -test for 
Independent Acquiring Enterprise's Post -Transaction Performance by Transaction 
Process Problems (Asset Valuation) 
Post -transaction 
performance 










Level of profit 
Net sales Not at all or a little serious -.502 .615 .07 .947 180 
Serious or very serious 54 
Gross profits Not at all or a little serious -1.117 .263 -1.53 .131 179 
Serious or very serious 54 
Operating Not at all or a little serious -1.133 .257 -1.44 .153 177 
income Serious or very serious 54 
Net income Not at all or a little serious - 1.287 .197 -1.69 .092 177 
Serious or very serious 53 
Profit rate 
Earnings pér Not at all or a little serious -1.950 .051 -2.22 .030 177 
share Serious or very serious 50 
Dividends Not at all or a little serious -2.048 .040 -2.42 .018 176 
per share Serious or very serious 50 
Price/Earning Not at all or a little serious -.328 .742 -.91 .366 171 
ratio Serious or very serious 46 
Return on total Not at all or a little serious -1.509 .131 -1.78 .080 168 
assets Serious or very serious 49 
H0 : Rim = µs 
H1 : µpn } µps 
where µpm = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction performance 
p, not at all or a little serious asset valuation problem 
µps = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction performance 
p, serious or fairly serious or very serious asset valuation problem 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 7 -9 -2 Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test and T -test for 
Independent Acquiring Enterprise's Post -Transaction Performance by Transaction 
Process Problems (Goodwill Valuation 
Post -transaction 
performance 










Level of profit 
Net sales Not at all or a little serious -.677 .498 -1.26 .209 202 
Serious or very serious 33 
Gross profits Not at all or a little serious -.983 .325 -1.29 .204 201 
Serious or very serious 33 
Operating Not at all or a little serious -1.004 .315 -1.39 .167 199 
income Serious or very serious 33 
Net income Not at all or a little serious -.732 .464 -1.10 .273 198 
Serious or very serious 33 
Profit rate 
Earnings per Not at all or a little serious -1.377 .168 -1.85 .065 196 
share Serious or very serious 32 
Dividends Not at all or a little serious -1.491 .135 -2.08 .039 195 
per share Serious or very serious 32 
Price/Earning Not at all or a little serious -.088 .929 -.18 .853 191 
ratio Serious or very serious 27 
Return on total Not at all or a little serious -.920 .357 -1.17 .243 189 
assets Serious or very serious 29 
HO :'.A.pn = '.d,ps 
111 : µpn # µps 
where ppn = mean or median value of rating scale score, post -transaction performance 
p, not at all or a little serious goodwill valuation problem 
µps = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction performance 
p, serious or fairly serious or very serious goodwill valuation problem 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
399 
Appendix 7 -9 -3 Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test and T -test for 
Independent Acquiring Enterprise's Post -Transaction Performance by Transaction 
Process Problems (Contingent Loss 
Post -transaction 
performance 










Level of profit 
Net sales Not at all or a little serious -.017 .985 -.51 .615 197 
Serious or very serious 38 
Gross profits Not at all or a little serious -1.461 .143 -1.79 .080 196 
Serious or very serious 38 
Operating Not at all or a little serious -1.480 .138 -1.94 .054 194 
income Serious or very serious 38 
Net income Not at all or a little serious -1.853 .063 -2.23 .027 193 
Serious or very serious 38 
Profit rate 
Earnings pér Not at all or a little serious -2.874 .004 -3.05 .004 192 
share Serious or very serious 36 
Dividends Not at all or a little serious -2.443 .014 -3.09 .002 191. 
per share Serious or very serious 36 
Price/Earning Not at all or a little serious -1.258 .208 -1.78 .076 184 
ratio Serious or very serious 34 
Return on total Not at all or a little serious -2.124 .033 -2.51 .013 183 
assets Serious or very serious 35 
Ho : µpn = µPs 
H1 : µpns 
where vim = mean or median value of rating scale score, post -transaction performance 
p, not at all or a little serious contingent loss problem 
µPs = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction performance 
p, serious or fairly serious or very serious contingent loss problem 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 7 -9 -4 Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test and T -test for 
Independent Acquiring Enterprise's Post -Transaction Performance by Transaction 
Process Problems (Customer Drain) 
Post -transaction 
performance 










Level of profit 
Net sales Not at all or a little serious -.480 .630 -.21 .838 215 
Serious or very serious 20 
Gross profits Not at all or a little serious -1.093 .274 -1.21 .226 214 
Serious or very serious 20 
Operating Not at all or a little serious -1.074 .282 -1.23 .219 212 
income Serious or very serious 20 
Net income Not at all or a little serious -.800 .423 -.98 .329 212 
Serious or very serious 19 
Profit rate 
Earnings pér Not at all or a little serious -1.280 .200 -1.31 .193 210 
share Serious or very serious 18 
Dividends Not at all or a little serious -1.147 .251 -1.29 .199 209 . 
per share Serious or very serious 18 
Price/Earning Not at all or a little serious -.722 .470 -.79 .433 201 
ratio Serious or very serious 17 
Return on total Not at all or a little serious -1.163 .244 -1.34 .180 201 
assets Serious or very serious 17 
H0 : µpn = µps 
H1 : µpn 
where µpn = mean or median value of rating scale score, post -transaction performance 
p, not at all or a little serious customer drain problem 
µps = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction performance 
p, serious or fairly serious or very serious customer drain problem 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 7 -9 -5 Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test and T -test for 
Independent Acquiring Enterprise's Post -Transaction Performance by Transaction 
Process Problems (Manager or Employee Drain) 
Post -transaction 
performance 










Level of profit 
Net sales Not at all or a little serious -1.171 .241 1.14 .255 206 
Serious or very serious 29 
Gross profits Not at all or a little serious -.407 .683 .37 .712 205 
Serious or very serious 29 
Operating Not at all or a little serious -.144 .885 -.08 .935 203 
income Serious or very serious 29 
Net income Not at all or a little serious -.779 .435 -.88 .381 202 
Serious or very serious 29 
Profit rate 
Earnings pér Not at all or a little serious -.382 .701 -.37 .710 201 
share Serious or very serious 27 
Dividends Not at all or a little serious -.149 .881 -.23 .819 200 . 
per share Serious or very serious 27 
Price/Earning Not at all or a little serious -.525 .599 -.43 .670 192 
ratio Serious or very serious 26 
Return on total Not at all or a little serious -.857 .391 -.98 .328 192 
assets Serious or very serious 26 
HO : µpn = µps 
H1 : µpn # µps 
where !Awl = mean or median value of rating scale score, post -transaction performance 
p, not at all or a little serious manager or employee drain problem 
µps = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction performance 
p, serious or fairly serious or very serious manager or employee drain 
problem 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 7 -9 -6 Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test and T -test for 
Independent Acquiring Enterprise's Post -Transaction Performance by Transaction 
Process Problems (Personnel Arrangements) 
Post -transaction 
performance 










Level of profit 
Net sales Not at all or a little serious -.643 .519 -1.01 .314 195 
Serious or very serious 40 
Gross profits Not at all or a little serious -1.404 .160 -1.86 .064 195 
Serious or very serious 39 
Operating Not at all or a little serious -1.316 .188 -1.50 .136 193 
income Serious or very serious 39 
Net income Not at all or a little serious -1.895 .058 -1.98 .049 192 
Serious or very serious 39 
Profit rate 
Earnings per Not at all or a little serious -2.589 .009 -2.85 .005 189 
share Serious or very serious 39 
Dividends Not at all or a little serious -2.722 .006 -3.09 .002 189 
per share Serious or very serious 38 
Price/Earning Not at all or a little serious -1.356 .175 -1.37 .172 184 
ratio Serious or very serious 34 
Return on total Not at all or a little serious -2.399 .016 -2.51 .013 183 
assets Serious or very serious 35 
Ho : µPn = lips 
H1 : Mpn # lips 
where j = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction perfo ivance 
p, not at all or a little serious personnel arrangements problem 
µPs = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction performance 
p, serious or fairly serious or very serious personnel arrangements 
problem 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
403 
Appendix 7 -9 -7 Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test and T -test for 
Independent Acquiring Enterprise's Post -Transaction Performance by Transaction 
Process Problems (Shareholders against Bidding) 
Post -transaction 
performance 










Level of profit 
Net sales Not at all or a little serious -.401 .688 -.17 .867 217 
Serious or very serious 18 
Gross profits Not at all or a little serious -1.132 .257 -1.17 .245 217 
Serious or very serious 17 
Operating Not at all or a little serious -.959 .337 -1.20 .232 215 
income Serious or very serious 17 
Net income Not at all or a little serious -1.233 .217 -1.41 .160 214 
Serious or very serious 17 
Profit rate 
Earnings per Not at all or a little serious -1.056 .290 -1.14 .255 210 
share Serious or very serious 17 
Dividends Not at all or a little serious -1.483 .138 -1.53 .127 210 
per share Serious or very serious 16 
Price/Earning Not at all or a little serious -.477 .633 -.52 .601 203 
ratio Serious or very serious 14 
Return on total Not at all or a little serious -1.486 .137 -1.72 .087 203 
assets Serious or very serious 14 
H0 : = Pps 
H1 : µp11 # µps 
where µPn = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction performance 
p, not at all or a little serious shareholders against bidding problem 
µPS = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction performance 
p, serious or fairly serious or very serious shareholders against bidding 
problem 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 7 -9 -8 Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test and T -test for 
Independent Acquiring Enterprise's Post -Transaction Performance by Transaction 
Process Problems (Corporate Culture Differences) 
Post -transaction 
performance 










Level of profit 
Net sales Not at all or a little serious -1.427 .153 1.31 .192 196 
Serious or very serious 39 
Gross profits Not at all or a little serious -.540 .589 -.74 .460 196 
Serious or very serious 38 
Operating Not at all or a little serious -.118 .905 -.41 .685 194 
income Serious or very serious 38 
Net income Not at all or a little serious -.315 .752 -.56 .576 194 
Serious or very serious 37 
Profit rate 
Earnings per Not at all or a little serious -1.079 .280 -1.05 .295 192 
share Serious or very serious 35 
Dividends Not at all or a little serious -.995 .319 -1.10 .272 192 
per share Serious or very serious 34 
Price/Earning Not at all or a little serious -.741 .458 -.82 .416 184 
ratio Serious or very serious 33 
Return on total Not at all or a little serious -.794 .426 -1.07 .286 184 
assets Serious or very serious 33 
Hp : lipn ='-t-ps 
H1 : Jtpn # tips 
where lip = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction performance 
p, not at all or a little serious corporate culture differences problem 
µps = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction performance 
p, serious or fairly serious or very serious corporate culture differences 
problem 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 7 -9 -9 Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test and T -test for 
Independent Acquiring Enterprise's Post -Transaction Performance by Transaction 
Process Problems (Litigation) 
Post -transaction 
performance 










Level of profit 
Net sales Not at all or a little serious -1.956 .050 -1.83 .094 222 
Serious or very serious 12 
Gross profits Not at all or a little serious -1.214 .224 -1.32 .214 221 
Serious or very serious 12 
Operating Not at all or a little serious -1.112 .266 -1.31 .192 219 
income Serious or very serious 12 
Net income Not at all or a little serious -1.167 .243 -1.36 .174 219 
Serious or very serious 11 
Profit rate 
Earnings per Not at all or a little serious -1.110 .266 -1.59 .114 216 
share Serious or very serious 11 
Dividends Not at all or a little serious -1.624 .103 -2.04 .043 215 
per share Serious or very serious 11 
Price/Earning Not at all or a little serious -.085 .931 -.10 .919 209 
ratio Serious or very serious 9 
Return on total Not at all or a little serious -.126 .899 -.12 .907 210 
assets Serious or very serious 8 
Ho : µPn = 
: µpn # µPs 
where µpn = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction performance 
p, not at all or a little serious litigation problem 
µPs = mean or median value of rating scale score, post -transaction performance 
p, serious or fairly serious or very serious litigation problem 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 7 -9 -10 Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test and T -test for 
Independent Acquiring Enterprise's Post -Transaction Performance by Transaction 
Process Problems (Raising Finance) 
Post -transaction 
performance 










Level of profit 
Net sales Not at all or a little serious -2.422 .015 2.37 .019 216 
Serious or very serious 18 
Gross profits Not at all or a little serious -.780 .435 .81 .421 215 
Serious or very serious 18 
Operating Not at all or a little serious -.173 .862 .26 .797 213 
income Serious or very serious 18 
Net income Not at all or a little serious -1.102 .270 1.09 .275 212 
Serious or very serious 18 
Profit rate 
Earnings per Not at all or a little serious -.415 .677 .23 .818 209 
share Serious or very serious 18 
Dividends Not at all or a little serious -.246 .805 -.50 .620 208 
per share Serious or very serious 18 
Price/Earning Not at all or a little serious -.278 .780 .12 .904 200 
ratio Serious or very serious 18 
Return on total Not at all or a little serious -.230 .817 -.46 .645 200 
assets Serious or very serious 18 
H0 : µpn = tips 
111 : µpn # Pips 
where µpn = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction performance 
p, not at all or a little serious raising finance problem 
µPs = mean or median value of rating scale score, post -transaction performance 
p, serious or fairly serious or very serious raising finance problem 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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Appendix 7 -9 -11 Mann -Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test and T -test for 
Independent Acquiring Enterprise's Post -Transaction Performance by Transaction 
Process Problems (Government Regulations) 
Post -transaction 
performance 










Level of profit 
Net sales Not at all or a little serious -2.568 .010 2.69 .008 191 
Serious or very serious 42 
Gross profits Not at all or a little serious -1.646 .099 1.69 .092 190 
Serious or very serious 42 
Operating Not at all or a little serious -.785 .431 .90 .370 189 
income Serious or very serious 41 
Net income Not at all or a little serious -.627 .530 .87 .385 188 
Serious or very serious 41 
Profit rate 
Earnings per Not at all or a little serious -.143 .885 .17 .863 186 
share Serious or very serious 40 
Dividends Not at all or a little serious -.030 .975 -.09 .930 185 
per share Serious or very serious 40 
Price/Earning Not at all or a little serious -.146 .883 -.35 .727 177 
ratio Serious or very serious 40 
Return on total Not at all or a little serious -.082 .933 -.02 .986 176 
assets Serious or very serious 41 
Ho : µpn = lips 
111 : µpn # µPS 
where 'Aim = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction performance 
p, not at all or a little serious government regulations problem 
'ups = mean or median value of rating scale score, post- transaction performance 
p, serious or very serious government regulations problem 
Source: Own calculations based on questionnaire survey in Taiwan, May -July 1996. 
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